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Executive Summary 
Background 
Organisations such as professional partnerships, co-operatives and similar 
non-hierarchical organisations (NHOs) play a larger role in health care than 
is usually recognised. For example general practices (professional 
partnerships) handle over 80% of patients' first contacts with the NHS. Co-
operatives provide much out-of-hours primary care. The role of such 
organisations might well increase as more diverse providers enter the NHS. 
The structure of these organisations is partly or entirely democratic. Unlike 
corporations and most public sector organisations they are accountable to 
their working members, or to service users, and allocate leadership roles by 
election or taking turns. Fewer than one percent of published research 
studies examine these forms of organisation. The studies that do exist raise 
two main questions. Are these types of organisation 'efficient', compared to 
hierarchies? And do they tend to 'degenerate' over time, reverting to 
hierarchy? 
Aims 
The aim of this research was to strengthen the evidence base for decisions 
about what kinds of partnerships and NHOs the NHS should incorporate or 
commission. We aimed to answer the research questions: 
1) What are the goals (explicit and implicit) of such organisations and 
why/how are they established? 
2) What is the nature of the governance and incentive arrangements 
that are placed on these organisations from external bodies? Is 
there an effective form of regulation, and if so what is th e nature of 
this? 
3) What are the structures and internal organisational arrangements of 
non-hierarchical organisations and partnerships? How are 
professional partnerships and non-hierarchical organisations co-
ordinated, and what makes for a successful co-ordination strategy? 
4) What are the key elements to the internal management of such 
organisations? 
5) How do professionals within such organisations interact with each 
other and how do they regulate themselves? 
6) How do such forms of organisation impact on securing professional 
engagement? 
7) Clinical workloads, job satisfaction and morale? 
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8) The development of innovative practice? 
9) Process: How do such forms of organisation impact on: 
a) Clinical quality and development of best practice? 
b) Adherence to external performance targets? 
c) The cost-effectiveness of service provision? 
d) Patient outcomes/experiences? 
Methods 
Two methods were used to achieve these aims. A systematic review of 
existing research was used both to bring together existing explanations of 
how the distinctive organisational structures found in professional 
partnerships and non-hierarchical organisations operate, what conditions 
cause them to 'degenerate' and what conditions enable them to operate 
effectively. To test these explanations we firstly reviewed and re-used the 
empirical findings contained in the research we had reviewed. Secondly, we 
made and compared new case studies of twelve organisations: three 
general practices; three professional partnerships outside the NHS; three 
health cooperatives (two English, one American ); and the cooperatives 
outside the NHS. We then combined our findings about patterns across 
these case studies with previously published findings; and then compared 
the combined findings with some earlier theories and predictions about 
professional partnerships and non-hierarchical organisations. 
Results 
The goals of partnerships and NHOs are typically to secure for members and 
partners and income no worse than prevailing market rates; produce a 
quality of work befitting their members' occupational status: to provide 
services for a particular locality: to break even (not maximise external 
shareholder profits); and to realise other values, including cooperation or 
professional values for their own sake. 
The main external governance mechanisms are contract and regulation. 
Contracts work most effectively when their terms are specific, 
unambiguous, legitimate (in the providers' eyes) and strongly incentivised. 
To preserve NHOs' organisational structures against the weakening 
('degeneration') of members' or partners' democratic control of the 
organisation, alternatives to financing by external shareholders are required 
and limiting the proportion of (non-voting) salaried employees. 
Partnership and NHO organisational structures essentially take either of two 
forms: a direct democracy of small workplace teams (which can articulated 
in multiple layers for controlling a large organisation); or a representative 
democracy in which the workforce elects the top, but not middle, managers. 
Optionally there may be a supporting infrastructure of employed staff. 
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Successful coordination relies primarily on concertive control. Members or 
partners monitor each others' work and through peer pressure prevent 
shirking. 
Key elements to the internal management of partnerships and provider 
NHOS they are concertive control; legitimation of collective decisions by 
appeal either to an organisational culture or to technical knowledge; and as 
a last resort expulsion of non-compliant members. The internal 
management of consumer NHOs is undertaken largely by employed 
managers. Smaller-scale organisations (e.g. workplace team, general 
practice) can operate through informal, direct democracy, taking decisions 
by consensus. Larger organisations can operate through indirect democracy 
whereby members elect a top manager (or a board) with similar powers to 
their corporate or public sector counterparts. Indirect democracy appears 
better suited than direct democracy when the organisation's work is not 
intrinsically rewarding (e.g. is laborious, monotonous, done at inconvenient 
times or places, inflexible). Three main causes of 'degeneration' are over-
reliance on supplementary hired labour, dependence on corporate sources 
of capital funding, and managerial 'capture' of the organisation. 
Professionals within such organisations interact and regulate themselves 
largely through direct democracy, peer pressure and the use of technical 
knowledge as described above, but in larger partnerships a distinct stratum 
of manager-professionals may emerge. Professional engagement in these 
organisations is promoted by high pay; by the organisation's decisions and 
activity being important for the professional's work taken as a whole; by 
enabling contact with fellow-professionals; and by providing a well-
organised support infrastructure. Production processes in NHOs and 
partnerships tend to produce an upward shift in the expertise and skills of 
their members and partners, which tends to satisfy members' and partners' 
intrinsic (i.e. non-instrumental, non-financial) motivations to work. In that 
respect they tend to increase workload, and add a managerial dimension. 
The forms of innovation which they favour are innovation through extensive 
replication, vertical integration, diversification and 're-engineering', 
provided that these innovations sustain the quality of work which the 
members or partners undertake and maintain the members' or partners' 
centrality to the productive process. NHOs and partnerships generally prefer 
to develop and market services and products on the basis of quality rather 
than price. The combination of evidence-based knowledge, incentives and 
concertive control appears to raise clinical quality. There is sometimes 
tension between requirement to break even and the goal of raising quality 
of work. User participation mechanisms may have merit as a means of 
representing users in NHO and partnership governance but the character of 
user experience appears was more effectively monitored and managed by 
developing systems for routine data collection on that point. Because of 
their founding goals and membership, NHOs and partnerships were active 
implementers of evidence-based medicine. External competition provided a 
discipline to control costs, EBM a discipline for clinical effectiveness. On 
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balance, economic theorists' predictions that NHOs and partnerships are 
economically inefficient and unsustainable were not supported by the 
evidence. In the NHS both partnerships and NHOs are demonstrably 
capable of close adherence to external performance targets when these 
targets are clear, specific, legitimate (to the providers), incentivised and 
compliance (or not) is transparent. 
Conclusions 
Because professional partnerships and non-hierarchical organisations tend 
to pursue goals which are more closely aligned to NHS objectives than 
those of corporations, there are likely to be advantages in commissioning 
them as NHS providers. Then, commissioners are likely to be less 
dependent on incentive schemes and adroitly-formulated contracts to align 
the provider's goals artificially with those of the NHS. Because these 
organisations compete on quality rather than price, and try to maintain their 
members' incomes and working conditions, they may be at a price 
disadvantage against corporate providers unless steps be taken to ensure a 
'level playing field'. One such step is to let longer-term contracts than the 
one or two years duration of some present contracts. Another would be to 
arrange public sources of loan capital for non-corporate providers. Our 
American case study suggests that users could play a much bigger part in 
commissioner governance than was customary in English PCTs, but also 
that governance by users is difficult to sustain. We also identify suggest 
further research needs, including the need for head-to-head comparisons of 
professional partnerships, non-hierarchical organisations, corporations and 
public bodies as service providers. 
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1 Policy context 
When particular organisations are made responsible for implementing a 
given health policy, their organisational structure constrains what policy 
outcomes result (1). Policy-makers and researchers generally take for 
granted that organisations have a hierarchical structure, an assumption 
which the focus and content of most published organisational research 
appears to confirm, as does the character of the organisations usually the 
most visible in the mass media and in public policy debates. 
Yet organisations with apparently non-hierarchical structures also exist, 
including professional partnerships, co-operatives, mutuals, charities and 
other 'third sector' organisations. Although less visible, these organisations 
are also important to health policy, organisation and management for 
several reasons. These organisations play a larger role in the health sector, 
and more widely, than is usually recognised. Knowledge of how they work is 
therefore indispensable for understanding how health systems work. In the 
form of general practices, professional partnerships handle about 90% of 
patient contacts with the NHS (2). An understanding of their organisational 
structures and their practical implications is therefore necessary to the 
process of attempting to implement health policy through them. Non-
hierarchical organisations (NHOs) also challenge by example some 
conventional assumptions about organisation and management, not least 
the new public management. If indeed organisation members can make 
decisions in egalitarian, collaborative ways, what use then remains for 
managers? If consumers or the public can through democratic or 
participative mechanisms exercise governance over organisations, what 
need remains for shareholders or public bodies to do so? 
The present study therefore investigates the relationships between these 
non-hierarchical organisational structures and the health policy outcomes 
which they are liable to produce in health systems such as the English NHS, 
so as to explore what the specific organisational benefits - and disbenefits - 
of non-hierarchical organisational structures are. In doing so it focuses on 
professional partnerships and non-hierarchical organisations (NHOs). 
Professional partnerships have a role in the health system to which UK 
policy-makers and NHS managers have given increasing attention since 
1990. The 2004 GMS contract regards the partnership itself, not the 
individual GP, as the contractor with whom the NHS deals. Legislation and 
new regulations in 1997 and 2004 widened the range of partnerships 
involved, opening the NHS to new forms (nurse-led partnerships, 
partnerships with non-medical partners). Practice-based commissioning is 
another move in this direction. The recent white paper Equity and 
Excellence (3) anticipates the transfer of most of the commissioning of NHS 
hospital care to consortia of general practices, a policy intended to give 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2012. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
 18 
Project 08/1518/105 
these partnerships a dominant role as the patient's agent in selecting, 
financing and monitoring secondary care. 
Recent policy changes in primary care have also made more evident the 
existing and potential role of NHOs in the NHS. On one hand the 2004 GMS 
contract caused substantial contraction in the number of GP cooperatives. 
Against this, the policy of provider diversification is being applied to primary 
care, creating opportunity for new forms of NHO to enter, or to develop 
from within, the NHS. Since 2004 English health policy has promoted 'Social 
Enterprise' forms of healthcare provider structure. The Secretary of State 
for Health published through the Social Enterprise Coalition a statement (4) 
on the advantages of social enterprises. The DH has established a social 
enterprise unit. These policy-makers have however defined the term 'social 
enterprise' broadly rather than sharply, as the concurrent policy of provider 
diversification and 'pluralism' might lead one to expect. In particular, policy-
makers count NHS Foundation Trusts which have a clearly bureaucratic and 
therefore hierarchical organisational structure as 'social enterprises' (5). (All 
bureaucracies are by definition hierarchical but not all hierarchies are 
bureaucracies.) The same applies to those Primary Care Trusts which, as 
policy-makers now recommend, (reconstitute themselves as social 
enterprises providing managerial support to GP commissioning consortia. 
However social enterprises with other types of organisational structure also 
exist, including examples with egalitarian, democratic organisation 
structures, enlisting both paid and volunteer labour. To contrast the latter 
categories with hierarchical organisational structures such those of 
Foundation Trusts we use the term 'non-hierarchical organisation'. 
These changes have made timely, and relevant to current health policy and 
management, the aim of by exploring forms of partnership and of non-
hierarchical organisational structure that NHS organisations might wish to 
commission, collaborate with or adopt, initially on an experimental basis. 
1.1 Professional partnerships 
Professional partnerships are found in most health systems, especially as 
primary medical care providers. (The most important exceptions are the 
Nordic health systems which rely mainly on salaried polyclinic doctors.) 
partnerships have also been a way of organising groups of hospital doctors, 
for instance in the Netherlands until recently. English publications for the 
later nineteenth century mention group practices. The first published 
account of them in the USA dates from 1919 (6). 
However it has not always proved easy to reconcile this type of 
organisational structure with free, universal health services. Problems of 
access have been one reason, illustrated by the recent history of GP 
dentistry in England. The NHS contract negotiated with general dental 
practitioners (GDPs) proved too expensive in the opinion of the Department 
of Health, who subsequently re-negotiated it on less favourable terms, 
alienating many GDPs and compromising access to NHS dental care in some 
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parts of England. To increase their incomes, partnerships often try to 
combine private work with mainstream health system work. For example 
German Kassenärzte nowadays generally aim to have at least 10%, often 
20%, of private patients, in order to maintain a viable partnership income. 
The independence of partnerships can at times create difficulties, from the 
state's standpoint, of governance and manageability, resulting in part from 
the inscrutability of their clinical practice (the Shipman case is the extreme 
example) although evidence-basing of clinical practice is palliating this 
difficulty; and in part from the fact that external governance over them is 
exercised largely by the blunt instrument of contract. 
Before 1947 medical GP partnerships in Britain had three main sources of 
income. The experience of two of these sources (coloured for decades 
afterwards many English GPs' subsequent attitudes and beliefs about how 
primary medical care should be funded and organised. In industrial, 
especially mining, areas friendly societies and trades unions often 
contracted or employed GPs to provide medical care for their members and, 
at times, their members' families. Some of these organisations gained a 
reputation for heavy, unrewarding workloads and and ungenerous pay. 
Local government had employed doctors since the days of, and in, 
workhouses and asylums besides departments of public health and (later) 
municipal acute hospitals, acquiring a similar reputation (7). These 
memories long sustained GP distaste for salaried employment with 
government bodies. 
With the 1997 Primary Care Act that pattern began to change, starting a 
diversification of the organisational structures of professional partnerships 
(above all, general medical partnerships) in terms of: 
1. Ownership: a small number (in 2009, still probably below 20) nurse-
owned general practices have come into being, with the 
organisational structure of a partnership but with the partners being 
all or mostly nurses, or having a nurse as senior partner. 
2. Membership: a small (but unknown) number of mixed-membership 
general practices have appeared whose partners include nurses, 
pharmacists, allied health professionals and managers besides GPs. 
3. Service profile, with the addition of CBT and other therapies, minor 
surgical procedures, and (less commonly) on-site diagnostic testing 
and 'alternative' healthcare. A substantial minority of GPs have 
become GPs with special interests in such diseases as diabetes and 
CHD. 
4. Staffing profile, with the spread of salaried GPs employed by the 
partnership as partners (it may be) in a collegial but not a legal sense 
or a structural sense as they are not co-owners of the practice. The 
long-established trend of recruiting 'ancillary' staff began with 
practice nurses but has continued to include out-posted CHS and 
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social work staff, nurse practitioners and other staff necessary who 
deliver the wider service profile described above. 
5. Federation of separate partnerships into a network centred on one of 
them as a GP-led health centre or on a PCT-run primary care facility 
as in the London 'polysystems'. 
6. Commissioning role through the practice based commissioning 
system (and previously through GP fundholding), although general 
practices' uptake of PBC is reportedly uneven (8) with only a minority 
of general practices very active commissioners. As noted above, 
policy-makers now plan a large expansion of GP commissioning. 
These developments have legal and regulatory implications, for instance in 
regard to the ownership of assets, audit and EU competition requirements, 
but also managerial and commissioning implications. The more detailed and 
comprehensive targets in the 2004 GP contract and the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (QOF) have also required increasingly sophisticated 
management of these partnerships to meet external or 'agency' targets (9). 
Alternatives to the professional partnership structure for organising primary 
health care have also appeared, including: 
1. NHS Direct, which despite planned modifications will essentially 
continue. 
2. NHS Plus (OH services). 
3. Case management, when the case managers are CHS staff or social 
workers rather than general practice partners or employees (10). 
4. Walk-in centres, including experiments with primary care provision 
within, or in separate units adjunctive to, hospital accident and 
emergency departments. 
5. Pharmacy-based health care, for instance medicines utilisation 
reviews or simple consultations, by pharmacists (11). 
6. PCTMS services, usually in a general practice-like format but 
involving a de facto nationalisation of former partnerships with a PCT 
directly employing primary care doctors. 
7. Corporations employing salaried GPs. 
Concomitantly, PCTs and other health care commissioners have developed 
service commissioning methods (above all APMS) expressly not limited to 
professional partnerships. 
1.2 Non-hierarchical organisations: a dual provenance 
The other organisational form on which UK economic policy has focused 
since the 19th century is the shareholder-owned private limited liability 
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company (PLC or 'corporation', the latter not to be confused with the 
recently-created entity of 'public benefit corporation'). 
Corporations' managers are in law explicitly and exclusively the agents of 
the firm's owners i.e. shareholders. The shareholders have decision-making 
votes and divide any profits in proportion to the size of their shareholdings. 
Because of the corporation's organisational structure, in particular its 
ownership, its managers generally interpret their prime responsibility and 
objectives as being to maximise the (profits distributed to shareholders and 
hence the value of the shareholders' collective property (reflected in share 
price) . The internal organisational structure of a corporation is almost 
always bureaucratic, therefore hierarchical. The corporation is a prototype 
against which other organisational structures can readily be contrasted and 
defined. 
A variety of contrasting organisational structures have in the last decade 
regained policy salience in the UK, promoted from (on both left and right of 
the political spectrum. 
1.2.1 Co-operativism and mutualism 
The alleged merits and defects of the corporation have remained 
controversial policy questions over the last 150 years. The alleged defects 
have motivated the invention and construction of alternative types of 
organisational structure. 
In health policy a standard criticism of corporate provision and financing 
health services has been that, more powerfully than any others, such 
organisational structures produce 'inverse care' outcomes (12). People with 
health problems are those least likely to be able to pay out-of-pocket for 
health care or buy health insurance affordably, or at all, from corporate 
insurers (for the very reason that they are likely to use their insurance). 
Nowadays the US health system with its high proportion of under-insured 
and non-insured people (13) is the example usually cited but until late 
nineteenth century European health systems were much same. The 
mutualist response was to set up non-corporate cooperatives or mutuals to 
provide affordable sickness insurance for income replacement when ill, 
payment for health services when required, or both. Depending on the 
country, the origins of these mutuals lay either in workplace-based 
organisations (e.g. trades union-based sick funds in Britain (14)); sick-
funds for occupational groups (for example in Germany), religious or similar 
charities (e.g. the large Catholic sick funds in France, Belgium), or 
organisations purely of patients (found in the USA to this day). In Britain 
such organisations, evaluated in the Beveridge report (15), became largely 
redundant when the NHS was founded and switched from funding basic to 
funding supplementary private health care (e.g. Nuffield; BUPA health 
insurance). English health policy documents often mention 'consumerism' as 
an influence upon health system development (e.g. (16)) but less often 
define it clearly. For present purposes, 'consumerism' can be defined as 
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activity (typically by NHOs) aiming on consumers' behalf to intervene in, or 
even resolve, the alleged conflicts between corporate and consumer 
interests (17). Briefly, the early consumerist organisations were attempting 
to contest corporations' tendencies to wasteful product design. They meant 
corporations' tendencies, in pursuit of profit, to design consumer goods with 
planned obsolescence (18); over-packaging; with no (e.g. bottled water) or 
negative (e.g. tobacco) value to the informed consumer; forced upgrades 
(e.g. some commercial software); over-specification for purpose (e.g. 4x4 
cars for suburban drivers); single use only (disposables); and adulteration. 
Misinformation of consumers was a corollary. Beginning with campaigns for 
smoking control (19), the 'new' public health movement (20) has also 
advanced more narrowly focused, but also more strongly evidenced-based, 
views of these kinds. Elements of the consumerist movement attributed 
these defects to the incentives for maximising sales and output arising from 
the corporate organisational structure. 
It followed that any countervailing organisations should have different 
organisational structures. In Britain the two commonest options were to set 
up campaigning organisations such as the Consumers Association (a 
company limited by guarantee: see below); and mutual aid organisations to 
finance goods and services not otherwise affordable to their members. 
Those which developed to fund pre-NHS hospital care are now almost 
forgotten (14) but a well-developed mutual building society movement still 
exists despite about 60% of it demutualising in the 1980s and 1990s. For 
the supply side of the economy, a large and both intellectually and 
politically influential literature has made three main criticisms of the effects 
of the corporation's hierarchical organisational structure: that it produces 
exploitation of the workforce (21) ; it impoverishes the quality of working 
life (22); and it is undemocratic (for a recent overview see (23)). Besides 
the formation of trades unions and political parties (beyond the remit of the 
present project) the organisational structures produced in response have 
included co-determination (Mitbestimmung: widespread in mainland 
Europe), trades union action, shop-floor programmes and works councils 
within existing corporations; and producer co-operatives as an 
organisational structure intended to supplant completely that of the 
corporation. Producer cooperatives have included organisations (combined 
consumer-producer cooperatives) for consumers to self-provide specific 
goods and services, ranging from foodstuffs through sport to information 
(CABs etc.) and including some health services (e.g. for reproductive 
health, hospice care) which in England the NHS was tardy or equivocal 
about supplying. 
Outside the NHS, Cook et al. (24) show that 'mutuals' (consumer co-
operatives, building societies, mutual insurers and friendly societies) have a 
total membership of around 19 million people (compared with about 11 
million share holders), making them a considerable economic sector in their 
own right. NHOs range from banks to football clubs to cooperatives. In 
healthcare: 
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There are about 35,000 TSOs [third sector organisations] in England providing health and social care 
services valued at £12bn, while a further 1,600 plan to enter in the near future... Most provide 
services in the fields of mental health, disability, learning difficulties, or long term care. (25) 
It is sometimes argued that NHOs are as, or more, efficient (26-28), 
entrepreneurial and user-responsive than large private or public firms, are a 
form of collective self-help and have a proven ability to innovate in forms of 
service provision. 
English health policy has favoured setting up NHS Foundation Trusts with a 
'social enterprise' (SE) structure 'modelled on co-operative and mutual 
traditions' (5). The imitation does not however extend to having a non-
hierarchical organisational structure, although a local public membership 
and an appointed supervisory board are superimposed on an organisational 
structure which otherwise strongly resembles that of the NHS trusts 
established in 1991. Neither does it appear in the small minority of Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs) which have separated groups of their former community 
health service staff (e.g. nurses, allied health professionals) into separate 
organisations (e.g. Central Surrey Health), much as local authorities have 
'spun off' their former employees into social enterprises which, say, run 
residential care or sell building and engineering work back to the council 
(e.g. CorMaC). As part of the NHS Next Stage Review ('Darzi report') 
introduced, the Department of Health introduced 
a "right to request” for Primary Care Trust (PCT) staff to set up social enterprises (SEs) to 
deliver services. The Boards of all 152 PCTs in England will be obliged to consider such 
requests and, if approved, support the development of the social enterprise and ultimately 
award it a contract for up to five years to deliver those services. 
www.dh.gov.uk/en/Procurementandproposals/Tenders/Informationaboutprocess/DH
_10003 
A 'Pathfinder' programme was set up to support and help fund 25 social 
enterprises, selected from over 300 applicants (29), which were then 
publicised as worked examples to encourage others to do likewise. All social 
enterprises have legally binding contracts with NHS or other statutory 
commissioners. There is no doubt, however, that the primary care out-of-
hours cooperatives which flourished in the early 1990s, and of which many 
large examples continue to operative, are essentially non-hierarchical 
organisational structures. They too tend to regard themselves as social 
enterprises and work under contract to PCTs. 
The default position of English health policy (the 'Fitness for Purpose' policy) 
is now that PCTs should contract out primary and community care services 
rather than provide them directly. Ministers have pronounced that the use 
of social enterprises for such purposes could expand further. From 2005, 
the new commissioning framework (30) was intended to accommodate 
social enterprises as permissible providers of NHS primary and community 
care (31,32). A Social Enterprises Investment Fund was set up to enable 
third sector organisations to invest in preparing themselves to provide 
health care for the NHS. Both Personal Medical Services and the Alternative 
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Provider Medical Services contractual frameworks have been used to enable 
third sector organisations to provide NHS services under contract. Recent 
commissioning policy expressly includes the option to commission local 
voluntary groups, registered charities and cooperatives besides foundations 
trusts and 'social enterprises' (31); and for PCTs to reconstitute themselves 
as social enterprises (3). 
In sum, current policy foresees a growing role for social enterprises in NHS 
provision and NHOs are one variant of social enterprise. 
1.2.2 Types of non-hierarchical organisation in England 
How current English policy defines the term 'social enterprise' is not 
altogether clear. The term covers, but is certainly not limited to, consumer-
controlled and worker-controlled cooperatives. It expressly includes 
provider organisations 'spun off' from former public bodies including PCTs. 
The category overlaps but is not equivalent to that of a 'charity' (see 
below). Similarly the category overlaps with that of the voluntary 
organisation. It can also include 'not-for-profit' organisations, such as the 
insurance arm of BUPA, which differ from commercial firms mainly in not 
distributing profits to shareholders. 
The legal system is however generally clearer than policy documents on 
these points. At present English law differentiates the following types of 
legal personality for companies (P. Allen, personal correspondence). 
1. Charities are often but wrongly regarded as a kind of organisational 
structure. To be a charity is a legal status which different types of 
organisational structure can attain provided their goals include at 
least one of those listed in the Charities Act 2006 (which include the 
advancement of health). Charities may not distribute their assets to 
their members. For-profit corporations may not be charities. 
2. Unincorporated associations, which have no legal personality distinct 
from their individual members. Individual members therefore 
personally sign any contracts, own property and incur debts instead 
of the association. In countries with English-style legal systems 
partnerships fall into this category. They are defined as agreements 
between two or more persons to undertake an activity in common, 
with each partner being jointly and severally responsible for the other 
partners' decisions and liabilities relating to that activity (33). These 
liabilities are unlimited. 
3. Companies limited by guarantee have no share capital. Instead, their 
members guarantee a fixed sum of money which is their maximum 
liability should the company fail. 
4. Corporations (in the economic sense used above; the term also has 
technical meanings in law) are companies limited by shares. Their 
members fund the company and are allocated votes in it s controlling 
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meetings and profits in proportion to their share ownership. Their 
maximum liability should the company fail is that their shares 
become worthless and non-refundable. 
5. Community Interest Companies (CICs) are a limited liability company 
introduced by the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community 
Enterprise) Act 2004 specifically as a legal personality for social 
enterprises. Companies limited by guarantee ((3) above) and 
corporations ((4) above) can become CICs, but only if they have 
primarily social objectives or serve a community interest. Their assets 
may only be used for these purposes but up to 35% of their profits 
may be distributed to shareholders. 
6. Industrial and Provident Societies (IPSs) are limited liability 
organisations governed by specific legislation (e.g. the Industrial and 
Provident Societies Acts 1965-2002, Cooperatives and Community 
Benefit Societies Act 2003). They are governed on the principle of 
one member, one vote. Members pay a subscription (which need not 
be equal for all members). Should the company fail they get only this 
initial payment back and no further assets. There are variants: 
(a) A cooperative or mutual pursuing only its members' benefit. 
Profits may be distributed to members, but not in proportion to 
size of shareholding. 
(b) A society which pursues a wider public benefit, not just its 
members' interests. It may not distribute profits to its members 
and can chose to impose an 'asset lock', meaning that should the 
company fail its assets can only pass to another asset locked 
organisation (e.g. a charity or CIC). 
Some legal systems admit 'limited liability partnerships' in which partners 
are not personally liable for other partners' errors or debts if they had no 
part in committing them, although the partnership does remain jointly 
liable. Whilst partnerships are widespread amongst knowledge-workers 
((33,34), this connection is a contingent relationship not a defining 
structural characteristic, although it does raise the empirical question of 
why such a pattern has emerged. 
1.3 Policy relevance of the study 
Consequently the study of professional partnerships and non-hierarchical 
organisations is of policy relevance for the following reasons: 
1) Partnerships remain the dominant organisational structure for the 
provision of primary medical and dental care. Reforms to them 
however continue. For one, the basis on which they recruit patients is 
about to change from a catchment to a subscriber model, raising 
questions about the likely implications for existing partnerships. The 
'engagement' of independent GPs with health policy and NHS 
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management is always necessary for the effective coordination of 
primary care services and for managing hospital referrals, but this 
engagement is likely to become if anything more important should the 
anticipated cuts in NHS budgets materialise (35). 
2) Federated (networked) and (hierarchical) polyclinics have been mooted 
as alternative organisational structures for primary care provision. 
Conceivably these new primary health centres could also be structured 
as cooperatives. Indeed at least one is already designated to be 
operated by an existing out-of-hours cooperative. As described below 
some of these cooperatives are attempting to broaden their activities 
into other areas of primary care. 
3) Elements of primary, community and social care already are, and 
further types of health and health-related services readily could be, 
provided by cooperatives or other NHOs in future. 
The commissioning of secondary care will largely be undertaken by 
consortia of general practices, nearly all of which are professional 
partnerships. Managerial infrastructure for this activity may be provided by, 
among others, social enterprises including social enterprises converted from 
PCTs and, conceivably, NHOs such as cooperatives (3). Three policy and 
management questions therefore arise: 
1) Under what circumstances might it be preferable to commission a 
cooperative or NHO provider rather than an NHS provider or a 
commercial provider? That is, under which circumstances and which 
types of service are NHOs well adapted to provide for the NHS? 
2) Does the commissioning and management of NHOs appear to require a 
specific approach, different to the case of other providers? 
In recent years the community services provider arms of PCTs have in a few 
cases been 'spun off' as social enterprises, but hierarchically organised 
ones. Would another way of re-establishing these services as separate 
organisations be to establish them as a cooperative or similar NHO?  
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2 Theoretical and research framework  
2.1 Research context 
The present study builds on an SDO review of research relating 
organisational structures to policy outcomes. It stated: 
Particularly under-researched are the structures of non-hierarchical organisations such as GP co-
operatives, professional partnerships, and the provision of NHS services in collaboration with 
voluntary bodies and local government. (36), p.12 
 
That study implied a contingency approach (37) to future research about 
partnerships and NHOs, i.e. research which investigates how partnership 
and NHOs vary in origins (environment), structures, processes and 
outcomes, and how different variants are adapted (or maladapted) for 
different policy purposes and environments. This approach appears 
especially relevant to such diverse organisations as the terms 'PP' and 'NHO' 
cover. 
Many studies equate 'organisation' with 'hierarchy' or 'bureaucracy' 
although network theory is now eroding that assumption. Organisational 
researchers largely neglect partnerships and NHOs. Of 14314 initial entries 
in the database for the aforementioned SDO review only 315 (2%) related 
to partnerships or NHOs. Of them only about a sixth compared theory and 
evidence. 
Although partnerships are one of the oldest forms of organisational 
structure pre-dating by several centuries the limited-liability company (33) 
empirical accounts of how they form, function and fail are relatively sparse. 
The findings and pattern of these studies are described (and referenced) 
more fully below but briefly they tend to concentrate on accountancy and 
legal, and to a lesser extent architectural, partnerships in the UK, USA and 
Canada. There are a few studies of the inner workings of general practice 
partnerships, including the effect of their internal organisation upon clinical 
processes or intermediate outcomes (38-40) but most studies of general 
practice presuppose the organisational structure rather than analyse it. A 
few studies describe marketing (41-43), innovation ((44) and planning (26) 
techniques for partnerships. 
Empirical studies of NHOs tend to concentrate on a few well-known 
examples: the Mondragon cooperatives, worker-controlled enterprises in the 
former Yugoslavia, US agriculture and kibbutzim. There are a few studies of 
English (45) and Scots (46) GP cooperatives. Histories exist of the 
cooperative movement and its antecedents (47) but most are tangential to 
present purposes. An important group of studies analyse how far the 
employment of supplementary wage-labour or external capital leads 
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cooperatives to 'degenerate' into corporations. Studies of former communist 
countries (48,49) describe how NHOs can emerge ex nihilo and also 
succumb, reporting what policy environments produce either effect. Recent 
policy developments in England have encouraged fresh reviews of research 
into not-for-profit organisations (50) and social enterprises (51), but NHOs 
and partnerships are only subsets of these categories. Research has focused 
more on the complementary bureaucratic subset. 
Theoretical accounts of how partnerships and NHOs form, function and 
sometimes fail are equally meagre. Institutional economics explains 
organisational structures in terms of what kinds of the transactions the 
organisation undertakes; their scale and frequency, whether opportunism or 
trust develops, the distribution of knowledge, and how much competition or 
contestability there is in the organisation's market environment (52). 
However 'new' institutional economists concentrate on hierarchies and 
markets, for whose sake Williamson (53) expressly avoided considering 
partnerships and NHOs, although Hansmann (54) proposed a theory of 
contractual failure to explain why partnerships and NHOs emerge. Micro-
economic models of cooperatives have been made, Vanek's (55) being 
perhaps the most influential. Elements of the economics of clubs (56) have 
also been applied to partnerships and cooperatives. Beginning with Michels' 
(57) 'iron law of oligarchy', a few researchers of various disciplines have 
proposed explanations of why large democratic organisations 'degenerate' 
into oligarchies. 
We next synthesise some existing theory about NHOs and partnerships into 
a framework which will then guide a systematic review of existing empirical 
research into those organisations and the presentation of new primary data 
about a sample of them. 
2.2 Organisational environment, structure, process and 
'fit' 
As our highest-level theoretical framework we adapt one used by the SDO's 
systematic review of the research literature on organisational structure and 
performance (36). Homologous frameworks have also been used by other 
researchers into health systems and organisation (e.g. (58)) and an SDO 
study of networks. A common framework aids comparison between more 
concrete (middle-level) theories and empirical findings. 
This theoretical framework describes the sets of relationships between four 
sets of factors: organisational environment, organisational structure, core 
productive process and the policy outcomes thereof. Recognising the 
complexity of the relationships between (and within) these four sets of 
factors, the theoretical framework concentrates on theorising three main 
relationships: 
1) Between environment and organisational structure 
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2) Between organisational structure and core productive processes How 
organisation's core productive processes produce policy outcomes. 
3) How organisation's core productive processes produce policy outcomes. 
'Core process' means the set of techniques, by which an organisation 
attempts to produce whatever goods, services or other outcomes it is that 
organisation's goal to produce. In health care settings, this core process 
includes not only interventions at biological level, but the collaborative 
practical activities (which deliver those interventions. Together the 
biological and the organisational elements comprise a model of care, with 
its characteristic variables of access to care, utilisation of services, 
continuity of care, clinician activity and competence (59), evidence base 
and patient and carer inputs. 'Process' in this sense refers to a technical, 
not (purely organisational, process. 
In partnerships, non-hierarchical and indeed any organisation the overriding 
purpose of managerial processes is to mobilise, manage and reform the 
core working processes which actually produce whatever outcomes ('effect', 
'functions', 'performance', 'success') an organisation achieves (60). In 
summary, an organisation's environment gives rise to the organisation itself 
and its goals, to pursue which a core process is required, and to operate 
that an organisation structure is created. The goals motivate and this 
structure operates a core process which literally produces outcomes (which 
may or not satisfy the original goals). Environment, the organisational goals 
arising from it and the organisational structure can thus be thought of as a 
set of initial conditions; process and outcome as what emerge from these 
initial conditions. Contingency theory explains organisational structure in 
terms of the type of tasks that the organisation undertakes, what 
technology these tasks require and the everyday working processes 
involved (e.g. (61,62)). For an organisation to be effective its structure 
must 'fit' its environment and its process of production, and the latter must 
'fit' the intended outcomes. 
What makes NHOs and professional partnerships feasible alternatives to 
public or to corporate bureaucracies is that in at least certain cases more 
than one organisational structure is capable of operating a given core 
process. For it is obviously false to postulate a rigid one-to-one 
correspondence between type of core process and organisational structure. 
Even organisations operating near-identical technologies (e.g. car 
manufacturing, railways, indeed hospitals) seldom use identical 
organisational structures. When a provider co-operative supersedes a failed 
corporation (e.g. Triumph in 1980s) it initially inherits and operates the 
same core process as before, but to different ends. 
Nevertheless a process of production does impose some organisational 
constraints. To operate a core process requires physical means of 
production equipment, raw and intermediate materials, decisions, 
information and feedback; and specific working times, places and sequences 
of activities because of the interdependence of stages of work (e.g. 
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production line workers must all start and stop work at the same time). It 
also requires methods for accommodating any uncertainties or disruptions 
in the work (63,64). The physical processes also constrain the number of 
people necessary to operate them and the skills required (e.g. classroom 
teachers must be literate). Hence use of a given technology necessitates 
using one of a specific range of compatible organisational structures. In 
many cases (although there are apparent exceptions such as armies) that 
range includes both hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures. We 
therefore describe the relationship between core process (technology) and 
organisational structure as one of mutual constraint, interpreting 'fit' and 
'determines' accordingly. 
If in practice these conditions are not met, a partnership, NHO or any other 
must adjust at least one of the four elements (environment, structure, 
process, outcomes) back into 'fit'. During the formation of an organisations 
its members adopt an organisational structure which they believe suffices to 
operate the core working process which they also adopt. Practical 
experience may expose these beliefs as false; the core process does not 
(indeed, cannot) produce the intended outcomes. Indeed the more fully a 
misconceived core process is implemented, the less likely it becomes that 
the intended outcomes will be achieved. Also, unexpected outcomes may 
appear besides the intended ones, indeed negate the intended ones (e.g. if 
case management increases case-finding on a scale that more than 
compensates for reduced admissions per hundred patients (65)). (Other 
events (technical innovations; external resource availability; natural 
disasters; policy changes; cultural or demographic shifts) may also disrupt 
the 'fit' between environment, structure, process and outcomes. Then the 
structure, processes or both may be modified or exchanged for others 
(perhaps over-reacting: Sorge and van Witteloostuijn (66) argue that 
organisational change occurs more often than necessary. If an 
organisation's core process fails to produce its intended outcomes the 
members have (the option either to alter the core process they use (e.g. 
alter equipment, inputs, techniques) or to revise their objectives to match 
what the core process can produce. If the organisation's structure proves 
unsuitable for operating the core process, the NHO members have again 
two options. They might to alter the core process of production to one that 
the existing organisational structure can operate, but then risk failing to 
fulfil their original objectives and having to renegotiate them (67). 
Alternatively they can adjust the organisational structure (e.g. skill mix, 
information systems, means of coordinating the core process) and try 
again. Any such adaptations must however remain broadly compatible with 
members' original motives for joining the NHO (68). The penalty for not 
making a compatible set of the above adjustments is continued failure, 
leading to loss of the original membership and resources (but perhaps also 
the gain of members who prefer the new regime to the old). Thus a non-
hierarchical (and indeed any other) organisation selects members who are 
content with its de facto activities and the values they represent (69). 
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An organisation's structure, managerial practices and environment thus co-
evolve, with environment having in most cases the larger influence (70). 
Successive working practices and belief systems become 'sedimented' over 
time (71), making development of the organisation's structure path-
dependent; the after-effects of history determine an organisation's future 
development (72). 
Thus organisational structure affects organisational outcomes (73,74). Our 
next step is to synthesise existing theory about professional partnerships 
and NHOs so as to elaborate how the above framework might apply to 
those kinds of organisations specifically. 
2.3 Environment 
2.3.1 Membership and formation 
To understand what goals professional partnerships and NHOs have, and 
why, requires an account of who sets these organisations up and why. That 
is, an account of these organisations' origins in a given social environment. 
Institutional economics raises the question of when, when a group of 
individuals wish collective to undertake a productive activity ('core process') 
an organisation emerges rather than a network or a Coaseian market of 
bilateral contracts (75). However with a few exceptions, above all 
Hansmann's work (54), transaction cost theory mostly, indeed deliberately 
(52), focuses on the formation of corporations. It also begs the most 
important question for a study such as this one by presupposing either that 
organisations are formed by individuals who already relate through a 
market or, still more question-begging, that markets are (so to speak) a 
'state of nature' from which all other forms of economic organisation are 
either derivatives or, to speak normatively, degenerations. Historical 
evidence (e.g. (76,77)) refutes these empirical assumptions. 
Instead we assume that NHOs originate 'from below' from individual 
producers or consumers who believe they through such an organisation 
they can satisfy certain of their already-existing personal motivations more 
effectively (or at all) by collaborating (78) This explanation requires a 
theory of individual motivation to work. Without accepting every elaboration 
which Herzberg (79) and Maslow (80) made, the assumption of a hierarchy 
of motivations ('needs') founded upon the most imperative and 'basic' ones 
(81) has a basis in psychological theory. In descending order of 
imperativeness, motivations relevant to the foundation of professional 
partnerships and NHOs are to secure: 
1) A certain minimum income, whether in kind, in money (55) or a 
mixture. We assume that individuals (as opposed to certain 
organisations) mostly seek a target (82,83) ('satisfice') rather than 
maximise money income. Simon (84) argued that this applies even to 
top corporate managers. 
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2) A safe physical environment for work, minimising the monotony, 
laboriousness (surveillance and danger of work, and enabling the 
incidental benefits of social networking and informal relationships (85). 
3) Activities and exercising skills which their occupational cultures or 
disciplines accord high status and value to (86), including working to 
'professional' standards of production i.e. quality standards defined a 
priori in technical or normative 'disciplinary' terms. 
4) Such scope as the technology allows for learning and other forms of 
self-development such as 'enablement' (the opposite of de-skilling) (87) 
or increasing autonomy and discretion at work (88). 
5) Pursuit of pre-existing non-economic (e.g. political or religious values) 
that the members bring into the organisation when it forms (89,90). 
On that assumption, insofar as the goals of a partnership or NHOs came to 
reflect its members' motivations, those goals would include the above, 
perhaps even follow the above ranking. 
2.3.2 Why non-hierarchical or partnership? 
A partnership or a NHO forms when three conditions all hold: other forms of 
organisations fail to meet the above needs or (in economic terms) maximise 
their members' welfare compared with other forms of organisation 
(91,92,68); collective action is nonetheless necessary to meet these needs; 
and none of the individuals who propose to act collectively has the power to 
subordinate the others within a new hierarchy. 
We do not assume that public and commercial bureaucracies oppose the 
aims listed above. Rather, they cannot satisfy those aims when: 
1. No such organisation exists, in the cases of goods or services which 
are either unprofitable to sell, controversial (e.g. birth control in the 
1920s) or of low prestige or desert in the eyes of state or professional 
interests (93). In healthcare, groups of patients or carers who 
nonetheless want such goods or services must then either establish a 
producer organisation (e.g. Marie Stopes clinics, hospices, HIV/AIDs 
charities in the 1990s) because they cannot achieve these ends 
privately (94), or establish a consumer NHO to obtain these services 
from elsewhere. 
2. Working conditions or activities of existing providers fail to meet the 
needs of those who go on to found a partnership or NHO, perhaps 
because the founders were in a weak bargaining position. Doctors (for 
example) may perceive a clash between a prospective employer's and 
their profession's values (87). 
3. A producer did exist but is closing down (95) Its work-force take over 
the enterprise to 'rescue' their livelihood (96-98) (e.g. Triumph 
motorcycles in the 1980s (99)). 
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Thus on the supply side of an economy the two main patterns of NHO 
formation are either from takeover of an existing productive enterprise or 
creation ex nihilo. It is obvious why collective action is necessary for 
operating a large core process such as a factory production-line, but less 
obvious what the benefits of working collectively are in professional 
activities such as medicine or law which to a large extent are individualised, 
handicraft activities performed mainly through one-to-one interactions 
between professional and client. At one extreme an 'atomised' partnership 
of such professionals might offer no benefit beyond office-sharing (69). 
However Hansmann (54,100) proposed that partnerships and NHOs rather 
than corporations emerge when the costs of contracting between members 
is higher than those of risk-bearing through trusting each other. Forming or 
joining an organisation largely removes the transaction costs of allocating 
(other) costs and income between the members or partners (6). Co-
operatives produce greater welfare for their members than other forms of 
organising by giving their members control over a vertically integrated 
process of production and jointly exploiting economies of scale which they 
separately could not (68). By their nature partnerships can emerge only on 
the supply side of an economy. They allow the partners to share risks and 
obtain a given income for less effort (101,102). A professional joining an 
existing partnership gains access to its ready-made reputation for quality of 
work (103)and avoids having to build up a clientele from scratch. For clients 
who are in a position of information asymmetry vis-a-vis professionals, 
exclusionary regulation is one way of establishing a 'brand name' which 
implicitly signals to clients what quality of service they can expect. However 
general practice is the medical specialty where this asymmetry is least (6). 
On the demand side, consumer NHOs form to obtain goods and services for 
their members on better terms (of price, information and quality) than 
otherwise obtainable in a market (104,100,105) or quasi-market. In Britain 
one instance is when patients or carers set up appeals around cause celebre 
patients whom the NHS is alleged to have 'let down'. Consumer NHOs also 
redress information (asymmetries between providers and consumers (100), 
and increase consumers' collective bargaining power against producers. 
Cooperatives which retail direct to consumers either re-sell goods at lower 
than market prices (newer consumer cooperatives) or sell goods at market 
prices but afterwards redistribute any profits to their members in proportion 
to their members' spending with the co-operative ('Rochdale pioneer' or 
'patronage' model) (106). Besides credit for purchases, consumer credit 
unions provide households with a means of managing income fluctuations 
(107), avoiding the higher interest charges of commercial or of illegal 
lenders. 
The third condition for a partnership or NHO to emerge is that none of the 
prospective members can compel the others to join as her subordinate 
employees (i.e. establish a hierarchy). Members and partners make broadly 
equal inputs, have equal rights to participation in decision-making and gain 
broadly equal benefits from collaborating. Hence cooperatives or 
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partnerships emerge in production activities which require little initial plant 
or equipment (or money-capital to buy them), for instance handicrafts or 
activities whose main input is knowledge rather than physical materials; or 
when a group can take over control of a large productive process (factory, 
laboratory) without having to find the initial capital themselves. Nowadays 
the most common way in which the start-up condition is met, is by having 
members pay a standard subscription e.g. a money fee (106) or, in an 
association of independent producers or of consumers, agree to buy a 
minimum level of goods or services from the NHO (68). 
2.3.3 External dependencies and governance 
To operate its core productive process a partnership or NHO needs to obtain 
externally whichever inputs its own members cannot supply. Together these 
internal and external inputs have to be sufficient cover all requirements of 
the core process. Put in financial terms, the partnership or NHO has to 
break even (68). For this purpose an NHO can besides its members' 
contributions draw externally upon market sales, private donations or the 
state, whether as a quasi-bureaucratic donor or commissioner in a quasi-
market (108). By imposing conditions for supplying resources, donors and 
commissioners create external, second-order incentives and objectives for 
the recipient organisation (109). What effects external incentives have upon 
an NHO depends upon what is measured by the incentive-payer, hence 
upon what is transparent to the external funders (69). (What is measured is 
what the incentive in practice attaches to.) Such media of control can be 
applied and exercised, however, only to the extent that the activity which 
the external body wishes to influence is transparent (visible) to it. The 
internal structure of the recipient organisation then has to adapt - if its 
members allow - to these requirements. 
Law and regulation provide the repertoire of property rights and forms of 
legal personality which are available for creating and structuring an NHO. 
(Those available under English law are noted above (ch.1)). Law and 
regulation are what essentially differentiate a professional partnership from 
a cooperative or mutual. A 'full' (rather than 'semi-' (110)) profession has 
legal or regulatory accountability for quality of practice and restriction of 
entry, giving members of the profession de facto property rights over the 
regulated work which enable their members to pursue (within the 
regulations) their own preferred modes of practice. These property rights 
are reflected, as explained below (ch.2s4), in the 'hybrid' organisational 
structure of a partnership. 
Neo-institutionalist theory emphasises that the beliefs which members apply 
in founding and operating NHOs pre-date that organisation. The new 
organisation is socially embedded in a legal and regulatory system, a social 
'culture' with particular 'values' and in social, occupational and 
organisational networks (111-114). Pinnington and Morris (115) point out 
that coercive, normative and mimetic pressures to conform with 
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occupational norms are especially strong in the professions. The putatively 
purely technical 'discipline' of medicine also establishes a relationship of 
'governmentality' between doctor and patient, doctor and managers, and 
doctor and her professional seniors (116). 
2.3.4 Goals 
From this complex of individual motivations, resource endowments and the 
wider, embedding sets of ideologies, laws and other institutions are formed 
the organisation's goals (objectives). partnerships and NHOs are founded to 
give governance of the organisation to different interests than control public 
or commercial bureaucracies, and concomitantly to pursue different goals. 
One would therefore expect their substantive goals to differ from those of 
public and commercial bureaucracies. One would expect the goals of a 
partnership to be the aggregate of the motivations and interests of its 
individual members (115) and the same reasoning applies to NHOs. 
Consequently one would expect these goals in broad terms to be: 
1. To obtain for their members a specified level of livelihood or access to 
a predefined set of goods or services. 
2. The sequence of formation outlined above presupposes that the 
individuals are closely enough connected, either by geographical and 
social proximity or, nowadays, through communications media to make 
it practical for them to collaborate. For this reason, and insofar as an 
NHO originated from the failure of an earlier enterprise, or its founding 
members were linked by some prior affiliation (e.g. ethnicity, 
residence, local activism), one would expect its goals to include the 
provision of service or benefit to a local community defined 
geographically (89). 
NHOs and partnerships undertaking productive activity would also aim to 
realise: 
1. What their members regarded as good working conditions (117). 
2. Work activity and its products which their members regarded as being 
of good technical quality befitting their occupation. 
3. Learning and other forms of self-development. 
4. Other non-economic values that the members subscribe to (69,118), 
including workplace democracy for its own sake (97). 
Policy changes which are in their own interests and those of like-minded 
organisations. There is no reason why a single organisation cannot pursue 
many different goals provided the members believe (perhaps rightly) that 
all these goals are compatible. 
Insofar as consumer cooperatives or mutuals arise in order to obtain 
unprofitable, controversial or low-status goods or services for their 
members, they would develop two kinds of goal: 
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1. Obtaining goods, not by producing the missing goods or services 
themselves but either by purchasing the service members or 
reimbursing members when they buy it. 
2. Campaign goals of inducing legislators to alter laws or regulations to 
induce firms producing consumer goods and services to alter their 
business models and marketing mix in consumers' favour; and to 
implement consumers' existing legal or contractual rights (e.g. truthful 
information about products; redress for bad products). 
Some analyses (e.g. (68)) assume that partnerships, NHOs or their 
members are profit-maximisers but in this context 'profit' is a slippery and 
ambiguous concept. After the immediate costs of production are paid, 
possible uses of the residual income include: 
1. Payment to members or partners for their own work. 
2. Extending the organisation's productive capacity. (One might say 
'investment' were that term not so often tied to the idea of increasing 
profits in sense (4) below.) 
3. Contingency funds saved as 'working capital' or to tide the organisation 
over income or cost fluctuations (69). 
4. 'Normal profits' (which labour process theorists (e.g. Braverman (60)) 
regard as rentier payments) distributed to non-working external 
shareholders. This is the standard everyday sense of the term 'profit'. 
5. Payments to (other) external rentiers (e.g. banks, owners of intellectual 
property). To producers these payments appear as costs, but to their 
recipients as profits. 
Non-hierarchical organisations and partnerships whose purpose is to 
maintain their members' livelihoods attempt to obtain profits in senses (1) 
(2) and (3), not (4) or (5). Of these, sense (1) is fundamental. Profit-
making in senses (2) and (3) is only a means to that end. Because the aim 
of (1) is members' personal consumption, because aim (2) is technically 
defined' and because (3) are costs to minimise so far as is prudent, 'obtain' 
usually means 'satisfice' not 'maximise'. Volunteer organisations have no 
need for profit-making in sense (1), only 'profits' of types (2) and (3). 
Furthermore, whilst purposes (2) and (3) can be funded from operating 
profits, they can instead be funded by, say, member subscriptions or 
donations (106). Because the requirements to finance technical 
development and (if it cannot be avoided) pay interest and similar charges 
are determinate, finite costs to a NHO, 'profit'-making in senses (3) and (5) 
amounts only to a requirement to break even in the long term. Expansion of 
productive capacity also amounts to a requirement to break even in the 
long term, except where NHO members regard the expansion of their 
organisation's activities as an end in itself. If NHO members take a fixed 
money income, that is 'satisfice' rather than 'maximise' money income, the 
same applies to 'profit'-making in sense (1). In contrast, whilst a 
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corporation must also break even if it is to survive, its fundamental aim is 
to maximise profits in sense (4) above. 
This approach towards profits, besides the other social values which 
partnerships and NHOs tend to have, implies a different competitive 
strategy than the one a corporation would usually pursue in order to 
maximise profit. The latter implies that the ideal position for a commercial 
firm is to be a monopolist. That implies a strategy of maximising market 
share and removing competitors from the market when possible, either by 
take-over or 'predatory' competition. If that cannot be done the next best 
strategy is to create a de facto monopoly through such methods as 
branding, 'first mover' advantages and retention of intellectual property. A 
satisficing organisation, in contrast, has the strategy of securing a large 
enough market to break even whilst providing a predefined quality of 
product and a predefined level of income for its members. What matters 
then is the absolute size of its own market, not market share. Its 
competitive strategy is therefore oriented towards obtaining that size of 
market. That condition met, its strategy towards other organisations can 
afford to be collaborative and open rather than predatory or even 
competitive. The non-economic values which professional partnerships 
subscribe to 'what they regard as 'high' standards of work are more likely to 
produce convergence (on those standards) than differentiation as a 
marketing strategy. 
Having negotiated a set of goals the need arises for a core process which, 
members think, will achieve them. For a partnership or for an organisation 
taking over an existing failed corporation or public body, the intended core 
process is predefined as the work of which the members or partners already 
do or are credentialised to do respectively. Having selected a core process, 
it then becomes necessary to allocate and coordinate the work among the 
people who are going to operate it. Hence these people have to create an 
organisational structure (even if they do not conceive of it in those terms) 
which they think will sustain that collaboration (70). 
2.4 Structure 
2.4.1 Modes of democracy 
Professional partnerships and NHOs form to coordinate the work of more-
or-less equal members who cannot coercively or hierarchically control one 
another. In these circumstances the obvious - though not the only 
conceivable (119) - organisational structure to adopt is some form of 
democracy (120,121). Small organisations can adopt directly democratic, 
relational control and decision making. The members' or partners' meeting, 
reaching decisions by consensus, is the fundamental decision-making and 
coordinating structure in a direct democracy. Major decisions, task 
allocation and work monitoring are taken by the members collectively 
through discussion. Posts of responsibility can be allocated to -and removed 
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from - members or partners by rotation (122), sortition, consensus or vote. 
Consensus-building is likely to be the preferred form of democratic decision-
making among professional partners (103). With consensus or voting the 
criterion for selecting a leader may be for proposing lines of activity with 
which most of the members agree or because she has accumulated 
resources of value to the organisation. Leaders may often be identified, 
especially in professional partnerships, as those members or partners either 
with special skills or interests or status (e.g. a founding member, long-
serving member, technically accomplished member) (123). These leaders 
may emerge through everyday work or organisational structures specifically 
for selecting and controlling them may develop. The close cooperation that 
relational democracy involves creates trust and wider information-sharing, 
which, Abzug and Phelps (124) say, make collaborative partnerships 
achieve their goals more fully than purely office-sharing 'atomistic' 
partnerships. 
Such structures require organisations, or sub-units of organisations, small 
enough for the members all to participate in a single meeting and to be 
familiar with each other's work (74); hence, to have relatively 
homogeneous memberships and core activities (33). Professional 
partnerships do however generally satisfy these conditions. 
In theory even large organisations can also operate by direct democracy. 
Representatives are directly elected at sub-unit workplace meetings on the 
above pattern, through which members select (and recall) delegates to 
higher-level bodies. This 'upward delegation' structure can be replicated 
layer upon layer (to encompass the largest organisation. 
In what might be called a 'representative' mode of democracy managers are 
elected by ballot for a fixed term of office or even indefinitely (until they 
leave the organisation). Ballots can be made across an organisation of any 
size, with members or partners choosing between policy options framed by 
the candidates. 
Whichever mode of democracy be adopted, a large organisation will 
typically have a coordinating body ('board', 'committee', 'council', 
'executive') accountable to the electing members or partners not to 
shareholders or the state. Its members are elected on the basis of their 
authority or legitimacy in the eyes of the workforce and to reflect their 
electors' interests. They may but need not be full time paid officials. A 
precondition for democratic control is to make information about the 
internal management of the organisation transparently available to its 
members or partners (117). (In hierarchies such information is in effect the 
property of top managers.). 
2.4.2 Implementation 
It then remains to implement the elected managers' decisions. As noted, a 
first requirement for this is a degree of internal transparency about 
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members' or partners' work within the organisation. Members each 
contribute to the work of the NHO and in return expect others to do so. On 
the basis of an a priori economic model, Espinosa and Macho-Stadler (125) 
predict that a major problem with equal profit distribution in partnerships is 
verification of members' contributions to profits. The benefits of reducing 
shirking are shared between all partners (126) yet this is a challenge 
because creative and intellectual pursuits are more difficult to monitor than 
mechanical, repetitive tasks (102). Healthcare furthermore is a stochastic 
process. Different doctors may treat patients exactly the same way but not 
all patients may react to the treatment in the same way, making it difficult 
(and perhaps unfair) to attribute output categorically to a particular partner. 
One solution is to rely upon trust is based on professional ethics, which are 
said to make individuals reluctant to monitor one another on a professional 
basis for the purposes of output measurement (127), but the less they 
monitor each other the more likely is a decline in overall partnership or 
team performance. Therefore an important coordination task for 
partnerships and NHOs is to establish some form of individual output 
measurement (128) or other system enabling each member to scrutinise 
the others' work (69). 
Should free-riding or non-compliance be detected, members or partners 
have a graduated set of methods available for changing the behaviour of 
free-riding or non-compliant colleagues (129). In ascending order of 
severity of the sanctions attached the methods are: 
1. Technical persuasion (authority) based upon scientific knowledge (in 
health care, formalised guidelines and clinical pathways). This sanction 
assumes that the member under-performs through not knowing how to 
do his job. 
2. Appeals to ideology and shared values (normative assumptions) (67), a 
collective 'culture' (130-132) which acts as a 'private law' within an 
organisation (133). 
3. Concertive Control, the collegial application of informal relational 
sanctions (134) through, initially, informal 'advice' or feed-back (123) 
such as the 'quiet word' among professionals (135) or, more 
powerfully, peer approval and disapproval (136), perhaps reinforced 
through social contacts outside work (118). Rather than expend their 
own 'social capital', however, members recruit a third party as 
intermediary to deal with 'free-riding' colleagues (67). Using evidence 
taken from a hierarchy rather rather than an NHO, Barker describes 
how through informal peer control: 
the organization's members developed a system of value-based normative rules that controlled their 
actions more powerfully and completely than the former [i.e. hierarchical bureaucratic] system. (136): 
p.408 
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But if on the contrary mutual scrutiny repeatedly verifies that a person 
competently contributes full her share, trust develops among the 
members or partners (137). Hence: 
The partnership form of governance is better suited to the management of professionals than the 
private or public corporation as it (1) uses more efficient (collegial) control processes and (2) provides 
superior incentives for expert individuals to share proprietary knowledge. (33) 
 
4. Allocation of resources, whether personal income or benefits in kind 
(holidays, study opportunities, convenient working hours, preferred 
area of work). 
5. Expulsion. Game theory often assumes that 'clubs' (in particular 
consumer clubs) can exclude potential members in order to prevent 
'overcrowding' of the services offered (94). Expulsion is the equivalent 
to demotion or dismissal in a hierarchy. 
Partnerships and NHOs nevertheless retain some structural similarities with 
bureaucracies. A division between work and private activity and income is 
maintained. Accepting favours, 'presents' or bribes is forbidden in 
partnerships and NHOs as it is in bureaucracies. Like bureaucracies, 
partnerships and NHOs are rule-bound. Elected officials have to be 
procedurally fair in decisions that affect individuals' roles and rewards (or 
penalties). Members and partners are more likely to regard these rules as 
legitimate, the more the rules are formalised, equitable and apply what the 
members regard as relevant, valid criteria when selecting individuals for 
responsible posts (118). Members have impersonally defined roles which do 
not depend upon which particular person holds which role (unlike, say, a 
feudal estate or charismatic sect). The elected representatives have also to 
maintain unified objectives, culture and ideology for the organisation. 
Decision-making is at least partly centralised. Where partnerships provide a 
rather standardised service to a dispersed clientele, a centralisation of 
technical functions is likely to co-exist with decentralised authority-
structures. In partnerships resistance to centralised control (even within the 
partnership) and the high differentiation of the services provided mean that 
partnerships are likely to set their members general rather than narrow 
(highly specific) financial targets with concomitant tolerance of (justified) 
deviation from those targets (103). 
2.4.3 Hybrid structures 
A partnership or a NHO can, through the structures described above 
implement its members' or partners' decisions through the members' or 
partners' own activity. Alternatively the members or partners can hire 
employees to do so (95), creating a hybrid structure comprising: 
1. A 'polycratic' kernel (123) which establishes the whole organisation's 
goals, monitors and controls the whole organisation. 
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2. A hierarchy of employed staff subjoined to the above, a bureaucratic 
infrastructure essentially similar to those found in public or commercial 
bureaucracies. 
Any differences in behaviour between such hybrid organisations and 
conventional bureaucracies must therefore stem from the democratic kernel 
(1). In these hybrid structures there is a parallel between the role of the 
partner or member and that of the owner of a small owner-managed firm; 
and a parallel between the roles of the most senior employee in either kind 
of organisation. Because professions by definition exclude non-professionals 
from their work, creating sharp demarcations between professionals and 
non-professionals, hybrid structures are especially likely to appear in 
partnerships. 
Hybrid organisational structures necessarily have an interface between the 
democratic and the hierarchical components. The subjoined hierarchical 
element is managed either by the partners collectively, via a generalist 
manager who then stands a the apex of the hierarchy as the link between 
hierarchy and partnership, or by a designated partner (an 'executive 
partner'). This role has parallels with that of a boundary-spanner (138) and 
involves role-conflict (139), which can be reduced if members and the 
boundary-spanning top manager have a similar view of the organisation, its 
task and environment and if a commitment-based rather than a control-
based approach to management is applied (140). 
Relatively high in these subjoined hierarchies are trainee professionals, 
potential future partners (118). Greenwood and Empson (33) and 
Pinnington and Morris (115) argue that 'tournament' career paths are 
typical of professional partnerships. At a certain point in her career the 
salaried trainee professional must either obtain promotion to become a 
partner or lose her post ('up or out'). This is considered a motivator to the 
would-be partner and enables the partnership to refresh its supply of 
employed professionals periodically (141). Implicitly, the role of employee is 
considered unsuitable as a long-term position for a member of the 
privileged profession to remain in. Consequently Greenwood and Empson 
hypothesise that: 
Partnerships and private corporations that use tournament career practices are more efficient than 
public corporations in the production of professional services because they offer superior career 
incentives to professionals, which result in higher effort and productivity. (33) 
 
In part the subjoined hierarchy is managed through similar methods of 
coordination (evidence-basing; appeal to culture and values; recruitment 
and expulsion) to the democratic layer (123). Ideologies and culture in 
particular are likely to work best as means of control if they are consistent 
across the different parts of a hybrid organisation. One might therefore 
predict that the organisational culture of hybrid organisations would favour 
a participative approach to the management of their employees. For 
technical reasons EBM (or its analogues) would also be unchanged. 
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What differs is that in the democratic layer, control amongst the members 
is democratic and bidirectional whilst in the subjoined hierarchy managers 
exercise unilateral control (rewards and punishments) over the employees 
(133) on behalf of the members. The methods are essentially those applied 
in bureaucracies elsewhere: hiring, firing, pay differentials, promotion, 
demotion or redeployment at managers' decision, or - more subtly - 
'responsibilisation' i.e. making employees at the bottom of the hierarchy 
responsible, besides the managers, for devising and implementing solutions 
to the increase the organisation's capacity to meet its objectives through 
such methods as TQM and problem-solving (142). 
2.4.4 Professional engagement 
In current NHS discourse 'professional engagement' is usually an ellipsis for 
'willing participation in the management of the NHS and in implementing 
national policy'. 'Professional' covers all NHS clinical occupations, but above 
all the medicine as the most privileged, powerful and independent. Active 
professional participation in NHS managerial activity would obviously be 
evidence of engagement. So, paradoxically, would critical 'voice' within 
these bodies (143). Professional members' 'exit' from managerial bodies 
would be evidence of disengagement, as would active or passive resistance 
towards NHS managers' decisions or national policy. 
In a partnership with a subjoined hierarchy the partners combine the roles 
of owner, manager and professional (103) with three corresponding income 
streams: 
1. Payment for their own labour. 
2. Profits from the employees' work (141), as in a corporation. 
3. Monopoly rents resulting from closure of the partners' occupation (its 
status of a profession). 
All these activities are managed or undertaken by the partners. Artificial 
measures to promote professional engagement, at least by the partners, 
therefore appear somewhat redundant in such a structure. More likely the 
opposite question arises of how to engage non-partners', including 
employed professionals', engagement in the partnership's decisions and 
activities. 
For professionals employed by partners and for professionals in non-
hierarchical structures the question of how to promote professional 
engagement is more meaningful. Above we predicted that when individuals 
controlling their conditions of work will seek to do what they regard high-
status activity under good working conditions for a sufficient livelihood, to 
undertake learning and self-development, and realise the other non-
economic values which are important to them. It seems reasonable to 
predict that the more a structure satisfies those goals, the greater 
professional engagement with its management is likely to be. Hence 
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partnerships and provider NHOs will establish the following modes of 
professional engagement, which Table 1 also compares with the structure of 
a public hierarchy, such as an NHS Foundation Trust. 
Table 1 suggests that professional engagement would be strongest in 
professional partnerships, less so in NHOs, and less again in a 'public firm'. 
All four organisational structures mentioned in Table 1 let clinicians work 
according to professional ethos and discipline, albeit as defined and 
constrained by national policy (144,145). The presence of professionals, 
especially doctors, in NHS (and other health systems') managerial bodies 
arises from a political settlement rather than any intrinsic structural 
characteristic of hierarchies. Job satisfaction can be assumed to be 
associated with professional commitment to the organisation for which the 
professional works, and commitment to be associated with engagement. 
Professionals are also likely to be more engaged when they have specialised 
skills which complement those of other members of the same organisation 
(118). How far that occurs depends however upon the technical 
characteristics of health care processes and the micro-politics of team-work 
(146) rather than upon organisational structure. 
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Table 1. Organisational structure and professional engagement 
 Professional 
partnership 
Provider 
NHO 
Consumer 
NHO 
Public 
(hierarchy) 
Professional 
representation on 
Board* 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Professionals control 
Board  
Yes No No No  
Professionals jointly 
own organisation's 
assets 
Yes Partly**  No No  
Professionals allocate 
organisational income  
Yes  Partly No  No  
Professionals profit 
from non-
professionals' work 
Yes No  No No  
Professionals define 
own terms and 
conditions of work 
Yes Yes No No  
*'Board' means 'top-level controlling body' (even if not actually called the 'Board'). 
**'Partly' means that the professional members participate as equal voting members 
with others. 
2.4.5 'Degeneration' 
A fundamental question in a hybrid organisational structure is whether the 
two organisational structures making it up are compatible and can coexist 
or whether one will eventually predominate, leaving an unmixed structure 
of one kind or the other (147). If a corporate structure prevails, the original 
structure is said to have 'degenerated', a decidedly normative expression 
connoting backsliding form egalitarian and democratic principles. 
Partnerships are, we noted, especially liable to adopt a hybrid structure. 
Adopting corporate managerial practices may therefore be more acceptable 
to them than to a cooperative or mutual. Cooper et al. ((71) describe how a 
'P2' archetype (traditional partnership) becomes overlaid with a managed 
professional business (MPB) archetype with more corporation-like goals and 
ideologies which value profitability, marketing and competitive success, 
productivity and client service above (as in P2) democratic control and 
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expert knowledge. Standards of work become more bureaucratised. There is 
a greater specialisation and greater reliance on rules and cross-functional 
teams as integrative structures. The relationship between individual goals 
and those of the 'organisation' (i.e. the group who control it) becomes 
subtly reversed. Managerial control among partners replaces a more 
collegial, democratic relationship. Notwithstanding some counter-argument 
(148), Ackroyd and Muzio conceptualise these changes as a less 
fundamental shift towards a 'reconstructed professional firm' (149,150). In 
medicine, McKinlay and Arches ((151) describe this shift as presaging the 
'proletarianization of physicians'. 
It has been argued that non-hierarchical organisational structures are 
impractical or unsustainable because they are liable to the following kinds of 
'degeneration'. 
1. The 'iron law of oligarchy' (57). Where peer control depends on social 
capital, power is likely to be unevenly distributed among the members 
of an organisation (103), and to become more so because successful 
use of informal sanctions strengthens the social capital of those 
members who already had enough of it to be influential in the first 
place (67) If the organisation is financially successful, the members 
who own a most of the equity of a partnership (86), are better 
educated (152) or have better external networks with the ruling party 
(122) or financiers take control and establish themselves as de facto 
owners of the enterprise. 
2. Employing wage-labour rather than recruiting new members or 
partners. The subjoined hierarchy eventually dominates the whole 
organisation, diluting its democratic character, leading to 
demutualisation (153,154) and re-instating the divergence of interests 
between employer (members or partners) and employees found in 
corporations (155,156). 
3. Selling equity (shares) to external financiers, or indeed the 
organisation's own managers (152), dilutes the members' ownership 
and therefore democratic control in favour of financiers whose main 
interest it to maximise the cash return on their investment. The 
organisation's structure and property-rights converge upon those of a 
corporation. From within, members prefer will prefer converting the 
organisation's surplus into income for themselves to re-investing it in 
the firm. 
4. Generational attrition. As the organisation ages its younger members 
are more weakly ideologically committed than the founders and 
tolerate reversion to a more conventional organisational structure 
(117). 
5. Weak decision-making. Democratic decision making is alleged to be too 
slow for responses to changed market conditions, (government policies 
or other environmental contingencies. Because members support 
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diverse values rather than the single goal of maximising profits, 
decision-making in NHOs will be more conflict-prone than in 
corporations, hence slower and with higher transaction costs (157) 
because a majority, or even consensus, has to be achieved (115). 
Decisions on controversial questions are likely to be fudged rather than 
consistent or clear-cut (155). Members will de-select leaders who try 
to manage them in ways they dislike (158). That 'unity of command' 
which Fayol (159) regarded as an advantage of hierarchy will be 
absent and corporations will out-compete the NHO. 
6. Insufficient access to capital. Insofar as external financiers believe point 
(5) applies, NHOs will find it hard to raise capital. An NHO which 
cannot sell its equity offers poor security against loans and is less 
willing to pay interest or rents than a corporation is (160). For 
partnerships in an English-style legal system, the larger the risks of 
litigation become, the more the partners will wish to isolate their 
personal wealth from those risks and the more inadequate their 
personal wealth becomes as security for the loan required should the 
partnership be sued. So 'As the degree of capital intensity increases, 
the professional partnership will be replaced by the private or public 
corporation' (33). 
7. Free riding. Each member has an incentive to shirk and not (vote for 
strong work monitoring mechanisms because his share in the total 
profits is small (161,162). Equal distribution of nett income rewards 
members of less than average productivity at the expense of those of 
greater than average productivity. Thus the former are likely to join 
the cooperative and the latter to leave (163). Checkland (9) predicts 
that if general practice partners recruit salaried doctors as employees 
the latter will stick to their defined workload and avoid taking on more. 
8. Consumer irrationality creates a tension between market demands and 
the organisation's goal of maintaining what its members regard as high 
product quality. If market forces make the partnership or NHO indulge 
what the members might see as consumers' perverse, ill-informed 
demands (perhaps stimulated by corporate marketing), the result is 
'mission drift' from the original goals (164). 
9. Becoming bigger. The larger an partnership's or NHO's financial base 
the more readily it can employ staff (106,165) whilst larger size makes 
collegial management harder (33). Before the recent financial crises 
one argument for privatising cooperatives and mutuals was these 
NHOs were too large for worthwhile member participation (166). The 
influence which one person can have and their share of the collective 
benefits diminish. Then controls on poor managerial performance 
weaken (89). The larger the organisation, the harder for it to avoid the 
free-rider problem (69). 
10. Becoming smaller. Vanek (167) proposed what others have called 'the 
self-extinction theorem' ((96), p.769). The fewer members a NHO has, 
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the larger the amount of distributed surplus each receives, so these 
organisations will tend to under-recruit members. But then in order to 
restore an optimal capital-labour ratio they will have to reduce the 
amount of capital they use; which makes it possible to reduce 
membership further; and so on until the organisation dissolves itself. 
11. Diversification. Heterogeneity of services provided and therefore of the 
professions involved removes uniformity of professional ethics, making 
collegial management harder; and commodified production is anyway 
more suited to bureaucratic modes of organisation (33). 
12. Equity release is impossible. When members leave the cooperative (as 
eventually they all must) they will not receive the value of the cash 
flow generated by assets which they helped create. Therefore 
cooperatives will under-invest in assets whose life is longer than 
members' career there (168), (hence invest less in such innovations 
than a corporation would. Consequently cooperatives are likely to be 
under-capitalised (155). Against this, a career is a longer planning 
horizon than most capital markets consider (169). 
13. Equity release is possible (the 'exploitation hypothesis'). The opposite 
prediction (170) concerns cooperatives with a large accumulated 
surplus, a high proportion of long-standing members (who stand to 
gain more than younger members do from acquiring some of the 
cooperative's present equity), growth in profits (hence undistributed 
surplus), little competitive advantage, and a rising proportion of newer 
members. Then, longer-standing members, and perhaps the managers 
they employ, have the opportunity for windfall gains by selling of the 
cooperative's equity to its founder members (100). However one-
member one-vote governance provides a limited protection against 
this event (154). 
2.5 Process 
In health care as elsewhere more than one 'technology' (core process) is 
sometimes capable of producing a given good or service. This raises the 
questions of whether the specific type of organisational structures found in 
partnerships and NHOs, tend to: 
1. Select certain types of core process (technology) rather than others. 
2. Operate a given type of core process in specific ways characteristic of 
NHOs. 
A core process includes not only the production of a good or service but also 
its distribution to users. Distribution and marketing are therefore also 
involved in the core process. Indeed many cooperatives have originated 
asdistribution and marketing organisations.In this context, 'process' means 
not the organisational activities ('organisational processes') which occur 
within such a structure, but the core productive process – the 'technology' – 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2012. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
 48 
Project 08/1518/105 
by which an organisation actually produces the healthcare or other goods 
and services, and thereby also the policy outcomes of interest to policy-
makers and managers. 
2.5.1 Production of goods and services 
For organisations in a market or a quasi-market, obtaining a specified 
income for members implies, sustaining a level of sales and therefore 
output sufficient to generate a break-even income. Assuming that producer 
organisations face declining average total costs over their range of 
production possibilities (171), that implies creating and exploiting 
economies of scale and scope up to that point. Even voluntary organisations 
which do not aim to generate livelihoods for their members nevertheless 
have to obtain sufficient (if proportionately smaller) inputs to sustain their 
core process (cover operating costs). When NHOs rely on donations or other 
fixed or precarious sources of income or inputs, they face the necessity of 
maximising the output from a given set of inputs. That is, they try to 
maximise efficiency in the sense of minimising the inputs required to 
produce a unit of output, and therefore select core processes accordingly. 
To obtain livelihood for members of a given occupation implies selecting 
processes of production which guarantee a role, or a fortiori give the central 
role, to the occupation in question. For to select a process of production is 
also to select (a limited range of options for) a division of labour. In this 
respect, members are likely to be risk-averse and reluctant to diversify their 
activities very far, leading to relatively conservative investment decisions 
(172,173). Maintenance of what the members regarded as good working 
conditions is likely to promote the adoption of working processes that 
automate or remove laborious, hazardous or low-status (see below) 
elements of the work process. The goal of creating working activity and its 
products which their members regarded as being of good technical quality 
and befitting their occupation is a second reason to predict that NHOs would 
(in contrast to corporate and many public bureaucracies) resist working 
processes that routinised or de-skilled work. If anything they would adopt 
work processes that increased the skills required for existing occupational 
groups, transferring their own less skilled work a (putatively) less-skilled 
occupation, providing the latter with tasks at the top of their range of skills. 
Thus the division of labour would, so to speak, shift 'upwards' in terms of 
skill for both occupations. Such changes would also satisfy the goal of 
promoting learning and other forms of self-development. In partnerships 
the additional profits from this 'leverage' (extended work roles) of employed 
staff accrue to the partners. This tactic implies codification of knowledge so 
that it can be transmitted to employees who are less expert than the 
partners (141). 
Quality of product would, we predicted, be defined on a priori technical and 
normative grounds. This obviously implies the selection of processes of 
production intended to to produce a complete, integrated product or service 
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realising those standards. Conversely such a goal also implies not producing 
what the members or partners would regard as technically redundant or 
superfluous products or services, including ones over-specified for the 
consumer need they were attempting to satisfy. If the partnership's or 
NHO's product or service quality is defined on technical or normative 
grounds, that implies also a policy of transparency ('honesty') about its 
specification in informational, promotional or marketing materials. 
It is difficult to predict a priori what effects upon selection and operation of 
the core process of product would arise from the non-economic values that 
members held. For those effects would depend on the content of those 
values, hence upon the social origins (112) of the NHO itself. However 
paths for NHO formation include 'rescuing' an earlier enterprise or the 
pursuit of other localised goals. Then the NHO would limit the scale of its 
core process to its community or place of origin. 
2.5.2 Consumer NHOs 
Consumer NHOs operate either or both of the following core processes: 
1. Mediating in interactions between its members and third-party providers 
so as to shift the balance of information and bargaining power in the 
members' favour when buying complex services such as healthcare 
(25). Ancillary to such interventions are social marketing campaigns 
(e.g. to reduce the fat, sugar and salt content of foods) aimed either at 
the producers of consumer goods or at changing state regulation of the 
producers. 
2. Commissioning services on its members behalf. This requires well-
developed search, bidding, legal (contractual), financial control and 
monitoring processes. It also requires negotiating and bargaining skills 
and, in a large organisation, consumer research staff to elicit and 
formulate its members' demands as consumers, and to recruit new 
members (subscribers). It may involve 'conflict handling' or discrepant 
demands from different groups of members). Typically these activities 
require a subjoined hierarchy of specialised staff. 
To resource the above requires recruiting paying members, and any 
consumer NHO needs activists to run it.. To this end Birchall and Simmons 
(174) propose a four stage strategy of identifying 'mobilisation potential' 
(reactivating membership lists, conducting member research), making 
membership more meaningful (providing better information to members, 
re-establishing democratic processes), building confidence and trust, and 
making organisational structures focus on their accountability to members. 
2.5.3 Marketing mix 
One way to summarise the above predictions is to contrast the marketing 
mix (175) which the above accounts imply a partnership or NHO will 
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develop with its corporate counterpart. The two marketing mixes will have 
some features in common. The legal framework usually sets minimum 
requirements for the content and veracity of consumer information, product 
quality and safety. The same regulatory and ethical codes apply to 
professionals whether they work in a partnership or for an employer. 
Table 2 predicts the differences which, because of their different goals, will 
nevertheless remain between the marketing mix of a producer NHO and 
that of a corporation. The table sets out the two types of organisations' 
preferred marketing mix, given their goals. Actually achieving this mix in 
practice may of course prove to be another matter. 
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Table 2. Marketing mix in NHOs and corporations  
 NHO Corporation 
Product Pre-defined quality standards. 
Products guarantee members' 
centrality to production.  
Product differentiation, unique selling 
points. Products designed to 
maximise sales volume and saleable 
'value added'.  
Price Break-even.  Initially below-cost price if necessary 
to gain market entry or remove 
competitors; thereafter highest 
sustainable price.  
Promotions Transparent, technical content 
and/or representation of 
NHO's non-economic goals.  
Persuasive sales promotions  
Place Often tied to place (in the 
geographical not the 
marketing sense), local 
identity. 
Footloose: any profitable sales 
channel or geographical location.  
The goals of guaranteeing members' livelihoods and a predefined quality of 
service implies break-even pricing. The goal of predefined quality standards 
implies implies transparent and rational sale promotion methods; but as 
noted this may come into tension with the imperative to obtain income. A 
profit-maximising goal implies maximising the saleable 'value added' to 
products even when, in the terms NHO partners or members would accept, 
the added value is technically superfluous (e.g. surgery for cosmetic not 
therapeutic reasons). In the long term a corporation also has to obtain a 
break-even price for its goods (indeed more), but what costs that price 
covers and their relative size is likely to vary between the two kinds of 
organisation. For instance NHOs have no costs of payments to shareholders 
to bear, but are likely to have higher wage costs resulting from reluctance 
to de-skill, casualise or dismiss labour. 
2.5.4 Impact on clinical workloads, job satisfaction and morale 
Professional engagement itself constitutes one piece of evidence for 
professional satisfaction with their working life, hence morale. Accordingly 
one would predict (from Table 1) professional morale and work satisfaction 
to be highest in professional partnership, and successively lower in provider 
NHO, consumer NHO and NHS foundation trust (or similar hierarchy). 
Professionals who control their own working conditions might be predicted 
to shift the profile of their workload towards the kinds of work attractive to 
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clinical professionals: work which their training equips them for; work 
whose difficulty attracts prestige or status in the profession (176); or simply 
work which interests or psychologically rewards the individuals involved. If 
so, less-esteemed types of work would either be transferred to other 
occupational groups or (if they refused it) be dropped. One would also 
predict a clinical workload that selected either highly-paid activities and/or 
activities that enhanced the equity value of the partnership itself. 
Greenwood and Empson (33) hypothesise that because partnerships use 
tournament career practices, they offer superior career incentives to 
professionals resulting in higher effort and productivity i.e. workloads. Given 
NHOs' goals, one would predict higher pay for equivalent work than in 
public or commercial bureaucracies. However one effect of restricting entry 
to professions is to create shortages of that kind of labour. Then 
competitive pressure to recruit scarce professionals would compel other 
organisations to offer salaries similar to a partner's income. Because of their 
relatively egalitarian origins, one would predict lower pay differentials in 
NHOs and partnerships than bureaucracies. 
2.5.5 Development of innovative practice 
Greenhalgh et al. (177) find that an innovation is more likely to be adopted 
when it is: 
1. Capable of small-scale trial 
2. Reversible 
3. Compatible with existing working practices 
4. Compatible with existing organisation members' 'values' 
5. Compatible with existing ways of measuring 'success' 
Conditions (1) and (2) are technical characteristics of the innovation which 
apply irrespective of organisational structure. However because 
partnerships tend to be small organisations, a sufficiently 'small' scale on is 
likely to be smaller than elsewhere. 'Compatability' requirements (3), (4) 
and (5) imply that innovations are most likely to be adopted when they 
conserve the existing patterns of control and benefit-distribution in an 
organisation. In health care, the necessary 'receptive' organisational 
context (178) includes absence of professional opposition (179,180) and, in 
partnerships and NHOs no opposition from the members or partners (rather 
than employees). Assuming that an NHO or partnership adopts innovations 
which reflect its organisational goals (181), Table 3 outlines what preceding 
sections imply will be the pattern of innovation in professional partnerships 
and NHOs. 
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Table 3. Predicted patterns of NHO and partnership innovation  
 Provider NHO Partnership Consumer NHO 
Dominant 
interest 
Working members Professional Partners Activist consumers  
Aims of 
adopting 
innovation  
Safeguard or 
increase income 
Improve working 
conditions 
Raise (member-
defined) quality of 
product  
Raise (partner-
defined) quality of 
product 
Conform to 
professional norms 
and discipline 
Increase partners' 
profits 
Raise service 
specification, 
remedy defects 
Reduce costs to 
(consumers 
Technical 
character 
Labour saving. 
Saving non-labour 
costs.  
High skill, high status 
work. 
Undertaken or 
controlled by partners' 
(profession(s) 
Inspire new 
providers 
Marketing (to 
recruit subscribers; 
social marketing) 
Discursive (new 
forms of contract 
etc.)  
External 
sources of 
innovation  
Other providers in 
sector 
Commissioner 
demands (in quasi-
market) 
Professional bodies 
Small owner-managed 
business (for 
organisational 
innovations) 
Commissioner 
demands (in quasi-
market) 
 
Interest and 
pressure groups 
 
For producer NHOs, the objective of maintaining members' incomes and 
working conditions implies preference only for cost-reducing innovations 
which do not intensify or routinise work but do save costs in other ways 
(e.g. fewer inputs, less processing). Labour-saving innovations (e.g. 
mechanisation) are compatible with this goal but not innovations which 
reduce costs by reducing wages. Mechanisation would imply a shift towards 
'commodified' (i.e. mass) production. As explained, some micro-economists 
predict that NHOs will make fewer long-lasting, capital intense innovations 
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than corporations do. Because it does not distribute profits, a producer NHO 
has less incentive than a corporation to profit from quality-reducing 
innovations (182). 
Partnerships would select similar innovations but with the additional 
constraints of selecting only innovations which retained the partners' control 
over the core processes (even if the partners no longer do the work 
personally), not innovations which introduced technologies which the 
partners could neither operate not control, and no innovations which risked 
causing large debts, for which partners have unlimited liability. That is a 
more conservative pattern of innovation than in limited liability or non-
hierarchical producer organisations. 
Not being controlled by producers, consumer NHOs would be open to a 
wider range of productin innovations than partnerships or producer NHOs, 
including innovations that radically altered the division of professional 
labour or even de-professionalised care provision. 
2.6 Outcomes 
The above framework yields implications how far the distinctive 
organisational structures described would tend to produce the NHS policy 
outcomes of interest to the present project. Those of professional 
engagement, of impacts on clinical workloads, job satisfaction and morale, 
and of innovative practices are discussed above. There remain four others. 
2.6.1 Impact on clinical quality and development of best practice 
Here we equate clinical quality and best practice with the uptake of 
evidence-based practice, in contrast to studies (101) which implicitly equate 
clinical quality with intensity of diagnostic testing and treatment (and 
equate these with doctors' 'effort'). 
Left to themselves, one would predict that partnerships and NHOs would 
develop a collegial, relational model of clinical governance in contrast to 
more 'Fordist' (prescriptive, documented, formalised, standardised) 
approaches to clinical governance (144). Nonetheless the mechanism of 
mutual scrutiny 'a mechanism more readily operated and potent within an 
organisation than an inter-organisational network 'would tend to 
homogenise clinical practice. The goal of allowing NHO members to 
concentrate on what they regard as work befitting their occupation and as 
high-status work implies that one would expect to see evidence-basing 
focussed and the development of clinical practice being at the level of the 
interaction between the individual clinician and patients, and on the more 
medicalised areas of care (183). 
Because they do not directly produce health services, consumer NHOs 
implement evidence-based clinical guidance only indirectly, by proxy 
through service contracts (or the equivalent). On would therefore expect 
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them to adopt more epidemiologically- than clinically-oriented approaches 
to evidence-basing, leaving the clinically-oriented approaches to providers 
(including partnerships and producer NHOs). To define quality of care 
standards in whatever services they commissioned, they would have to rely 
upon prior definitions in service contracts and upon post-facto monitoring of 
providers' quality of care. These techniques for external implementation, 
hence the corresponding patterns of innovation in them, are the same as for 
corporate and public commissioners. But insofar as consumer NHOs 
originate as responses to market or state failure, they would innovate by 
commissioning types of services not commissioned by other commissioners 
i.e. unprofitable services, controversial services, services with low status 
among the clinical professions and services for 'undeserving' care groups. In 
short, their innovations would occur on the (current) margins of the health 
system. 
2.6.2  Adherence to external performance targets 
For present purposes we take the external targets in question as being 
those set by service commissioners, government departments, regulatory 
bodies and international organisations. 
The extent to which these external bodies can exercise governance over 
another organisation depends, firstly, upon how the objectives of the NHO 
or partnership membership align with the external performance targets. If 
they do align, the external body's capacity to achieve adherence will depend 
on the character of the accountability chains (184) (number of intermediate 
organisations, character of the links between them, consistency of the 
targets involved) linking them to (in this case) the NHO or partnerships. In 
a quasi-market professional partnerships are embedded in triple 
accountability chains: to commissioners, to regulators and to professional 
organisations. External targets which all three chains endorse are therefore 
likely to be highly salient to a professional partnership, hence likely to be 
implemented. 
Many NHOs form however in response to apparent failures of the public 
sector, or a fortiori in opposition to public policy. Then this alignment of 
objectives is unlikely. Their adherence to external performance targets will 
be achieved only the the extent that the commissioners (and other target-
setters) exercise power over them. We adapt Therborn's account (185) of 
power for to explain how susceptible partnerships and NHOs are to external 
sources of power. 
Obviously external bodies cannot select (or rather, elect) the topmost 
officials or managers in NHOs or partnerships nor manage any conflicts 
within them, but simply because these organisations are independent not 
because of their internal (organisational structure. These organisations' 
adherence to external performance targets will therefore depend on the 
following remaining conditions. 
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1. Law and regulation. Whilst the legal and regulatory framework for 
professions covers (also) professionals in partnerships and NHOs, it is 
usually too broadly defined to enforce adherence to specific policy or 
managerial targets. Typically, contracts are the main legal or 
regulatory mechanism for producing adherence to external targets. 
Their effect depends upon how the contracts themselves were 
formulated, what incentives attached to them, and whether the 
partnership or NHO was willing to sign such a contract in the first 
place. 
2. Resource dependence and bargaining power determine the willingness 
of partnerships or NHOs to do so. Cornforth and Simpson (186) 
suggest that smaller organisations (which partnerships often are) are 
more dependent on external resources and than larger ones (such as 
NHS trusts). However it may be that what matters is not the size but 
the proportion of an organisation's resources coming from a given 
external source, in this case NHS commissioners. In that case, 
professional partnerships in England would be highly adherent to 
external targets because few of them earn enough income from non-
NHS sources (medical certification etc.) to meet their income 
requirements. Probably fewer than 2% of English general practices, 
largely in London, are sustained mainly by private income. NHS 
commissioners' near-monopsony power is thus their main means of 
achieving partnership and NHO adherence to policy targets. 
3. Impersonal power. When one occupational group alone can operate a 
technology for which there is no substitute, for example by maintaining 
an occupational closure, it gains power thereby. including the power to 
resist or temper external targets. However, because such power 
accrues to an occupational group because of its technical role in a core 
productive process, it is the same across all organisational structures. 
4. Ideological persuasion. The likelihood of adherence to an external target 
will obviously be increased if the commissioner can persuade the NHO 
or partnership of the legitimacy of that target in terms the members' 
or partners' beliefs and the types of NHO or partnership goals listed 
above (. If the external targets align with these beliefs and goals, the 
NHO or partnership would adhere to the targets more willingly than 
(say) a corporation, whose goals are independent of such 
considerations. But the content of the organisation's ideology (could 
equally stimulate resistance to external targets, starting by recalling 
any elected managers who (members or partners thought) were 
pursuing external targets against the members' interests or beliefs. 
5. Transparency (187). The ability of a commissioner or other external 
body to secure adherence to its targets depends also upon whether it 
can detect adherence or non-adherence to them; that is upon whether 
the organisations' activity is transparent to the commissioner. Because 
they tend to pursue a different competitive strategy than corporations 
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do, and tend to make their internal managerial regime and working 
processes transparent (in contrast to 'commercial confidentiality'), it 
would be easier for commissioners to verify adherence (or not) to 
external targets on the part of partnerships and NHOs than on the part 
of corporations. 
2.6.3 Patient experiences 
Patient outcomes and experiences have two main components. Within the 
limits of existing health care technologies the outcome of clinical care 
depends upon the extent to which it is evidence based (see above). That 
leaves the matter of how far services conform to patients' expressed desires 
or preferences in such matters as convenience and how 'user-friendly' 
services are (e.g. relationships between staff and patients). In partnerships 
and NHOs (as other organisations) that depends upon what mechanisms 
exist for patients' expressed needs to influence decision-making. 
Professions (hence professional partnerships) subscribe to codes of ethical 
conduct in dealing with patients but these codes focus upon honesty, 
informed consent etc. rather than specify such matters as the convenience, 
range or user-friendliness. The goal of what members of partners define as 
high-quality care is, in health care, likely to include its clinical effectiveness, 
an outcome which patients also want. But given their origins, the goals of 
professional partnerships and NHOs will not necessarily include a goal of 
user satisfaction of their experience of health care. Neither can it be stated 
a priori how the goals of maintaining members' livelihoods and working 
conditions will impact upon the quality of service as clients experience it. 
(For producer NHOs, user participation in decision making is perforce 
marginal. Their democratic structures exist to give effect to the collective 
will of the members not consumers. Provider NHOs which rely upon user 
participation in decision-making and management are therefore likely to 
have an extent and effect as limited as has been reported (188,189) for 
some public bodies. Since partnership and NHO goals express partner nor 
member (i.e. producer) rather than consumer interests, a coincidence 
between these goals and consumers' expressed wishes is more likely to be 
the exception than the rule. 
If they do not spontaneously align, that alignment has to be created 
artificially from outside, either by a commissioner (whether an NHS 
commissioner or a consumer NHO) or by the consumers themselves. In a 
quasi-market, patient outcomes then depend upon the extent to which the 
commissioners are willing and able to convert users' preferences for 
services into contractual requirements, and then ensure adherence to those 
requirements. The conditions under which a commission would have the 
power to do so are outlined above. 
Consumer NHOs are the polar instance of user participation 'or rather 
control 'as the mechanism whereby consumers' preferences determine the 
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goals and activity of an organisation. For these organisations, the extent to 
which they achieve the outcomes that their users want depends on: 
1. How faithfully they implement the members' decisions; that is, upon the 
extent to which they have not 'degenerated' (see above). Where 
alternative cooperatives exist, members may try to influence consumer 
cooperatives' behaviour through 'exit' rather than 'voice' (143). 
2. The extent of their market power over providers, also described above. 
3. Their capacity to produce for themselves the services their members 
require, i.e. become a combined producer-and-consumer NHO. 
Consumer NHOs have the specific goal of obtaining services which would 
not otherwise exist for their members, and achieving that goal would the 
organisations' distinctive outcome for consumers. The same applies to the 
ancillary goal of making accurate information about products and services 
available to its members. 
2.6.4 Cost-effectiveness of service provision 
The effectiveness of service provision, i.e. the extent to which it is 
evidence-based, is considered above. Whilst a corporation has incentives to 
minimise the cost of its goods or service so that the residual shareholder 
profit is maximised, it does so in order to pass the savings on (so far as 
possible) to shareholders not payers. A partnership or NHOs has the 
financial goal of breaking even (in the sense defined above), hence of 
containing (rather than minimising) costs so that its income covers them 
over time across all its activities. On the assumption that cost changes are 
reflected in prices to the payer, the foregoing material suggests three 
conflicting predictions for the impact which producer NHOs and partnership 
have on the costs of service provision to those who pay for the services. 
1. Increased prices, because one goal of producer NHOs and professional 
providers is to maintain its members' income and working conditions at 
more generous levels than the prevailing market rates (106). The goal 
of producing high-quality goods or services (as defined by members or 
partners) may also be presumed to increase costs. 
2. Decreased prices, because shareholder and rentier payments are 
avoided. Members or partners pool risks and cover fluctuations in each 
other's overloads, which if anything reduces the unit costs of services. 
Many NHOs also rely - sometimes heavily - on voluntary labour 
including that of informal carers (which some commentators (190) 
regard as cost-shifting). It has also been argued that a well-motivated, 
more contented, self-managed workforce will be more productive than 
an hierarchically managed one (191,192). Cooperatives entering an 
oligopolistic market may produce 'yardstick competition', raising 
output and reducing prices compared with an oligopoly (193), and with 
a corporate monopoly (194). Also: 
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Because professional partnerships have higher reputations than public corporations, they 
enjoy lower status-based costs and are thus more efficient in the delivery of professional 
services. 
(33) 
3. Unchanged prices, because the prices of services are determined by the 
balance of demand and supply across the sector as a whole, not by the 
internal structure of the producer organisations, so long as these 
organisations are 'price takers' rather than 'price makers'. 
More generally, it has been argued that NHOs are likely to be inefficient, 
have high transaction costs (195) or 'distort' market incentives. Kremer 
(196) argues that worker cooperatives' habit of redistributing income 
among members distorts (market) incentives. If the median member has 
less than average ability, the cooperative will vote for income redistribution, 
weakening personal incentives; but members who lose by this (i.e. 
contribute more than the average) will be reluctant to leave since this 
entails forfeiting the dividends on their capital contribution. This argument 
assumes that members make a personal cash payment to join the co-
operative but cannot then sell or otherwise recoup it. When there are no 
share prices to reflect managerial efficiency, the incentive to monitor that 
efficiency is reduced ((155) and cp. (117)). A hybrid structure as described 
above insulates the employees from the effects of external variations in 
incentive or other payments (69). Against this, members of a partnership or 
NHO which distributed its profits equally would (paradoxically) be more 
directly exposed to market or quasi-market incentives than, say, the 
employees of a corporation who receive fixed salaries with only the owners 
being directly exposed to market incentives. In sum, markets will select 
against inefficient non-hierarchical producers, which implies that market 
survival is evidence for, and extinction evidence against, their micro-
economic efficiency. Many predictions of degeneration or conversion cite 
inferior microeconomic efficiency either as reasons why NHOs (especially) 
will in fact be rare (147), or as reasons why economic policy should make 
them rare. 
Such predictions have an empirical but also a normative content. The latter 
is usually the neo-classical micro-economic assumption that Pareto-optimal 
competitive equilibria are the normatively desirable outcome of economic 
activity. Some writers (e.g. (197)) expressly argue that if a non-hierarchical 
organisation exhibits different patterns of price, output and factor use to a 
perfectly competitive corporation, then since the latter is a priori efficient, 
non-hierarchical organisation is not. Supporters of non-hierarchical 
producers might reply that to 'distort' or neutralise certain market 
incentives is a merit, not a defect, of these organisations. 
Consumer NHOs aim to increase consumers' bargaining power vis-a-vis 
providers which ceteris paribus would reduce prices and bring quality 
specifications close to users' preferences as articulated by the NHO. 
Compared with individual consumers, consumer NHOs will achieve lower 
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prices than the hitherto prevailing market price ((106) for a given service 
specification (range or quality or both); or higher service specification for a 
given price. For a consumer NHO is in a stronger bargaining position than 
individual consumers to negotiate these benefits. For the same reasons the 
consumer NHO would achieve wider eligibility of access. 
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3 Research aims and questions 
3.1 Research aims 
In light of this background, this project aims to contribute to improving the 
evidence base about, and so an improved understanding of, how 
professional partnerships and NHOs as organisational structures produce (or 
not) distinctive effects on the cost, quality, effectiveness and user 
experience of the services they produce. Among the rationales for such 
research are the need for an evidence base for decisions about what kinds 
of partnerships and NHOs the NHS should incorporate or commission. There 
is also a simple scientific rationale. Despite the prevalence of partnerships 
and HHOs existing body of organisational research into these organisational 
structures is evidently deficient. 
3.2 Research questions 
We adopted the research questions stipulated in the research brief but 
altered their sequence to match the environment-structure-process-
outcome ('ESPO') framework described above. 
1. Organisational Environment: 
a. What are the goals (explicit and implicit) of such organisations and 
why/how are they established? 
b. What is the nature of the governance and incentive arrangements 
that are placed on these organisations from external bodies? Is 
there an effective form of regulation, and if so what is th e nature of 
this?  
2. Organisational Structures: 
a. What are the structures and internal organisational arrangements of 
non-hierarchical organisations and partnerships? How are 
professional partnerships and non-hierarchical organisations co-
ordinated, and what makes for a successful co-ordination strategy? 
b. What are the key elements to the internal management of such 
organisations? 
c. How do professionals within such organisations interact with each 
other and how do they regulate themselves? 
d. How do such forms of organisation impact on securing professional 
engagement? 
3. Process: How do such forms of organisation impact on: 
a. Clinical workloads, job satisfaction and morale? 
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b. The development of innovative practice? 
4. Outcomes: How do such forms of organisation impact on the policy 
outcomes of: 
a. Clinical quality and development of best practice? 
b. Adherence to external performance targets? 
c. The cost-effectiveness of service provision? 
d. Patient outcomes/experiences? 
This report does not consider informal organisations within bureaucracies 
(e.g. trades unions), organisations which exist solely to promote political 
causes or vested interests, or 'partnerships' as the term is used in 
normative accounts of the professional-client relationships (e.g. (198)). 
Neither does it consider inter-organisational networks, collaborations or 
contracts, or network-based sharing schemes (199). By non-hierarchical 
organisations we mean organisations controlled by their members on a one-
person-one-vote basis. This definition excludes employee shareholder 
schemes (wherein employees are a minority shareholders and voting is per 
share not per person) (117); worker 'participation' in management (as 
opposed to control) including 'co-determination'; and consumer 
participation in (as opposed to control of) public bodies (e.g. Sure Start 
schemes (200)). 
As research questions 2(b) does, (and some researchers (201) also, we 
reserve the term 'management' for governance by bureaucracy (hence, 
hierarchically) and the term 'coordination' for the egalitarian and democratic 
governance which, in different ways, both NHOs and partnerships use. We 
therefore take RQ 2(b) as (referring both to democratic governance, and (to 
the line-management element in hybrid structures. Throughout this report 
we (use 'member' and 'partner' to denote the people in NHOs and 
partnerships (respectively) who can vote and hold elective office. 
'Employees' are the salaried staff who cannot. We use 'worker' to denote (in 
producer organisations) both categories combined. 
As the 'external bodies' mentioned in RQ1 (we focus on the public 
authorities (PCTs, SHAs, practice-based commissioners) which commission 
partnerships or NHOs to provide care. We define impact on clinical quality 
and development of best practice (RQ4(a)) as the extent of adoption of 
evidence based practice. In 'user outcomes / experience' (RQ4(d)) we 
include 'service outcomes'(access to services, range of services offered) and 
the degree of opportunity for users to influence decision-making. We take 
'cost-effectiveness' (RQ4c) as a marker for the wider normative criterion of 
economic efficiency. 
Some research questions overlap. Adherence to external performance 
targets (RQ4(b)) we regard as a special case of external governance 
(RQ1(b)). To prevent repetition we subsume it under that heading when 
presenting the findings. Similarly, adoption of evidence-basing (as we now 
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interpret RQ4(a)) is a special case of the adoption of innovations generally 
(RQ3(b)) (202). We interpret 'patient outcomes' (RQ4(d)) to include 
'service outcomes' (access to services, range of services offered), but the 
range and scale of services offered depends on what innovations 
organisations adopt, already covered under RQ3(b). RQ4(b) on adherence 
to external performance largely duplicates RQ1(b). 'How do such forms 
impact?' we take to connote: 'What effects are produced and through what 
mechanisms?' Implicitly RQ2(d), RQ3(a) and the whole of RQ4 invoke a 
counterfactual: how would the impacts differ from those produced by 
another organisational structure? The two obvious counterfactuals are 
'public firms' (e.g. NHS Foundation Trusts) and shareholder-owned for-profit 
businesses, for short labelled 'corporations' throughout this report. 
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4 Methods 
4.1 Study design 
A multi-method design combined a cross-sectional comparison of multiple 
case studies with a systematic review. Because comparatively little is known 
about partnerships and NHOs we adopted dual method. One component 
was a wide-ranging systematic research review. From theoretical material in 
found in the review we formulated the middle-range theoretical framework 
outlined above (ch.2). The other component was a cross-sectional 
maximum-variety set of exploratory case studies. From them we selected 
the subset of healthcare sites and made more detailed longitudinal case 
studies of them. Qualitative testing (203) of the theoretical framework was 
then possible against two sets of data: 
1. Data from the case studies, in particular the more detailed health sector 
cases. 
2. Empirical findings reported in the studies which were systematically 
reviewed. 
The theoretical framework was therefore open to falsification and 
modification in light of the evidence and findings emerging from the study. 
Since this was a framework partly of the authors' own assembling the more 
rigorous approach was to test it in both a falsificationist (204) and a 
verificationist (205) way. (Although different the two methodologies are 
compatible.) In testing the framework we deliberately checked for 
disconfirming evidence. 
4.2 Systematic review of literature 
4.2.1 Search 
The aim of the search was to extend an existing database of the 
predominantly qualitative research literature on organisational structure 
conducted for an earlier study (36) to ensure that it covered as completely 
as possible the relatively sparse and scattered studies of NHOs and 
partnerships. The systematic review was necessarily an iterative process 
involving a combination of database searching, scanning existing 
bibliographies, citation searching and scanning web sites. We electronically 
searched two groups of databases: a group of cross sector databases on 
organisational studies comprising ABI-Inform, Scopus and Web of 
Knowledge; and then a group of health related research comprising 
Medline, Pubmed and Cinahl. Two separate searches were conducted 
because the software and user interfaces for the health databases allowed 
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more sophisticated search strategies (more complex combinations of search 
terms, hence more specific selection) than ABI-Inform. 
ABI-Inform search. The electronic all-sector search used ABI-Inform as the 
main database, which despite the limitations in its search capacities covers 
a wide range of economic sectors and organisational types. This search 
began with scoping searches, using a number of methods, aimed at 
identifying keywords, journals, authors and organisations for further 
systematic searching by means of: 
1. Citation searches of papers cited in the research proposal 
2. Looking up bibliographic records of papers cited in the research 
proposal. 
3. Exploration of subject keywords used to index literature on professional 
partnerships on ABI-Inform 
4. Scanning bibliographies of other commissioned projects within the SDO 
Studying Health Care Organisations theme and recording relevant 
papers for potential inclusion 
5. Identifying web sites of relevant organisations for systematic scanning 
6. The preceding steps led to a search of ABI-Inform, Scopus and Web of 
Knowledge databases to identify organisational science research on 
particular types of professional partnership, including management 
consultancies, law and architecture partnerships. 
This search found 1510 items. During these searches we generated a list of 
synonyms for organisational forms and types of professional partnership in 
health care which we combined with terms suggested by the research brief 
and proposal to produce a further search strategy for the main subject 
search of Medline. 
Medline search. We combined the list of synonyms for organisational forms 
and types generated in the cross-sector literature search with terms used in 
or implied by the original research proposal to produce a further search 
strategy for a health-sector search using Medline as the starting main 
database, and otherwise using the same methods as above. After removing 
duplicates already found in the preceding search this added 619 items. 
The electronic search strategy for Medline is stated in Appendix 2. (The ABI-
Inform search used equivalent terms and logic.) The lists of peer reviewed 
items from the two database searches were combined giving a list of 2129 
abstracts of varying completeness and informativeness. The above searches 
were limited to peer reviewed materials, which we sought in order to find 
well-theorised, well-evidenced and tested explanations of the relationships 
between organisational environment, structures, processes and outcomes in 
NHOs and partnerships. Because of the likely paucity of material, we placed 
no date limits on the electronic searches. 
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Hand searches. Besides identifying key journals in this topic area for hand 
searching, the above steps also showed that because of the disparate and 
scattered nature of the relevant research, hand-searching would be a more 
important search method than for topics with a more formalised body of 
research. More work than first anticipated therefore went into hand 
searching. We hand-searched a small number of journals which focus 
explicitly on the topic areas of interest. The hand searches were continued 
throughout the project period. 
As additional sources of data we also wished to obtain unpublished 
research, 'grey' literature and reportage from non-peer reviewed 
periodicals. We supplemented the electronic searches with hand searches of 
websites, beginning with the RCGP and Mutuo, as national bodies of 
partnerships and NHOs respectively, to collect grey material from them, and 
to snowball the search on to other sources that they might recommend. We 
regularly scanned the Health Services Journal, Pulse, the Nursing Times and 
the social policy sections of the Guardian as the periodicals most likely to 
contain relevant rapportage. When possible we traced the reported material 
back to its original sources if the latter were peer-reviewed journal papers. 
Hand searches of non-peer reviewed grey literature and the media, 
including the professional press, yielded 112 and 74 documents 
respectively. Of the latter 16 were in the peer-reviewed part of the 
professional press (Nursing Standard, Nursing Times etc.). 
4.2.2 Selection, coding and data extraction 
To select papers for inclusion or exclusion we coded them according to what 
elements in the ESPO framework their abstracts described and what kind of 
organisations. Selection of peer reviewed papers for data extraction 
involved three stages. First, based on the ESPO framework, the research 
brief and questions we devised the coding framework shown in Appendix 3. 
To refine the framework the researchers separately coded a maximum-
variety selection of 24 papers sampled from the search results. The 
researchers then met to compare their initial codings. Where the codings 
differed the researchers agreed more specific coding criteria. This process 
also helped refine our definitions of what did (or not) count as a non-
hierarchical organisation or a professional partnership. 
The second stage was to apply these criteria to code all the abstracts. Each 
abstract in the list of peer-reviewed papers or books was screened by two 
researchers for relevance to the study. The two researchers selected blind 
of each other, and items were allocated in such a way as to give each 
possible combination of pairs of assessors. We checked each possible 
category of disagreement (i.e. whether paper was about an NHO or not; 
whether paper was about partnership or not; disagreement over 
classification of partnership; disagreement over classification of NHO) and 
what categories of the ESPO framework it was about. Testing of the initial 
agreement on how to classify the papers by ESPO categories produced a 
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Cronbach's alpha of 0.42 which is low; alpha > 0.7 is generally regarded as 
acceptable (206). This level of agreement probably reflected the diversity of 
the literature being assessed, differences in the researchers' disciplinary 
backgrounds and the fact that two of the team were new to screening in 
this subject area. Differences in coding were reconciled by agreeing specific 
written criteria for categorisation in (previously) ambiguous cases. The 
criteria were then jointly applied to the disputed categorisations. Items 
which satisfied the disambiguated selection criteria and those whose 
abstracts were too brief or ambiguous to indicate whether they were 
relevant to the present study were then retrieved. Each study was thus 
categorised according to whether it contained empirical material about 
partnerships and if so what kind (by economic sector i.e. medical, 
consultancy, accounting etc.); and whether it contained empirical material 
about NHOs and if so what kind, again by economic sector. These fields 
were the first eight of the data extraction instrument in Appendix 3. 
Studies which contained empirical findings about at least one ESPO category 
and at least one category of study organisation were selected for us to 
obtain the full paper, as were studies whose database entry was too brief or 
ambiguous to ascertain its relevance from. We excluded papers which were 
clearly irrelevant, for example because they concerned 'partnership' in the 
sense of civil partnership or marriage, or what were evidently large 
bureaucracies. 'Cooperation' or 'cooperative' produced many at best 
tangentially relevant citations about working relationships between 
occupational groups. Many papers were found to concern 'partnership' and 
'non-hierarchical organisation' in the sense of inter-organisational networks. 
We donated them to another SDO project on that topic. Nevertheless, so as 
not to miss materials in a relatively sparse field, we included any papers 
whose relevance to the present project was uncertain (as opposed to 
certainly irrelevant). Of 2194 items found in the searches only 330 
(approximately 15%) proved to have any relevant empirical findings. 
We therefore supplemented them by obtaining: 
1. Unpublished peer reviewed research studies from academics and think 
tanks known to the researchers to be working in this field (cited in the 
text below). 
2. Other relevant papers which appeared in the main journals for the field 
during the course of the research, and concurrent news rapportage. 
3. Apparently relevant papers which we found references to whilst 
extracting data or conducting other research projects. 
4. Hand-searching the last years' issues of journals which specialise in the 
subject area of this project and which the systematic search had 
shown to produce relevant papers viz. Annals of Public and Co-
operative Economics, Economic and Industrial Democracy, Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, the International Journal of Voluntary and 
Non-Profit Organisation and Labor Studies Journal. 
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These methods yielded another 191 full text papers, making a total of 521. 
The selected items were then downloaded or obtained from libraries or their 
authors, except for 14 (mostly pre-1980) items which we would could not 
obtain anywhere. Having obtained the full-text items we excluded editorials, 
advertorials, non-theoretical data-free papers, empirically irrelevant papers 
obtained on the strength of an ambiguous, vague or missing abstract, and 
data-free theoretical papers. These exclusion criteria caused heavy attrition 
especially among the economics papers (mostly data-free algebraic 
models), leaving 194 papers with relevant empirical content. Peer-reviewed 
theoretical but data-free papers were however retained for use in 
constructing the initial theoretical framework above. Thus the inclusion 
criteria were that items should be both (1) peer reviewed and (2) have 
empirical content about partnerships or NHOs or both. 
4.2.3 Data synthesis 
The pre-selection coding had allowed us to group the selected papers 
thematically by relationship between ESPO categories i.e. relationship 
between organisational environment and structure, between organisational 
structure and process and so on for all six possible combinations. Each 
researcher undertook to analyse one such theme and all the full text-papers 
relevant to that theme were allocated to them for data extraction. Data 
were extracted onto the form in Appendix 3. Reviewers extracted data 
relevant to not only to their allocated theme but also to all the other themes 
treated in their allocated papers. For each of the six ESPO themes data from 
the separate forms were then collated into a single document, which was 
the raw material for each section of the empirical systematic review findings 
presented below. This method which immediately exposed any patterns of 
agreement or of disagreement among empirical findings in the reviewed 
studies. 
Some full-text materials stated theories relevant to the research brief. 
(Some, particularly economics papers, contained little else.) The foregoing 
theoretical framework (ch.2) was assembled from these or, where gaps 
remained, by a priori reasoning. The architecture of the explanatory 
framework was adapted from an SDO review on organisational form and 
function (36). In particular, we attempted to deduce from the published 
studies their implications for public-sector health systems such as the NHS. 
In this way we generated working assumptions, tailored to our research 
questions and the research brief, about the relationships between 
organisational structures and policy outcomes in NHOs and partnerships. 
We also deduced the taxonomy below (ch.12), following the taxonomic 
principles described by (e.g.) Pinnington and Morris (74). We checked that 
the resulting categories were logically consistent, mutually exclusive and 
together covered all the varieties of NHO and partnership we had found 
evidence of. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2012. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
 69 
Project 08/1518/105 
4.3 Case studies 
4.3.1 Sampling 
Our sampling strategy was theoretically driven. One way to test our 
assumptions (see above) that organisations' environments determine their 
founding membership and gaols, hence core processes and organisational 
structures, was to explore how far diverse environments, memberships and 
core processes did indeed produce the predicted divergence of 
organisational structures; and how all the former produced diverse 
outcomes. This theoretical framework drove a qualitative maximum-variety 
sampling strategy. Our case study sites were purposively selected to cover 
the main NHOs and partnership structures in differing environments and 
with differing core processes. Hence we assembled a cross-sectoral sample 
of case study sites. In qualitative sampling the question of achieving 
statistical representativeness does not arise. Rather, our sampling strategy 
was to obtain cases that were typical in kind of the types of organisation we 
wished to study. That is, their organisational structures contained a 
substantial non-hierarchical component. We sought one example (case) of 
middling size and scope of activity in its field. We limited the selection to 
partnerships with three or more partners because a smaller partnership 
would be unlikely to have a developed relational democracy or subjoined 
hierarchy, indeed be too small to count as an organisation (207). The first 
strategy produced, as a first stage, a broad selection of study sites of which 
we would make relatively brief case studies. Our reasons for initially 
comparing health and non-health organisations were to explore: 
1. As wide a variety as feasible within project resources of the 
memberships, governance structures and core processes that NHOs 
and partnerships accommodate; hence, a wide variety of the 
relationships between these elements. 
2. Whether, how and why, these organisational structures and core 
processes differed across economic sectors, so as to throw into relief 
any differentiating characteristics of those in health sector. 
The corresponding range of coordination and management problems which 
NHOs and partnerships face, and the range of solutions attempted. This 
work contributed to produced an initial set of answer to the descriptive 
elements of the research questions stated in the brief besides laying the 
groundwork for stage 2. Following a ‘funnelling’ strategy for site selection 
we (selected about half of the stage 1 cases for more in-depth studies over 
a longer (i.e. two-year) period, a two-layer arrangement of case-studies is 
similar to that of (the Evercare evaluation (208). Since the research brief 
and questions explicitly concern health settings, we funnelled down in the 
second set of case studies to examining the health sector cases more fully. 
The longer duration, greater detail and larger number of informants in these 
case studies was intended to aid the gathering of data on informal 
organisational structures and to enable the case studies to narrate how 
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external changes or stimuli were perceived (or ignored) by NHO or 
partnership ‘boundary spanners’, how decision makers responded (e.g. 
what targets they set, what internal incentives they apply), how these 
events set in train further organisational processes, and to what effect on 
services. 
4.3.2 Site selection 
We identified possible study sites by consulting the relevant academic 
departments in the applicants’ institutions, the researchers’ existing 
networks of relevant contacts and searching the websites and publications 
of such sector-wide coordinating bodies as Mutuo and CABs, the DH website 
and the professional press. From the NPCRDC database we were able to 
identify a small number of PCTs with a relatively wide variety of general 
practices and other providers, and this suggested a number of PCTs whose 
websites we checked and to whom we made telephone enquiries seeking 
information about whether their general practices included any with salaried 
doctors employed by the PCT. In fact several of the PCTs contacted had 
difficulty supplying such information. We contacted 23 organisations of 
which, after various refusals, 12 agreed to participate in the study. More 
than we had expected the choice of study sites was constrained by 
availability (what types of organisation actually existed at the time of 
study), visibility (which of the available existing organisations were visibly 
identified as partnerships or NHOs in the sources mentioned) and access 
(which of them were willing to be study sites). In general, professional 
partnerships were harder to access than other kinds of (organisations. In 
some cases (e.g. general medical practices with a manager as partner, PCT-
managed practices ) it took visits to several sites before we found one 
willing to participate. In one non-health NHO we had just started 
interviewing when the organisation lost a local authority contract and our 
main contacts were made redundant. Few consumer cooperatives exist in 
the UK health sector. We approached one of the largest but they declined to 
participate (no reason given). We therefore initially proposed to study a 
New Zealand IPA as an instance of this category of NHO since these IPAs 
are part of a health system quite similar the English NHS. We therefore 
sought the advice of academic colleagues currently working in New Zealand 
and contacts in the New Zealand Department of Health as to whether these 
IPAs would be suitable study sites, and if so how to access them. These 
enquiries and the New Zealand Department of Health publications 
suggested that the character of the New Zealand IPAs was not quite what 
certain policy documents suggested. Although these IPAs were supposedly 
intended as community-controlled, co-operative like bodies for 
commissioning local primary care services, closer enquiry suggested that in 
reality they are much more like the medically-dominated Primary Care 
Groups found in England during 1998-2001 i.e. a network of general 
practices with a relatively egalitarian but professionally dominated co-
ordinating body. In consultation with SDO we therefore abandoned the idea 
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of studying a New Zealand IPA and investigated whether it would be 
realistic to study a patient and consumer cooperatives in the Netherlands. 
That however would require a native Dutch speaker to do the fieldwork. 
Even in the Netherlands there are few experts in this field and the four 
whom we contacted were already fully committed. We therefore approached 
a prominent consumer cooperative in the USA which, as following data 
showed, proved to be a study site well suited to the purposes of the present 
project. These methods and contingencies resulted in the selection of the 
following case study sites, here pseudonymised to comply with the 
conditions of ethical approval. Fuller background descriptions are in 
Appendix 1. 
NHOs, non-health: 
A) 'Wholefood': Whole-food producer, retailer and cafe 
B) 'Bigshop': Retailer, household goods 
C) 'HouseLend': Mutual building society 
Partnerships, non-health: 
D) 'Legal': Legal partnership 
E) 'Architects': Architectural partnership 
F) 'Accountants': Accountancy Partnership 
Partnerships, health : 
G) 'NurseLed': Nurse-led general practice 
H) 'PlusPM': General practice with manager partner 
I) 'PharmPlus': General practice with pharmacist partner 
NHOs, health: 
J) 'OverThere': US consumer cooperative commissioning health services 
K) 'Metro': GP out-of-hours cooperative 
L) 'City': Social Enterprise providing out-of-hours and other primary 
care services 
Besides the 12 main sites we collected data for comparison more restricted 
data focusing on structure, origins and market strategy at a PCT-managed 
general practice ('PCTrun') and three corporate primary care providers, one 
('WasCoop') a de-mutualised out-of-hours cooperative. To check that the 
selected study were sites typical of their respective types of NHO and 
partnership in terms of populations served we compared the characteristics 
of the population they served, as described in GPPS data, with the English 
averages. It so happened that our one of two OOH cooperative study sites 
served all but two general practices in the three PCTs that it served ((98% 
of practices there) and the other served all practices. By combining PCT-
level GPPS data for each set of three PCTs it was therefore possible to 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2012. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
 72 
Project 08/1518/105 
produce approximately equivalent comparisons for the two cooperatives. 
The data are in Appendix 4. Because GPPS is a survey of general practice 
users a clear majority of its respondents are women. Both in large cities, 
the two cooperatives served a somewhat younger, more ethnically diverse 
population than the generality of English primary care users at the time. For 
all the relevant population characteristics, the practices (taken together) 
and the cooperatives (taken together) were distributed either side of the 
England mean. This is weak evidence that, taken together, the study sites 
were not markedly qualitatively atypical of those in England as whole. This 
is at least a necessary condition for making cautious qualitative 
generalisations from any patterns found across the study sites taken 
together. 
4.3.3 Data collection 
In all the study sites an initial exploratory study began with interviews of a 
small number of (key informants, typically four to six per site including the 
chief executive, senior partner or equivalent; a ‘boundary spanner’ and one 
person involved in the organisation's core activity (healthcare, audit etc.) of 
the organisation. For the in-depth health organisation case studies we 
collected data by interviewing doctors, managers and nurses, observation of 
meetings, in reception areas and offices, and content-analysis of documents 
collected on site or on-line. Data collection over two years allowed us to 
observe at least one annual financial, planning, production and reporting 
cycle. In all we conducted 146 interviews and collected 631 documents 
ranging from patient leaflets, spreadsheets and web-pages through annual 
reports to one full-sized textbook (the official history of the health consumer 
NCO). We monitored the main professional (as opposed to peer-reviewed) 
periodicals such as Health Services Journal and Pulse for relevant news 
items (cp. (70)). We recorded how the study organisations experienced 
external, (especially commissioners', governance and incentive 
arrangements. To describe the other side of these relationships we also 
interviewed informants from the commissioners, including those responsible 
for promoting and then influencing, new kinds of partnership and NHO. We 
examined user experience by using documents and interview data to map 
(cp. (209)) the main sequences of patient care. 
The QPID data-sets mentioned in the original research proposal were 
superseded after 2004 for most primary care services (and for the 
remaining two therapy services after 2005). NPCRDC's Tracker survey, 
which would have been a valuable source of such data, had also been 
discontinued at the start of the study period. PACT data are not publicly 
available. Originally we proposed to undertake randomised sample surveys 
of English study site patients. Patient surveys however became mandatory 
and NHS service providers were generally implementing them by the time 
of our fieldwork. Since it was pointless to duplicate this activity we decided 
in consultation with SDO to use instead the survey data that were (already 
being collected and the nearest publicly available replacements for the 
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discontinued data sets. General Practice Patient Survey (GPPS) and Quality 
and Outcomes Framework (QOF) data were therefore downloaded from the 
NHS Information Centre at www.ic.nhs.uk/statistics-and-data-
collections/supporting-information/primary-care/general-practice/gpps-
2007/08/gpps-2007-08-data-tables and www.qof.ic.nhs.uk respectively, 
and used to contextualise the study sites in terms of their performance 
compared with England average scores on the outcome-related data sets 
relevant to the research questions. These data were not used as outcome 
measures by which to compare outcomes of different types of organisation 
(a methodologically suspect approach) or of the particular sites 
(uninformative) but as a way of checking whether in terms of those 
outcomes the study sites were typical of their kind. 
Interviews were tape-recorded with permission and transcribed. Field-notes 
were taken during site visits, cleaned and anonymised (210). We used 
theoretical memos (211), often e-mails for discussion, to trace the 
development of our thinking during the research. Data collection was 
iterative in the sense that a common interview schedule was consulted 
before each interview or site visit. Setting aside any topics on which we 
already had data, the researcher selected which general questions in the 
interview schedule the prospective interviewee would best be placed to 
answer, at need supplementing them with more specific sub-questions or 
probes formulated in light of our accumulated knowledge about the site, so 
as to elaborate or check emerging themes and findings. When unforeseen 
kinds of data appeared the researchers supplemented the data grid (and 
hence interview schedule) with additional sub-categories. We also 
supplemented our original data grid and interview schedule with categories 
suggested by (emerging from) the systematic literature review. In those 
senses data collection by interviewing was iterative (212). 
The data so collected were used to populate field grids (Appendix 5: one per 
site) structured to reflect the environment-structure-process-outcome 
framework and theories outlined above. After fieldwork we checked our 
findings at two levels. At individual level, interviewees were invited to see 
and as necessary correct transcripts. (Many did.) At organisational level, we 
invited our main contact at each study site to correct any factual errors 
which they might find in the completed case study. 
4.3.4 Data analysis 
To test the above theories and concomitant taxonomy it was necessary first 
to collate the case study data under the categories of the initial theoretical 
framework. Use of a standard data grid for all sites achieved this. It also 
revealed any gaps in the data or apparent contradictions between different 
data sources. Supplementary data could then be collected to resolve these 
uncertainties ad hoc, often by e-mail or telephone enquiry. By triangulating 
the data so collected we built up narratives for each site describing 
partnership and NHO structures and internal organisational arrangements; 
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their goals (explicit and implicit), why and how they were established; how 
they were coordinated and what made for a successful co-ordination 
strategy; the key elements of management in any subjoined hierarchy; how 
professionals within them interacted and regulated themselves; and what 
governance and incentive arrangements external bodies placed upon these 
organisations and to what effect. In that way each in-depth case study 
described how the organisation’s environment, structure and processes 
produced (or stymied) the policy outcomes of interest. Cross-case 
comparative analyses followed the assembly and analysis of each individual 
case study (213). Our sample of sites allowed us to compare the empirical 
similarities and differences between: 
1. NHOs and partnerships (e.g. primary care partnerships and primary 
care cooperatives). 
2. The different kinds of NHO (e.g. NHOs in different sectors; producer 
and consumer NHOs). 
3. The different kinds of partnership (e.g. in different sectors; medical 
versus nurse-led partnership). 
Partnership-owned and PCT-managed primary medical care. The initial 
round of case studies, across all the sites, was intended to provide an 
overall narrative of how each organisation developed, how it was structured 
and managed, and what differences there might be between nominally 
similar organisations within and outside the health sector. In a second 
phase, the six health sector case studies were elaborated with interviews at 
the level of front-line (clinical and care) staff, and by the inclusion of 
publicly-available routinely-collected data about the services provided, 
(their outcomes, and survey data about patients' responses to the services. 
The second-stage case studies thus attempted to examine more fully the 
connections between organisational structure and service delivery. 
4.4 Combined analysis 
For each main element of the above theoretical framework we next 
combined the empirical findings from the systematic review with those from 
the case studies. Our main method of analysing the combined data was to 
induct patterns across the two main types of evidence. The combined data 
grounded more robust empirical generalisations than the case studies alone 
could supply. By combining primary and secondary sources we were also 
able (to compare (indeed check) our own findings against those from other 
studies. We combined the two kinds of empirical findings about 
organisational environment, and within that heading collated review with 
case study findings about organisational membership, formation, external 
dependencies and goals; and so on for the rest of the theoretical 
framework. (We supplemented or corrected our original theoretical 
framework where it proved insufficient to accommodate patterns emerging 
from the combined data. Our theoretical framework implied that the 
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patterns found in partnerships and in NHOs would differ, as would the 
patterns found in different variants of organisation within these two main 
categories. We therefore systematically compared the different types of 
organisation research question by research question. Our sample of study 
sites allowed us to make cross-case comparative analyses (213) of the 
empirical similarities and differences between: 
 1. NHOs and partnerships (e.g. primary care partnerships and 
primary care cooperatives) 
 2. The different kinds of NHO (e.g. NHOs in different sectors; 
producer and consumer NHOs) 
 3. The different kinds of partnership (e.g. in different sectors; 
medical versus nurse-led partnership) 
Partnership-owned and PCT-managed primary medical care. Terms such as 
'successful' involve normative assumptions. We assumed the criteria of 
'success' were: 
1. Achieving the founding goals of the study organisations. 
2. In light of the predictions of organisational 'degeneration', 
sustaining the eqalitarian and democratic ('non-hierarchical' and 
'partnership') character of the organisation. 
3. Realising the health policy outcomes stated in the research brief 
(securing professional engagement; maintaining clinical job 
satisfaction and morale, and hence the (corresponding level of 
workload; developing clinical quality, best practice and 
innovation; adherence to external performance targets; cost-
effectiveness of service provision; satisfactory patient outcomes 
and experiences). 
Research questions about the 'success' of organisations were therefore 
answered by making a normative comparison (214) between data about the 
organisations' characteristics or activities and the criteria listed above. 
The methods of analysis shown in Table 4 were used to produce findings in 
answer each research question. 
Table 4. Methods and findings  
Research question Method of analysis 
1a. What are the goals (explicit and implicit) 
of such organisations and why/how are they 
established?  
1. Induction of patterns of goals 
reported across the systematic 
review and case study evidence. 
2. Narrative accounts of 
organisational formation. 
1b. What is the nature of the governance and 
incentive arrangements that are placed on 
these organisations from external bodies? Is 
1. Induction of patterns of external 
governance reported across the 
systematic review and case study 
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there an effective form of regulation, and if so 
what is the nature of this?  
evidence. 
2. Narrative accounts of responses to 
external regulation.  
2a. What are the structures and internal 
organisational arrangements of NHOs and 
partnerships?  
Induction of structural patterns 
reported across the systematic 
review and case study evidence.  
2b. How are professional partnerships and 
NHOs co-ordinated, and what makes for a 
successful co-ordination strategy? ( 
1. Induction of patterns of 
managerial practice (reported across 
the systematic review and case 
study evidence. 
2. Comparison of these strategies 
and their outcomes with normative 
criteria of 'success'.  
2c. What are the key elements to the internal 
management of such organisations?  
Induction of patterns of managerial 
practice (reported across the 
systematic review and case study 
evidence.  
2d. How do professionals within such 
organisations interact with each other and 
how do they regulate themselves?  
Induction of patterns from self-
reports of professionals in the case 
studies and from secondary reports 
of effects of changes in professional 
self-regulation.  
2e. How do such forms of organisation impact 
on securing professional engagement?  
Induction of patterns from self-
reports of professionals in the case 
studies.  
3a. How do such forms of organisation impact 
on clinical workloads, job satisfaction and 
morale?  
For health sector case studies only, 
induction of patterns from self-
reports of professionals  
3b. How do such forms of organisation impact 
on the development of innovative practice?  
Induction of patterns of, and reasons 
for, service innovations from self-
reports of professionals in the case 
studies and from secondary reports. 
4a. How do such forms of organisation impact 
on clinical quality and development of best 
practice?  
For health sector only: 
1. induction of patterns of innovation 
reported in case studies and 
systematic review. 
2. Synopsis of publicly available 
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clinical process and outcome data.  
 4b. (How do such forms of organisation 
impact on adherence to external performance 
targets?  
For health sector only: 
1. induction of narratives of 
organisational responses to external 
targets. 
2. Synopsis of publicly available 
administrative data.  
4c. (How do such forms of organisation 
impact on the cost-effectiveness of service 
provision?  
Induction of patterns of costing and 
pricing policies, and of financial 
constraints, reported across the 
systematic review and case study 
evidence.  
4d. (How do such forms of organisation 
impact on patient outcomes / experiences? ( 
For health sector only: 
1. induction of patterns of systems 
for patient influence upon service 
design and delivery. 
2. Synopsis of publicly available 
patient survey data.  
 The environment-structure-process-outcomes (ESPO) framework holds that 
an organisation's environment gives rise to the organisation itself and its 
goals, to pursue which an organisation structure is created. The goals and 
structure operate a core process which literally produces outcomes which 
may or not satisfy the original goals. Environment, the organisational goals 
arising from it and organisational structure can thus be thought of as a set 
of initial conditions, process and outcome as what emerge from these initial 
conditions. A further way of testing the theoretical framework was therefore 
to find out how far these assumed initial conditions did in fact exist, on the 
basis of the combined evidence. Insofar as the initial conditions did 
empirically obtain, we then examined whether, judging by the combined 
evidence, they did indeed generate the processes and outcomes which the 
aforementioned theories predict. We empirically tested the theoretical 
framework thrice over: 
 1. In each site the case studies reconstructed the ESPO sequence(s) which 
produced (or not) the policy outcomes stated in the research questions 
and other outcomes predicted in the theoretical framework or published 
theory. Then we compared these observations with the relevant parts 
of the theoretical framework. Single-site analysis served three 
purposes: 
(a) Taking each site as a qualitative exemplar of one type of 
organisation, it could test the relevant theoretical assertions for 
each type of organisation studied (215). 
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(b) One counter-example can falsify a claimed universal causal 
relationship (204). 
(c) One example is sufficient to provide proof-of-concept, showing that 
a particular type of organisation is practically feasible. 
 2. Across sites (cases) we compared the ESPO sequences for each policy 
outcome of interest. The standardised data grids allowed systematic 
comparisons, revealing patterns of similarity and differences which 
could then be compared with the theoretical framework outlined above. 
By testing the theoretical framework assertion by assertion against our 
combined primary and secondary evidence. We compared the data against 
theoretical assertions and assumptions in a falsificationist way, looking for 
any empirical patterns necessitating rejection or revision of theories or 
assumptions found in the literature or our own initial theoretical framework. 
These methods enabled us to verify some and correct other parts of the 
above framework of 'middle-range' theories. 
4.5 Advantages and limitations of the methods used 
Because this was an exploratory nature of the study we made initial case 
studies of a wide variety of organisations. This is both an advantage and a 
limitation methodologically. The advantage is that a wide selection is likely 
to reveal a wide range of possible organisational structures, which is of 
value in considering new health policy possibilities. The multiple 
comparisons which become available also allow the analyst to abstract from 
different organisational characteristics. For instance by comparing, say, 
partnerships with different memberships one can abstract from differences 
in the organisations' legal personality and focus on the organisational 
differences (if any) produced by the difference in membership. The 
disadvantage is that any more widely generalisable findings have to be 
produced by qualitative generalisation and therefore have to be taken with 
caution. The present study works with middle-range theory. It investigates 
relationships among a subset of variables from wider theories (see above) 
'in the hope that, if empirically validated, more comprehensive theories 
might proceed' ((59); p.140). 
The selection of study sites allowed us to focus development of the above 
theoretical framework on the health sector, at the price perhaps of 
empirically neglecting other sectors (e.g. housing, consumer credit, 
distribution of farm products) where NHOs also exist. By its nature an 
exploratory study also aims to study organisations sites which may prove a 
source of ideas for innovations in organisational structures; hence, sites 
which are (only) in that respect exceptional. 
Case study methods are open to recall bias insofar as they rely on 
informant interviews, and to bias towards self-justification by informants 
(and documents). One might expect this risk of bias to be greatest when 
clinicians, managers or member-representatives describe the benefits of 
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their services to patients or commissioners. Triangulation of data sources, 
especially data sources external to the study organisation, can reduce these 
dangers. The documents we collected included marketing and public 
relations materials. If their claims conflicted with other sources we gave the 
latter credence. With these precautions, however, the actors' recollections 
and eyewitness accounts are valid - nay privileged - sources of explanation 
of organisational formation, goals and working practices. 
We have made no formal CEA. It might appear that GMS payments, being 
standardised, remove price competition from the quasi-market for NHS 
primary medical care services in England. However this does not make it 
possible to compare the cost-effectiveness of general practices by 
examining which kinds give larger or better real-side outcomes for their 
standardised payments, because these payments are through a QOF points 
mechanism intended to make the payments reflect the outputs or outcomes 
produced. Comparison of QOF data is thus informative (within the limits of 
the data and of the indicators chosen) about effectiveness but not cost-
effectiveness. 
We compared certain characteristics of the study sites against national 
patterns, but solely in order to assess the apparent qualitative 
generalisability of our findings. NHS-ICS recommend that national QOF data 
should not be used to construct 'league tables', in the present case by 
(invalidly) comparing the putative merits of the different organisational 
structures and management practices across our study sites. The same 
applies to GPPS data. Beyond suggesting how far our qualitative findings 
might be generalisable the publicly-available data sets mentioned above 
were indeed of little use to this study. The crucial omissions were that data-
fields for salaried GPs did not distinguish between GPs employed by 
partnerships from those employed by PCTs. Data-fields for PMS practices 
did not distinguish between PMS practices directly managed by PCTs and 
independent partnerships under a PMS contract. Neither did published data 
on GP payments (e.g. (216)) and workloads (217) so discriminate. Indeed, 
fewer data-sets on these points were publicly available than in 2004-5 when 
the present research proposal was written. Without being able to compare 
these subcategories, tests of association between such variables as 
information for patients, staff training, medical records and medicines and 
management, and practice management (on one hand) and clinically 
related QOF outcomes (on the other) generate little information of value for 
the analysis of organisational structures. A supplementary census of PCTs 
would be required to differentiate practices in the necessary ways. 
4.6 Ethics and research governance 
Ethical approval was complicated by the fact that both NHS and non-NHS 
sites would be studied. NHS REC approval was required for the NHS sites 
and University of Plymouth approval for all sites, the latter being conditional 
upon REC approval. NHS approval was obtained from North Staffordshire 
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REC (ref: 06/Q2604/153) and then from Plymouth University ethics 
committee. For NHS sites research governance clearance was then obtained 
site by site, which for general practices meant gaining approval from the 
practice and its PCT. We conformed to the same ethical requirements in 
researching non-NHS as the NHS sites. 
One condition of ethical approval was that we anonymise findings and 
quotations unless we had consent to do otherwise. Three of our study 
organisations waived their right to anonymity but for consistent 
presentation we have retained pseudonyms throughout. In describing small 
organisations, pseudonymisation requires care. A pseudonym such as 
'phlebotomist, site A' is easily seen through if despite our efforts site A's 
identity is worked out and it has only one phlebotomist. For informants who 
made adverse comments about colleagues or their organisation we would in 
any event use uninformative pseudonyms (such as 'employee A'). For 
consistency we have applied the same role to all informants even though 
that removes information which might otherwise contextualise their 
remarks. 
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5 Systematic review findings: professional 
partnerships 
In presenting our systematic review findings we follow the ESPO sequence 
described above, treating professional partnerships and non-hierarchical 
organisations separately. 
5.1 Environment 
The practical advantages of collaboration are evident in most professions 
((218); on law, see Greenwood, Hinings, and Brown (103); for medicine, 
see Casalino et al. (219)) although their training and early career tend to 
prepare professionals to work more on an individual basis. McNair (220) 
reports that even during professional training, re-adjusting from individual 
to team working may provoke a 'tribal' reaction when professionals feel 
threatened by others who they view as encroaching on their territory. 
Professionals working in partnerships obviously have to accommodate to 
requirements of the partnership as a whole, unlike the solo professional 
(221). Against this, Cooper et al. (71) describe the unproblematic 
coexistence of managerial and professional ideologies amongst law firm 
partners. Predominantly, though, published studies examine the economic 
motives for partnership formation. 
A partnership shares profits between members (222). Therefore incentives 
in the form of individual reward appear to be an important consideration 
when professionals decide the best form of organisation or partnership to 
join (223). A few studies (224,225) explain partnership formation in terms 
of financial and tax advantages. A study of 119 large and medium-sized 
consulting firms found that the significance of capital requirements, service 
standardization, business risk, and organization size endogenously 
determined the allocation of ownership rights in these firms (226). Casalino 
et al. (219)found that a lack of doctor cooperation, investment and 
leadership were the most frequently cited barriers to large group practice. 
Based on information derived from 195 interviews conducted between 
2000-2001 and information on group trends in group size obtained from 
more than 6000 doctors in private practice in 12 randomly selected 
metropolitan areas via telephone surveys, this US study found that gaining 
negotiating leverage with health insurance plans was the most frequently 
cited benefit to increasing group size. The study concluded that current 
payment methods rewarded gaining size to obtain negotiating advantage 
more than they rewarded quality. Bodenheimer et al. (227) and Conrad et 
al. (228)also suggested that US hospitals and doctors were increasingly 
consolidating and merging in their search for economies of scale and 
contracting leverage relative to private health plans. More risk averse 
doctors, especially in small practices, appeared willing to sacrifice about 
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10% of their income as a concomitant of risk spreading (101). The 
substantial barriers to creating large medical groups meant that most 
private doctors continue to practice in small groups, although the size of 
these groups is slowly increasing. The benefits of obtaining a more equal 
balance of power appear in one case (out of sixty English partnerships in 
that study) where a large external client was able to stipulate what internal 
monitoring and planning arrangements a legal partnership should adopt 
(86). 
Lang and Gordon (102) start from the assumption that professionals make 
a significant investment in their human capital and such investments are 
risky as there are no capital markets in which to sell this asset and no 
available forms of insurance. One explanation for the existence of 
partnerships therefore they maintain is their role as a risk sharing or 
insurance mechanism. Here partnerships are perceived as mutual insurance 
associations in which partners join together to insure themselves against 
idiosyncratic shocks to their human capital. This they argue generates a 
trade 'off between efficiency and risk sharing as it is assumed that since 
partners retain only a proportion of the profits that accrue, they will 
contribute less than optimal effort. Based on an analysis large scale 
empirical survey they show that in equilibrium, participants in larger legal 
partnerships in US law firms keep a smaller share of their own proceeds 
than smaller partnerships; larger partnerships share profits more fully 
among partners. This they argue provides empirical support for the view 
that partnerships are designed, at least in part, to provide insurance. Like 
Lang and Gordon, Gaynor and Gertler conceive partnerships as a classic 
organisational response to the trade-off between risk spreading and moral 
hazard and the extent to which firms choose to spread risk and therefore 
sacrifice efficiency incentives depends upon risk preferences. They note that 
institutional economics literature suggests several reasons why doctors 
organise in partnerships: to exploit economies of scale; to internalise 
referrals, to smooth work schedules, to exploit reputational economies of 
scale and possibly to collude against competition. Their econometric 
analysis of US data derived from a sample including 415 medical groups 
and 1,230 doctors practising in these groups. The study found evidence to 
support the theory that firms adopt 'second-best' incentive structures in 
order to spread risk. In particular, increased risk aversion leads medical 
partnerships to choose compensation arrangements less closely related to 
doctor productivity and to decrease the number of doctor members. They 
also found that incentives had a strong positive effect on doctor effort. For 
an average sized group, moving from compensation unrelated to 
productivity to a compensation completely related to productivity more than 
doubles output. More risk-averse doctors form smaller partnerships with 
greater non-medical staff input (101). 
Lang and Gordon (102) propose that because they offer a continuous, 
professional service in order to reduce the likelihood of claims for 
malpractice, GP partnerships might also be viewed as mutual insurance 
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associations in which doctors band together to insure themselves against 
loss of both human and monetary capital. For unlimited liability places the 
partners at risk of financial ruin in the case of a claim for medical negligence 
by a patient. Strong partnership ties also provide a strong signal of each 
partner's belief in their own and their colleagues' ability (222). US clinicians 
are able to insure themselves against litigation through malpractice 
insurance premiums. However these premiums are not experience rated so 
a doctor who has often been sued for low quality care may pay no higher 
premium than doctors who are sued less frequently (128). The Lancet 
(2005) suggests this factor may be of relevance in the modern NHS, where 
patients are encouraged to complain more in order that the service can be 
improved. Thus deliberations about economies of scale and projected 
financial outcomes may determine whether or not a partnership is formed, 
as would consideration of financial risk sharing between partners. 
Levin and Tadelis (222) develop an economic model to show that organising 
as a profit-sharing partnership can alleviate problems in situations where it 
is difficult to assess service quality and firms are prone to hire suboptimally 
low ability workers. In markets where clients may not be able to monitor 
quality well partnerships emerge as a desirable form of organisation for 
addressing client needs. If however the assumption of equal sharing in 
partnerships (that is all partners have the same objective) is relaxed, the 
structure of decision rights and how partnerships are governed becomes an 
important area for future research. 
Bodenheimer et al. (227) and Conrad et al. (228) also suggest that US 
hospitals and doctors can be seen to be increasingly consolidating and 
merging in their search for economies of scale and contracting leverage 
relative to private health plans. More risk averse doctors, especially in small 
practices, appeared willing to sacrifice about 10% of their income as a 
concomitant of risk spreading (101). The substantial barriers to creating 
large medical groups meant that most private doctors continue to practice 
in small groups, although the size of these groups is slowly increasing. A 
study of 119 large and medium-sized consulting firms also found that the 
significance of capital requirements, service standardization, business risk, 
and organization size endogenously determined the allocation of ownership 
rights in these firms (226). 
Getzen (6) sets out a 'brand name firm' theory of medical group practice 
which arises where the quality of output is highly variable and the costs of 
quality information much greater for consumers than producers. Then 
patients depend upon provider reputation and are willing to pay a premium 
for 'brand name' quality services. The advantage of group over solo practice 
is that to some extent internal evaluation by medical colleagues can 
substitute for more costly patient search in monitoring quality. Thus 
patients and reputation can be transferred more efficiently and brand name 
can be created at less cost. Group practice is more common where 
population mobility is higher (in theory because costs of search are higher 
for patients in such settings and so a 'brand name' saves patients more 
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costs). In the Netherlands, however, partnerships of independent doctors 
with hospital admitting rights are becoming a thing of the past as hospitals 
negotiate with sick funds on behalf of the doctors, a deliberate policy to 
integrate these doctors into hospital structures and attenuate the 
partnerships' power to obstruct change (229). A survey comparing group 
and single-handed general practices in the Netherlands indicated what 
doctors might gain by joining a group practice. The latter had more 
extensive infrastructure, more computerized medical information and more 
quality assurance activities although patients gave single-handed practices 
higher marks for service, accessibility and even for the facilities. Single-
handed GPs worked more and had higher levels of job stress, but perhaps 
also more autonomy at work (230). The demise of partnerships also gives 
clues as to what motivated their foundation. Empson's study (231) of the 
takeover of one English accounting partnership by another suggested that a 
larger partnership was more likely to take a managerialist approach to its 
day-to-day operations, have a less traditional interpretation of professional 
identity and (depending on the circumstances) value different professional 
skills than its predecessor did. Denning and Shastri (224) examined the 
consequences for shareholders of a change in organisational form from a 
corporation into a limited partnership. The study used longitudinal data 
about 53 firms in the United States that announced either complete 
conversions or spin-offs of units into limited partnerships during 1980-1989. 
The announcement of a plan to create a limited partnership was associated 
with an increase in stock price. The stock price impact of a conversion did 
not appear to depend on whether the conversion is partial or complete, or 
defensive. The authors interpret these findings as evidence of positive 
economic benefits to shareholders when conversion from corporate to 
limited partnership form is anticipated. Citing two rather old studies 
(232,233), Getzen (6) states that 25% of US group practices cease to exist 
after 10 years with disagreement over income distribution being the main 
cause. A panel study of doctors in one large US corporation (87) suggested 
that doctor's length of service in an organisation did not reflect 
organisational commitment but this finding applied to an employed doctors 
besides partners. 
5.2 Structures 
5.2.1 Modes of democracy 
Various studies describe a rather relational form of democracy amongst 
professional partners. Managing and senior partners are usually selected by 
consensus or election, perhaps with a central board (or equivalent) 
undertaking (in descending order of likelihood) monitoring (especially 
financial monitoring), corporate planning and operations-monitoring roles. 
In large legal practices a committee of partners is often elected to take on 
managerial work. Crucially, their authority is derived from the partnership 
as a whole. Founder members tend to have largest equity and greatest 
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status internally. Therefore the organisational hierarchy in partnerships may 
be said to be inverted with an executive committee being formed to serve 
the partnership in strategic operational decision-making (86). Typically, the 
partners in Canadian accounting firms annually elect an executive 
committee and more specific working committees. Partners at the national 
or international office frequently returned to their former roles after serving 
one or two terms (103). 
Profits in those firms were distributed pro-rata to partners' numbers of 
shares; and the latter reflected length of service, type of clients, revenue-
generation, responsibilities within the partnership (103). In contrast, most 
US medicine is in group practices with undifferentiated ownership rights. 
Non-medical and fixed costs are shared equally between partners. New 
members are soon promoted from salaried to partner status. US 
partnerships tend to have group decision-making and resource allocation 
(101). So far as we are aware no equivalent English data have been 
published. 
Restratification of the profession, i.e. the emergence of a stratum of GPs 
who, although they remain mostly partners within professional partnerships, 
mediate the relationship between (on one side) government and health 
system managers and (on the other side) professional partners, has also 
been reported in Canada and England (234-237). 
5.2.2 Mutual scrutiny 
Studies of legal partnerships belie some micro-economists' predictions (see 
above) about the likelihood of shirking ('free riding'). Lazega (129) 
describes a large US law firm where partners' work was documented and 
open to all other partners, so that under-performance soon became 
apparent. A partner would be selected to talk a deviant or under-performing 
partner back into line. Partners chosen to speak to infractors tended to be 
of similar role (same office and legal specialty), to have equal or greater 
seniority or status than the infractor, to have some prior connection with 
the partner, and to have control over employees (but not necessarily other 
resources). Lazega and Lebeaux' ((67) study of law firms found that 
relational control of one professional by another was often undertaken 
through a third professional, most often one who was a counsellor rather 
than collaborator or friend of the professional first raising the problem. 
Partners used friends to influence other friends among the partners, 
collaborators as intermediaries to influence other collaborators, and 
counsellors to influence other counsellors. A partner trying to influence 
another partner with whom he had close working ties would generally select 
a mediator who had only impersonal ties to the person whom the first 
partner was trying to influence. Cooper et al. (71) describe a law 
partnership which employed non-lawyer manager and IT systems to help 
partners review each others' performance. In a minority of the 60 UK law 
partnerships studied by Pinnington and Morris (86) operations monitoring 
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involved scrutiny of partners' working practice. This was the largest 
departure from traditional autonomous role of a partner. Even in these 
sites, the practical need for individual partners to retain flexibility and 
discretion in dealing with clients (see below) limited the scope for that 
monitoring. 
Clinical governance in NHS general practice shows parallels with 
Courpasson's concept of 'soft bureaucracy' Influence is not exerted through 
'hard' managerial tactics like hierarchical supervision, disciplinary measures 
and the like but more sophisticated strategies such as hints of the risk of 
non-medical managerial intervention (238). Hence formal organisational 
structures played little role in obtaining adherence to external performance 
targets via clinical governance. Clinical quality was mostly managed by 
semi-formal networks that relied on collective medical self-surveillance 
(239). 
5.2.3 Ideology and culture 
Working teams are more effective when people with similar attitudes are 
grouped together, than when the team includes diverse-thinking individuals 
(240). Drawing on an in-depth case study of the management controls used 
in the Nordic subsidiary of a global management consultancy ('Global') 
employing roughly 800 people, Alvesson and Karreman (241) question 
traditional ideas about the existence of pure forms of organisational control 
and the assumption that technocratic and socio-ideological controls are 
mutually exclusive. Global was viewed as strongly 'partner centric' and 
partners were perceived to have a strong control over the business. Global 
achieved a high level of compliance, including a readiness for staff to work 
very long hours and meet very ambitious targets and deadlines. Different 
forms of technocratic control interacted and merged with socio-ideological 
controls in an organisational context to produce a high performance 
workforce. In particular, formal systems of checking and audit directed 
attention and encouraged a particular outlook and mentality and in this way 
the formal control structures, although intended to alter behaviour and 
outcomes, also exercise cultural control. A recent analysis of 46 cases of 
new partnership creation in consulting and law firms suggested that the 
legitimations required for radical diversification of partnerships are very 
different from those required for incremental diversification (242). A study 
of 10 Netherlands veterinary partnerships suggested that professional 
partnerships tend to have a clan culture with elements of 'adhocracy', but 
not a strongly market-oriented culture (243). A study of 18 US medical 
practices suggested an absence of coherent cultures there (244). 
In English general practice two main cultures have been described: 'holism' 
which legitimates general practice in terms of the needs of the 'whole' 
person (245) and more recently a culture of 'bureaucratic' medicine 
(144,145) which emphasises the scientific, evidence-based character of 
general medical practice. Jones and Green (246) also describe an emerging 
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more democratic and informal culture. General practices with better team 
climate showed greater continuity of care (247). Another multiple case 
study suggested that changes in the GPs' contract led to the emergence of a 
culture in which lead GPs were 'chasers' (and other partners the 'chased') in 
pursuit of the new contract targets (38). The blurring between professional 
and commercial cultures reported in legal partnerships (see above) also 
began to become apparent in English general practices(248,38). 
5.2.4 Hybrid structures 
Professional partnerships are apparently becoming more hybrid in structure. 
Even over the three years 1994-97 English legal partnership sizes in one 
study rose from a mean of 12 to 14 but support staff increased faster, from 
49 to 60 (115). A similar pattern is observed in English general practice 
(249). In the large Canadian accounting firm, partners tended to manage 
other professionals at local level. Each local office had an 'office managing 
partner' but this structure was still less centralised than in corporations. 
Although central bodies existed to deal with most aspects of operations they 
only did so at lower bodies' request and focused only on critical functions 
(103). 
Because of the managerial implications of such changes in partnership size 
and firm composition, Pinnington and Morris (115) propose that the 
traditional archetype of the professional partnership (called 'P2' by 
Greenwood et al. (103)) has changed into a more 'business-like''managed 
professional business' (MPB). The latter introduces, rationalises and 
bureaucratises the strategic planning and detailed target setting, defining 
performance more in terms of pre-defined quality standards. In English 
legal partnerships these bureaucratic activities were concentrated in 
'market-facing' parts of the partnerships and undertaken more by 
employees than by partners. Accounting partnerships differed little from 
non-partnerships in their use of marketing and finance controls, but in the 
partnerships the setting of local targets was very negotiative and 
decentralised. For example there were no fixed targets for market share. 
Accountability was tolerant and strategic direction weak compared with 
multi-divisional firms and holding companies, with heavy reliance on 
collegial control. In Canadian law firms, a focus on targets paradoxically 
gave local offices greater freedom in other matters. The planning horizon 
emphasis remained short-term, typically for one year at a time. Williamson 
(53) suggested partnerships operate under market and financial control as 
M-form organisations. They design performance targets, connect resource 
allocations to such targets and link compensation and bonuses to target 
attainment. This may be problematic for medical partnerships as many 
targets are short (less than one year) rather than longer term. Thus the 
effectiveness of medical partnerships is usually monitored through monthly, 
quarterly or annual business reports (86). Cooper et al. (71) stress that the 
MPB model is not the adoption of wholesale corporate practices by 
partnerships, rather the introduction of management systems to guide 
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professional activity at a higher level of aggregation. In the transition to 
MPB, collegiality declines, tenure becomes conditional on performance and 
there is less consultation between partners. In such partnerships, partners 
and employees would interpret events in ways which avoided the two 
discourses ('P2' and 'MPB') confronting each other. In the accounting 
partnerships which Greenwood, Hinings, and Brown (103) studied, 
management consultancy sub-divisions were growing rapidly and in tension 
with the partnership approach used very different (more corporate) 
language and concepts. The underlying form of ownership prevents radical 
departures from the partnership to a managerial model. Partners retained 
control of client selection (and recruitment) and core production process 
(115). A minority of partnerships adopted a corporate-planning approach to 
management but only where equity ownership was concentrated did 
managerialisation proceed very far (86). 
Debate continues as to whether these changes are more accurately 
portrayed as one 'archetype' replacing another or as the 'sedimentation' of 
one organisational structure upon another (71,115). Whilst the explanatory 
value of the 'sedimentation' metaphor has been disputed, the empirical 
pattern is not. These organisations continue to be controlled by the 
partnership element with its values of collegiality whilst the subjoined 
hierarchy continues to grow faster than the partnership element. 
In NHS general practice, the increased availability of funding has led to the 
recruitment of more professionalised managers and more extensive, diverse 
support staff employees. Fundholding practices were more likely to have an 
externally recruited manager (250). After 2001 practice managers were 
increasingly required to implement guidance which affects all the partners 
(9). Despite the coming of the more complete 2004 GMS contract, it would 
appear that in some English general practices managerialisation has not 
gone as far as described in the studies above. None of the three general 
practices in Checkland's 2004 study (251) had any concrete plan for 
implementing NSFs and lacked much structure for dealing with incoming 
guidance. Use of a nurse to implement NSF was welcomed because it meant 
the practice could comply with what it regarded as legitimate guidance 
without GPs having to do the work themselves. Guidelines were welcomed if 
they made work easier, otherwise not. The practical impacts of guidance 
(on workload etc.) were more important to GPs than the effects on 
profession-wide autonomy and control. GPs responded to increasingly 
detailed guidance and guidelines by recording their clinical decisions more 
fully, even those who normatively opposed the increased 'bureaucratic 
accountability'. Some GPs recorded selectively, focusing on cases where 
more than one clinical decision might be indicated. Recording reduced GPs' 
scope for private, non-accountable self-assessment of their clinical practice 
(236). Nevertheless, there appears to have been little 'gaming' of the data 
which GPs returned to central government (252). 
The 2004 GMS contract placed significant demands on practice 
management and there was confusion about what a practice manager's role 
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should be. Some GPs doubted their capacity to manage the practice 
managers and the latter had problems trying to 'manage' the GPs who 
employed them: 
Both the managers in practice A and practice B commented on the difficulties associated with 
providing strategic management as the employee of a partnership. Ultimately, responsibility rests with 
the partners, and both managers felt that they were unsure how far their higher-level input could go. 
(251): p737 
However the separation of managerial and clinical roles was maintained. 
Clinical matters belonged to the partners only. 
Whilst not of partnerships, a study of 15 small owner-managed firms 
(where the relationship between employed manager and owners is similar 
to that in a partnership) found that the owner-manager relationship 
functioned most effectively when both parties conceptualised the 
competitive circumstances in similar ways and there was role clarity and 
complementarity. The effectiveness of owner-manager relationship 
depended on the expectations of those involved (whether democratic or 
authoritarian, depending on case). The relationship was more likely to work 
when both parties shared a clear vision (or both had none) and there was 
mutual respect and trust between the two parties (140). 
A few studies describe transition from partner to salaried status. Thompson 
and Van de Ven (87) examined the personal transitions of 48 US doctors 
over three years as their private medical practices (group clinics) were 
acquired by a larger organisation. The study found that organisational 
changes perceived to be enabling to the doctor fostered compatibility 
between organisational and professional attachments. A key aspect of a 
smooth transition was the sense that the doctor could influence the change 
to which she was adapting; transitioning doctors were more likely to more 
likely to align themselves with the new organisation when they felt that 
their ideas were listened to, were involved in the change and retained some 
autonomy and discretion in their work. 
In the USA Physician Practice Management Companies (PPMCs) act as a 
corporate partner, re-organising and consolidating medical practices to gain 
economies of scale, provide administrative support, provide capital for 
growth, and improve doctors' opportunities and bargaining power with 
payers. PPMCs include hybrid-structure organisations, and may be multi-
speciality or equity model groups. They are typically capitalised by private 
venture capital firms. However, they retain some aspects of partnership. 
There are direct chains of command and communication channels between 
the managing doctors and partners. The PPMCs show a tendency towards 
adopting a more corporate approach, characterising medical groups as 
'commodities' or 'business units' to be acquired or sold depending on their 
operating performance (253). 
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5.3 Process 
5.3.1 Control of the core process 
Greenwood, Hinings and Brown's study (103) of four of the eight largest 
Canadian law firms reported that 70-80% of the workforce were 
professionals, who did most of the core productive work. The core working 
process could not readily be broken down in a standard way into a set of 
discrete tasks and required discretion to undertake. A 'partner in charge' 
signed each audit off upon completion. Close links with clients also made 
accounting practices highly localised. Partners' focus and loyalty was to 
their local practice, not national or international head office. Hence even in 
the largest accounting partnership each local office ran almost like a self-
contained firm. The central bodies focused on professional standards, 
training, new accounting practices, advice networks and inspection of work, 
including a rolling programme of detailed inspection in turn of the work 
done at each local office. Another Canadian study of accounting 
partnerships (254) showed that while auditors in them did have decision-
making powers, their organisations' payment and decision-making policies 
ensured that partners' decisions were constrained by an interaction of 
professional and of commercial 'logics'. Conceptually this appears similar to 
the conclusions of Dowling, Wilkin and Smith (255) that NHS professionals 
and front-line staff in the NHS have authority and discretion to make 
decisions provided they are consistent with current policy. 
Nevertheless, analysis of a panel dataset of top performing US security 
analysts over a nine-year period suggested the top performers did not 'own' 
their performance, even in this knowledge-intensive work. While an 
individual's past performance does indicate future performance, the quality 
of colleagues in one's organization also significantly affects top performers' 
ability to maintain their performance. Top performers in professional 
business services rely on high-quality colleagues both to improve the quality 
of their own work and to deliver it effectively to clients (256). In that sense, 
the partners' performance was an attribute of the partnership rather than of 
the individual practitioner. 
A similar finding applies to complex projects and to the proprietary 
knowledge of certain types of partnership. Partnerships often set up matrix-
like project teams for particular tasks. Lazega (123) cites examples from 
legal, industrial design, public relations and laboratory services 
partnerships. Fincham et al. (257) describe the 'sector knowledge' that 
management consultants accumulate which derives from repeated 
assignments in an economic sector, enabling the consultants to play the 
role of the outside expert whilst drawing upon language and experiences 
which the client shares. In health care, the rise of evidence-based medicine 
has deepened this distinction between publicly-available knowledge and the 
partner or partnership which applies it in practice. The rise of bureaucratic-
scientific medicine produces a shift of work focus from individual 
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relationships with patients towards ways of treating care groups. Cross-
sectional analysis of surveys of US doctors (258,259) found that IPAs 
(associations of independent partnerships) were the type of organisation 
least likely to undertake health promotion. Doctor-owned practices (by 
implication partnerships) were significantly more likely than IPAs to 
undertake health risk assessments for their patients (260). In England, 
policy guidance (NSFs especially) has to some extent homogenised clinical 
practice across general practices and, with the new contractual 
requirements have since 1990 shifted locus of general practice work to 
practice-initiated preventive work, not just responding to patient 
attendances; and increased the tension between these. Nevertheless, the 
three general practices in Checkland's 2004 study (251) each implemented 
the same guidelines differently, selecting different guidelines to implement, 
even different parts to read. GPs tended to think that guidance was for 'bad' 
practices not for them. External guidance had little practical impact on 
working processes. An earlier study found that, for example, some practices 
used 5-minute and some 10-minute consultations although the latter were 
correlated with better-quality chronic disease management (247). Jonsdottir 
et al. (198) argued that the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) 
marked a shift towards standardized, commodified care increasingly 
measured and assessed by objective outcomes, away from the subjective 
experiences of care which Jonsdottir et al. regard as the relational core of 
nursing practice. Harrison and Dowswell (236) found that only 20% of the 
GPs in their survey thought they would not record their reasons for non-
compliance with the new guidelines. Generally about two-thirds of 
innovations in English primary care were evidence-based, albeit on a 
generous definition of 'evidence'. Most of the rest were policy imperatives 
from outside the practice (261). 
5.3.2 Substitution 
In the USA (where medical partners typically have hospital admitting rights) 
changes in the technologies of patient care and improved information 
exchange mechanisms have shifted the dominant locus of care from 
hospital inpatient to outpatient settings (262). The capacity to link 
geographically dispersed care settings with electronic medical records has 
encouraged clinical integration among provider organisations (228). 
Black and Weiss (263) attributed US medical partnerships' increasing 
collaboration with mutual aid organisations to the reduction in government 
funding for non-urgent medical services. The research focused on chronic, 
genetic diseases that required active patient or family and professional 
involvement for effective treatment and support on a personal level, 
including brittle bone syndrome, Huntington's disease and 
haemochromatosis. Through decreasing the need for health professionals on 
a day-to-day basis, the health service was able to save money. Black and 
Weiss further suggest that reducing the reliance on healthcare professionals 
and increasing the dependence on self-help groups can be more beneficial 
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to patients than them relying on medical support alone because self-help 
groups are better suited to deliver practical and emotional support to 
reduce the social and emotional isolation of those suffering from chronic, 
genetic diseases. However these models of care tend to become 
increasingly formalised because each party is required properly to 
understand and their specific role in it. Bodenheimer et al. (227) also 
predicted that financial pressures will promote the use of such models of 
care. Newton et al. (178) describe the failure to achieve close integration 
between an English general practice and community health services to the 
reluctance of the main external body (the PCT) to relinquish its 
responsibilities for the services rather than to any inflexibility inherent in 
the professional partnership involved. However another multiple case 
study(264) reported GPs as being reluctant to relinquish what they saw as 
their central role in the clinician-patient relationship and wondering whether 
inter-professional working would reduce their autonomy. 
5.3.3 Size and economies of scale 
The professional partnerships described in the published literature are 
mostly larger than the average NHS general practice with its mean size of 
just under four partners. The average size of English legal partnerships in 
Pinnington and Morris' 1996 survey (86) was 14 equity partners and 21 
non-partner lawyers. One Canadian accounting firm had 490 partners (and 
4000 employees). The biggest seven Canadian accountancy firms all had 
over 200 partners in 1987. All 60 firms in that study (20 accounting, 20 
solicitors, 20 architects) had over 15 partners, tended to be multi-site. 
Some had offices abroad. A 1978 US national survey on medical practice 
data showed the average practice size even then as 21 doctors. More 
competitive local health markets are associated with larger practice sizes 
(101). 
Economies of scale do not however appear to explain the larger size of US 
group medical practices (6). A US study (265) found diseconomies of scale 
with increased practice size, perhaps because increased practice size 
attenuates the effects of external productivity incentives. Conrad et al. 
(223) found decreasing returns to scale for capital inputs. More doctors than 
dentists in the USA (1976) were organised in group practices but dentists 
have greater opportunity to achieve economies of scale; which Getzen (6) 
takes as evidence against the economies of scale explanation for the 
formation of partnerships. Increased efficiency in the doctor-nurse-patient 
exchange is usually more important for achieving cost-effectiveness than 
economies of scale are. Conrad et al. (223) found decreasing returns to 
scale for capital inputs. Economies of scale due to capital indivisibilities exist 
only for groups of 2-7 doctors (but that is the size of most English general 
practices). Moral hazard (free riding) is larger in large practices, but with a 
decreasing rate of increase as practice size grows (101). In conjunction 
these studies imply that the economies of scale found when practices have 
fewer than 10 partners are soon exhausted. Defelice and Bradford (266) 
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suggest their economic modelling of the relative efficiencies of solo and 
group practices do not support the view that they operate at different levels 
of efficiency. Levin and Tadelis (222) suggest that partnerships expand their 
labour force less quickly than corporations. Partnerships hesitate to recruit 
new partners unless it is clear that new partners would maintain or raise the 
average partner's share nett of costs. Nevertheless Conrad et al. (228) 
argue that medical practice organisations are gradually reshaping 
themselves into larger, more formalised ownership structures ('multi-
faceted metamorphosis'). It seems likely that a partnership will choose a 
partnership number threshold in a similar way to the way a corporation 
chooses an employment threshold. This is said to create stability within the 
organisation (222). Alliances with other organisations allow partners to 
assess whether they would be able to create new value if resources were 
pooled (267), and at what size diseconomies of scale and scope might arise. 
In the UK, access to most care seems better in small practices except for 
diabetes services (better access in large practices) (247). 
5.3.4 Marketing 
Increased pressures to undertake marketing can, it appears, strain the 
partnership model. Pressure to cross-sell each other's work undermined the 
collegial 'P2' archetype (71). Similarly, pressure to sell legal services in the 
crowded Canadian market has led to greater reliance on advertising, 
marketing and franchising, creating an uneasy cultural mix of 
professionalism and commercialism (221). Doctor ownership of pharmacies 
is prohibited because of the grounds - 'apparently well founded' ((6); 
p.207n.12) - that doctors would promote unnecessary drug sales and raise 
prices. For similar reasons fee-splitting (one independent doctor paying 
another for referrals) is illegal in the USA. 
5.4 Outcomes 
5.4.1 Productivity 
Richter and Schröder's (226) study of 119 consulting firms found that 
ownership allocation per se was not a significant driver of performance. 
Mathijs and Swinnen's (73) econometric analysis of farms in the former East 
Germany suggested that partnership-farms have higher technical efficiency 
and lower labour costs than individual farms and larger cooperatives. 
Several US studies consider what factors affect the productivity of doctors in 
partnerships. A study analysing the effects of the structure and culture of 
medical group practices on the amount of resources used to manage 
uncomplicated hypertension episodes of care for enrollees in a Minneapolis-
St. Paul HMO during 1990 suggested that resource use for a well-defined 
episode of care varies much more than one would expect in this highly 
competitive managed care environment; the culture of the group practice 
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appears to be more important than organizational structure in determining 
resource use for the treatment of hypertension, but together the culture 
and structural variables only explain 8% of the variance in resource use, a 
smaller influence than might have been expected (268). US doctors' 
productivity increased with their experience, but the productivity gain was 
least in the most complex types of services. Female US doctors had lower 
productivity than male doctors but also worked fewer hours (223). Without 
attributing more specific causes than the whole complex of clinical 
governance policies between 1998 and 2001, Campbell et al. (269) found 
that access to services, chronic disease management and the quality of 
angina care had all improved, but not quality scores for mental health care, 
care of the elderly care and interpersonal care, whilst mean practice 
budgets rose 3.4% in real terms. Diabetes care was better in larger 
practices and in practices where staff reported better team climate, but 
access to care was better in small practices. Preventive care was worse in 
practices located in socio-economically deprived areas. 
Cooper et al. (71) describe the example of a legal partnership which limited 
pay differentials and therefore individual workloads to guaranteed partners 
an improved work-life balance. Wallace's comparison (118) of commitment 
to work between employed and professional partner lawyers found that 
organisations' structural characteristics were generally not very important in 
explaining professional commitment. Nevertheless, structure in the sense of 
skill mix did matter. Lawyers working in non- professional organizations 
were less committed to their profession than lawyers working in 
organizations whose members were mainly professionals. In the 
accountancy profession, organisational commitment was found to have a 
strong relationship with auditors' perception of the meaningfulness of their 
jobs. Identifying with the tasks they perform was associated with their 
professional commitment (270). Davies (271) touches on professional 
engagement when discussing the trend away from a traditional feature of 
general practice in the English NHS: a professional partnership routinely 
based on long-term relationships between doctors in the practice and 
between doctors and many of their patients. In arguing the NHS has 
adopted a shorter-term focus with salaried GPs likely to move between jobs 
more regularly, Davies suggests the service has become less stable. This 
trend may be reinforced by the decline in twenty-four hour care by GPs, 
with out-of-hours care often being provided by doctors the patient is not 
registered with (45). Scores for satisfaction, continuity of care, and access 
to care were higher in practices where staff reported better team climate 
(247). 
5.4.2 Effects of incentives 
Conrad et al. (223) examined the impact of financial incentives on doctor 
productivity in medical groups. They found that partnerships tended to have 
a governance structure where each partner served as both a principal and 
agent. Collectively, partners set their own fees (where permissible) and 
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agreed their own partnership constitution and reward structure. 
Individually, each partner made personal decisions based on the incentive 
structure and working arrangements offered by the partnership (272). In 
the large Canadian law firms studied by Greenwood, Hinings and Brown 
(103) partners built up a client portfolio which made them reluctant to 
move office in pursuit of 'career' or 'development'. 
Several US studies evidence a connection between payments to individual 
doctors and their productivity (in the sense of volume of medical acts). 
Conrad et al. (223) explore the impact of financial incentives in medical 
groups, both at individual doctor and group level. Using secondary data 
from 1997 on individual doctor and group characteristics from two US-wide 
surveys, this study suggested that doctors in medical groups that base a 
higher share of the typical doctor's compensation on his or her own 
production are more productive (in terms of paid activity undertaken). 
Another study also showed that increasing the sensitivity of doctors' pay to 
personal incentives from 0% to 100% increased productivity by 28% (265). 
An earlier (1995) US national survey suggested that revenue sharing in a 
medical practices reduces doctors' effort compared with paying each doctor 
their own fees (FFS), whereas stronger (e.g. by +10%) links between pay 
and productivity correlated with increased office visits (patient episodes) (in 
that study, by +6.4%). Doctors' income was correlated with number of 
patient visits per week. Patient visits are twice as high in practices where 
doctors pay fully reflected their activity compared with those these it did not 
(101). These studies assume that incentives increase medical work-effort 
which raises visits per week which raises doctors' income. But (we note) 
these data are consistent with a simpler explanation: in the US health 
system, more patient visits generally raise the doctors' income irrespective 
of what causes the increased number of visits. An English study comparing 
implementation of mental health and CHD NSFs (183) suggested that 
incentives and guidance have a stronger impact on doctors' behaviour for 
care groups for which the doctor can single-handedly influence practice (i.e. 
clinically treatable physical conditions) than for those which require 
collaborative, 'social' treatment (e.g. mental health) which the doctor alone 
can influence less. 
But if the demand for doctors' services is constrained, strong incentives for 
productivity become perverse. A large US survey (273) showed that if the 
demand for doctors' services is constrained, then the more closely doctors' 
income within the practice is linked to their productivity, the more doctors 
will compete on quality within their practices for patients, raising quality (in 
the sense of volume of treatments per patient) to what the author of that 
study regarded as an unnecessarily high level. Payment of a bonus, even 
one related to practice not individual productivity, appears to raise doctors' 
individual productivity. Equal distribution of practice income tended to 
increase (not reduce) US doctors' productivity, although the increase was 
less than with incentives for personal productivity. Incentives based on a 
capitation have a negative but small effect on productivity. Doctors in (US) 
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partnerships which own their own hospital appear more productive than 
doctors working in hospitals not owned by their partnership. Doctors in 
hospital-owned practices are less productive than those in independent 
practices However Conrad et al. (223) found ambivalent effects of not-for-
profit status on doctors' individual productivity; the predicted negative 
effect was not found. 
In England an intensifying policy emphasis on evidence-based practice and 
general practices' compliance with guidance such as NSFs and NICE 
guidelines were already producing improvements in the clinical quality of 
care before 2004 (274). The shift to the 2004 GMS tied around 20% of 
practice income to compliance with externally-defined quality standards. 
The result was high (91%) compliance with the (often increased) target 
levels of activity required of GPs (275). A comparison of two English with 
two Scottish general practices found that due to the new English contract 
patients experienced a more standardised, disease-oriented type of care 
with more tightly-organised recall systems. When QOF targets were 
relevant to it, treatment was liable to become more intense (245). Some of 
the additional workload was given to employed nurses (276), so these 
incentives accentuated the tendency for employed staff to increase faster 
than general practice partner numbers (249). Whilst some GPs (e.g. part-
timers) could practically ignore the new contract, the 'lead' partners 
responsible for implementing it could not (38). A longitudinal study of 42 
general practices showed the new contract's effects on quality of care to be 
complex. In the short term the new contract incentives appeared to 
accelerate improvements in quality for two (asthma, diabetes) but not a 
third (CHD) of the three chronic conditions studied. Once the contractual 
targets were satisfied the improvement in the quality of care for patients 
with these conditions slowed. Interpersonal aspects of care, and access to 
care, which were not incentivised were unaffected. Continuity of care (also 
not incentivised) deterioriated after the new contract was introduced (277). 
A longitudinal survey of English GPs found that overall job satisfaction, 
especially with pay (mean income rose from an estimated £73400 in 2004 
to £92600 in 2005) and hours of work, increased. Against this, most GPs 
reported that the new contract decreased their professional autonomy 
whilst increasing their administrative and clinical workloads (278).  
5.4.3 Employment status 
A study to examine lawyers' sense of professionalism across solo 
practitioner offices and partnership, and status distinctions within law firms 
between associates, partners, and independent practitioners found solo 
practitioners and partners to be similar on most of the key dimensions of 
professionalism (autonomy, public service orientation, collegiality, variety of 
work). The greatest contrasts were between partners and associates within 
law firms. Partners and solo practitioners had similar experiences of 
autonomy and service-giving as owner-managers did, whereas partners and 
associates shared greater professional collegiality, perhaps fostered by law 
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firm cultures. All three groups reported comparable amounts of variety in 
their work and were equally committed to practising law. The key factors 
constraining professionalism arose from the nature of legal partnerships, in 
particular the time spent with corporate clients and pressure to generate 
profits. The everyday practical character of legal work in different 
organisational settings accentuated some, and diminished other, aspects of 
lawyers' professionalism. In that sense solo practice was not on balance 
'more professional' than in a partnership (221). 
Much published research has assumed that solo practice as the ideal 
professional work arrangement, and that when professionals become 
salaried employees their professionalism is seriously threatened. For 
doctors, the degree of 'enablement' (i.e. doing more skilled work) of doctors 
weakly predicts their commitment to their organisation. If enablement 
increases, a US study found, the transition from professional partner to 
employed doctor is compatible with the doctor maintaining or increasing her 
commitment to her organisation (87) even though the doctor has moved 
from independent to employed status. In England, analysis of census data 
on salaried GPs found slight but inconclusive evidence that their practices 
might have slightly higher QOF scores than other practices; and that 
salaried posts were attractive to doctors whose career stage or personal 
preferences made the role of practice partner unattractive or impractical for 
them (279). Overall job satisfaction levels were similar for salaried and 
partner GPs (280). A diary study (controlled before-and-after design) 
comparing ten standard GP partnerships with ten salaried GP practices 
found that the GPs in the salaried practices spent less time on practice 
administration but more working out-of-hours and in direct patient care, 
allowing more patients to be seen. List sizes per GP were higher in the 
salaried practices. Salaried GPs tended to provide shorter consultations 
compared than partner GPs, prescribe less often but not make fewer 
hospital referrals (281). 
5.4.4 Cost-effectiveness 
Although fee size may not necessarily be an indicator of cost-effectiveness, 
in a study of audit fees the bigger audit firms charged higher fees than 
smaller audit firms (282) and the larger client companies paid higher audit 
fees (283). However, the notion that the higher audit fees of the bigger 
audit firms reflects a higher quality service is supported by the work of Teoh 
and Wong (284) who found that the bigger audit firms produce more 
credible earnings reports. Indeed, the research of Read, Rama, and 
Raghunandan (285) suggests that small audit firms were ceasing some 
audits due to an environmental factor, namely the more stringent 
monitoring of audits in the USA following the collapse of Enron and 
Anderson. Similarly Dye (286) found that smaller audit firms generally earn 
less money and are more likely to leave the audit market. Nevertheless, the 
prospects of substandard audits increase as the length of time of the audit 
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and the client relationship increases or grows, and violation of professional 
standards become more likely with fixed fee audit contract (287). 
Defelice and Bradford (266) explore whether solo or group practices in the 
United States are more efficient. Using a sample of 924 primary care 
doctors in solo and group practices, a stochastic frontier model analysis 
suggested that solo and group practice doctors operate at similar levels of 
efficiency; an important question for future research is whether the 
similarities in efficiency are due to the nature of medical practices or 
possibly the selection of doctors into the mode of practice that suits them 
best. Doctors are hired, managed and terminated only by their colleagues. 
Conrad et al. (228) argue that efficiency should not be defined as lowest 
unit cost per output, but instead as the greatest value-added (health 
benefit) for the least cost. 
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6 Systematic review findings: cooperatives 
and mutuals 
6.1 Environment 
6.1.1 Formation 
A number of studies describe the formation of cooperatives as an attempt to 
increase market power. Two histories of US dairy cooperatives describe 
farmers' belief they could process cheese more cheaply than a private dairy 
monopsony (155); and farmers' attempts to countervail the supermarkets' 
power. Few commercial banks were willing to lend to US agricultural 
cooperatives so the latter founded their own not-for-profit bank (106). 
Credit unions in both developed and developing economies arose to remedy 
their members' exclusion from conventional banking services (288,78). In 
the USA, insurance mutuals arose as an efficient means of addressing the 
contracting challenges caused by aggregate uncertainties and moral hazard 
(289). As for rescue, the Kerala Dinesh Beedi cooperative was founded in 
response to a dispute between employer and workers about pay and 
conditions, a dispute which resulted in the original owners abandoning the 
enterprise and attempting to shift from employed to casualised sub-
contracted labour (117). 'Rescue' was a common origin of western 
European producer cooperatives in the 1980s (96-99). Support for 
cooperatives is based on the belief that they provide a more satisfying 
environment for workers as they emphasise flexibility and cooperation 
(290). 
Strong values or an ideology stimulated the formation many NHOs, for 
instance to correct ethnic or gender discrimination (98). Oerton (291,290) 
(indicates that women's experiences of discrimination in traditional 
organisational hierarchies encouraged some to look at alternative forms of 
governance that apparently offered more autonomy and control in the 
workplace, and less risk of the 'burn-out' due to more stressful ways of 
working in traditional workplaces. Some joined in reaction to gender 
discrimination in hierarchical organisations, including discrimination because 
of non-continuous and part-time career histories. Women mostly described 
their recruitment to the cooperatives as fortuitous. The Grameen Bank 
deliberately aimed to recruit women members, with the result that women 
are 94% of its borrowers (members) (292). Other cooperatives have 
originated to support economic development or from a religious motivation 
(293). A study of out-of-hours services cooperatives between 1996 and 
1997 in the English NHS concluded that most GPs formed or joined 
cooperatives to reduce their hours on call to patients (45). Out-of-hours 
cooperatives reduced clinical workloads but also enhanced job satisfaction 
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and morale. For GPs instigated the formation of cooperatives (in Denmark 
and Ireland besides Britain) to improve their own working conditions (294). 
Turning to consumer cooperatives, a comparison of Group Health with 
nearby fee-for-service providers found the cooperative's patients to be 
somewhat younger than in the comparator system, come from larger 
families, have fewer pre-existing health conditions (59). 
Charismatic entrepreneurs founded some cooperatives. Grameen Bank was 
founded by Muhammed Yunus, initially using his own borrowings as loans in 
an 'action research' project, financing self-help projects for poor, landless or 
illiterate people, especially rural women whose projects only money lenders 
would previously finance (at high rates of interest). Later this project was 
authorised as a bank (292). The Mondragon cooperatives were originated 
by one Jos'Maria Arizmendiarrieta (27), John Lewis Partnership and 
Raiffeisen by their eponymous founders. 
Policy initiatives have also stimulated the formation of NHOs. Development 
of a suitable legal personality, land grants, educational and research 
facilities, and credit facilitated the growth of US agricultural, especially 
dairy, cooperatives in the 1930s. Similarly for provision of not-for-profit 
credit, managerial and technical advice in 1980s (106). Policy can also give 
unforeseen support to cooperatives. In English cooperatives, male 
cooperators were often able to supplement their income from the 
cooperative by taking state payments or benefits which were not available 
to the women members e.g. business enterprise payments (290). 
Wanyama, Develtere, and Pollet (78) outline how the foundation and 
subsequent development of agricultural cooperatives in a number of African 
countries stemmed from British, French, Belgian and Portuguese policies for 
colonial economic development. Unification of Germany led to the formation 
of new farm cooperatives from separate private farms (295). Consumer 
ownership of the Danish electricity supply system was established, then 
perpetuated, by legislation (105). Against this, in pursuit of marketisation 
policies the IMF, World Bank and US government forced national 
governments to remove the legal frameworks and budgets supporting many 
African and east European NHOs. In Yugoslavia the civil war physically 
destroyed many of the enterprises (122,78). 
6.2 Structures 
6.2.1 Modes of democracy 
Two main modes of democratic control are described in the published 
research. 
One is direct control, found in kibbutzim. A kibbutz rests on a founding 
principle of periodically (e.g. five-yearly) rotating managers out of their 
posts partly so that other members can experience the challenges of 
management, but also to prevent formation of a permanent hierarchy. Thus 
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kibbutz members are simultaneously the owners, managers and employees 
of their organisation (296). Between 30% to 50% of Kibbutz members 
participate in the controlling committees which run the enterprises. All 
members engage in running of the overall Kibbutz including enterprises 
which they do not personally work in. Workers deliberate proposals made 
by managers. General managers are elected. They select other managers, 
but the workforce ratify such decisions (297). In a study of small British 
cooperatives, women reported feeling more autonomous and influential in 
NHOs where men did not predominate (291) but meetings outside working 
hours made participation harder for women with children (290). 
The other mode is federated representative democracy, found in larger 
organisations. Kerala Dinesh Beedi (KBD) cooperative had 35000 members 
working in 22 main plants. This cooperative used direct democracy within 
each department (typically 75-150 members) holding meetings every six 
months to discuss discipline and any apparent shirking by members. Each 
plant had an elected board of directors who usually served no more than a 
couple of terms and who were paid approximately the same as other 
members. These boards similarly elected a whole-cooperative board. The 
boards had powers of direction over foreman who in turn directed the 
supervisors who directed daily work, ensuring work discipline and product 
quality were maintained. The supervisors were thus accountable to a board 
elected by all the cooperative, so the workers whom they supervise could 
not alone depose their own supervisor: 
That combination of democracy and delegation of authority seems to have been an essential element in 
KDB's success. (117), p.1451 
This principle is also found in the John Lewis Partnership; top managers are 
elected but members do not elect their immediate supervisors. 
The Mondragon cooperatives each have an elected board with the same 
powers as a corporate Board, but the Board may not include any employed 
managers or other non-members. A parallel elected Social Council 
represents the members in negotiations with the Board over pay and 
conditions, in lieu of trades union representation (298). The point of this 
arrangement is to give the Board and the Social Council clear-cut, 
unambiguous roles and interests (27). The main disciplinary mechanisms 
are written warnings, suspension without pay (up to 60 days) or expulsion 
from the cooperative if the member goes on strike (298). Mondragon 
Cooperatives also elect representatives (in numbers proportional to their 
membership) to a Congress which elects an executive committee, president 
and executive which have decision-making powers in the two years between 
each Congress (27). Caja Laboral, the cooperative bank created to finance 
all the Mondragon Cooperatives, is managed by bodies comprising equal 
numbers of CL workers and representatives of its parent federation of 
cooperatives (299), i.e. its users. The former Yugoslavian labour-managed 
firms gave the employees at each workplace usufruct rights over the firm's 
assets and residual earnings, and a vote in a worker's council which elected 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2012. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
 102 
Project 08/1518/105 
managers (later, members gained the right to select managers by public 
competition), votes on production quotas, pay-rates and investment, but 
not the right to sell the firm's assets or their membership of it. They also 
had a system of tiers of indirectly elected representative bodies (122). The 
system was applied in the health sector. 
As for consumer cooperatives, mergers of UK mutuals and co-ops gradually 
reduced the opportunity for members to serve on the Boards although 
fashions for ethical consumerism and fair trade tend to encourage support 
and participation. In a study of the largest UK retail cooperative a 
substantial minority (20%) of members said that cost of attending meetings 
influenced their ability to participate in Boards and similar bodies. Childcare 
commitments were a significant practical barrier to member participation. A 
geographically dispersed organisation incurs higher costs of these kinds. 
Links between coops and adult education (e.g. co-ops help fund adult 
education) contribute to the success of coops in Denmark, Switzerland 'and 
in the past in UK through WEA and similar organisations. Active members 
stated that the rewards of participating were not material but learning, 
contributing and expressing one's own views. To reinforce these benefits it 
is necessary to feed back to members the reasons for decisions besides the 
reasons themselves. Participating members do have a sense of community, 
but a weak sense of a very localised community. Local managers' capacity 
to interact with local members' groups and meetings is important to giving 
active members a sense of influence in the Co-op. Use of customer loyalty 
cards instead of dividend for members reduced consumers' incentives to 
join the Co-op and participate (174). Personal links to like-minded 
organisations made people more likely to join the UK retail Co-op. Face-to-
face recruitment via shops is most effective recruitment method. Members' 
self-confidence encourages participation and vice-versa (89). The Eroski 
and Consum consumer cooperatives in Spain allow their employees to buy 
membership (including voting privileges) on the same basis as consumer 
members (300). The Danish electricity supply cooperatives have modified 
the one-customer-one-vote principle to allow larger customers the rights to 
send delegates with increased voting powers; 'one-kilowatt-one-vote' (105). 
Size is a key issue for NHOs two reasons. Economies of scale are discussed 
below. Its other significance is for democracy; whether cooperatives and 
mutuals is whether they can continue to be genuinely member-owned and 
controlled businesses once they become very large (174). When first set up, 
cooperatives and mutuals tend to have small, simple organisational 
structures. Their decision-making structures emphasize maximum 
involvement by members through general meetings. This however becomes 
less straightforward as the mutual or cooperatives expand, diversify and 
become more complex in structure. As the number of members eligible to 
participate in democratic decision-making grows, Olson (301) suggests, the 
individual incentive not to contribute increases. There is also a dis-
economies of scale in member coordination. Then, investor-ownership may 
provide better returns. In a large cooperative, members may feel it more 
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difficult for their actions to be decisive and for group identity to develop 
(174). However little evidence appears to be available showing the 
organisational size at which democratic control degenerates (296). 
This raises the question of how NHOs renew their memberships. New 
members were recruited to the Kerala Dinesh Beedi cooperative 
competitively on the basis of a practical test of the skills required for their 
job. Gulati, Isaac, and Klein (117)attribute the longevity and success of the 
Kerala Dinesh Beedi cooperative partly to its recruitment of competent, 
ideologically supportive and non-corrupt managers. Wanyama, Develtere, 
and Pollet (78) describe the difficulties arising when managers of African 
cooperatives had the opposite characteristics. A new recruit to a Mondragon 
cooperative pays an entry fee (which can be deducted from subsequent 
wages) but she cannot sell her membership or this account to anyone else 
(27). US dairy cooperatives had the right to restrict membership but, at 
least until the 1980s, seldom did so (106). US agriculture cooperatives had 
a fixed membership subscription, making members who owned smaller 
farms less satisfied and more prone to switch cooperatives (68). As for 
consumer cooperatives, by entering a contract to buy electricity Danish 
electricity consumers automatically become members of the cooperative 
which supplies it (105). Most Grameen Bank borrowers (hence, members) 
are recruited by word-of-mouth, on bank reputation. Each new recruits 
must then recruit four or fives others, the number required to set up a new 
group (292). Many C19 and C20 American communes attracted too many 
intellectuals and too few practically useful workers. Their members often 
feared that the promise of material gain attracted recruits unwilling to 
undertake the hard work required for self-sufficiency (119). 
In cooperatives as in partnerships mutual scrutiny was an important 
medium of control. In kibbutzim, workers scrutinise the work of new 
recruits. Control of workers is by reputation (which is highly valued). Non-
compliant workers are likely to have their 'needs' for additional income 
regarded unfavourably, and to experience social isolation and eventual 
transfer away to another task (297). (Gulati, Isaac, and Klein (117) 
attribute the longevity and market success of the Kerala Dishesh Beedi 
cooperative partly to its workplace culture and members' ability mutually to 
monitor each other's productivity and work discipline. Grameen Bank 
members monitor one another's punctuality in repaying loans because non-
repayment jeopardises future loans to others (i.e. themselves: two 
members of each group of five may receive a loan at one time). The same 
process applies to bank staff. The Bank's loan recovery rate was 99%, 
achieved partly by concertive control amongst back workers who publicly 
post recovery rates for each worker to see, so that workers pressurise each 
other to maintain the 99% rate (292). Members of therapeutic communities 
for drug users have therapeutic besides organisational reasons for mutual 
scrutiny (93). 
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6.2.2 Culture and ideology 
Control of the work process in a kibbutz is provided partly through common 
values (297). Ronen suggests: 
the main components of an individual's motivational set and job attitude depend largely on the system 
of social values with which he approaches the work environment and the organizational reward 
system. (302); p.85 
Kibbutz workers were reported to place higher importance on intrinsic job 
facets whilst private sector workers placed higher importance on extrinsic 
job benefits (296). The same values-based motivation is reported in quite 
different settings (e.g. credit unions), although cooperative and 
'entrepreneurial' (i.e. more corporate-like) cultures sometimes coexist 
uneasily (288). Strong ideologies can however be a mixed blessing for a 
cooperative or mutual. In the USA during the nineteenth century sectarian 
communes often succeeded in meeting their self-imposed aims because 
they in effect selected an ideologically-committed membership. The longest-
lasting communes were Pietist and celibate. These early communes' 
sometimes odd rules about dress and conduct restricted free-riding because 
they deterred all recruits except those strongly committed to the 
communes' aims. Against this, doctrinal differences (for instance between 
socialists and anarchists about the desirability of post-capitalist hierarchies) 
tended to promote splits and failures, which about a third of the communes 
experienced. Originating in an ideological split tended to reduce a 
commune's prospects for survival, whilst originating as a spin-off from an 
established commune (with no ideological differences) tended to increase it 
(119). In contrast, the Grameen bank has an explicit set of political values, 
for example against dowry, but does not make (say) dowry-taking an 
obstacle to receiving loans and so becoming a Bank member (292). 
6.2.3 Structural 'degeneration' 
If the organisational structure of a cooperative, mutual or similar 
organisation does start to lose its non-hierarchical character that change 
occurs, existing research suggests, in three stages. 
1. Democratic deficit: Côté (303) and Olsen (304) discuss the 
increasing difficulty of being a cooperative once its members no 
longer recognise the connection between identity of ownership and 
redistribution of surpluses based on their transactions. Then, Cote 
suggested, cooperatives will become emptied of organisational 
content, and the dominant paradigm of the investor-owned 
hierarchy will prevail. In default of member participation, managers 
take over governance. The UK Co-op's abolition of dividend 
payments to members in 1970s cut precisely this economic link 
between members and cooperatives: a 'fatal mistake' ((89); p.491) 
because it made the Co-op barely distinguishable from the 
corporations from whom the idea was copied. About 70% of UK 
building societies demutualised after 1984, mainly due to 
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managerial pressure and managerial opposition preserved the other 
30%. That managerial preference could decide such a fundamental 
issue suggests a substantial 'democratic deficit'. Against this, it has 
been argued that mass participation is not necessary to ensure the 
smooth running of a large-scale cooperative. Members often feel 
apathetic towards voting and often choose to rely on a few core 
members to act on their behalf, rather than vote personally (305). 
Birchall and Simmons (174)segment consumer cooperatives' 
membership into three segments: 'true believers', who may include 
potential board members; a 'supporters club' who believe in the 
aims of the organisation and offer individual support through voting 
and attending social events; and those who vaguely support the 
organisation's values but do not engage much with organisational 
structures. 
2. Expenditure on its services will, for many members of a consumer 
cooperative, be only a small fraction of their income. In the (large) 
Danish electricity supply cooperatives, most members act only as 
consumers not owners. Diversification of membership and their 
interests, besides an increase in cooperative size, has distanced 
Danish consumers from the electricity supply cooperatives that they 
are members of (105). Chaddad and Cook (170) describe how the 
ownership of US savings and loan mutuals was dispersed, 
regulatory and insurance systems insulated members from the 
effects of managerial decision, and so the management gradually 
became a barely-controlled self-perpetuating oligarchy. Regulatory 
changes to facilitate conversion and background changes in the 
financial markets, meant that about 90% of US savings and loan 
mutuals demutualised. 
3. In many African countries, and Peru, democratic deficits arose as 
cooperatives became increasingly subject to control by public 
authorities rather than their members (78). 
4. Hybridisation: Perrow (63) points out that increasingly, hired labour 
is being used in kibbutzim, embracing what Kibbutz founders 
regarded as the exploitative wage-labour structures found in 
corporations, with managers increasingly appropriating profits for 
distribution to external shareholders and treating departments and 
activities as profit centres. Managers cite 'commercial 
confidentiality' to justify withholding information from members 
about kibbutz work and finances (156,306). Similar events occurred 
in the Estonian cooperatives (152). To prevent formation of such an 
oligarchy, Irish credit unions only allow unpaid volunteers to be 
directors (288). Mondragon cooperatives have three categories of 
participant: members; employees; and temporary participants of 
either category. Reports of the composition of the Mondragon 
cooperatives appearing to reflect an increasing hybridisation. In 
1995 that only 10% of workers were employees not members (27) 
but in 1999 that 30% were (300) and in 2003, 40% (299). 
Acquisitions may be at least part of the explanation. When the 
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cooperative took over two small foundries the workers there voted 
to stay employees not become members and the cooperative 
subsequently acquired overseas corporations as subsidiaries. In 
contrast, Kerala Dinesh Bedi remains exclusively a full-membership 
cooperative. 
5. Demutualisation: Drake and Llewellyn (166) say growth is a strong 
argument for demutualisation; the typical mutual Building Society is 
simply too big to run democratically. Besides showing the effect of 
changing from a non-hierarchical to a corporate organisational 
structure, studies of demutualisation also reveal the ways in which 
NHOs may be susceptible to weaknesses of organisational structure. 
Chaddad and Cook's non-systematic review of demutualisations in 
the US financial sector identified relaxation of managerial and 
constraints as the main motive for demutualisation, but also point 
out that these studies did not examine the hypotheses that 
demutualisations were also motivated by the prospect of private 
benefits for members or managers. Hence, 'this hypothesis cannot 
be ruled out' ((170); p.586) (and was certainly not ruled out by 
informants in our building society case study). 
We found a few exceptions to the above pattern. Cameron and Collins (307) 
(contend that some traditional rock bands of typically 3-5 musicians can be 
considered as worker cooperatives whose instability, due in part to lack of 
well-defined property rights and appropriate governance structures, can be 
reduced by shifting to a 'boss and workers' wage system. Individuals 
appeared to quit when their expected utility ((income) outside the band 
exceeded that inside it. In rather different cultural vein, a commitment to 
celibacy means that religiously-motivated communes eventually die out if 
they cannot or will not recruit new members from outside (119). Many 
nineteenth-century US communes died out with their founders because 
existing members suspected the motives of young people joining 
established, relatively wealthy communes. The Shakers attenuated this 
problem by hiring labour. Communes which allowed some personal property 
lasted longer than those which did not. Anarchistic decision-making 
(relational democracy) tended to prolong the survival of the commune but 
Thies (119) found only small numbers of such cases. Early agricultural 
cooperatives in the US were often funded by the issue of stocks, which over 
time became concentrated in fewer and fewer hands so that the cooperative 
where this occurred increasingly approximated to a shareholder-controlled 
firm (106). 
6.3 Process 
We found considerable diversity of working practices. Kibbutz factory 
workers have permanent roles. They define their own technical roles, 
divisions of labour and deployment. Ad hoc they can swap or adjust their 
shifts and rotas (297). Ezzamel and Willmott (201) incidentally describe 
similar arrangements springing up spontaneously in a weakly-managed 
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corporate factory. In contrast the Mondragon cooperatives, operating a 
diverse group of industries, agricultural production, housing, shops, 
educational centres, social security, consumer cooperatives, a bank and a 
research and development organisation (96) appear to have a relatively 
stable division of labour and allocation of work duties (298,27,300). A 
survey comparing matched samples of Italian cooperatives and corporations 
found that the cooperatives had more labour-intensive production methods 
than the private firms (308). A wider, more recent study of Italian 
cooperatives using 1991 census data showed that worker co-operatives 
emerged mainly in cleaning and security services, and road transport of 
goods, where employees' tasks are standardized and homogeneous, 
relatively little capital is required and the equipment is not firm-specific, in 
contrast to say mining and manufacturing where high investment is 
required and investments are firm-specific. Hence co-operatives mainly 
arose in food and drink manufacturing and wholesale distribution. Non-profit 
organisations (including but not limited to cooperatives) were concentrated 
in education and welfare services, where there is information asymmetry 
between customers and producers (309). Newly-recruited Grameen Bank 
members form a group to undertake loan transactions, receive training from 
bank worker, recite '16 principles' (No dowry, use pit latrines etc.). Because 
of customs of purdah many of the Grameen Bank's income-generating 
activities allow women to stay close to their homes (e.g., paddy husking 
and processing, sewing, cloth spinning, poultry raising, etc.). Besides their 
directly financial activities, Grameen Bank workers also provide education 
and training in family planning, personal hygiene, public sanitation, 
nutrition, and child development; and PE. Grameen officials are often 
deputed to work on outside projects (e.g. Grameen Krishi (agricultural) 
Foundation, Joyshagor (sea of joy) Fish Farm) to avoid a promotion logjam 
due to the pyramidal structure of the organization. These projects helped 
Grameen Bank recover most of its operating costs (292). 
A (low doctor-patient ratio of about 1:1000 was found in the Group Health 
cooperative compared with about 1:481 for the equivalent fee-for-services 
alternatives. The performance of Group Health doctors was more uniform 
than in the comparator organisations and less sensitive to differences in 
doctors' qualifications. Group Health however found it less easy to adapt to 
changes in demand levels. Shortell et al. (59) concluded that different 
organisational forms appear differently to mediate the effects of differences 
in doctor and in patient characteristics. 
6.3.1 Size and economies of scale 
NHOs tend to be smaller than their corporate counterparts. In Oerton's 
purposive sample of UK cooperatives (not seeking small cooperatives alone) 
39 out of 45 had 10 workers or fewer (290). A number of empirical studies 
suggest that US agricultural cooperatives tend to be smaller than the 
corresponding corporations, so that the former could become more 
technically efficient by expanding production so as better to exploit 
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economies of scale (68) but Craig and Pencavel's census (310) of US 
plywood cooperatives found no evidence of a negatively-sloping supply 
curve. Another study of US dairy producers showed corporations to be 
slightly more price-efficient than cooperatives, slightly larger than 
cooperatives and hence exploiting economies of scale more fully. Non-
cooperatives showed about 20% more managerial (i.e. technical) efficiency 
than cooperatives. Porter and Scully (155) therefore concluded that due to 
its collective decision-making and property rights a cooperative is about 
75% as efficient as a corporate counterpart. However, presence of 
cooperatives may prevent monopsony firms from reducing prices (to 
farmers) below a certain threshold. The effects of economies of scale can 
also work the other way. Cooperative farms in the former East Germany 
appeared more efficient than smaller organisations such as family farms 
(73). Some US retail cooperatives achieve economies of scale by operating 
a 'pre-order' system with one cooperative or branch collating individual or 
local orders into one large order to suppliers. This also allows economies of 
scale in (e.g.) warehousing (example given of Federation of Ohio River 
Cooperatives) (106). Jones and Backus (197) compared output, size, 
investment and factor proportions for four producer cooperatives with 
corporations in the British footwear industry from 1945 to the mid-1970s, 
finding that the cooperatives invested less, had smaller and slower-growing 
'value added' (nett income). Jefferis and Thomas (98) argued that this was 
why (British clothing and printing) cooperatives found it hard to raise capital 
(see below). 
Research on credit unions gives conflicting evidence about the effects of 
merger and growth. An econometric analysis of the growth performance of 
US credit unions during 1992-2001 investigated the relationships between 
size, age and growth. Ceteris paribus, larger credit unions grew faster than 
smaller ones. State credit unions grew faster than federal credit unions, and 
single bond credit unions grew faster than multiple bond credit unions. 
These patterns are attributed to variations in legislation and regulatory 
treatment. There is some evidence that younger credit unions tended to 
outgrow older ones. This seems consistent with a life cycle typology of 
credit union growth and development. There is also evidence of a positive 
persistence of growth effect. However another study found that the cross-
sectional variance of growth is inversely related to size but (largely 
independent of age (311). The, increasing difficulty for the Portuguese 
Agricultural Credit Cooperatives (ACCs) in gathering equity since the 1990s 
forced many of them to merge. The incorporating ACCs were the more 
profitable ones with better credit management; the ACCs which they 
absorbed were smaller, facing difficulties in reaching a minimum efficient 
scale. They had weaker credit management and leverage problems. 
However the merged ACCs had heavy administrative costs and still faced 
profitability problems. The mergers had no positive influence on cost 
reduction, credit management and solvency ratio (312) (cp. also (313)).  
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6.3.2 Capitalisation 
As time passes, the scale of technically-required start-up funding increases 
for cooperatives as it does for corporations. Contrary to some predictions, a 
survey comparing matched samples of north Italian cooperatives and 
corporations found no significant differences between them in terms of 
investment horizons or criteria for finance (308). Uvalic (169) cites similar 
evidence about Yugoslav cooperatives. US cooperatives' share prices 
appeared to be undervalued, a possible explanation of the difficulties which 
cooperatives have in raising capital from private sources (310,314). Easier 
access to capital was a strong motive for US savings and loans mutuals to 
demutualise (170). Yet indebtedness to external non-member (rentier) 
financiers or shareholders poses a challenge to democratic control. Early 
agricultural cooperatives in the US were often funded by the issue of stocks, 
which over time became concentrated in fewer and fewer hands so that the 
cooperative where this occurred increasingly approximated to a 
conventional shareholder-controlled firm. Even the cooperative banks 
founded by US dairy cooperatives imposed managerial and technical 
efficiency conditions upon the dairy cooperatives as a condition for lending 
to them (106). 
When acquiring a private firm, the Mondragon cooperatives therefore 
acquire 100% so as to leave non-member shareholders no claims (27). US 
cooperatives can, under restrictive legal conditions, buy out older members' 
shares and retain them for use by future members of the cooperative (155). 
When indebtedness forced some early cooperatives to issue stock to the 
public, to prevent concentration of control they issued non-voting stock and 
limited voting stock ownership to one share per member (106). Having 
made a start-up loan and obtained two non-voting places on the Kerala 
Dinesh Beedi cooperative board the government did not further interfere in 
its operation, unlike public authorities' approach elsewhere in India, and had 
strong political motives for wanting the cooperative to succeed (117).  
6.3.3 Marketing 
Kibbutzim in many cases sell industrial products into the open market 
(297)and therefore undertakes conventional product marketing (with 
marketing mix). In contrast, the Kerala Dinesh Beedi cooperative sustained 
its sales with almost no marketing and sales promotion over a long period, 
relying on word-of-mouth recommendation and producing a higher product 
quality than its competitors (117). 
Besides the dislike which businesses normally have for competitors, 
cooperatives have tended to arouse more ideological opposition because 
they challenge by example corporate business models and property rights. 
For example external firms (shippers) opposed the agricultural cooperatives 
in the USA and made it difficult for them to obtain favourable input costs 
(106). Co-operatives have at times also aroused ideological opposition from 
other sources. Some Islamic leaders tried to persuade borrowers (mainly 
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women, as noted above) and staff to leave Grameen on the grounds that 
use of a bank is anti-Islamic. The Bank therefore persuaded local Imans to 
say that bank membership is compatible with Islam (292). After the wave of 
failures in the commercial banking sector in 2007-9, the UK building 
societies which survived attempts at demutualisation have begun to 'Talk 
up' the idea of mutuality, emphasising the benefits of no shareholders, who 
seek to take the surplus away from the organisation (89). 
6.4 Outcomes 
6.4.1 Organisational survival 
Various studies (see above) report, and others predict, NHO degeneration 
and demise but others describe NHOs which have survived long periods, a 
precondition for achieving any other outcomes. A study of British clothing 
and printing cooperatives suggests lower survival rates than corporations 
during the first five years (98), but not necessarily afterwards. 
A study of 11 African countries showed that cooperatives there have 
withstood market forces and marketisation of the economy, and continued 
to grow in number and membership with a shift towards 'social economy' 
models (cooperatives collaborate with other types of economic institution 
and diversify their activities) from the 'unified' model (vertically-integrated 
federated cooperatives). Removal of state support and managerial linkages 
in the 1990s meant that the least well managed cooperatives collapsed but 
the survivors diversified and there was a nett growth of cooperatives (78). 
The Mondragon cooperatives have operated successfully and on a large 
scale since 1954, being now the sixth largest industrial organisation in 
Spain (299), manufacturing 'white goods' among other items. A survey of 
French producer co-operatives during 1970-79 found a high rate of survival 
with many of them over 50 years old with no evidence of degeneration in 
terms of the proportion of hired workers, productivity, profitability, or 
capital intensity. However the cooperatives' financial structures become 
increasingly inefficient with age due to over-accumulation of collectively 
owned assets and, in Estrin and Jones' view, under-utilization of external 
debt (315). The oldest Kibbutzim have survived, with the vicissitudes 
described above, since the late 1940s (156,297). The Kerala Dinesh Beedi 
cooperative has functioned successfully since 1965. The German Raiffeisen 
food cooperatives date from 1869, having maintained turnover size since 
the 1990s but reduced in number through mergers (295). The John Lewis 
Partnership (and latterly Waitrose) in the UK have developed a substantial 
market share since their nineteenth-century origins. Among consumer 
cooperatives, UK retail cooperatives and building societies have continued 
to survive and grow (largely but not only by merger) since the middle 
nineteenth century, experiencing various economic vicissitudes in doing so, 
of which the most serious was the demutualisation of the most building 
societies in the 1990s. 
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The above cases among others have survived competition from 
corporations, in many cases out-competing the latter if market share and 
growth of exports be any indication (27,300). 
6.4.2 Livelihoods for members 
To get cooperatives started members are often willing to undergo a 
'shoestring' period of low pay (308,98). Afterwards the pattern changes. 
The Kerala Dishesh Beedi cigarette cooperative in South India dating from 
1965 payed wages and benefits that (including 'fringe benefits' in kind) are 
around three times higher than those paid by its competitors, while at the 
same time providing better working conditions. Each member had to meet a 
standard minimum productivity target in order to qualify for the payment of 
needs-based supplements to the basic wage. The members were satisfied 
with this remuneration without attempting to maximise their income to the 
last rupee (117). Oerton examined male workers in social enterprises, 
finding that these men cited the benefits of being able to enjoy some of the 
conditions traditionally associated with women's work 'namely having more 
routine, less-pressurised, less competitive working lives. But women 
members' income from the cooperative was generally lower than men's, 
even allowing for women's greater tendency to work part-time and women 
had less security of tenure (290). The presence of dairy cooperatives in the 
USA may have prevented corporations reducing prices (to farmers) below a 
certain threshold (155). Often Kibbutz members are paid well in excess of 
the accepted rates for the work they undertake (296). Kibbutzim originally 
functioned without waged labour, distributing operating surpluses equally 
with an adjustment for needs (297). The Israeli Registrar of Cooperatives 
stipulates that any which implement differential wages lose Kibbutz status. 
In UK cooperatives, maternity provision was generally more generous than 
the legal requirements and ordinary employers' provision. Mondragon 
cooperatives retained between 30% and 50% of operating surplus for 
reserve funds and redistributed the rest according to members' hours 
worked and pay grade. A percentage also went into each member's account 
(based on her entry fee), from which interest was paid back to the member 
(298). This reserve fund tides the cooperatives over market fluctuations of 
income. During the economic recession of the early 1980s, the cooperatives 
reallocated members and other resources between each other in order to 
retain full employment (27) and tended to vary wages rather than numbers 
of employees (298). A survey of plywood producers in one US state also 
found cooperatives were more likely to adjust wages and less likely to 
reduce staffing in response to market changes than corporations were 
(310). However the benefit to members (rather than 'society') has also 
been cited (316) as a reason against including doctors on the boards of not-
for-profit hospitals, implying a trade-off between the policy objectives of 
social benefit and professional engagement in the running of not-for-profit 
hospitals generally. Towards the end of their existence some Yugoslav 
cooperatives were raising wages at the expense of investment (122). 
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Describing 30 early mutualisations of US life insurers (formerly shareholder-
owned) Mayers and Smith (317) found that the rate of growth of premium 
income from policyholders remained unchanged, stockholders received a 
premium for their stock and management turnover declined. They conclude 
that mutualisation was 'on average efficiency-enhancing'. 
Effective, honest, and dedicated managers appear to contributed to the 
success of the Kerala Dishesh Beedi cooperative. A few professional 
managers were recruited, but their proportion and pay was lower than in 
the commercial sector (at perhaps one tenth the level in Indian 
corporations). These managers were subordinate to the elected board at 
whole-cooperative level (117). Wage differentials in the Mondragon 
cooperatives were in the order of 4.5:1 and in industrial kibbutzim 3.5:1 
(306). Kibbutz managers were paid about half the pay of their private-
sector equivalents (298). For perspective, the differential between the 
highest-paid company director in the UK (£36.8m per year (Guardian, 14th 
September 2009)) and the national minimum wage is over 3000:1. 
6.4.3 Quality of working life 
A study comparing workers' job satisfaction in the profit and non-profit 
sectors of seven European countries showed the workers in the non-profit 
sector had greater job satisfaction, attributed to the workers' greater 
autonomy at work and their greater satisfaction with the type of work they 
were doing. These workers therefore developed a stronger intrinsic 
motivation to carry out their work (318) ('non-profit' includes but is not 
limited to NHOs). The same was reported, and a propensity to monitor each 
other's work, at the Kerala Dinesh Beedi cooperative (117). Workers of both 
sexes found that cooperatives enabled a more flexible accommodation of 
private and working life than the conditions given by hierarchical employers 
(290). 
6.4.4 Cost-effectiveness 
A meta-analysis of productivity data from 43 surveys covering a number of 
countries concluded that on balance labour productivity was higher in one-
person-one-vote producers than comparable corporations (seven surveys 
versus two, and two equivocal surveys: none stated which findings were 
statistically significant). Profit-sharing was associated with higher 
productivity (all surveys), and more strongly association than worker 
ownership was. On balance (two statistically significant surveys versus one) 
worker ownership was nonetheless associated with higher productivity 
(319). A survey comparing matched samples of Italian cooperatives and 
corporations found the cooperatives had higher productivity, lower income 
differentials, and fewer industrial disputes (308). A now rather dated 
econometric study estimated that whilst the productivity effects of various 
forms of worker participation in producer cooperatives varied between 
settings, the overall effect was positive, most uniformly with respect to 
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profit sharing and, somewhat less, individual share ownership and 
participation in decision-making. Collective capital ownership had an 
insignificant or a negative productivity effect (320). Low administrative 
costs were not related to other aspects of partnership and NHO 
performance (321). The Kibbutz movement as a whole had large debts 
following Israeli financial crises in 1980s due to high-interest loans 
promoted by government, market collapses and banking irregularities. From 
mid 1990s Kibbutz growth rates for exports and overall sales exceeded 
private sector's (297). Before the effects of the (external) oil crises were felt 
in the late 1970s the Yugoslav cooperatives were sustaining average growth 
rates of 7.2% annually (122). In Estonia, however, worker-owned firms 
were not more productive than corporations because the former were often 
reluctant cooperatives to start with, being worker-owned but not worker-
controlled (instead, bureaucratically managed) (152). French cooperative 
banks have survived by specialising and diversifying in providing credit. 
Their market role increased during the 1990s. They maintained higher 
profitability than the commercial banks during 1992-1999 and similar 
profitability in the period thereafter. Because they cannot be taken over by 
commercial banks they retain a capacity to influence the development of 
financial regulations in Europe and globally (322). UK building societies 
started to outperform commercial lenders on interest and market share 
from c.2001; and were more trusted than investor-owned banks (89). 
Three studies of US mutuals (323-325) showed that those which 
demutualised showed increased (but also more variable (326)) profitability 
and share price, and faster growth, linked in Cole and Mehran's (323) view 
to the stronger financial incentives on managers who became shareholders 
and according to Cordell, MacDonald, and Wohar (327) and to Esty (326), 
linked to a switch of investments towards higher-growth, higher- risk 
financial instruments. This increased financial performance is the foundation 
of the agency-theorists' claims that de-mutualisation increases 'efficiency' 
(in the micro-economic not the technical sense). However, 
In general the literature is silent about distributional effects related to demutualisation, particularly 
the effects on depositors following demutualisation. (170); p.581 
Although demutualisation does appear to provide members with access to 
'unallocated equity and reserves' (ibid. p588). (The 2007 financial sector 
crash however cast considerable doubt on some of these claims. To the 
extent that they did not imitate corporate financial management practices, 
mutuals weathered the crisis more successfully than corporate financial 
institutions. Indeed it was failures of the latter, not of the mutuals, which 
triggered the crisis (328). 
In the health sector, van Uden et al. (329) found that it made no difference 
to the costs of running a cooperative whether it was integrated or not with a 
hospital A&E department, although the integrated cooperative had greater 
impact on reducing A&E admissions. But reducing the number of patients 
seen produced dis-economies of scale, hence higher costs per patient. 
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6.4.5 Values 
Cooperative organisations are still viewed as 'alternative'or marginal 
organisational forms. Regarding gender issues in social enterprises, Oerton 
(concludes that women workers in cooperatives and collectives have a 
greater tendency towards being exploited by virtue of being women rather 
than being simply workers in a cooperative or collective, a tendency 
underpinned by familial and gender specific 'orientations' ((290); p.218). 
Her research indicated that women workers in social enterprises are usually 
materially disadvantaged when compared to their male counterparts, 
receiving on average lower earnings, even allowing for that fact that the 
women were mostly employed part-time. However, the women had 
different expectations from their male colleagues about what constituted 
'well paid' They were more likely to view their jobs as temporary and hence 
make plans to move in and out of employment in response to personal or 
family needs. Despite children being undifferentiated by sex (clothing aside) 
in their early years, by 1975 the sexual division of labour in the Kibbutz had 
reached an 80% saturation of women in education and consumption 
(laundry and food production) and men in production. Simons and Ingram 
(296) suggest that Kibbutzim fail to maintain social equality because sex-
role differentiation is too engrained in society at large, indeed in basic 
human motives, for the Kibbutzim to abolish. 
6.4.6 Quality of product or service 
Kerala Dinesh Beedi cooperative survived for many years by producing a 
higher-quality, higher-priced beedi than its commercial competitors (this is 
what enables it to pay the high wages mentioned below) (117). Hanf (295) 
(notes how some of the Raiffeisen cooperatives are forming centralised 
networks with closed membership in order to impose higher standards of 
quality control on the goods their farmer-members supply. Sloan et al. 
(330) reported that for US hospital admissions of 91 days or less duration 
for four acute conditions (primary diagnoses of hip fracture, stroke, 
coronary heart disease, or congestive heart failure) between 1983 and 
1995, costs were higher in for-profit than government and non-profit 
hospitals (including but not limited to NHOs). There was no significant 
difference in survival, changes in functional and cognitive status, and living 
arrangements. Shortell et al. (331) compared semi-affiliated hospitals with 
their market area competitors (550 system hospitals and 555 of comparator 
hospitals). Not for profit system hospitals provided a wider range of services 
than investor owned systems hospitals, a higher percentage of services for 
which charity care was offered, and were more likely to provide unprofitable 
services than not-for-profit system hospitals. Both corporate and not-for-
profit hospitals offered wider ranges of services under highly competitive 
conditions. These findings concern not-for-profit hospitals generally. A more 
focused though now rather dated US study showed that patients at FFS 
services reported higher satisfaction than at a cooperative (Group Health). 
Nevertheless, Group Health met a higher proportion of indicators for high 
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quality care than fee-for-service (FFS) providers did. Its patients had 
greater continuity of care than FFS patients, except for Group Health 
patients seen by 'internists' (generalist physicians treating adults) but this 
difference had no impact on the main outcome indicator (age-adjusted 
blood pressure). Care group characteristics seem to influence successful (in 
terms of main outcome indicator I.e. age-adjusted blood pressure) care 
delivery in Group Health-like contexts, provider characteristics seem more 
influential in FFS settings. No relationship was found between doctor 
performance and the main outcome indicator (age-adjusted blood 
pressure). The linkage between access and perceived satisfaction was 
stronger among Group Health patients than among patients of the FFS 
comparator (59). 
European studies give divergent conclusions about patient satisfaction with 
primary health services provided by cooperatives. Hallam and Henthorne's 
case studies of primary care cooperatives' emergency centres found that 
patients attending the centres were as satisfied with their treatment as 
those patients visited at home, and more satisfied with response times 
(45). McKinley et al. (332) however found that patients seen by deputising 
doctors (including by implication those from co-operatives) were less 
satisfied with the care they received than were those seen by practice 
doctors. The greatest difference in satisfaction concerned delays in visiting. 
There were no differences in the change in health or overall health status 
measured 24 to 120 hours after the out of hours call or subsequent use of 
the health service in the two groups. Another counter-example was an 
Israeli experiment in the form of fertility clinics that used lay clients as co-
producers of a professional service (333). Involving clients as co-producers 
in service provision lowered the satisfaction of clients and staff with work 
and services. A study (294) of one Irish OOH cooperative found generally 
high levels of patient satisfaction but patients with lower physical and 
mental health status scores were less likely to be satisfied, as were patients 
with higher socio-economic status. Age, gender, and call outcome did not 
significantly affect overall patient satisfaction. 
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7 Bibliometric profile of the reviewed 
literature 
The number of relevant theoretical studies was higher than expected, the 
largest single category being a priori economic models rather than 
organisational theory. We have already noted how ambiguous terminology 
in this area of research is. Oerton's comment (291) that the literature on 
NHOs focuses mainly on class relations (taken to include property rights) 
rather than the effects of NHOs on gender (or indeed other forms of) 
inequality remains true. 
Our electronic search found 71 relevant empirical papers about cooperatives 
and mutuals, and 122 about professional partnerships. The former tended 
to concentrate on a few celebrated cases (e.g. Mondragon, US agricultural 
cooperatives). Many studies which might otherwise have been informative 
failed to differentiate egalitarian and democratic organisations from 
hierarchical not-for-profit organisations. Table 5 shows the distribution by 
geographical region from which the data (as opposed to the authors) came. 
 
Table 5. Distribution of papers by region of origin of data 
 NHOs Partnerships 
UK 9 28 
Rest of Europe 7 21 
Australia and New Zealand 1 3 
Canada 2 10 
Israel 4 1 
USA 25 51 
Elsewhere  8 0 
Two or more of the above regions 3 4 
 
We give data separately for Israel because of studies of kibbutzim are 
prominent in the research literature on cooperatives and mutuals. Not 
included in the databases we searched was (a more extensive literature 
(including a specialist journal) about kibbutzim, including literature in 
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languages other than English. Table 6 shows the distribution by economic 
sector. 
 
Table 6. Distribution of papers by economic sector 
 NHOs Partnerships 
Accountancy 0 22 
Agriculture 9 2 
Architects 0 2 
Consultancy  0 11 
Finance  3 0 
Health 12 57 
Law 5 28 
Manufacturing, building and retail 15 0 
Women's organisations 4 0 
Others 11 3 
Two or more of the above 0 4 
 'Finance' includes banks, building societies and credit unions. 'Others' 
included veterinary services, museums, social clubs, music groups, 
unspecified 'voluntary organisations' and a radio station. Two now rather 
dated studies report forms of professional partnerships in health care which 
had not been formally evaluated at the time nor, so far as we could 
discover, since: partnerships which combined general physician and 
rheumatologists (i.e. partners working in primary and in secondary care) 
(334); and a medical partnership based on hospital premises, making use of 
the ancillary services in its host site (335). Many more papers reported 
producer than consumer cooperatives. 
Across the thematic components of the ESPO framework outlined above, 
papers were distributed as Tables 7 and 8 show. 
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Table 7. Distribution of papers by ESPO category 
 NHOs Partnerships 
Environment 34 83 
Structure 54 80 
Process 38 75 
Outcome 51 40 
Table 8.  Distribution of papers by ESPO relationship  
 NHOs Partnerships 
Environment - Structure  28 41 
Environment – Process 8 19 
Environment - Outcome 13 6 
Structure - Process 39 23 
Structure - Outcome 25 16 
Process - Outcome 28 11 
Generally the outcomes studied were more often financial and market 
outcomes (growth, market share, competitiveness) or organisational (e.g. 
membership numbers, longevity of organisation) than 'real-side' outcomes. 
The statement (308) that the empirical literature contains many diverse, 
often conflicting conclusions remains true. In general, the systematic review 
findings are impoverished by the difficulty that the most abundant, and 
often high quality, studies from the USA seldom empirically differentiate 
partnerships, NHOs and other organisational structures. 
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Methodologically the distribution of research designs was as Table 9 shows. 
Table 9. Study designs  
 NHOs Partnerships 
RCT 0 1 
Quasi-experiment (non-randomised 
controlled)  
0 0 
Longitudinal, multiple cases 6 25 
Cross-sectional or comparative 26 66 
Single case study 20 21 
Laboratory game, simulation or 
experiment 
3 0 
Other  3 5 
'Cross sectional' and 'comparative' are grouped together as the respective 
designs in quantitative and qualitative methodologies for making 
observational comparisons. 'Longitudinal' also covers both quantitative 
designs (e.g. time series) and their qualitative equivalent (narrative 
histories, including recent histories). In terms of hierarchies of evidence 
(336) the research appears to be concentrated in less-than-gold-standard 
designs but experimental studies are generally rare in organisational and 
policy research (though not unknown (337)). The number of cross-sectional 
studies of partnerships reflects the high proportion of surveys using US 
data-bases. Of these 31 were in the health sector and covered (but were 
not all limited to) medical partnerships. Of the 25 longitudinal studies of 
professional partnerships, 21 were narrative histories. The 'other' category 
contained no systematic and 6 (2+4) non-systematic reviews. 
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We also classified studies by the representativeness of their data in the 
descending hierarchy of sampling strategies shown in Table 10. 
Table 10. Sampling strategies  
 NHOs Partnerships 
Census 17 49 
Randomised sample 2 6 
Purposive sample 10 26 
Convenience sample 1 7 
Single case 18 21 
Other 6 9 
'Purposive' includes 'qualitative' or 'theoretically-driven' sampling. 'Other' 
includes studies where the sample was not clearly specified (e.g. just 
described as 'representative'). Although this table gives an overview of the 
literature studied its implicit ranking should be taken with caution. A single 
case-study (e.g. (338)) describing the history of a whole sub-sector of an 
economy for a long period might present more safely generalisable 
conclusions than a census of narrowly-defined organisations in a small 
region or idiosyncratic setting. The proportion of organisational censuses 
again reflects the number of studies which re-analyse US databases. 
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8 Environment: case study findings 
We present our primary empirical findings in research question order, which 
matches the order of the main headings in our research framework. (This 
chapter begins by summarising the empirical patterns found in the case 
studies about the relationships between the study organisations and their 
environment. 
8.1 Organisational goals 
Goals of the study organisations related mainly to: 
 1. Personal work interests of founder-members or partners 
 2. Values or ideology 
 3. Finance 
 4. A particular locality 
 5. Quality of working life 
These five were present across all the study sites although the relative 
prominence, and of course content, of each varied. 
8.1.1 Personal work interests 
In the professional partnerships, the organisation was a vehicle for the 
founding partners' personal work interests, which the organisation's de 
facto goals included. Thus in PharmPlus practice areas of special interest 
(dermatology, ophthalmology) developed simply because that was what the 
individual GPs were interested in. For the pharmacist, 
for me this role [partner] is better [than salaried or subcontracted pharmacist] because I like to 
create things and I like to shape ideas and to be at the heart, at the top, with the partners, 
driving the process, it's what makes me tick. 
(Pharmacist Partner, PharmPlus) 
At PlusPM one manager-partner had an interest in target-meeting so this 
figured prominently in practice goals. Another partner had interest in 
making PlusPM a training practice. However formation due to visionary 
personal interest or motivation could also inhibit future recruitment of 
partners who, existing partners feared, might not be of like mind. Thus in 
NurseLed: 
So the Board [of partners] is just the three of us 'we've talked a lot about expanding the Board 
but [name] and I have such a clear vision of what we want, and it's our baby, that we've been 
very hesitant. 
(NP partner, NurseLed) 
The organisational structure of PCTrun practice directly reflected partners' 
interests in another way. The GPs remaining after the senior partner retired 
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were uninterested in management and wanted to concentrate on clinical 
work. They became salaried GPs employed by the PCT to do the work they 
had as partners, choosing nationalisation because it served their personal 
work interests. 
In professionally-controlled NHOs too, one goal was to realise the members' 
view of how services ought to be provided: 
because it is owned by doctors, because although it's NHS and all that, the organisation is 
owned and run by doctors. And it's easier for the doctors to say what they want and do the 
out-of-hours how they want it. 
(Finance Manager, City) 
Personal development was another motivation for helping found, or joining, 
an NHO. Thus in Metro: 
I got involved in the first place because one of my other jobs is as a GP tutor for [town], and I 
was very keen to start getting a protected time scheme for doctors developed so that they 
could have educational events in the daytime, and originally the PCT wasn't (prepared to fund 
these, and Metro was. 
(Clinical governance lead, Metro) 
Similarly the accountancy partnership used a generous personal 
development programme to help recruit good-quality staff in face of 
competition from the big four accountancy firms. 
8.1.2 Principles, ideology, 'values' 
Many of our informants were motivated in part by a set of principles or 
values, or an ideology. 
Three of the cooperatives studied traced their origins to principled, visionary 
founders. Wholefood was founded by two individuals who in principle 
supported the idea of cooperatives and therefore acted as 'seedling' 
members, helping to establish one cooperative before moving on to help 
start another. Our large retail cooperative clearly traced its origins to its 
founder, who had inherited a department store from his father. Years later 
the founder explained his motivation to the BBC: 
It was soon clear to me that my father's success had been due to his trying constantly to give 
very good value to people who wished to exchange their money for his merchandise but it also 
became clear to me that the business would have grown further and that my father's life 
would have been much happier if he had done the same for those who wished to exchange 
their work for his money ...[I came to] the notion that the relation of employers to employees 
should be that of lawyers or stockbrokers to their clients or of doctors to their patients or of 
teachers and trainers to their students. None of these experts ask for their services more than 
a definite fee quite moderate in relation to the importance of the service they give for it. 
(BBC broadcast, 15th April 1957) 
HouseLend could also trace its origins to a visionary founder, in this case 
one who had the idea of establishing a mutual building society which, unlike 
previous building societies, was permanent (not 'terminating' once its 
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members had built themselves housing) and which financed rather than 
built housing for its members. 
Among the general practices we studied the goal most often expressed was 
that of providing a good quality of service: 
To try and provide a good standard of health care within the resources that we are given, 
having an eye to ' we want to be cost effective with regards to ' it sounds awful but we are not 
a high prescribing or high referring practice because we feel that we should be referring and 
prescribing appropriately. 
(GP, PlusPMs) 
The health cooperatives also emphasised the goal of good quality care. The 
'mission' of Metro was to: 
Provide the highest quality, most efficient and appropriate out of hours care for our 
commissioned PCTs and their full patient population. We aim to be a central agency to develop 
the widest range of complementary primary care too. We see ourselves as part of the NHS, 
and therefore strive to act in the best interests of the wider NHS economy and community. 
(finance director, Metro) 
At City: 
Everyone would demand, and even [City] would demand of itself, is that the patients are the 
ones in the centre of all this, so whatever we do we have to provide care to patients. 
(Finance manager, City) 
Its website presented its goals for the quality of its services, emphasising 
the values of 'respect, scientific discipline, integrity, pioneering spirit and 
stewardship'. Equivalent statements were made by informants in non-health 
cooperatives and mutuals. In the case of the small food retailing co-
operative we were told, quite simply, that 'one of our mission statements is 
to cook some healthy food' (Member, Wholefood). Another aim was to 
create sustainable employment. 
It was noticeable that quality of service was the goal most often mentioned, 
unprompted, across both the partnerships and NHOs. 
In addition the cooperatives valued the idea of cooperation in itself; 'we 
want it to operate like a co-operative with the same ethos. 
(MD, Metro). Formation of OOH cooperatives offered GPs a better way to 
discharge a responsibility which they felt towards their patients, but also the 
opportunity for GP members to recoup at least some of the cost of these 
services by working paid sessions for the cooperative. In the other 
cooperative: 
In the entire country there was an entire revolution happening at that time, we all know that, 
right? Coincidentally [name] had a framework, or a legal framework, of a company limited by 
guarantee which was a co-operative, which was a social enterprise reason because it was not 
for profit. 
(CEO, City) 
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In describing how they made decisions, our informants in the small food 
cooperative repeatedly mentioned their founding ethical goals. For that 
reason they had turned down a multi-million pound contract from one of the 
largest supermarkets in the world. However they did make large contracts 
with two other supermarkets (one commercial, one cooperative) whose 
policies they found less objectionable. 
8.1.3 Finance 
Consumer cooperatives were a partial exception to the above pattern. 
Members' motivation for joining changed over time. Many people joined the 
consumer cooperatives not primarily because they supported the notion of 
cooperation or mutualism but either on grounds of price (OverThere) or 
economic security (HouseLend). As the chair of the OverThere Senior 
Caucus stated, 
99% of them look at one thing, price and I don't think there is anyone in the organisation who, 
if they were being 100% honest, wouldn't say the same thing. 
This seemed to be unanimously agreed by members and staff alike when 
asked the question. 
Otherwise, our health sector, co-operative and building society informants 
all stated that the relationship between financial and other goals was that 
remaining solvent was a precondition for meeting the other goals. Solvency 
was thus an instrumental, subordinate goal. At NurseLed: 
the idea of a social enterprise is that we don't make a profit, we don't have shareholders who 
are staff, we put it back into the practice. 'at the end of the day this [practice] is a business 
and needs to be run as a business... [although] Financially we're not a particular success 
because we have high employment costs. 
(NP partner, NurseLed) 
Insofar as the partners of this practice were interested in profits, it was for 
the developments which they could then finance: 
We provided a foot clinic right from the beginning, the free foot clinic, we pay a foot care 
specialist to come in and run a foot clinic 'we would do more of that sort of thing if we had the 
profits, but we don't. If we had the premises like Bromley by Bow we would have the art 
exhibition or a coffee shop would be great 'I've got an artist's impression here if we did ever 
move to our dream new practice. So then we could be a proper social enterprise, make a profit 
on the coffee shop, set up a mother and toddler group 'but we haven't got room here. 
(NP Partner, NurseLed) 
PharmPlus's goals expressly included the need to improve productivity to 
increase profitability so as to invest in staff and pay partners. Hence the 
pharmacist partner also expressed the aim of maximising profitability of the 
pharmacy (which generated about 60% of the practice surplus). 
For the cooperatives too: 
all the surplus, because we don't have a profit, all the surplus legally enters back into the 
cycle of development for the patients. 
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(CEO, City) 
When City made an unplanned surplus, the members decided to invest the 
money in buying its own building. A leading member of the small retail 
cooperative implicitly differentiated profitability in the sense of earning a 
livelihood from members' own work from profiting from the labour of others 
(i.e. employees): 
co-ops aren't necessarily a non-financial award [sic] organisations, [but] they're non-, I think 
you could say that they seek to be non-exploitative. 
(Member, Wholefood) 
This organisation too believed it was necessary to cover its costs and to 
develop, but that was not the same as maximising profits and therefore 
income: 
I'm sure compared to some business manuals, we are not maximising our income generation, 
income generating potential as much as others, but that would have to be in line with what we 
individually and collectively feel comfortable with. 
(Member, Wholefood) 
For years the cooperative subsidised its loss-making cafe with profits from 
its shop. However the larger retail cooperative adopted as goals certain of 
the standard retailing outcomes are also adopted by corporations: cost 
control, costs as a percentage of sales, service levels and their 
achievement. 
The 2007 financial sector collapse had especially sensitised the mutual 
building society which we studied to the goal of solvency. Its chief executive 
expressed it by saying that the society has a set of principles, but the 
clearly predominating aim in the current financial market was to remain 
solvent. Practically all HouseLend customers (members) were (we were 
told) aware that it also exists to make profits but these profits are re-
invested in the society and not paid out as dividends to shareholders but 
return to customers as lower interest rates. HouseLend was interested in 
long-term profit making only in the sense that: 
in the long term we do need to generate profits to have a sustainable model, to make sure that 
we can out-strip costs, inflation, to give development opportunities to staff because you don't 
shrink to greatness. 
(CEO, HouseLend) 
However, the Society could in principle chose, for the short term, not to 
grow or increase profits because: 
we don't have to report to the City on a quarterly or six monthly basis that we are showing an 
increasing trend in doing so. 
(CEO, HouseLend) 
In explaining the main differences between the financial goals of mutuals 
and corporations, he concluded: 
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the whole issue of how much profit we should make and performance management for profit 
is worthless, except for a PLC. 
(CEO, HouseLend) 
The architectural partnership wanted to make a profit, but expressly not to 
become over-commercialised. They were also committed to the goals of 
working for the healthcare and the public sector as interesting and 
worthwhile activities in their own right. Intensified competition had however 
led them to a shift towards more performance-oriented goals and to pay 
closer attention to quality control, sales and marketing. 
In all these cases the financial goal was to break even, including in the 
costs to be covered the members' guaranteed income, some development 
and improvement to existing services. 
Nonetheless several of our study organisations had also set up a parallel 
for-profit company whose purpose was either to sidestep regulations 
limiting the range of activities they could undertake (i.e. pharmaceutical 
services, in PharmPlus general practice) or to provide a mechanism for 
returning to the members of a discontinued cooperative their initial 
subscriptions which had been spent largely on buildings. 
In order to limit the risks to which its partners were exposed, the 
accounting partnership we studied had adopted the limited liability 
partnership structure. This was also a way of meeting transparency and 
governance requirements in their sector, and making recruitment to the 
partnership more attractive. 
8.1.4 Locality 
Both out-of-hours cooperatives which we studied had the goal of providing 
services for GPs and patients in their particular locality. They showed little 
interest in activities elsewhere. City's goals expressly included recruiting 
local doctors for local services; 
No we don't look at those applications [from elsewhere in England and from Germany], we just 
say we can't, sorry, we don't, because we are local so we just take local [doctors]. 
(CEO, City) 
Metro too was uninterested in bidding for work or recruiting members 
beyond its own conurbation (an area of about 25km radius). An exception 
to this localism was OverThere which, despite its origins and values, did not 
pay much attention to local ethnic minorities or other marginalised groups, 
and was prepared to acquire new partners and resources outside its original 
area of operation. 
Localism was also a goal, though less pronounced, in the non-health 
cooperatives. In descending order of local orientation, the Wholefood 
cooperative supported local food production despite acknowledging that the 
geography and climate of its region were not especially favourable. The 
legal partnership that we studied had the goal of becoming the largest firm 
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of lawyers in the south west region specifically. It had originated there, 
where some of its founders (and other members of their family) were for 
over a century prominent political figures, and did not express any national 
ambitions. Although now operating all across the UK, traces of original ties 
to a particular locality also remained evident in the building society we 
studied. Like many mutuals its name reflected its place of origin where 
(after 150 years) its headquarters still stood and its AGMs were held. Its 
county of origin was still disproportionately represented among its 
branches. 
The large retail cooperative was the exception to this pattern. It had 
branches all across the UK. All products were nationally sourced via the 
Head Office. There was some, but not much, regional or local variation in its 
product range. It regarded itself as a national organisation with no 
particular regional affiliation. 
8.1.5 Quality of working life 
Quality of working life was another goal recurrently mentioned, although 
our informants' idea of what constituted a satisfactory working life differed 
from site to site. For PCTrun, it was simply one that allowed GPs to do 
clinical and not managerial work. PharmPlus informants also mentioned 
home-work life balance although they saw that as a 'softer' (flexible, 
negotiable) goal. The practice manager had suggested that the number of 
partners or salaried doctors' hours could be cut if the partners were 
prepared to work more hours, but the partners decided against 'ending up 
being completely stressed out by the time they came to their holiday'. 
The out-of-hours (OOH) cooperatives' goal was to meet their members' 
contractual obligation to provide out-of-hours cover. A motive for founding 
the cooperatives was originally simply to enable GPs to get more nights of 
unbroken sleep by setting up turn-taking systems for out-of-hours work. 
Indeed, Metro offered members the option of (paying a subscription and 
letting other members do all the work. These cooperatives were intended to 
replicate the partnership structure in another setting: 
The concept started like a practice at night. The GPs had their practice at day, they said, "Why 
not have a practice at night?'so City initially was coined as a practice at night, and so it would 
have very similar features to a practice within the daytime, except that there would be moon 
instead of the sun. 
(CEO, City) 
Beneath the differences in rhetoric and self-descriptions, there was little 
difference in organisational structure and work processes between City and 
Metro. 
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8.2 Competitive strategy 
Mostly the co-operatives' and general practices default strategy towards 
other co-ops was non-competition rather than a competitive strategy, still 
less predatory: 
We have good working relationships with these other co-ops [in neighbouring PCTs]. Most of 
them are not-for-profit, so there is no financial reason to just grab everyone and make 
everybody go bust. . 
(Finance Director, City) 
At Metro too: 
I still don't think we would become as predatory as to just tender against other local providers 
'for what benefit? We're a non-profit making organisation. 
(MD, Metro) 
Indeed, its attitude towards potential rivals was the opposite of what one 
might have predicted for a corporation, for it still shared best practice, 
information and ideas even with a nearby cooperative that had teamed up 
with a commercial organisation and was tendering against other local 
cooperatives. 
We found the same attitude in the smaller retail cooperative: 
When we set up, we didn't set up to use our leverage to put other businesses out of business. 
If we set up a cafe, because we've got a captive customer base we would affect the trade of 
other shops around here, such as [name] Cafe's, [another name]'s which is just across the way 
there, and that's not what we intend to do; we're not here to become a giant ourselves. 
(Member, Wholefood) 
Informants in the large national retail cooperative were rather indifferent to 
its competitors. None of the respondents spoke of the national retail 
environment, only their own company environment and local civic issues. 
Nevertheless, this cooperative has a strong market presence and brand 
names which are as well known as the largest corporate supermarkets'. 
In PlusPM and PharmPlus, the nearest equivalent to a competitive strategy 
was to consider whether to take over smaller nearby practices if the chance 
arose. NurseLed displayed a similar attitude. When asked about 
competitors, the salaried GPs at PCTrun mentioned no nearby practices but 
a walk-in centre at the city about 25km away. 
OverThere had become increasingly exposed to competition, ironically of its 
own making in the sense that it had been a pioneer which demonstrated the 
feasibility of pre-paid OverTherecare cover for people of moderate income. 
This success prompted commercial insurers to compete. OverThere's 
response was to form an alliance with Kaiser Permanente, involving cross-
over cover for each other's members (each organisation would treat the 
other's members at its own facilities) and the sharing of technical 
information about clinical practices but the two did not merge. Our 
accountancy partnership were well aware of other partnerships, especially 
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the 'Group A' firms as competitors, but also maintained dialogues with their 
main competitors, and decided that their were certain market segments 
where the partnership was just not interested in competing for custom. 
Informants in the legal partnership rarely mentioned competitors at all.  
8.3 External governance, incentives and regulation 
8.3.1 Regulation 
One might have expected that the regulations which most impinged upon 
our study organisations, and of which they were most conscious, were those 
regulating the central tasks in conducting and developing an enterprise: 
regulation of safety and service quality, planning permission, probity, 
environmental health and safety and so on. Far from it; our health sector 
informants most often mentioned more arcane regulations which they saw 
as needless obstacles to their ideas. 
NHS Pension Scheme rules were the most often mentioned. Those 
regulations prevent a 'profit-making' organisation's members or employees 
being a member of the Scheme. Our informants were willing to sacrifice 
other proposals and aims in order to retain the pension that the Scheme 
provided. At NurseLed it was proposed to recruit a non-NHS Director (from 
the parent social enterprise) to the Board but if that happened the practice 
board members would no longer be entitled to NHS pensions and neither 
would practice employees: 
We couldn't understand why they couldn't accept the company limited by guarantee. But for 
some reason it has been left out of the wording in the NHS Pension Act and that means if 
doesn't count so we had to reconstitute the company. 
(Board Member, NurseLed parent organisation) 
This took about a year to resolve. 
Also because of NHS Pension Scheme regulations, Metro was constituted as 
two organisations in parallel. (Different regulatory complications made 
Traidcraft adopt a similar structure (293).) The former cooperatives (which 
merged to form Metro) were neutral trading organisations whose 
accumulated operating surplus has by law to be returned to its members. In 
the eyes of the NHS Pension Scheme that made it a profit-making 
organisation. Thus a parallel non-profit-making organisation, whose 
members can be in the NHS Pension Scheme, was set up to undertake 
Metro's current services. The older organisation owned the buildings which 
the new organisation used, and those remained the property of the old 
organisation's members. Such was the complexity of these regulations that 
we have to go to the Pensions Agency conference and forums to actually understand all the 
pensions requirements and regulations and get that on board 'our organisation. 
(Finance Director, Metro) 
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Given its level of income, City could not afford to participate in the NHS 
pension scheme, substituting the cheaper benefits package of a private 
pension fund (6% of salary, which City matches), medical insurance (!) and 
gym membership. The other repeatedly-mentioned regulatory obstacle 
concerned the status of non-doctors as clinical principals. At times this 
state-of-affairs was merely a minor irritant, especially for the nurse-led 
NurseLed partnership: 
We have stupid problems like the paperwork of the NHS [which requires] the doctor's name, 
it's doctor so and so's surgery. Our patients go to x-ray, "Well who's your doctor?” “Oh I don't 
have a doctor, I'm registered with [NurseLed]” “Yes, but who's your doctor?” “Well, I don't 
know, it's been a new doctor”. “But we need a doctor's name in this box!” Why?. 
(Nurse partner, NurseLed) 
The Quality of Dispensing scheme had its own funding and annual 
monitoring meeting with PCT, which the PCT wanted a lead GP to represent 
the practice just because that was what the guidance stipulated, even 
though the relevant lead partner at PharmPlus (with specialist knowledge in 
prescribing) was the pharmacist partner not a GP. PharmPlus's nurse 
practitioners could make secondary care referrals but it remained unclear 
whether the pharmacist partner could, or order X-rays. 
Similar regulatory irritants restricted the role of the OOH cooperatives with 
occasionally 'stupid' effects so far as the management of walk-in patients 
was concerned. The OOH cooperatives were supposed only to deal with 
telephone enquiries: 
In the surgeries you [patient] can walk in to your surgery and talk to them [doctors]. If you 
walk in here, we can't see you because then you mess up the whole thing and we have to ask 
them [walk-in patients] to go back home and make the call. Sometimes it is so stupid because 
the patient goes outside, they make the call!. 
(Finance manager, City) 
Indeed, out-of-hours patients were officially supposed to receive the service 
only if they 'phoned from their own home: 
The reason is, traditionally, the doctor wouldn't visit you if you are not at home, therefore if we 
visit, and you are not at your address, they [PCT] refuse to pay for it. It's silly, when you 
explain it to the patient, why they need to be at home, you just sound so stupid. 
(Finance manager, City) 
This situation apparently arose because the OOH service is regulated as an 
extension of general practice not as a service in its own right. 
Pharmaceutical regulations also had a big impact on the development of 
some of the organisations studied. On the positive side, the regulations also 
enabled the participation, on a more equal footing, of non-medical clinicians 
as partners in general practices. It was practically very important to their 
job that the NurseLed nurse practitioners could be independent prescribers. 
Revisions to the independent prescriber regulations had also made it 
possible for the pharmacist mentioned earlier to function more 
independently as a clinician. Despite these positive changes, the 
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pharmaceutical regulations could still complicate, even impede, service 
developments. At PharmPlus the one pharmacist in this small country town 
retired. His business was too small to sell on so PharmPlus practice applied 
for the vacant pharmacy licence but found that GPs aren't permitted to hold 
them. They therefore set up a parallel private company (PLC) to hold the 
pharmacy licence. Its shares were divided among the practice partners in 
the same ratio as their partnership shares, and the partners were its 
directors. 
This company also owned the practice's land and buildings, which required 
redevelopment. The PLC had to work out how to finance the building until 
there was an income stream. The answer was to claim VAT recovery whilst 
the building work was under way (a common practice outside the health 
sector). Similarly, NurseLed's building were owned by a parallel limited 
liability company with the practice partners, and a representative of the 
parent social enterprise, as its directors. The parent social enterprise 
negotiated the actual purchase of the premises. Arrangements at PlusPM 
were simpler. Its building was owned in equal shares by three partners, but 
the others had the option to buy into it in future. 
The reason for these convolutions lay in the legal nature of the 
partnerships: 
As a partnership you are individually and separately liable for everything so if you have got 
this building which has like a £1million plus mortgage on it, you don't want to hold that as 
your personal liability and risk. But having it in a limited company, the company holds the 
risk. . 
(GP, PharmPlus) 
The Metro cooperative also set up and maintained its residual property 
owning company purely because of the pension regulations, although for all 
practical purposes it was superfluous, as did City when it won a contract to 
run a Darzi 'polyclinic'. 
Outside the health sector, the regulatory framework for legal partnerships 
was being brought closer to that of general practice. The Legal Services Act, 
due to apply from 2011, will allow a limited liability partnership to operate 
as a company and generate profit for capital growth rather than for 
drawings (payments to partners). It also allows for non-lawyer partners (a 
similarity to PMS in English general practice). Our legal partnership study 
site were already planning ways of taking advantage of this change. For our 
building society site, the Building Societies Act 1986 greatly broadened 
what a Building Society could do. The FSA regulations which our informants 
thought most important for them stipulated certain managerial ratios, 
reminiscent in some ways of the NHS planning norms and ratios in the 
1980s. The Building Societies Association stipulates that three-quarters of 
building society of assets must be invested in retail mortgages and half the 
funding must come from retail customers. For the small food retailing 
cooperative, the most important regulatory event was the possibility (from 
the 1970s) of registering as an industrial provident society. Previously its 
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members had collaborated as a cooperative, but used the legal status of a 
private company which meant that the houses of the few members who 
owned houses were at risk if the cooperative ran into trading difficulties. 
Registration as an industrial provident society removed this inhibiting 
danger. The cooperatives were also bound to apply legislation concerning 
employment rights and equal opportunities. Wholefood concentrated its 
efforts in the area of employee appraisal 
an activity which had also been a requirement of its 'Investors in People' activity but was also 
maintained 'so that you know if you do have to sack anybody, you've got a clear record, so 
you've kind of got to cover your back. 
(Member, Wholefood) 
For this cooperative, member appraisals were (as one might imagine, given 
its egalitarian principles) 'a nightmare'. To make appraisals as objective and 
impersonal as possible, the cooperative eventually devised the survey 
system described above. 
Our building society study site relied heavily on non-executive directors to 
conduct external scrutiny of how far they were adhering both to external 
norms and to the members' interests: 
we have to have a majority of non-executive directors unlike corporates, so there are 
weaknesses in the mutual model in the fact that we are not accountable to scrutiny of 
analysts, the shareholders etc ' but there are lots of benefits that we've talked about in the 
longer term etc. It therefore places a greater degree of responsibility, I believe in accountability 
to ourselves [managers], so it is important that the non-executive directors challenge the 
Executive to act in the best interests of the Board. 
(CEO, HouseLend) 
Notice that the absence of shareholder and analyst scrutiny was seen as 
giving managers greater responsibility, but this also implied greater 
discretion (see above). 
8.3.2 Contracts 
How contracts were formulated was a more important question for the 
general practices and OOH cooperatives than for the other organisations we 
studied, because the other organisations' income did not rely mainly on just 
one (contract. 
Providers preferred less complete contracts because they left more 
flexibility to innovate. This was why the PharmPlus partners wanted to keep 
a PMS contract rather than (as they saw it) the more 'dictatorial' APMS 
contract. The PMS contract allowed a more predictable cash flow and 
flexibility, since it had enabled the practice to recruit a non-GP (pharmacist) 
partner. Even the PMS contracting system, though, had difficulty 
accommodating the role of different professions in this partnership. Another 
problem was that of standardised contracts requiring what the providers 
saw as superfluous activity. Thus at PharmPlus: 
part of QOF is that they [patients] have all the tests, you know. 
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(employee, PharmPlus) 
and at NurseLed: 
to reach the QOF targets is not that difficult. 'We are approaching things the wrong way 
because ticking a box for blood pressure and checking that the patient is healthy but if that's 
what you've got to do to get the income to run the Practice with, then that's what we have to 
do. 
(NP partner, NurseLed) 
From the PCT's point of view, it was important in justifying their decision to 
set up a nurse-led practice that this contract had been awarded in an open 
(nationally-advertised) competition. 
Duration of contracts was mentioned in two contexts. First, a short-term 
contract makes it easier for a corporation with large financial reserves to bid 
low for an initial contract in order to drive out competing NHOs who don't 
normally have large financial reserves. The same applied to the cost of 
preparing contract bids, which the Managing Director at one OOH 
cooperative estimated at tens of thousands of pounds per bid. For the much 
smaller general practices, the requirements of bid preparation were a 
deterrent to bidding. Second, the contract duration has to be long enough 
to enable bidders, including NHOs, to plan and finance the provision of 
buildings and other expensive equipment. In both general practices and 
OOH cooperatives the imminent end of a contract puts what might be called 
a contract blight on capital developments. Metro acquired the building next 
door to their headquarters but were not at first able to use it because the 
building happened to come on the market 12 months before Metro's 
contract end: 
Two years wasn't enough even for buying cars, let alone making significant investments in 
buildings and IT and that kind of thing. 
(clinical governance lead, Metro) 
The PCT therefore agreed that the next contract would be for 5 years. 
NurseLed's short terms (3 to 5 years) of PMS or APMS contracts also 
prevented NurseLed's parent social enterprise from bidding for further NHS 
contracts because they could not solve the problem of obtaining premises. 
Short term contracts thus made capital financing hard, again favouring 
corporations with large capital reserves. 
Exacerbating these uncertainties, problems with letting Metro's contract 
renewal led first to the original two-year contract being extended for a year, 
but then the new competition was aborted on the day of the interviews 
because one of the PCTs withdrew from the commissioning consortium; our 
informant said, ten minutes before the interviews were due to start. The 
competition for a contract from another PCT was aborted the day before 
interview, although at least in this case an explanation was given i.e. that 
they needed now to consider how the out-of-hours service would relate to 
the newly-announced GP-led health centres ('Darzi clinics'). An effect of 
contract insecurity was to encourage Metro to diversify its activities to give 
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them a safety net rather than depend solely on one large contract. Having 
spare call handling capacity, they offered call answering for a translation 
service for example and for district nurses (and said they could also offer it 
for out-of-hours dental service). At the time of the fieldwork Metro were 
also considering selling advice and consultancy services to other out-of-
hours providers. 
The main practical effect of the contracts were in incentivising specific 
activities and targets. For the general practices, the QOF scores were cited 
in every case. The use of QOF and GPAQ scores as contract targets was 
however well-received in all the study general practises because these 
indicators gave clear feedback, were rewarded with income and were 
definite, so that all could see when they'd been achieved. In the out of 
hours cooperatives, the national out of hours quality standards were 
thought to have similar virtues. 
8.3.3 Guidance and governance 
NHS guidance and policy are implemented partly through contracts (see 
above) but also through providers' networked and quasi-hierarchical 
relationships with external governance bodies such as PCTs (108). For the 
general practices in this study, implementing national policy was sometimes 
seen as an extraneous chore: 
Choose and Book, was difficult in the beginning, very time consuming. The initial stage that 
the doctor has to do when the patient comes in, is quite time consuming, best if the GP does it 
face to face when the patient is in the room. In this practice there's a target of 90% of our 
referrals by Choose and Book. 
(employee, PharmPlus) 
Practice-based commissioning had created a lot of extra work for my staff with regard to the 
actual paperwork, it has intruded into my consultations where I am cursing at a piece of 
software that doesn't work properly, depending on how one hospital has put on their 
consultants or their specialities [which] will not be the same as another … So national policy 
usually hasn't helped a lot. We have carried on doing what we have always been doing. 
(GP, PlusPM) 
Provider diversification policy complicated management for the NurseLed 
practice. Although the PCT wished to retain (in effect) a directly-managed 
primary care service, the main effect of the provider diversification policy 
was to add an organisational layer to produce an organisational separation 
between the PCT and the services it no longer line-managed. For NurseLed, 
the intermediary organisation was a social enterprise constituted as a 
limited liability company, although as noted above this arrangement 
eventually broke down and the practice reverted to having a direct 
contractual (APMS) relationship with the PCT. These arrangements 
contrasted with those at PCTrun which, during the time of our fieldwork, 
remained directly managed by the PCT. 
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The study organisations' knowledge of current policy priorities tend to be 
filtered through their commissioners. In widely separated sites our 
informants gave the impression of being overloaded with policy guidance 
and imperatives. This applied both to the cooperatives: 
It seems like every other meeting [with the PCT]'they have got something new that has come 
up. There is always another policy from somewhere. 'We see it as PCT telling us, PCT has 
come up with something else but we understand that these things come from the top. 
(Finance manager, City) 
and to general practices: 
Most of what we feel negative [about] at the moment is down to, coming down from, 
government. Choose and Book agenda, practice-based commissioning agenda, lots of 
initiatives that seem to be put into place without any thought of who's actually going to do the 
work anyway, chaps. The IT, central spine, the data protection. 
(manager-partner, PlusPM) 
However our financial sector study site experienced a degree of external 
quasi-hierarchical scrutiny without parallel in the NHS. In late 2008 and 
early 2009 the FSA were asking for twice daily reports on the net inflow and 
outflow of cash from the society. 
8.3.4 Effective regulation? 
On the positive side, adherence to external regulation was assisted by the 
content and form of the external targets themselves. QOF, PACT and GPAQ 
all involved clearly-defined, detailed targets with correspondingly elaborate 
data collection systems to provide the necessary data. The specificity of 
these targets allowed identification of specific concrete activities to improve 
services. No less important, the content of these targets were seen as 
legitimate because they accorded with values strongly held by GPs and 
other health workers (to make patients better, give them a good 
experience, build up a relationship with patients). The clinical targets were 
based on evidence (albeit of varying strength) or at least clinicians' 
consensus about good practice. Hence the targets appeared 'objective', not 
based on an arbitrary decision or negotiated deal. They could be used 
internally to scrutinise and persuade doubters and 'free riders', and to 
satisfy external scrutiny. The targets were set at levels which the provider 
could achieve (perhaps too easily) and it mainly depended on the provider's 
own efforts whether it did achieve them. Not least, achievement was 
rewarded with non-trivial amounts of money. 
A prerequisite for external, as for internal, governance is transparency over 
the activities over which governance is to be exercised. The general 
practices were linked into quite structured and standardised information 
systems intended to generate data to enable external accountability (in the 
first instance) their PCTs. The three systems mentioned at all three sites 
(and the fourth, hierarchical general practice that we studied): the Quality 
and Outcomes Framework (QOF) which is an adjunct to the 'new' GMS 
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contract of 2004; the PACT pharmaceutical monitoring system; and the GP 
patient survey. These data were fed back to the PCT. For their respective 
domains these three systems enabled the PCT to compare each practice's 
performance on a consistent basis with those of other local practices, and 
with regional and national patterns. For the OOH cooperatives, external 
financial monitoring and service standards monitoring were equally 
frequent. Metro made its accounts transparent to its commissioning PCTs 
one of which sent its own accountants to examine them. Its PCT, with (at 
that time) a cost-based contract with Metro, used the information to identify 
costs to remove, including the Metro's contingency fund. City sent monthly 
activity reports to the PCT every month and had face-to-face monitoring 
meetings every quarter. Because of recent corporate failures in the financial 
sector failures (of which some of the most conspicuous were failures of ex-
mutuals) our financial sector study site was at times exposed to 
requirements for transparency far exceeding those of the NHS. HouseLend 
was bound by Financial Services Authority (FSA) rule. Fearing further 
business collapses, the FSA were during 2008 asking for twice daily reports 
on the net inflow and outflow of cash from the society, as from all FSA-
regulated businesses. In the USA (as in the UK), new regulatory 
frameworks accompanied the development of information technologies. This 
addition of this framework, reinforced by a wish to maintain commercial 
confidentiality, paradoxically meant that the more powerful IT reduced the 
transparency of OverThere's work to its members. All its Board meetings 
used to be held in public but now, data protection and business 
confidentiality mean that only inconsequential things were now discussed in 
public. In summary, partnerships' and producer NHOs' goals were to break 
even at a level that gave members or partners and income at least as good 
as the prevailing market rate; to produce what they defined as good quality 
work for their locality; to assist members' or partners' personal 
development; and to pursue non-financial values which varied by 
organisation. Consumer NHOs' goals were to reduce the price and raise the 
quality and accessibility of services for their members. The study 
organisations had to contend with legal and regulatory systems designed 
mainly with for-profit, shareholder-owned firms in mind; and with what they 
experienced as excessive amounts of policy guidance. The most effective 
form of contractual governance was through contracts whose terms were 
unambiguous, legitimate and incentivised. 
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9 Structure: case study findings 
This chapter reports not only the study organisations' formal structures, but 
how these structures were used to manage the organisations, how 
sustainable the structures were, and how they intersected with professional 
cultures and engagement. 
9.1 Coordination strategies: modes of democracy 
9.1.1 Members and their rights 
In partnerships, the question of who could vote to elect the organisation's 
leader was straightforward: it was only the equity owning partners. 
Partners' meetings were generally closed to employees and in one site (the 
legal partnership) closed even to the partners who were not elected 
representatives of the rest, which may explain the discrepancies in the 
accounts which different partners gave us about how decisions were made. 
At the architectural partnership the five (pre-merger) partners had equal 
shares of equity although different levels of responsibility for managing the 
partnership. 
In one of the out-of-hours cooperatives salaried doctors only counted as 
members if they worked at least half time for a practice in its territory. The 
Board of Directors consisted of GPs. The local PCT sent an observer but she 
could not vote in elections to the Board or at Board meetings. Metro 
membership was open to all GPs practising in the PCTs covered by Metro, 
including GPs who had ceased working sessions for the cooperative. 
Wholefood members were a mixture of volunteers and paid members 
(initially three or four) working in a food shop and cafe. Every member had 
the right to propose policies and decision, even (in principle) to propose 
cessation of the organisation. By the time of writing they had expanded 
their membership to around 60, in three categories: 46 working members, 
hence directors; 5 probational members; and casual employees, whose 
number could not exceed 5% of the cooperative's labour force. Bigshop 
members were all those on the permanent payroll. 
HouseLend members were eligible to vote at the AGM if they held savings 
over £100 or had borrowing (mortgage) with more than £100 owed. The 
constitution stipulated one member one vote, with the first named on any 
joint accounts being the voting member. The account holders choose the 
sequence of names on any joint account. OverThere members were those 
who subscribed individually to one its insurance plans. 
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9.1.2 Engagement 
In the cooperatives (but not the partnerships) there could be a substantial 
difference between the membership who could vote and those who actually 
did. The highest level of participation appeared to be in the two retail 
cooperatives, especially the smaller one. Although approximately a hundred 
times more numerous than the average GP partnership, Metro and City 
members met less often, participated much less evenly and had less control 
over day-to-day practice (quality, working practices, hours of service etc.) 
than in a general practice. Their annual meetings were (we were told) more 
like a shareholder's meeting than that of a work-team. For the members 
were mainly busy GPs who found it difficult to spare time to attend 
meetings, especially the regular attendance required for Board membership. 
From a low starting point, AGM attendance at City did rise during the study 
period, which the EO attributed to the increasing scale and pace of change 
in general practice making GPs think their attendance was becoming more 
necessary. 
Member engagement was weaker in the consumer cooperatives. OverThere 
had only 30,000 voting members, of whom only about 6000 actually voted, 
and that number was declining. Members' local meetings were often quite 
limited and basically consisted of information-giving by employed clinicians 
and managers on subjects of the local members' choice. Members' other 
meetings, above all the Medical Centre Advisory Councils , took place six 
times a year. There was uncertainty about their role and it seemed to be 
diminishing. Board meetings' serious work was done in private now, where 
once it was public: 
The governance in truth has always been the Board of Trustees. That's the governance. 
(Senior Consumer Caucus member, OverThere) 
The Senior Caucus was the only Special Interest group still operating (there 
have been at least two more during OverThere's history), although it was 
very active. 
Below Board level in OverThere were Medical Centre Advisory Councils 
(MCACs), of which there were 16 when we collected data, based at local 
medical centres. Each MCAC comprised nine elected consumers, the 
manager, medical chief of staff and nursing director of the centre. In theory 
MCACs monitored the centres' budgets and quality of care but our interview 
data painted a slightly different picture. The chair of one MCAC gave 
feedback at the Advisory Group Assembly (ASA) pointed out that directors 
or staff of the clinics used to always be present at the MCACs but now the 
Chief-of-Staff and manager will come, briefly give their reports and then 
leave without taking questions or comments. One member didn't think 
much of that: 
'The MCACs are here to give advice 'how can they if staff aren't there? We 
give up OUR time as well as they giving up THEIR time - It's only six 
meetings a year, why can't they stay?' (Advisory Council (MCAC) Chair, 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2012. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
 139 
Project 08/1518/105 
OverThere). HouseLend claimed approximately 560,000 voting members at 
January 2009. Two levels of engagement were available to them. They 
could vote by post on resolutions put the AGM. About 20% of eligible 
members do so. We were told this percentage is higher than in most mutual 
building societies. Also, members can attend the AGM and speak. Only 
about 30-40 qualifying members do so, below 0.0001% (one in 10,000) of 
the eligible members. 
Engagement in the Wholefood retail cooperative was as frequent and direct 
as in the partnerships. Each work-team (typically not larger than 8 
members) sent a representative to a fortnightly representative forum 
meeting whose purposes were to hear items of news or problems reported 
back the work teams; and on behalf of the whole membership to make 
policy and other decisions. 
Members' engagement in the study organisations appeared to be promoted 
by: 
 1. Geographical concentration of the membership. 
 2. The practical importance for members of the decisions which 
members' meetings took. 
How far members' activities appeared to influence the management, activity 
and direction of the whole organisation. 
9.1.3 Election 
We found the following methods of selecting members to take on leadership and 
other responsible roles: 
 1. Rotation, with consensus about whose turn is next. At PharmPlus 
the partners agreed a 'Chair of the Day' held for one year in 
rotation. In Metro the five medical directors of the executive 
took turns to cover weekends as director on call. Within work-
teams in the small retail cooperative the roles of representative, 
minute-taker etc. were rotated: 
the idea being that we are sharing and diversifying... so you don't find somebody sitting in the 
same role unduly for year upon year upon year upon year. 
(Member, Wholefood) 
This rotation also applied to representing the work group in the 
organisation-wide decision making forum. 
 2. Volunteering as 'lead' on the basis of personal interest or 
competence, subject to consensus endorsement. So for 
example, the pharmacist partner at PharmPlus volunteered as 
lead on HR matters. At PlusPM the partner-manager took the 
lead on liaison with employees and on meeting external targets, 
finance, computerisation and dealings with PCT since he had 
greatest knowledge of such things. Whilst the council of City was 
elected, its three GP members who were on the Board were 
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selected by consensus when a vacancy occurred. Even for 
council members there was an element of self-section: 
I think most council members have come because they've got issues that they think need to be 
dealt with 'things they want to change. 
(Finance Director, City) 
 3. Seniority, as founders of the organisation. This common 
arrangement in medical partnerships was also found at 
NurseLed. 
 4. Election. Metro members elected the Board of Directors, which 
was therefore seen as accountable to the members. The Board 
consisted of GPs and a Managing Director. In Metro any GP 
member could be nominated for the Board. The executive team 
were accountable employed by, hence accountable to, the 
Board. The council of City were an elected group of 15 who 
selected three Board members. The Council were all GPs, five 
from each of the three boroughs which City served: 
every year it comes up for nomination, we ask people, we send papers round, we say if you 
want to be a council member, 3 seats are available, put yourself forward. They write a 
statement and send it out to everybody to say these are the people that have come forward, 
who would you like to vote for?. 
(Finance Director, City) 
The Company Secretary and the Chairman were also members 
of the council. 
The HouseLend Board of Directors was elected through 
proposals from existing Board members, or through professional 
contacts such as solicitors and accountants. Sometimes a search 
and selection company was involved. Because support had to be 
gathered from 200 or 500 members depending on the nature of 
the resolution, it was harder for members to nominate 
candidates: 
there's a route by which members can get resolutions and can put forward directors but 
obviously because of all the data security and sensitivity, their ability to gather a sufficient 
number of names isn't very easy and it also depends on what that resolution could be and 
what it's about. 
(Secretary of the Society, HouseLend) 
The legal partnership had a board of six partners with a Chair, the latter 
being elected by and from the Board members. Each put themselves 
forward if they wished to stand for election. A merger with another 
partnership had occurred on condition that the managing partner of the 
acquired partnership became a member of the Board to ensure that other 
pre-merger agreements were adhered to, until the next election when the 
board reverted to its original form. The accounting partnership had a mixed 
board, four elected and three appointed. The architectural partnership 
elected the members of its board and who, after the partnership merged 
with another one, sat on the combined board. 
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The largest study organisations had correspondingly elaborate electoral 
structures. Four-fifths of the board members in the large retail cooperative 
were elected, one-fifth appointed by the chairman. The majority of Board 
members are elected by a Staff Council, of whom in turn at least two-thirds 
are elected yearly by secret ballot of the whole Partnership Any member 
can stand as a candidate for election to the Board. Elections take place 
every two years. Thus the members indirectly elect the majority of Board 
members and the Chair. 
OverThere had a Board of Trustees with 11 members including a Chair. Its 
official aim was to oversee and monitor the well-being and accountability of 
the organisation by establishing organisational goals, setting policies, 
monitoring the fiscal affairs of the Co-operative, employing necessary 
personnel, and assuring the quality of the health care services provided to 
consumers. It had various specialist committees e.g. for audit, pay, quality 
and 'emerging issues' (short and long-term business goals). A standing 
Nominating Committee of 10 consumers recruited candidates to the Board 
of Trustees. Board election had become increasingly carefully managed. The 
Board of Trustees information officer (manager) explained that ordinary folk 
could no longer be elected to the Board, as they could ten years ago. The 
management now meet with the Standing Nominating Committee (SNC) to 
discuss what types of candidates might be 'useful' for the Board. The 
criteria of usefulness are neither published nor widely known. They received 
159 enquiries in 2009, yielding about 50 serious applications. These were 
then vetted for criminal record and employers' references, also for their 
qualities and experience. The SNC drew up a short-list of these candidates 
and then publicised their candidatures in bulletins posted to members' 
homes, a presentation and the cooperative's website. One of our own 
informants had put himself forward as a candidate and was not selected (no 
reason was given to him). Coordination strategies for the study 
organisations were therefore rather circumscribed modes of democracy in 
three respects: 
 1. An electorate extending only to equity partners is in effect a 
democracy with a stringent property-qualification, comparable to 
the election of English MPs before 1689. In large partnerships 
this electorate was only a small proportion of the workforce. 
 2. Rotation is an non-rational (i.e. neither rational nor irrational) 
procedure similar to sortition. However it has been argued (339) 
that in egalitarian terms, in fairness and as a mechanism for 
securing representative leaderships sortition (and by implication 
a similar organisational structure) is not necessarily inferior to 
election, especially when the people from whom leaders are 
selected are more or less equally competent. Such organisational 
structures are neither democratic nor hierarchical. 
In the consumer cooperatives especially, member control was liable to 
degenerate in face of managerial control. We return to this point below. 
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9.1.4 Decision-making 
The general practices we studied had a common sequence for decision 
making. Closed partners' meetings first made a decision, followed by 
discussions with the employees, usually at periodic practice meetings. 
Internally the partners' meetings generally worked by consensus. For 
instance the Legal Board meetings almost always reached decisions this 
way. Usually the decisions had already been discussed beforehand and were 
simply adopted without the need for a 'Show of hands' vote. In this type of 
direct democracy, taking a vote was paradoxically regarded as a failure. It 
had happened only once since 2000, about the cost of potential new 
premises. Since the board was almost evenly split they decided that the 
proposal was too doubtful and dropped it. 
NurseLed adopted a more open approach. The partners had a non-
hierarchical style of management, with consultation always, and at times 
employees voting on changes in working practices. Weekly staff meetings 
voted on proposals suggested during the previous week. More weight was 
given to the views of the staff who would be undertaking the tasks being 
discussed or changed: 
The team leader said to us, because we are the people that actually do the work, 'How do you 
feel that would work? Which way do you think would be the best way to go forward with 
that?. 
(employee, NurseLed) 
In Wholefood (all important decisions were taken at meetings open to all 
members: 
We depend on meetings. Obviously, if you don't come to meetings, then we're not having your 
say in the business, so therefore you shouldn't carp about decisions that are made because 
you're not there. 
(Member, Wholefood) 
However even these principled supporters of direct democracy agreed that 
such decision making processes are practically limited to smallish groups: 
It's very difficult to work a group size above about eight; eight people is about the maximum 
you can have in there [for] conversation and dialogue and come to decisions. 
(Member, Wholefood) 
Each such meeting elected a delegate to a cooperative-wide body which 
(made two kinds of rules: foundation rules which were included in the 
cooperative's registration document and secondary rules which prescribed 
the more concrete, mundane work practices. 
Decision-making in the out-of-hours cooperatives devolved much more 
upon an elected minority of members and employed managers. Decisions at 
Metro were made within the Board of Directors and at regular meetings for 
members. A quarterly Board meeting endorsed the decisions of an 
executive team which met monthly and had sub-groups (e.g. for clinical 
governance). Things that significantly affected the future of Metro, like a 
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tender bid and decisions to buy property, had to be fully discussed and 
endorsed by the board. Ad hoc member meetings (less frequent than the 
regular meetings) also dealt with clinical governance and premises issues. 
At City, Board meetings appeared quite open to proposals from the 
members, the source of many small (and some big) innovations: 
it was a question of other doctors coming up with suggestions or ideas of what we could be 
doing … so whatever people came up with, we would just look into it and see if we could go. 
The new one that has come up now is practice-based commissioning so we are looking into 
what we can do. 
(Finance Manager, City) 
In the large retail cooperative, decision-making powers were distributed 
across bodies stipulated by a founding constitution i.e. a Board, a Chairman 
and a Council. 
1. The controlling Partnership Board had their own powers under 
Company Law. They openly discussed and decided policy issues, 
even matters of business reorganisation and redundancy. The 
Board had to approve any reorganisations or closures involving the 
loss of 12 or more posts. 
2. The Chair (of the Board) was Managing Director with 'those of the 
powers of an owner-manager that … it seems necessary to 
concentrate in one pair of hands.' (Founder, BBC broadcast, 15 
April 1957). The Chairman could can veto a Council decision if in he 
judged it dangerous to the organisation's business interests. 
3. The Staff Council had about a hundred and twenty members. It 
represented all partners and elected five directors to the 
Partnership Board (see above). This Council had unlimited rights of 
discussion and recommendation, including power to pass votes of 
confidence (or not) in the Chair. It had to vote by secret ballot if so 
required by any member or by anyone else principally interested in 
the particular matter. It had a small budget at its own disposal. 
The cooperative operated on explicitly democratic principles under a written 
constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech. Every branch of the retailer 
and its support services had a Committee for Communication elected by and 
comprising non-management Partners. 
In the consumer cooperative, decision making devolved almost completely 
upon managers, who reported to an annual general meeting. In recent 
times the business element of the AGM took well under an hour, the rest 
being given to questions and answers and a presentation by a visiting 
speaker. There were also member councils to exercise governance at the 
more local medical centre level (see above). 
9.1.5 Speed of decision-making 
In the partnerships decision-making was quite swift when need arose. So, 
when PlusPM practice had to decide whether to recruit another doctor; 
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We had a strategy meeting last night with the partners and I pulled the... notes together, what 
I think we agreed, all the partners have got a copy of those now so hopefully by Friday we will 
all have agreed what we agreed and then we can share that with staff on Monday and move 
it forward. 
(PM-partner, PlusPM) 
Formal decision-making was inevitably supplemented with informal, chance 
contacts during everyday work. 
The large retail cooperative showed no sign of slow decision-making, we 
infer because its Chair and Board could take decisions without immediate 
reference to the members, subject to post facto endorsement (or not) only 
through the structures described above. Three other Co-operatives were 
conscious that their decision-making could be slow. City therefore revised 
the constitution to speed up decision-making at Board and Council meetings 
by delegating the more trivial decisions (see below) to managers. 
OverThere publications stated that the cooperative had not responded and 
adapted sufficiently swiftly to market changes, especially competitors' entry 
to its markets: 
The leadership's assessment of this problem is that [OverThere] is still too expensive and too 
slow in responding to changes desired in the health care marketplace. For example, in 2002, 
there were five Medicare insurance products in the [name of state] market and [OverThere's] 
was the dominant one. By 2007 There were 100 such products and [OverThere's] was no 
longer dominant. The goal is to turn that around. 
(Newsletter, 2008) 
One manager suggested ('off the record') that slow decision-making was a 
legacy of the cooperative ideal. The Board and top managers needed 
endless meetings because no-one could decide things on their own 
initiative. 
At the opposite extreme in size, Wholefood made decisions on the basis of 
consensus which meant that major decisions had to be unanimous. It had a 
distinctive method for resolving conflicts of interest among members. Within 
the existing legal and regulatory requirements (e.g. for fairness and 
confidentiality in deciding personnel issues), 
Our process is that there is a period of time identified to discuss it, after which it goes to 
workshop; the workshop is to be outside of the meeting time and interested parties basically 
know their responsibility is to sit down and thrash out some kind of compromise. If you reach 
the situation where even after workshop there's an impasse, then ultimately then it has to go 
to the forum...for a double blind vote. 
(Member, Wholefood) 
Another member told us that someone who had worked as a manager in a 
hierarchical organisation probably would at times find decision making 
slower than she had been used to, even frustrating. Nevertheless, we were 
told that consensus decision making has never held the cooperative back in 
any practically significant way. The cooperative had after all survived and 
grown for forty years and the same applied to the far larger OverThere 
consumer cooperative. 
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9.1.6 Mutual scrutiny and concertive control 
Some of our informants were conscious of the 'free rider' problem even if 
they did not so describe it: 
One of the most difficult things in a co-op is the member that isn't pulling their weight. 
(member, Wholefood) 
Members of this small food retailing cooperative certainly noticed who did 
and who did not pull their weight. However, they tried to prevent such 
issues coming up at meetings 'because obviously that's just dead loss' 
(member, Wholefood). Instead the cooperative tried to encourage its 
members to be assertive with one another in dealing with such problems, 
even to the extent of providing training in it; an indication of how important 
they regarded this approach as being since the cooperative could only rarely 
afford training activities. This cooperative had a distinctive, systematic 
approach to mutual scrutiny. Every member had an annual review in which 
every other member of the cooperative voted (anonymously) on her 
performance: 
So the chances are that unless you are a very thick skinned or stupid individual that is a 
hundred people are telling you that you are doing your job well, or a hundred people are 
telling you that you are doing your job crap, you'll take that on board. 
(member, food cooperative) 
The aggregated survey results were also used as an indicator of job 
satisfaction across the organisation as a whole. 
In the general practices everyday working systems would often expose such 
a member. Although speaking of locums, this GP in PharmPlus described 
systems that applied to all the partners too: 
Internally, the dispensing system spots any aberrant prescribing by locums; so do practice 
staff. Not all locums like this. 
(GP partner, then chair of the day) 
The same applied to referrals. For all the general practices studied, PACT 
information allowed partners to scrutinise each other's prescribing practice. 
Although they encouraged continuity of GP through each patient episode, 
PharmPlus GPs had no personal lists. Hence each partner's practice was 
transparent to the other partners by way of the patient record and patients' 
own reports, which would at times provoke discussions between the GPs. 
Partners at PlusPM established the practice of meeting in one room at 
lunch-time to do 'paper-work' (nowadays mostly computerised), 
deliberately creating opportunity for informal discussion. Both there and at 
PharmPlus partners' involvement in the PCG or (later) PCT caused friction 
with the other partners because the PCT-goer was often out of the surgery, 
leaving the other partners either to do work or pay a locum to. At 
PharmPlus, as one informant delicately put it, certain partners 'ensure they 
have no greater workload than others' whilst others readily took on extra 
tasks, differences said to reflect the individual partners' personalities. One 
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obstacle to mutual monitoring was that GP roles and functions had changed 
over the past five years making it less clear what constituted a standard 
level of commitment to the partnership. So the practices agreed policies 
about partners on taking on external commitments. PharmPlus developed a 
'time off in lieu' spreadsheet recording how many sessions the practice 
owed or was owed by each partner and when the sessions were paid back 
so that in the long run partners' inputs were equal. In the much smaller 
NurseLed practice, 'We don't have huge amounts of formal feedback 'it's all 
relatively small, the organisation, really. People just talk to each other.' 
(Board member, parent social enterprise for NurseLed). Mutual scrutiny was 
least evident in the accounts of the (all salaried) GPs at PCTrun, with 
greater emphasis on the GP's own conscientiousness and self-discipline. 
In out-of-hours cooperatives this scrutiny was more like that in an 
hierarchical organisation. The elected board member responsible would 
monitor activity figures for each shift. When complaints or disagreements 
arose, 
It's normally easier with the GPs [than patients or employees] because they are doctors and 
they can talk to each other. 
(Finance Director, City) 
If informal discussions did not work the last resort was to stop the member 
working shifts for the cooperative. The systems operated at the large retail 
cooperative were essentially similar. It had a line management system 
which in these respects appeared to operate much as in a corporation. 
Individual members' level of performance was appraised through personal 
development plans of all staff. These plans were designed around achieving 
the Principles reported below. The principles were set as the performance 
indicators, and the measures were set at three levels of 'don't want to see'; 
'want to see' and 'outstanding', built around a set of behaviours about what 
partners are expected to enact. OverThere employees were also line-
managed much as in a corporation except for doctors, who had formed 
themselves in a semi-autonomous medical organisation contracted solely 
with OverThere. The rationale for this arrangement was never clearly 
explained to us, but its practical implication was that doctors were line-
managed and mentored by other doctors. 
9.1.7 Technical persuasion 
Evidence-based practice is discussed below. The QOF, GPPS and PACT 
information systems were used internally as a supplementary form of 
mutual scrutiny to convince any doubting partner of the need (when it 
arose) for corrective action. 
The large retail cooperative used Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), one of 
which was how quickly a product reached the shelf in a cooperative that has 
over 300,000 product lines. These KPIs were expected to be met via the 
partners even where they do not have a direct responsibility for a particular 
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process, such as the central distribution system. For example store partners 
would be expected to work with a distribution centre if there was a problem 
getting a product to the shelf and to partake in joint problem solving to 
develop a communication conduit in order to deal with operational issues. 
That apart, technical persuasion took the form mainly of training and 
education, which were were used mainly in the producer organisations in 
much the same way as in corporations (but with a different content): to 
induct new recruits and to update members' technical working skills. A third 
use of education and training was more specific to NHOs. In the small retail 
cooperative and NurseLed: 
The only thing we do is, we do team building and we spent a bit on staff team building 
because we see that as important. 
(NP partner, NurseLed) 
Team-building training also occurs in hierarchical organisations often, 
paradoxically, for much the same reason as in non-hierarchical ones. Such 
activities provide the skills needed for informal collaboration in relationally-
democratic settings, above all, teams with no overall line manager and 
drawn from different sub-hierarchies (340-342). 
9.1.8 Culture and ideology 
In all the study sites informants described what normative assumptions 
('mission statements', 'principles' etc.) were accepted in their organisations. 
Several interviewees (in different rooms) asked about PharmPlus practice's 
goals pointed to a copy of their 'practice philosophy' pinned up on the wall. 
Although NurseLed was a partnership in structure it like the two OOH 
cooperatives adopted the 'social enterprise ideology' which featured in 
policy pronouncements at the time of our fieldwork. 
The study organisations' culture had three main elements. One was a strong 
sense of locality; 
We've always maintained that you need to have a local knowledge. (That's been our 
underlying principle 'is it has to be local knowledge. 
(Managing Executive, Metro) 
The second element was an emphasis on quality (see above) and upon the 
organisation being clinically led, in part a reaction to the members' 
experience of commercial deputising services. A third element was a culture 
of support and mutual aid with other similar local organisations, even those 
who might under NHS provider diversification policy become potential 
competitors. 
In City a new chief executive recruited during the study period had 
attempted to change the culture. In his words: 
Before, the culture was, we employ perfect doctors therefore the doctor is always right. And 
the doctor is what you focus on, what's good for the doctor is what you do. But with time it 
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has moved on to [the] patient and the big thing now is that the patients are the ones who are 
important, the patients are the reason why we exist. I've been surprised when the council has 
agreed to something where it would actually cost more money but is better for the patient. 
(Finance manager, City) 
A similar outlook was found in the OverThere consumer cooperative. There 
was a particular mentality amongst clinicians who worked for this 
organisation of wanting to 'Serve others'rather than simply 'Get rich'and to 
emphasise preventive medicine. They expressed an interest in socialised 
medicine and idealist politics; in some cases they expressed interest in a 
biomedical model that is less 双rthodox' in other cases they had a family 
history of working in cooperative organisations, or even in this very 
organisation. In more general terms, its publications state that it subscribes 
to the values of 'respect, scientific discipline, integrity, pioneering spirit and 
stewardship'. 
The market niche for the small retail food cooperative was the vegetarian 
segment. It therefore tended to attract as members people wanting to work 
in an ethical, environmentally friendly organisation. The cooperative was not 
overtly political but we did involve itself in campaigns related to its core 
values and activities, for example the anti-GM food campaign. In the large 
retail cooperative, the founding principles (quoted in Appendix 1), and a 
handwork elaborating them, were widely disseminated and consulted. The 
values and principles of the cooperative were instilled into every point of the 
staff recruitment with potential new staff being tutored about the ethics of 
the cooperative. The unanimity with which our informants referred to them 
or even quoted them from memory was striking. This culture of 
philosophical and business differentiation is actively and positively 
encouraged by including 'in every conversation discussions of how to do 
things differently'. The founding principles have not changed, only the 
language of these principles has been contemporarised. Managers were 
repeatedly told that they are constantly accountable to Partners, particularly 
via councils and their sub committees where managers have to account for 
their business performance. 
In the building society, an official organisational culture was equally evident 
but its formulation and presentation relied more on a marketing approach 
than in the NHS study sites, reflecting the different external economic 
systems confronting the different organisations. Its recent marketing 
campaigns sought to differentiate HouseLend from a bank by highlighting 
HouseLend's accountability to its members not shareholders. Another 
marketing mix element - removal of secure physical barriers between 
customers and staff - highlighted a further difference (with banks) in how 
HouseLend regarded its customers. Its staff were continually reminded of 
four core objectives: Enthusiasm, Fairness, Ownership and Trust. The CEO 
suggested that their mantra is 'to attract on price and retain on service'. 
Like other building societies, this one prided itself on probity and reliability: 
The sector is proud of the fact that no customer has [over 150 years] lost any retail funds. 
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(CEO, HouseLend) 
Many customer facing-staff had joined HouseLend from corporate banks. 
The CEO suggested that they noticed the cultural differences between the 
values of either kind of organisation, especially in how customers were 
approached with regard to sales. The mutual's norm was that customer 
priorities and needs were put first, before profit. Branches existed for 
customer service even though the branch network represented over 50% of 
the society's operating costs. 
Differences between NHO and corporate cultures surfaced in two ways. One 
was the difficulty which ex-corporate managers had in grasping the 
rationale, and hence relevant performance indicators, of an NHO. In our 
building society study site the question of how much profit to earn exposed 
deep-rooted differences about the criteria of good financial performance 
management in mutuals and in corporations: 
They [non-executive directors] get confused because they look at, they come from the outside 
world, from a PLC world and they... really struggle with do we give good value to members 
because it's a total red herring to say the value of the business was x at the beginning of the 
year and the value of the business was y at the end of the year and is that movement good or 
bad? It only becomes relevant if and ever we had to pay people out or converting ended [the 
society], that's the only time it becomes relevant, all other occasions it's totally irrelevant 
because we're looking after the interests and giving value to current membership. 
(CEO, HouseLend) 
OverThere members were also on occasions aware of the conflict between 
democratic (mutual, cooperative) and corporate approaches to 
management: 
At one time and [now] less and less so, the members of the Board were influenced by the 
people who elected them, but that's no longer the case'he Board is almost 100% now 
influenced by the needs of the business model. 
(Senior members' caucus chair, OverThere) 
Ex-corporate managers were prone to respond to this difference in cultures 
by blaming the cooperative model for difficulties the organisation was 
currently experiencing (see above): 
Soon it will come to the point where it's probably better to get the Board nominated. A lot of 
money and resources are spent on facilitating things like the Senior Caucus 'but is it worth it? 
(Manager, OverThere) 
9.1.9 Material incentives 
Pay was used as an incentive in three main ways. 
 1. Distribution of operating profit among partnership partners.  
(a) The default mode in the general practices we studied was an 
equal division per capita, but other partnerships (including those 
outside the health sector) used other criteria. The greater the 
proportion of operating profits was in partners' pay, the more an 
directly an equal allocation of profits transmitted external market 
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incentives directly to the partners.  
(b) In the large retail cooperative, operating profit nett of the 
partners' fixed salaries and other costs was divided equally 
among the partners as a bonus. Hence the market-sensitive 
bonus was a proportionately bigger component of pay for staff 
on lower than on higher salaries. 
 2. Payments per session, for GP members who worked shifts for 
the out-of-hours cooperatives. In both cooperatives payments 
for the least popular shifts were raised to up to twice the 
payment for the more popular shifts in order to attract 
volunteers. The cooperatives established the necessary payment 
levels by trial and error. 
 3. Salary, gradated by position held (occupational group, 
supervisory versus non-supervisory) and, in the retail 
cooperatives, supplemented with payments for dependants and 
other individual 'needs'. The latter payments were discretionary. 
Wholefood could (and did) withdraw them from non-compliant 
or 'free-riding' members. 
In the partnerships and the small retail cooperatives, the prospect of 
recruitment as a partner was also applied as an incentive. Our sites made 
no use of the 'tournament' ('up-or-out') system reported elsewhere 
(33,115). At PCTrun the salaried GPs regarded the absence of strong 
financial incentives as a benefit, enabling them to concentrate on clinical 
work: 
The money isn't the most important thing at the end of the day. 
(GP, PCTrun) 
An important distinction between NHOs and partnerships was the disposal 
of equity. In the cooperatives and mutuals (including building societies 
unless and until they converted to banks), none of the members stood to 
gain from a shareholding if the enterprise were closed or sold off assets. 
Thus, if ever the Wholefood fails, any remaining money has to go either to 
another co-operative or towards re-starting the original cooperative. 
9.1.10 Exit 
Explusions of members or partners were reported but exceptional. A 
manager and founding partner left the NurseLed when its managerial 
services were centralised into a parent social enterprise. PlusPM had lost 
two partners, (of whom one: 
just handed in his resignation out of the blue as far as anyone else was concerned. He 
obviously had underlying issues which he felt couldn't be tackled or weren't going to be 
tackled, and that was quite painful. 
(PM partner, PlusPM) 
No recent departures of partners were reported in our third study general 
practice. 
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In City there were reports of board members resigning but as this was 
attributed to personality clashes not free-riding or disputed decisions. 
However Metro did expel working members who seemed not to pull their 
weight or to comply with collective decisions; 
At the moment we have more doctors wanting to work than we have shifts to cover, so we can 
say to people, “Fine, if you don't want to do things our way then you can go and do shifts for 
somebody else.”. 
(clinical governance lead, Metro) 
In WholeFood two of its founders were 'seedling members' who supported 
to aim of cooperatives and help set them up but, noting wish to work in 
every cooperative that they helped to found, left when it began trading. 
Otherwise the main potential exit route was the decision made after their 
nine months probation about whether they fitted into the cooperative, partly 
a matter of whether they shared the cooperative's values and partly 
whether they fitted what one informant called the 'Identikit' of members of 
that cooperative. Occasionally members left in other circumstances: 
it's very rare but we yeah we've had in my time, all the [20] years I've worked here, I think 
we've probably only … sacked a couple of members or we've asked one to resign and we 
sacked another and that was, one was just sheer uncooperativeness - would not co-operate 
after what happened and it was finally presented to them at the meeting that you know, 
either they should conform or clear off, and they said "I'm clearing off” and took their toys with 
them er, and the other one was a gross, you know, misconduct where it was just there was no 
option; it was just instant dismissal. 
(Member, small retail cooperative) 
Bigshop had probationary and disciplinary mechanisms similar to those 
found in corporations since its structure was in effect a hierarchy with an 
elected leadership. Expulsions of members were unknown in the consumer 
cooperative (OverThere) and the mutual building society. Such expulsions 
would be counterproductive for the purpose of gathering subscriptions and, 
since members contributed little to the core process of a consumer 
cooperative anyway and (few participated in governance, probably have 
little impact on those activities either. 
9.2 Management 
9.2.1 Interfaces between democracy and hierarchy 
The role of intermediary between members and employees had parallels 
with that of a boundary-spanner (138) and involved role-conflict. Usually in 
partnerships one or more partners would be selected as this intermediary. 
(In the temporary absence of a practice manager the inter-face role was 
divided among all the partners at PharmPlus.) Management arrangements 
at NurseLed had gone through some vicissitudes. Initially the practice had 
transferred large parts of its managerial work to its parent social enterprise, 
at which time a third partner, a manager by occupation, left. The parent 
social enterprise undertook payroll duties, overseeing and underwriting 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2012. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
 152 
Project 08/1518/105 
practice finances, managing employment and health and safety, and 
purchasing the practice premises. Initially the signatory for APMS contract 
with the PCT was the parent social enterprise not the partnership itself. 
NurseLed paid a management fee and would have shared its operating 
surplus with the parent social enterprise had the practice ever turned a 
profit. However the parent organisation ran into difficulties and shed a 
number of its non-core activities including health care. After that NurseLed 
employed a Practice Manager. 
At PlusPM the team leaders and one of the doctors (representing the 
partners) had regular meetings. The manager-partner was responsible for 
implementing the practice's business plan and converted the relevant 
national policy and technical guidance into working procedures. At 
PharmPlus the chair-of-the-day filled this intermediary role in collaboration 
with the employed practice manager. The practice manager described his 
job as 'being the meat in the sandwich' between partners, staff and 
patients. 
Similarly, in Legal a managing partner and a senior partner were charged 
with running the partnership. Responsible to them were a finance manager 
and IT manager. Even among its legal professionals Legal partnership had a 
clearly defined hierarchy whose ranks (top downwards) were: Full Equity 
Partners; Limited Equity Partners; employed Associates; Assistant 
Solicitors; Legal Executives; and Para-legals. Promotion up the hierarchy 
was by line manager's recommendation. 
In the OOH cooperatives, elected Board members were the intermediaries 
between the membership and full-time employed managers. City's CEO 
reported to the council every two months. Similarly in HouseLend, the posts 
linking the membership and the employees were those of the Secretary to 
the Society and the chief executive. The partnerships nominated managing 
partners as the interface with employees. In the accounting partnership 
each region had a managing partner who reported to a national managing 
partner. 
Two opposite problems in managing the member-employee interface were 
reported. One was the risk of clogging this interface with trivia. At City over 
some years the practice developed of disgruntled employees appealing to 
the council when they didn't like managers' decisions. Thus the council was 
getting drawn into relatively trivial discussions such as deciding whether 
there had been an error in a person's shift payments. Latterly this practice 
has been prevented by the council insisting that the managers deal with 
such problems. An opposite problem that employees sometimes wished to 
avoid engaging with the members. At PlusPM several informants mentioned 
the passivity and non-involvement of staff at practice meetings. Mini-
meetings between the partners and team leaders replaced regular full staff 
meetings for this reason. Employees didn't participate because (the 
manager-partner said) they considered that 'they weren't paid to think'. 
PlusPM employees said that they tried as far as possible to run their part of 
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the practice fairly self-sufficiently, turning to the partners as 'really more of 
a backup' (employee, PlusPMs) in the last resort. 
A OverThere member also described a: 
natural tendency, temptation on the part of the staff to avoid controversy, to avoid problems, 
to steer things into safe non-controversial channels and ways that will make their jobs easier 
and support the mission of the organisation as they see it' 
(Member, OverThere) 
9.2.2 Subjoined hierarchy 
We were told two rationales for appending a subjoined hierarchy to an 
otherwise democratic organisation. One was, the level of work discipline, 
nay compulsion, which it can produce: 
The vast majority of our services are provided by paid staff because the bins and boxes need 
to be dealt with at 6 o'clock in the morning and if you don't pay people they have a tendency 
not to want to do that at that particular time, strangely enough!... you can't have a discussion 
with loaders and drivers about what they are going to do today. That was one of the problems 
they had in [organisation], they sat down for two hours before they started work debating who 
was going to do what and consequently they never finished anything. 
(Board member, parent social enterprise for NurseLed) 
The other rationale was than a subjoined hierarchy gave some flexibility in 
size and skills at the margins of the (stable) member-workforce. This was 
why Wholefood employed a maximum of 5% (in terms of hours per week) 
of temporary casually-employed staff. 
Health service hierarchies are traditionally organised in occupational 'silos'. 
In western hospital systems the medical 'silo' has often been 'semi-
detached' from the others and enjoyed certain privileges: high pay, less 
onerous performance management and a degree of collective professional 
autonomy. The general practices we studied conformed to this pattern. The 
private architectural partnership developed (partly by merger) a growing 
subjoined hierarchy of staff to take on activities that the architects 
themselves felt less interested or competent to do, not only quantity 
surveyors and structural engineers but also business managers and 
marketing staff. 
9.3 Managing the subjoined hierarchy 
Within each occupational 'silo', management was much as in any hierarchy, 
but with certain qualifications. Some methods of management applied in the 
hierarchical part of the hybrid organisations were similar (i.e. evidence-
basing; appeal to culture and values; recruitment and expulsion) were 
similar to those employed for coordinating non-hierarchies and are 
therefore reported above. 
A relatively new development in general practices is the management of 
doctors by other clinical professionals. The two partners at NurseLed wanted 
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employees who were team players and able to work autonomously in a 
small unit. Two salaried GPs were dismissed, one for being too cautious in 
approach and the other as not a 'team player'. Two other salaried GPs were 
supplied by the PCT, both from different EU countries but in the view of the 
two partners these doctors were not trained in a way suitable for the needs 
of primary care in the practice and the practice could not afford the time or 
money to train them. OverThere also line-managed its medical staff. One 
daily task for Regional Directors of Clinical Operations was to use the 
morning 'huddle' as an opportunity for looking ahead at individual doctors' 
schedules and trying to facilitate their smooth running. So, for example, if 
they had back-to-back physical examinations to perform, which took some 
time, they were allotted extra time in their schedule to do those. One such 
manager explained his managerial style as: 'I'm never tough on people, but 
I'm very tough on practices.' (Regional Director of Regional Clinical 
Operations of Primary Care, OverThere). 
Especially in general practices, coordination of productive work between 
partners and employees was often achieved through a 'teamwork' 
(approach, one which was also technically required by the multi-
professional, indeed networked, character of the more complex forms of 
primary care. A team approach to working carried a relatively egalitarian 
style of coordination from the democratic world of the partners or members 
into the subjoined hierarchy. Whilst this type of managements appears in 
hierarchies too (e.g. as 'matrix' management (61)), in the partnerships and 
small cooperatives we studied such teamwork was the normal mode of 
working and problem-solving: 
In an instance last week … a home visit got missed and anything like that becomes a critical 
incident and is discussed with everybody in the Team, obviously that sort of incident would 
involve admin as well as medical staff so we re-wrote the procedure and discussed it with 
everybody and now it's adopted to try and prevent that sort of incident happening again. 
(NP partner, NurseLed) 
Exactly the same procedure was followed at the PCT-managed practice 
when one of the GPs visited the wrong patient at home one evening. 
NurseLed receptionists had a separate meeting every week, the nurses met 
every 6 weeks and the nurse practitioners every month to 6 weeks. Specific 
issues to those groups are discussed, noted and minuted. There were 
regular team meetings and, in this small practice, reliance on informal 
communication. Practice meetings can be regarded as a permanent, 
routinised teamwork structure. Speaking of other practices she had worked 
in, an employee at NurseLed told us that, team meetings were often not in 
fact held, even when practices claimed that they were. 
Partnerships outside the health sector also applied a team-work approach. 
Legal divided its business across a series of teams which covers specific 
areas of law. Within each team is a series of units based on practice areas 
(company and commercial, employment, dispute litigation, real estate, 
advocacy, clinical negligence, family and childcare and private client), each 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2012. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
 155 
Project 08/1518/105 
with its own leader. The architectural partnership also constructed teams for 
each project (the partnership's market niche was medium-sized schemes) 
or, sometimes, for a sector (e.g. health, education). Each team combined 
partners and employees by expertises as the case required and was headed 
by a director. 
9.3.1 Pay 
Salary schemes were the other means of incentivising and controlling 
employees, replicating in two of the partnerships the external incentives to 
which the partners were exposed. 
The PharmPlus staff bonus scheme was an incentive worked through an 
elaborate weighting of bonuses to reflect individual effort, as assessed by 
managers, towards meeting QOF targets. This bonus were not guaranteed 
but contingent upon the whole practice doing well with the QOF. Rewards 
were based on a grid that measured achievement against each employee's 
level of effort. The grid was discussed at the Practice Leaders' meeting and 
the Practice Manager took the results to the partners who could adjust the 
scores. This was a change from the previous Christmas bonus scheme that 
had been based purely on length of service which, the partners felt, this did 
not recognise effort. Similarly, PlusPM employees received a cash bonus if 
the practice met its QOF targets, the bonus being up to three weeks' pay 
with a ceiling of £1000 in addition to a Xmas bonus. 
HouseLend staff were salaried but all eligible for performance related pay if 
they hit predefined targets. For branch staff these included, for example, 
the number of sales leads passed to other departments to allow the closing 
of sales of financial 'products'. Pay differentials at partner or member level 
tended to be absent or small compared with the corporate world. The 
general practices tended to distribute their income pro rata to work 
contributed (i.e. without differentials except for quantity of work). The 
recruitment of a pharmacist partner at PharmPlus triggered a debate about 
about what this new partner was (financially) worth: 
I sort of felt that from the business point of view, if you were a director in a company, you had 
equal worth because you put equal contribution in, despite whether you came from a financial 
background or a management background, you still had equal worth. So my argument then 
was, I am equal to you. Their [medical partners'] argument then was ... still they would be 
holding some accountability for the work I do clinically … So we came to an agreement that I 
would do, although I am a half time share partner, I would work 5 days a week for a year 
and I would move to a half time share over three years which was fine. 
(Pharmacist partner, PharmPlus) 
By the end of the three years all partners received either a full share or a 
half share, depending on the work contributed to the partnership as a 
whole. Proportionately to the hours worked, there were therefore no income 
differentials among the partners arising from the work of the partnership 
itself. PlusPM practice's operating surplus was divided pro rata to sessions 
worked except for the manager-partner: 
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they [GP partners] feel that the value of those ten sessions isn't necessarily as good as me 
seeing a patient. So we spent a lot of time arguing over that! But effectively I ended up with a 
9 to 10% share. 
(PM partner, PlusPM) 
Metro directors were paid at the same rate as clinician members for the 
managerial time they spent at the cooperative outside normal working 
hours. Generous pay increased the pressure to ensure that members 
working as clinicians pulled their weight: 
When 'they were getting, you know, about £20 an hour, then you couldn't be too hard on 
people if people had a gap between calls and sat down for 10 minutes to watch the telly, then 
it wasn't a big deal. Now they are on £80 to £100 an hour, 10 minutes watching telly is 15 
quid's worth of time that's gone down the tubes. Whilst we have not been too hard on that … 
we have parted company with a few doctors that were noticeably slow on a regular basis, 
even when it was busy, and I think word has gone round. 
(clinical governance lead, Metro) 
With session fees at these rates, City and Metro had surpluses of members 
volunteering to work. Metro engaged them on what it called a 'practising 
privileges agreement' so that it paid only national insurance and not tax on 
their work. In cooperatives and partnerships alike employees of the same 
profession as the members or partners were an important exception to the 
rule that employees be paid less than a partner or member: 
It's [a GP's salary is] basically keeping in line with what the GP partners get because it seems 
totally inequitable to pay someone more to do less than you are being paid to do. So we 
resisted that. 
(PM-partner, PlusPM) 
Non-health partnerships paid the partners on the basis of judgements 
against a wide range of criteria such as income generation, maintenance of 
regular clients, securing new business, overall performance and one's own 
conduct of work. Legal had introduced a performance-related pay scheme in 
2008-2009, but at team rather than individual level. To qualify, all the 
teams had to meet pre-defined targets. Whilst some teams had exceeded 
targets, others (e.g. conveyance) had not. Therefore nobody except full 
equity partners received any monetary bonuses that year. 
Wholefood cooperative took a strong line against pay differentials: 
Same hourly rate, so there's no, there's no differentials; so it doesn't matter if you're um 
operating a specialist task that will have a market value greater than the hourly rate... ah, it 
doesn't matter if you have mild learning difficulties. 
(Member, Wholefood) 
Probationers received the same rate of pay as full members. Monetary pay 
was were similar to other shops and cafes in the city but members also 
received a 25% discount on anything bought from the shop, free food, free 
complimentary medicines (if stocked in the shop), six weeks' paid holiday 
and a month's sabbatical after five years. Non-financial rewards also loomed 
large, such as being able to support other like-minded organisations. The 
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constitution of Bigshop stipulated that neither the Chairman's own income 
from the Partnership nor the income awarded to anyone else may exceed a 
certain upward limit. Neither can any member be paid less than a lower 
wage limit fixed by a Council. To that basic wage was added a family 
allowance (fixed in the same way) for any dependants. All the dividends 
were also limited to a fixed rate. The large retail cooperative had substantial 
wage differentials, but less than corporations in that sector. 
9.4 Degeneration and managers 
Only our informants in the mutuals and cooperatives raised the question of 
degeneration. The question arose more sharply in the two retail 
cooperatives, the mutual building society and the health consumer 
cooperative than in the two out-of-hours cooperatives which had explicitly 
adopted a general-practice like structure. Ways in which, we were told, 
democratic control by the members might degenerate were through the 
growth of managerial discretion; the 'managerialisation' of the senior staff 
employed as stewards of the members' interests; and the decline of 
member engagement. 
9.4.1 Managerial discretion 
At the interface between members and employees, an important 'window' 
for managerial discretion emerged in three circumstances. 
The first was when an organisation accommodates apparently conflicting 
interests, in the case of a building society those of borrower-members and 
those of lender-members. How to balance these interests was a potentially 
delicate, ambivalent matter which gave senior managers the opportunity to 
exercise their own judgement and discretion: 
It's very clear that the Board has to act in the interests of the membership as a whole, both 
current and future. So in effect we are Trustees of the mutual organisation and we do have to 
take primarily the Society as a whole. So we can't differentiate between borrowers at the 
expense of savers, or savers at the expense of borrowers... So if we felt we [organisation] were 
doing something which was not in the interests of the Society of the future we [managers] can 
dismiss it. 
(CEO, HouseLend) 
By far the most important exercise of this discretion came when it was 
proposed to convert this mutual building society into a commercial bank. 
During the recent US health policy about the proposals for a single-payer 
health system, OverThere also accommodated conflicting interests, those of 
insurer and provider. Although OverThere's founding values might have 
been expected to support a single payer system, the managers steered the 
organisation away from publicly advocating that view. When members' 
interests' potentially clash with those of OverThere as an organisation (as 
our informant rather tendentiously put it) the governance staff discourage 
groups like the Senior Caucus (particularly by chair and vice chair) from 
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opposing what the managers recommend on behalf of the whole 
organisation. In the single payer healthcare system debate, as the Senior 
Caucus vice chair put it, 'It's important that we don't stray off the 
reservation and get into things that are not good for OverThere.' Here, the 
'organisation' appeared to have acquired interests distinct from those of its 
members; apparently the interests of its managers and employees. 
Ill-defined divisions of labour between members (or their Board) and 
managers also create space for managerial discretion and autonomy. In 
OverThere the most stark example was a proposed merger with Kaiser 
Permanente. The Board Chair said she was informed only when the talks 
with Kaiser were far advanced: 
There was a final decision and the decision to have that agreement between organisations 
had to be signed by the board chair, who was me. I remember me ask[ing], “Would you come 
down and talk?” We talked about it in the board and pretty much said “Yeah, I guess we'd 
better do that, there's not much else”. 
(Former Board Chair, OverThere) 
The Chair of one medical council explained to us how in one locality 
OverThere decided to withdraw their services from one hospital and 
contract instead with the Franciscan hospital. The local MCAC was outraged 
'there was the question of whether of not they wanted to contract with a 
Catholic hospital with its different attitude towards end of life issues and 
abortion (assisted suicide is legal in the state, following years of 
campaigning). OverThere did not consult the local MCAC before making 
their decision. The chair complained, was told it would never happen again 
and everything was smoothed over. There was a balance to be kept 
between facilitating the meetings, putting together the agenda and 'setting' 
the agenda, which members assure us the governance managers from 
OverThere do not do. 
HouseLend employed managers also deflected a far-reaching decisions 
which at least some members appeared to prefer. Each respondent 
individually and without prompting referred to a call by members about ten 
years before to allow a vote at the AGM to de-mutualise the society. A 
single member was able to bring this fundamental decision to the Society's 
AGM. However the apparent decision-making power which this gave 
members was severely qualified by a legal restriction which the managers 
exploited: 
in fact...all you [members] can do is you can get the Board to consider doing something - 
there's this great case law on this 'so [in] that instance the best that the members could do 
was put forward a resolution that said: "We recommend the Board consider conversion' So 
that went before the membership and there was a vote and it was 95% in favour because all 
they were doing was asking the Board to consider something that we already do anyway, so 
the Board followed the instruction, considered it and dismissed it. 
(CEO, HouseLend) 
Subsequently discussion of this question became routinised: 
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on an annual basis, [we] consider our status and it only takes a few seconds to do that 
because the demutualisation experiment over the last few years has been an unmitigated 
disaster. 
(CEO, HouseLend) 
Important as it was, the proposal to demutualise was the only example in 
recent years of resolutions coming from members. Mostly resolutions came 
from the board, and many concerned relative technicalities such as the 
noting the adoption of the accounts. Some important decisions never went 
to the AGM: 
We don't put any of our investment decisions to members. So that's in terms of the 
subsidiaries, even at Society level in terms of products we don't put any resolutions. 
(CEO, HouseLend) 
9.4.2 Managerialisation 
In the largest study organisations, our informants wondered whether 
increased in organisational size and the increased managerialisation of the 
employed staff would compromise members' governance over the 
organisation. 
OverThere's employed managers had become considerably more 
'managerialised' in recent years. The calibre of the Executive Leadership 
Team had increased, partly because the pay had increased. The Board's 
compensation committee voted for the increase but some leading members 
expressed strong opposition, for instance dismissing the managers' 
arguments for raising their own pay as 'Self-serving bullshit' One of our 
informants feared that debate would become inhibited; how were members 
going to be able to engage in debate with a management which can 'run 
rings' round them? On the managers' side, a governance executive 
remarked: 
If you were to go back several years, these folks [member chairing the medical centre councils] 
used to make important decisions about their facilities.. As we have evolved as an 
organisation, these have had less and less power. And that has been a source of frustration 
for some of these folks actually, where they would like to be able to call up or CEO and have a 
great conversation; some of them still can, but it's a much smaller group. 
(Manager, OverThere) 
Members were entitled to meet, if they wished, without any staff present. However, 
the staff wish to attend members' meetings because 
they 'want to make sure that there is no inadvertent effort or inadvertent course of action 
taken that can be harmful to OverThere. 
(Member, OverThere) 
One consequence of recruiting supposedly more skilled, ex-corporate 
managers was to import with them assumptions and working practices 
which included some apparently inconsistent with, indeed damaging to, the 
goals and founding principles of the importing organisation. 
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9.4.3 Member engagement 
Organisational structures for member engagement in the study 
organisations' affairs are described above. Some OverThere members felt 
that the low level of member participation meant the organisation was in 
decline as a cooperative or a cooperative only in name. OverThere Members 
were suspicious of managerial ideologies, symbolised by such terms as 'lean 
management', or 'customer' instead of 'member'. One member described a 
'vicious circle' between the passivity and lack of active engagement by the 
consumers partly arising from the lack of control they feel over OverThere 
business and the fact that the employed managers actively set the agendas. 
A former chair of a members' group however disagreed. She argued that 
the 'natural evolution' of the cooperative into a large organisation does not 
signal such decline, only a change: 
I don't despair of the fact that we don't have big meetings of the whole thirty thousand or six 
or three hundred thousand elected members every time we want to make a decision, because 
it wouldn't work. The only question is, is the elected board providing sufficient oversight in the 
interest of the membership over this corporate process, because the corporate process is a 
powerful dynamic process and it can very easily co-opt 'the co-operative governance process. 
(Member, OverThere) 
In a similar situation the chief executive at HouseLend thought the 
opposite: 
In terms of actual attendance at the AGM it's literally just a few dozen. I mean there can be 
more staff members. 
(CEO, HouseLend) 
We asked 'So what do you see as the role of the Annual General Meeting?'. He replied: 'A 
statutory function'. 
9.4.4 Size and risk 
The question of whether growth made NHOs unsustainable was also raised 
by an informant from our building society site: 
out of all the converters [from building society to corporation] the one that I believe had a 
business rationale to do it, and the only one, was Halifax because it had 22% of the retail 
market, 25% of the mortgage market. They were competing against the major high street 
banks and international banks coming to the UK and they were so big 'So it was probably 
purely as a result of their size that I believe they had a business case to convert, so they had 
access to the equity markets because it was right that the shareholders took that downside 
risk and not the members. 
(CEO, HouseLend) 
One the one hand this argument shows concern for the members' financial 
security, but it also reveals and assumption that if building societies were to 
compete with corporate banks they (would have to operate in equally risky 
ways. 
The question of degeneration arose acutely only in OverThere. The smaller 
food cooperative had a constitution designed to prevent a permanent 
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managerial stratum emerging in the first place (through direct democracy 
and the rotation of managerial posts). The larger food cooperative's 
members were organised into a managerial hierarchy, but the rights of its 
managers were ultimately circumscribed by legally-binding documents of 
foundation and the cooperative's constitution. These documents both gave 
the managers a wide field for discretion but also defined its limits, closing 
off the scope for discretionary managerial encroachment on members' 
decision-making powers. 
9.5 Professionals in non-hierarchical organisations 
Of our study sites, the large retail cooperative had (only a small proportion 
of professional members and the small retail cooperative none. In the 
building society a substantial proportion of staff had some sort of 
professional qualification, but they were employees not members or 
partners. 
9.5.1 Multi-professional partnerships 
Two of the study general practices had non-medical partners, one 
(PharmPlus) a pharmacist and another (PlusPM) a manager. Recruitment of 
partners of a different profession to the existing partners happened as an 
ad hoc problem-solving measure, partly stimulated by external policy 
changes. Had this study occurred two years later, we could also have 
observed in other legal partnership (Legal) the effects of changed 
occupational mix of the partners at this site when the Legal Services Act 
comes info force in 2011. 
Recruitment of the pharmacist partner at PharmPlus occurred by almost by 
trail-and-error. Initially one of the medical partners had a watching brief for 
the pharmacy but found it too much work to an add on to a GP's normal 
work. Because of the new GMS contract and QOF the GPs were by now 
looking at new organisational models for the practice anyway because work 
was 'mushrooming'. Through their involvement at their PCT two of the GP 
partners knew the prescribing lead and approached her to 'work with' the 
practice, having no initial preconceptions exactly how. The pharmacist 
partner developed a case-management role similar to a GP's, beginning 
prescribing as a supplementary prescriber within case management plans 
agreed with the GPs. However it was she who wrote these plans for angina, 
heart failure, diabetes, ischaemic heart disease, epilepsy, hypertension and 
hyperthyroidism. This activity caused the GPs to compare their clinical 
practices with hers, finding that some of their clinical practices were 
habitual rather than evidence-based. In order for the pharmacist to act as a 
supplementary prescriber the GPs had to homogenise their clinical practice. 
This clinical role was not without its initial difficulties for both the 
pharmacist and the GPs, who found the idea of her seeing and managing 
patients 'a challenge' to start with. On her side, the pharmacist found it 
challenging to deal with the more clinically complex patients; patients 
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wanting to widen the consultation ('while I'm here...'); and some of the 
complications and implications posed by some patients' (social 
backgrounds. The pharmacist preferred to have partner status and none of 
the GPs had any difficulty accepting that. Her partnership agreement was 
on the same basis as the GPs', sharing all the risk and all the profits, and 
acquiring an equivalent fund for PGEA training to what a GP partner would 
have and a share of the PLC attached to partnership proportionate to her 
share in the partnership itself. Other informants agreed with her own 
assessment that; 
Here I am recognised just as another clinician, another health care professional, so I work 
very much, you know, with the clinical team on my day to day role, but I have the business 
interest to maximise the profitability of the dispensary, because I have an expertise in that 
area so the partners see that as a key role. 
(Pharmacist partner, PharmPlus) 
Her eventual incorporation as a partner took about three years. 
In PlusPM the practice manager was elevated to partnership. The GP 
partners regarded the practice manager as good as his jobs and wanted to 
be sure to retain ('tie') him to the practice. The partners had noticed a 
nearby practice considering the same step to retain a very competent nurse 
practitioner. The practice manager already received a profit-share so 
moving to become a partner was a relatively small step in terms of role, 
although it increased his income. We were told it made little difference to 
his participation in running the practice either: 
he has always had as much say as us anyway. We are fairly egalitarian that way anyway. 
We are quite happy to be guided by him. 
(GP, PlusPM) 
With a managerial, in contrast to a non-medical clinician, partner there was 
well defined division of labour with few overlapping elements in different 
partners' jurisdictions.  
9.5.2 Salaried and partner professionals 
Our study general practices had partners and employees of the same 
profession; nurses at NurseLed, doctors at PlusPM and PharmPlus. 
All the study health partnerships had hesitations about employing salaried 
GPs, but for different reasons. PharmPlus partners felt that partner status 
made them collectively responsible for the work of the partnership, even if 
this meant working longer hours than if they had been salaried workers. It 
reinforced the incentive for each partner to check that others were also 
contributing their share of production and management work (mutual 
scrutiny). They did not wish to weaken these incentives. Also the shared 
benefit of having a salaried GP implied a shared responsibility for managing 
her. 
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Partners at PlusPM felt a partners would stay long-term with the practice. 
They disliked the idea of the 
controlling partners or controlling [supermarket chain], employing lots of salaried doctors who 
will come in and do their shift and collect their money and go and not be part of the business. 
(GP partner, PlusPM) 
For salaried doctors at this practice it was specified what hours they would 
work, how many patients they would see, what visits and paperwork to do, 
and what time was protected for teaching and personal development. Thus 
the salaried doctor's contract was basically the same as for other employees 
but with dedicated training time. The practice also recruited a salaried 
registrar. Without the salaried doctors' workload being specified in advance 
you thought well, we are actually not going to get any work out of this person. 
(GP partner, PlusPM) 
Nevertheless this GP also said that with the salaried doctor currently 
employed in the practice 
our problem with [name] is not that she doesn't work hard, it's stopping her working. She does 
work very hard and we are telling her, for God's sake go home and switch off. 
(GP, PlusPM) 
NurseLed was wary of employing salaried doctors for a different reason. The 
partners asked 'why pay them [doctor] that big salary to do something that 
somebody on a lower salary can do?' (Nurse partner, NurseLed). The policy 
for medical recruitment in that nurse-led practice was that any salaried 
doctor had to be able to work independently from the outset without a high 
level of support, which was not available in a relatively small, newly re-
founded practice. The best way to recruit a doctor, in the view of NurseLed 
partners, was by recruiting one who had proved satisfactory as a locum. 
The main difference between the employing partners' and employed nurses' 
role was that the former undertook wide-ranging, inter-professional 
management work in addition to their clinical work and leadership. The line 
management of one nurse by another is however such a long-established 
practice that our informants regarded the arrangements at NurseLed as 
unproblematic, barely worthy of comment. 
At PCTrun, where all doctors were salaried, they were annually reviewed by 
another GP external to the practice. Although his practice employed a 
salaried GP, one of our informants was sceptical of the value of salaried 
general practice elsewhere: 
PCTs will always tell us to follow national guidance. They always follow national guidance 
which is why PCTs' PMS practices don't hit any of their targets, certainly in [town]. The three 
practices that so far under-achieve consistently, are theirs. 
(PM-manager, PlusPM) 
If this be true, the under-performance might conceivably arise either for the 
reason this informant stated or because PCTs often tend to take over (and 
convert to salaried general practice) small, marginal or struggling practices. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2012. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
 164 
Project 08/1518/105 
The out-of-hours cooperatives paid members a sessional rate for working 
shifts. Salaried GPs were disproportionately represented among City's 
working members: 'quite a few salaried doctors also work here. ' they want 
quick money' (CEO, City). But so far as the cooperatives were concerned 
there was no difference between members who were the salaried 
employees of practices and those who were practice partners. 
OverThere's professionals were its employees (or in some cases sub-
contractors), not members or partners. Its employed doctors described a 
democratic way of working, believing that their feedback was regarded as 
important. Nevertheless there was a clearly hierarchical organisation of 
doctors. Every doctor had three year probationary period before they were 
elected into the organisation. A key part of this passing the probation and 
becoming a 'Shareholder'was, the medical director of primary care 
explained, that they received high patient satisfaction scores. 
9.6 Professional engagement 
9.6.1 Engagement within organisation 
Comparing our study sites, the engagement of members in general 
(irrespective of occupation) appeared to depend upon: 
 1. What other commitments members had, hence the relative 
importance of the organisation's activity in its members' lives. 
Consequently members' engagement in provider NHOs was 
higher than in consumer NHOs. For GP members, participation in 
the governance of cooperatives was usually one of the less 
pressing demands on busy working lives. 
 2. Members' geographical dispersal (building society members) or 
concentration (GPs in cooperatives). 
Rather like Arnstein's 'ladder' of citizen participation in civil society (343), 
our data suggested a hierarchy of engagement in cooperatives, ranging 
from payment of subscription and use of the services only (to volunteering 
do paid working sessions to unpaid participation, for instance in the 
managing bodies. 
Without ranking the following factors, it appeared that among professionals 
specifically, engagement appeared to depend upon: 
 1. Co-ownership of the partnership or cooperative, which provided 
both the means and the incentive for engagement in its 
management. For non-partners the possibility of future 
engagement as a partner provided an incentive to work well and 
to maintain good working relationship with existing partners. We 
were told of this phenomenon in both an NHS (PharmPlus) and 
the legal partnership (Legal). 
 2. Material benefits. Similarly the connection between engagement 
and payment was much closer in partnerships than 
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cooperatives, but even so both cooperatives attracted the 
participation of members as shiftworkers simply by paying them 
generously. City retained membership by providing incentives 
for GPs to remain opted-in to providing OOH cover and then 
doing so via City. These incentives included a free locum service 
(GPs opted-out from OOH had to pay for locums) and an 
answering service free of charge because of economies of scale, 
gave this additional service a negligible marginal cost. Only 
members could do paid work for the cooperative, thereby 
recouping some of (or in a few cases more than) the cost of 
membership. 
 3. Experience of the practical usefulness of the organisation to 
them. This applied even in the ex-cooperative that later 
converted to a PLC. Originally 
'it was a little bit marginal really in terms of numbers and compared to lots of GP co-ops, we 
could only just about make it work, but it did work very well and within a couple of years, 
'three years, the [town] GPs could see that it was a better way of working and that it was safe 
in terms of patient care. 
(GP co-director, WasCoop) 
 4. Even if the NHO or partnership was (marginal to (a 
professional's working life its decisions might have practical 
implications for her more central activities and interests. For 
example it was a matter of some interest even to the less active 
GPs members of Metro and City whether these two cooperatives 
got involved in practice based commissioning, began operating 
diurnal services (which the GPs were already doing themselves), 
took over vacant local general practices or set up a 'Darzi clinic'. 
In these periods professionals became more actively engaged. 
 5. Open access to board members appeared to promote clinician 
engagement: 
most of the people on the council are the doctors themselves, so they are elected partly from 
the body of doctors and sometimes the doctors go directly to the council members to say, 
"What's going on here?” or “This is what I think”. 
(Finance Director, City) 
Similarly in OverThere, by far the largest employer of clinicians in 
the study, informal access and feedback to higher managers was 
used to promote clinician engagement, particularly when it came to 
pilots for new models of service models. Each clinic started the day 
with a 'huddle' at which staff and doctors discussed particular 
issues (e.g. pharmacy initiatives) and anticipated problems (e.g. 
scheduling at the clinic, shortage of appointments). Twice a month 
there was also an one tour provider staff meeting looking at issues 
specifically relating to the clinic. 
 6. How far they subscribed to the culture and goals of the 
organisation itself. This emerged more clearly from the US case 
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study than the more homogeneous NHS. One interviewee, a 
primary care doctor called his clinic: 
certainly by far and away the best practice I've been in. I feel I can do the right things for the 
patients without killing myself in the process 'my worst day here at [OverThere] is better than 
90% of my days at Kaiser. 
(Doctor, OverThere) 
We found little evidence of professionals' disengagement or resistance. 
Whilst the PCTrun doctors had sought salaried employment because they 
wanted to disengage from managerial work, that did not mean they resisted 
managerial decisions or power or refused to contribute, only that they 
wanted more time for clinical activities. 
With a view to testing the predictions (see above) about the degeneration of 
co-operatives we researched a former out-of-hours cooperative which had 
converted itself into a commercial firm. Implicitly this conversion increased 
the engagement of some professionals (the new owners) and reduced the 
engagement of others (former members whose role was now restricted to 
that of employee or sessional sub-contractor). It turned out that the 
reasons for the demise of this cooperative lay in the disorganisation of out-
of-hours services across the local PCT, a problem exposed when the 2004 
GMS contract permitted GPs to opt out of providing out-of-hours services: 
Leading up then to the October 2004 opt out the PCT began to hold various steering groups 
and ... I think [PCT name] was somewhat unusual in that it was in complete disarray. I think I 
am right in saying it had 14 different out-of-hours providers at that stage, and we were easily 
the biggest. And that ranged from a single-handed guy doing it by himself to bigger practices 
or whatever. But it was a mess. … (And at the end of all these meetings … I went up to one of 
the managers there who was running it and said, “I don't think we are going to get anywhere. 
Are you interested in me and perhaps one or two colleagues coming up with a vision, a plan of 
how we might run the out-of-hours service?”. 
(Director, WasCoop) 
The figure of 14 providers turned out to be only for a part of this PCT's 
territory. This co-operative thus fell victim not to its own inefficiencies, 
asset withdrawal or 'free riding' but rather to a 'garbage can' (344) style of 
commissioner management. 
9.6.2 Engagement in health system management outside the 
organisation 
External networking with similar organisations was a way of giving and 
obtaining mutual support and encouragement, and the same pattern 
appeared outside the health sector. HouseLend was one of currently 55 
building societies who kept in close touch 'on a whole host of issues apart 
from commercially sensitive [ones] in terms of product design etc,’. (CEO, 
HouseLend), in part because: 
we do recognise the fact that as a sector we are probably less than 20% and we're up against 
major high street players, [and] we're now up against Her Majesty's Government who will end 
up being the largest mortgage lender in the UK. 
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(CEO HouseLend) 
Our Wholefood informant involved with food-growing stated that food 
growers like to work with them because they are ethical 'unlike 
supermarkets' who (he said) often exploited their suppliers in ways he 
described. 
A wider range of professional contacts was specifically mentioned as a 
benefit of working for an OOH cooperative: 
It's one of the main opportunities that a lot of doctors have to stay in contact with other doctors 
'finding yourself working a shift with somebody who might have been working two miles up 
the road for the past 10 years, and you didn't even know what they looked like. 
(clinical governance lead, Metro) 
However, we were also told that this benefit becomes diminishes once the 
NHO grows beyond the size of what might be called a 'natural community' 
of doctors, for instance those working in one town or for the same PCT. 
As for PCT-level work: 
Interviewer: 'What do you actually get from them, these bodies? What do you provide in 
return?' 
GP: 'From the PCT?! (laughter). Forms to fill in, hoops to jump through, targets to hit which are, 
you kind of wonder, what's the point of these targets, but, you know, not a great deal. We are 
mainly pretty independent and we 'yes, we get guidance on this and guidance on that, you 
know, clinical guidance is useful. We do get some support from the PCT when - there will be 
times when we feel that some demands of some patients are not reasonable with regard to 
prescribing. 
(GP, PlusPM) 
Consequently PlusPM's main external networks were with the other 
practices in its local PBC consortium. 
In the sites we studied practice based commissioning was noticeable more 
by its absence than as a means of professional engagement with NHS 
management. (Other studies have also reported the uneven development of 
practice based commissioning (345,346,8).) Whatever practice based 
commissioning offered by way of professional engagement in management, 
it also incurred transaction costs of collecting data and de-duplicating 
secondary providers' invoices. One partnership was overtly sceptical: 
I am very anti. If the PCT can't commission, how the hell are smaller organisations going to be 
able to do so? It's nonsensical. 
(manager-partner, PlusPM) 
Engagement (or not) thus depended in part on the professionals' perception 
of how coherent and how practically helpful to them a given policy was 
likely to be. The case studies show two main structural for organisational 
democracy in partnerships and provider NHOs: direct democracy within 
small work-teams; and what we called a 'representative' structure where 
working conditions necessitated a more extrinsic discipline. Voting and 
participation rights within partnerships were based on property-
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qualifications, though less so in health partnerships than elsewhere. NHOs 
had egalitarian voting and participation rights among their members (if not 
for employees). Management was primarily through concertive control, 
supplemented with exit in exceptional cases. Pay differentials among 
members or partners were low. Professional engagement depended mainly 
upon the material and practical benefits thereof, and upon whether 
professionals found the organisational culture congenial. In partnerships, 
ownership and control were the main basis of professional engagement. 
Only small minorities of members engaged actively in the consumer NHOs. 
There, employed managers influenced the election of officials and took most 
decisions. 
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10 Process: case study findings 
Next we report the case study findings about the technical, productive 
processes by which the study organisations attempted to realise the goals 
reported above. 
10.1 Impact on workloads, job satisfaction and morale 
We found some evidence that members or partners of NHOs would select (if 
they could) a workload focusing on occupationally highly-esteemed types of 
work, dropping lower-status work or, in partnerships, transferring it to non-
partners. Such transfers were constrained by the legal regulation governing 
the division of clinical labour. This especially affected NurseLed since English 
regulations constrain nurse practitioners' work (more narrowly than general 
medical practitioners'. Comparing doctor-led and nurse-led practices, we 
found in both (that the partners tended to raise – so far as practicable - the 
skill level of their own clinical work and transfer the residue to employees. 
Both the upper and the lower skill thresholds for the partners' work were 
thus raised. This permitted job enrichment for the employees too. 
Recruitment of partners from non-medical clinical professions had a similar 
effect. PharmPlus's pharmacist partner persuaded the GPs to support a 
different role for the pharmacy than they had first envisaged: 
I think their view 'was the traditional view where you go now to health centres and there's a 
Lloyd's attached to it, they were still separate businesses. ' What I saw was ' we could get the 
pharmacy to actually do those services, public health services, so this would take on a lot of 
the roles that the practice nurses do 'Then we could also use our nurse practitioners more in 
terms of minor ailments, which we [in pharmacy] currently do, which means a pharmacist 
might be freed up to do domiciliary visits for elderly ill, and look at medicines reviews. 
(Pharmacist partner, PharmPlus) 
So the pharmacy assistants would take on some former nursing tasks, 
whilst nurse practitioners took on some former medical tasks, as would the 
pharmacist partner, who also became a clinician in her own right as 
described above. Partners at the nurse led practice (NurseLed) reversed its 
division of labour from that in a conventional general medical partnership to 
one in which nurse practitioners replaced GPs as the point of first contact 
and the overall case-manager for patients. Nurse practitioners became the 
first point of contact for patients, with the goal that 60% to 70% (acute 
basic care; long-term chronic disease monitoring; well people screening) 
would be treated entirely by a nurse practitioner. Very sick people with 
complex conditions were referred to a doctor. By a different route the 
outcome was similar to that in PharmPlus. GPs increasingly concentrated on 
more complex cases whilst NPs undertook general consultations. 
PlusPM GPs wanted more control over care, distrusting the trend that: 
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Telephone consultations have become a lot more common but I know there is an awful lot of 
practices where the patients phone up and talk to the receptionist and get antibiotics, they 
never ever speak to a doctor. 
(GP PlusPMs) 
Even so, certain clinical roles still transferred to nurses: 
We [GPs] used to be going in every day or every other day to people terminally. Now it's the 
Macmillan Nurse who will be going in and then feeding back to us, which in a way I regret 
because it was one of the most satisfying parts of general practice. But things move on. 
(GP, PlusPM.) 
Both the OOH co-ops allocated medical shifts by rotation among those who 
had applied (volunteered) for that particular shift. Other work was 
undertaken by paid employees, mirroring the division of labour in a 
conventional general practice. Here too staff of other occupations were 
taking on the more routine aspects of doctoring. For example if a lot of 
patients arrived at the Primary Care Centre and nurse practitioners in triage 
were not busy they were expected to see primary care centre patients; and 
when the treatment doctors had little work they undertook telephone triage. 
OverThere discovered that by removing unnecessary or stressful work, good 
quality support systems also improved doctors' job satisfaction. The way 
OverThere operated from the mid '0s to about 2000 gave them a poor 
reputation and affected doctors' morale considerably. One doctor who 
experienced this phase in the organisation's history said: 
I was ready to quit, honestly, you know, about six or seven years ago...the systems were 
poor, the systems were discordant... you work as hard as you can and neither are you good 
for the patient nor good for the administration... ([patients] couldn't get in at a reasonable time, 
schedules were overloaded. They would come in; we wouldn't have the chart available … very 
inefficient, and then we would refer to the specialist.. the specialist would say they didn't get 
any records, they would say "Why are you here?” and the patient would say “I don't know, 
they told me to come over here”. 
(Doctor, OverThere) 
Two innovations which improved the situation were the changes to 
Electronic Medical Records (EMR) and to the primary-care led 'Medical Home 
Model'. The latter, a more primary care centred model of care, was credited 
with markedly improving doctors' working conditions and hence job 
satisfaction. It reduced patient list size from 2500 to 1800 per doctor, and 
that rather than any financial reward was their incentive to adopt it. As one 
doctor described it: 
”See you guys, I'm going home at five-thirty and I don't do emails in the middle of the night.” 
That's an enviable position for a lot of people.' 
The two retailing cooperatives took opposite approaches to allocating 
members' work. At Wholefood all members eventually did all jobs: 
We are a multi-task organisation and also a consensus organisation. Tthere isn't an individual 
who pays accounts thirty-five hours a week and then goes home, and there isn't an individual 
who cleans the toilets thirty-five hours a week '[This arrangement] develops understanding 
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and diversion, range of skills and also empathy. If you have spent time in the packing, trying 
to reduce bags, you can understand what's going wrong there. 
(Member, Wholefood) 
Each working team had a specific function (e.g. personnel, operational 
planning, training, store), and the cooperative was thus moving away from 
having the individual to having the work team as the basic organisational 
unit. In the larger cooperative there was in contrast a stable division of 
labour with a corresponding gradation of pay and authority. This large 
cooperative contained almost no non-members, so an allocation of high-
status work to members and lower status work to non-members could 
hardly arise. Neither was it technically practicable for members to abandon 
the more onerous types of work. 
As noted, the architectural partnership recruited employees to do the types 
of work that the partners felt uninterested or not competent in. For 
architectural work itself, the partners organised themselves by the stages of 
the core process for an architectural project (inception, conception, design, 
production, delivery) but also required a lead to coordinate the project and 
present it to the client in a coherent, unified way. Division of labour was by 
legal specialisation in the law partnership. Individual solicitors 'there were 
few other occupational groups 'were allocated to specialty teams which 
were not location-specific but dispersed across four towns and cities 
regional-wide. There was a clear division of labour between legal 
professionals and non-professionals, and within the legal profession the 
gradation of ranks described above. 
Pay, pay differentials and their part in the management of the study 
organisations are reported above. 
10.2 Economies of scale 
Economies of scale were apparent both in the partnerships and the 
cooperatives. The former was a somewhat unexpected finding because the 
partnerships were relatively small organisations with essentially handicraft 
core processes of the kind which resist mechanisation, the usual source of 
economies of scale elsewhere. It was less surprising that the OOH 
cooperatives, with their more standardised, larger scale, more automatable 
core processes (call-handling, vehicle scheduling) displayed economies of 
scale. 
Metro informants also described economies of scale (and diseconomies of 
scale from losing contracts: see above): 
You need at least 300,000, actually to be precise 285,000 members of the public, to be able to 
provide this [service] effectively. ' you would need to place one GP at least [for] '24 hours 
coverage 'at least one supervisor, at least one driver 'then I'd say, 'How much would this cost 
to me?'and look at the minimum rent or whatever and say, 'How much would that cost to me?'' 
so we are charging £3 per list size [i.e. per listed patient], how many people do we require? 
And that's where I get those figures. 
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(CEO, City) 
Also City bought supplies such as gloves and flu vaccine in bulk, passing the 
savings on its members. 
Both the partnerships and the cooperatives were able (start-up finance 
permitting) to launch a virtuous circle of expanding services, expansion 
reducing unit costs, making more price-competitive bids for work (enabled 
by lower unit costs), leading to further expansion. Loss of a contract started 
the reverse vicious circle for (in this study) Metro. In these respects NHOs 
appeared little different from corporations. 
10.3 Capital 
Given these economies of scale, the expansion of the general practices, and 
the large-scale out-of-hours cooperatives, required funding to replace and 
upgrade buildings and equipment. The study organisations found the short-
term cost-covering constraint particularly restrictive when it came to the 
start-up costs of large changes to services. 
PlusPM practice had planning permission to extend for some years, but no 
way of raising the capital from its own retained earnings to do so. 
PharmPlus practice found the obvious alternative, the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI), equally unsatisfactory; disadvantageous to the practice 
because a PFI contract would lock the practice into renting the building from 
(external) private developers for 35 years. (LIFT did not have this 
drawback.) NurseLed's parent organisation was unable to supply capital 
investment because the short duration PCT contracts made the investment 
too risky. From a different standpoint the architectural partnership had also 
experienced of PFI, finding that because the scheme multiplied the number 
of agents and organisations involved in capital projects, making it harder for 
the architects to know who precisely was the client among the many 
interested parties. 
Whilst the partnership model and cooperative models made it hard for some 
of the study organisations to access capital from the financial services 
sector, that turned out a blessing in disguise when the financial crisis (of 
2007-2008 occurred because, being entirely member-owned they were 
insulated from these vicissitudes. In contrast these events also caused 
financing difficulties and retrenchment for one the three commercial firms 
whose CEO we interviewed. 
Outside the health sector, for HouseLend the significance of generating a 
surplus was that: 
we can't subscribe for share capital, we can go to the capital markets to raise debt but they're 
closed at the moment [2009], but even then we're restricted in terms of how much, so we are 
highly dependent [for development] on organic generation of profits after tax. 
(CEO, HouseLend) 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2012. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
 173 
Project 08/1518/105 
The only organisation which reported any distinctive approach to raising and 
using capital was the small retail cooperative. Wholefood pursued vertical 
integration by starting to grow food necessitating a land purchase costing 
£150,000, a significant step for the cooperative. It was funded by 
customers' loans, at an interest of rate of their choice, in fact between 0% 
and 6%. Lenders did not become shareholders or gain any decision-making 
voice in the cooperative. One of the cooperative's goals was to provide 
long-term secure work for their members. They were therefore risk-averse 
about over-extending themselves financially. 
10.4 Patterns of innovation 
We observed five patterns of service development in the study sites: 
extensive development (replication); vertical integration; diversification; re-
configuration of an existing core process, at times involving an 
intensification of the services given; and responses to external 
requirements. Only to varying extents were these changes 'innovative' in 
the sense of introducing new techniques for carrying out existing core 
processes, although they were more 'innovative' in terms of changing the 
models of service provided by the study organisations. 
10.4.1 Extensive development 
Partnerships developed their core productive activity partly by replication 
i.e. doing the same activities on a larger scale when local demography and 
'market' permitted, recruiting more partners as necessary. This could be 
done either of two ways. PharmPlus's tactic was to expand its practice list 
first by acquiring a vacant practice nearby. Such decisions turned partly on 
consideration of whether economies of scale could be achieved by using the 
main practice's existing staff to provide the additional service. PlusPM tactic 
was first to recruit a new partner and then open its lists to more patients. 
Having female doctors in an area without many others also helped. A larger 
practice increased patient choice by enabling patients to 
gravitate to the partner they prefer because there is always going to be a bit of difference 
between how we [GPs] deal with people. 
(GP, PlusPM) 
NurseLed replicated its services simply by employing more nurses (who 
were the core workforce in this nurse-led practice). The partners anticipated 
that due to growth of their patient list they would anyway have to move to 
bigger premises and so planned to use this event as an opportunity to take 
over other lists and run more surgeries, although their bids to do so had not 
yet succeeded at the time of writing. 
Using extensive replication to exploit economies of scale was a common 
pattern across all sites, including the OOH cooperatives (see below). To the 
extent that it stemmed from indivisibilities in buildings and equipment, and 
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in small organisations of staffing, this pattern of expansion did not much 
differ from the responses to be expected of a corporation. 
10.4.2 Diversification 
In the short term the scale of income which the OOH cooperatives could 
obtain from PCT contracts had a fairly rigid upper limit. The cooperatives 
therefore exploited economies of scale by adding related services 
(diversification), either for their members or for third-party customers, to 
their original core activities rather than expand by replication. 
City pursued diversification in order to reduce the risk of fluctuations in 
membership and income as the terms of GP contracts and PCT 
commissioning changed. City therefore: 
had a huge call centre 'primary care locum services, 24 hour answering services, 24 hour on 
call services, forensic medical examiners, free education programme for GP Registrars as well 
as GPs, half day cover for practices when they were closed. 
(CEO, City) 
The cooperative to exploit economies of scale in these resources: 
As we have got resources here ready we have had to do other things so that it is not dormant 
during the day ' We've got the space, we've got the cars, we've got resources, just waiting to be 
used. 
(Finance officer, City) 
This cooperative extended its telephone triage service to cover dentistry, 
employing a dental triage nurse who could refer patients to local dental 
practices with out-of-hours services rather than the dental hospital. It 
arranged for a GP to work in a local A&E department to deal with primary 
care cases there and bid successfully to set up a Darzi 'polyclinic'. These 
last two extended its case-load and marked a greater commitment to 
providing diurnal services, but especially for patients not registered with a 
GP, which mitigated the problem of potentially competing with its members' 
practices. The conurbation served was anyway under-doctored. 
For Metro, the risks which diversification would mitigate were realised 
during our study. In October 2008 Metro lost, at least for the next 3 years, 
their largest contract to provide OOH services. Metro were therefore forced 
to start looking for other avenues of work. At the time of writing they were 
undertaking a pilot exercise with practice based commissioning consortia, 
the PCT and hospital trust to provide supported discharge, urgent care and 
early intervention services. Metro were also setting up a community IV 
service to reduce the occupancy of hospital beds by patients admitted just 
for daily IV treatment. 
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10.4.3 Vertical integration 
To varying extents the general practices studied also attempted vertical 
integration, especially 'down-stream' by providing 'follow-up' services 
previously delivered by non-medical primary care (e.g. pharmacy, health 
education). 
When the local pharmacist retired PharmPlus practice took over his 
business, as described above. This revealed the pharmacy to be an 
important income stream, enabling the practice to employ more clinicians. 
OverThere also attempted 'up-stream' vertical integration, wishing to 
develop preventive health services for the dual reasons of improving 
patients' health and of containing costs. Thus, for their medical home 
model: 
If you let people go without their diabetic retinal eye scan, or foot exam.. you know, they're 
gonna end up in urgent care 'We need to take care of our patients so they don't get sick. So 
they don't cost us money. So we can go hire more doctors to manage them. 
(Manager, OverThere) 
In one sense OverThere also pursued vertical dis-integration by remedying 
the lack, in the US health system, of primary care gate-keeping to 
secondary care. OverThere introduced gate-keeping by primary care 
doctors, which required instituting a clear division of labour and better-
defined referral criteria between primary and secondary care, and what they 
called a 'medical home model', basically similar to the English 'closer to 
home' model in that family doctors coordinated as much of the patient's 
care as possible. 
Outside the health sector, both the retail cooperatives added re-packaging, 
limited manufacturing activities, gardening and farming (although for the 
larger cooperative this remained a small proportion of its activity). Smaller 
subsidiary organisations, also non-hierarchical (one unmixed, one hybrid), 
were set up to undertake these secondary production operations. 
10.4.4 Re-modelled core processes 
In provider NHOs, members were the obvious sources of ideas for 
innovation, but employees also contributed innovations, partly as means of 
problem-solving. PharmPlus reception staff developed a self-referral system 
for patients. Letters were sent on patients, 30th, 40th and 50th birthdays 
with a piece of string for them to check waist circumference and a request 
to make an appointment if the string did not meet. During the time of the 
study the practice added an 'MOT bay' for patients to check their own 
weight, height and blood pressure; nurse clinics to deal with expanding 
workloads for the management of asthma, diabetes and COPD; Well Person 
clinics at which cervical smears could be taken and a teenage clinic dealing 
inter alia with contraception. NurseLed's partners paid attention to 
recruiting competent receptionists: 
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if we've not got good receptionists the systems aren't going to work, your basic patient 
perception will be bad. 
(NP partner, NurseLed) 
Some changes were made with the intention of improving quality of working 
life for partners and staff. Such were PharmPlus's new building and PlusPM's 
attempt to make its office routines 'paper light'. In that practice, the extra 
income from the new GMS contracts was used to reduce the full-time 
partners' working time rather than to increase practice activity: 
The new GMS contract, yes we earned significantly more money 'but we were all feeling pretty 
raw so at that stage, I used to work night sessions but the Thursday, which was my half-day, 
was never ever a half day so [another partner GP] and I made conscious decisions 'that 
instead of taking all the money, we would take some time back 'and we used some of that 
[money] to help pay to take on [name] who is also 'full time at our practice. 
(GP, PlusPM) 
The large retail cooperative explicitly encouraged staff discretion. Twenty to 
twenty-five years ago the cooperative had begun to develop rules and 
regulations and standard operating procedures, but it became apparent that 
too much emphasis was being put upon these. Today, the focus has shifted 
away from these procedural approaches, so 'releasing the potential of our 
people', allowing, once trained, staff to make their own judgements within 
the principles. 
In summary, the study organisations selected innovations which reduced 
reduced labour inputs but not necessarily non-labour costs, which exploited 
economies of scale and reduced the risks of reliance on a small number of 
sources of contractual income. We found no instances of partnerships 
adopting innovations which transferred control of the core productive 
processes to other occupations than the partners' nor which reduced 
partners' surplus. We found one instance (only) of a cooperative making an 
innovation which improved quality of care even though it reduced the 
financial surplus. 
10.4.5 Responses to external requirements 
QOF and GPPS particularly stimulated the development of stronger methods 
for managing clinical quality, partly because they were contractually 
compulsory but also because of the information systems, data collection and 
dissemination which they entailed. PlusPM practice sought ISO 
accreditation, which among other things involved drawing up an official 
doctor's bag list, trying to get the (then) four doctors to agree what they 
should be carrying, and standardising that as a written protocol. In 1995 
the practice had also sought ISO standards accreditation for its complaints 
procedures but that was found too bureaucratic and was dropped in 2004. 
The cooperatives also received external feedback about their standards of 
clinical work, used either as a reinforcer of good practice or to identify 
weaknesses. Metro won two national awards too for clinical governance and 
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clinical excellence. It became a national reference site for one of the main 
OOH call management and operational software providers. At times external 
feedback was tantalisingly incomplete: 
we have had a lot of chuntering about inappropriate admissions out-of-hours and that kind of 
thing. Every time we ask them [hospitals] to be specific about things so we can look into it, we 
get a deafening silence. We have tried for as long as I can remember to get copies of discharge 
reports for patients who have been admitted through our service, and that is completely 
impossible from any of the local hospitals. They all say that their IT is not up to it. 
(GP clinical governance lead, Metro) 
PlusPM practice had the problem that different consultants from different 
specialities recommended different drugs for similar purposes (e.g. choice 
of preferred ACE inhibitor), so all three ended up in the formulary, which 
rather defeated one of the purposes of having a formulary. 
Because its clinical practice was structured hierarchically (outside the 
cooperative element of the organisation), comparison with the US consumer 
cooperative showed how hierarchical and NHOs differed in their modes of 
managing clinical quality and practice. OverThere relied mainly on line-
management, for which they had well-developed routines. Line-
management of the doctors extended to their clinical consulting style etc, 
although with a focus on 'Targets' OverThere relied heavily on routine data 
to check on and manage individual clinicians, and so raise standards of 
clinical care (besides responsiveness to patients). Family care doctors were 
given targets and had monthly print-outs (audits) of their performance 
comparing it with that of other doctors. They also received direct patient 
feedback, including complaints, routed via the Director of Regional Clinical 
Operations. One way in which this manager can alter doctors' clinical 
performance is by using patient satisfaction data. The example was 
described to us of a doctor who was failing to spend the period stipulated by 
management (8.00 to 8.30 daily) for telephoning clients. She said 'I have a 
lot in my schedule to do. I'm not going to tie down to the phone'. The 
manager's view was; 'So, she's refusing to do the standard work that we 
expect everybody to do.' Further investigation by the manager found that 
she was a very busy practitioner. Her patients received twice as many 
emails per patient as in comparable lists and counselling also took up much 
of her time. So now, she and the clinical manager understand and know 
'how to help her.' 
In contrast the work even of the minority of salaried doctors in our UK study 
sites was monitored, although still quite closely, through the more collegial 
methods described above. To summarise, organisations whose structure 
was based on direct democracy either rotated their less congenial (more 
routine, lower-status) tasks among the members or partners, or delegated 
them to employees. Those with a 'representative' democracy allocated 
these tasks to particular (members, more in the fashion of a hierarchical 
organisation. The case study organisations attempted to create economies 
of scale, but existing financial institutions made it difficult for them to 
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access capital. Development of the core process (innovation) occurred by 
replication, vertical integration, diversification, external organisations' 
requirements and re-engineering. In health care, the latter two drew 
heavily upon evidence-based practice. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2012. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
 179 
Project 08/1518/105 
11 Outcomes: case study findings 
Of the policy outcomes mentioned in the original project brief, the case 
study findings about external governance, professional engagement, clinical 
workloads and innovation are reported above. This chapter reports the 
remaining three: impact on clinical quality and development of best 
practice; cost-effectiveness; and patient experience. 
11.1 Impact on clinical quality and development of 
best practice 
11.1.1 Skill mix 
Skill mix was the first structural influence on clinical quality. It was striking 
but hardly surprising that due to having a pharmacist partner PharmPlus, 
although a dispensing practice, had a generics prescribing rate (adherence 
to formulary) above 80% whilst other dispensing practices in the locality 
barely surpassed 40% because they found it harder to break away from 
branded drugs. 
11.1.2 Mutual scrutiny 
Mutual scrutiny was as described above an important governance 
mechanism and clinical governance was no exception. Because PharmPlus 
had no personal lists each GPs' practice was more or less transparent to the 
other GPs by way of the patient record and patient reports. Discrepant or 
disputed practice (led to discussions between GPs. Significant Event 
Assessment (SEA) meetings were held monthly with low thresholds for 
event inclusion, for example discussing misunderstandings about 
communicating test results to a patient. The PHCT discussed all deaths 
within the practice population, assessing whether the patient had had the 
right treatment and whether she died where she wanted to. 
At NurseLed one of the nurse partners was clinical governance lead. She 
took the decision not to employ a salaried GP who the PCT sent: 
Well basically he did one session, and I then looked through the, looked through the clinical 
notes and thought - no, well, sorry!. 
(NP-partner, NurseLed) 
This was well received by the PCT's clinical governance lead (a doctor): 
[NP partner] showed me very early on that she knew what to do and she was prepared to do 
the right thing ...[NP partner] was prepared to put her name on the line saying these are the 
problems, this is the documented evidence of what I think is going on here. Whereas some 
other GP would have written and just said, "I don't like them, take them away” but wouldn't 
necessarily been able to take on the professional responsibility of getting it sorted out. 
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(clinical governance lead, PCT) 
Members of the English OOH cooperatives who worked clinical shifts were 
subject to routine clinical audit by the member elected as clinical 
governance lead. At Metro this director responsible for clinical governance 
had the task of auditing, seeing doctors who caused concern, and 
examining a fixed percentage of all the records for every single clinician 
working for the organisation, in all about 240 calls a month, 
looking at ones that result in admission or A&E attendance to see if that was really 
necessary. We are looking at the duration of the calls, again to make sure that we are offering 
value for money. We are seeing whether people are prescribing antibiotics appropriately, and 
sticking to prescribing policies for other medications. 
(clinical governance lead, Metro) 
For serious breaches of protocols a disciplinary procedure was applied. This 
was at times triggered by (another member) GP coming across 'something 
eccentric' (clinical governance lead) in the treatment of her patient. In City 
routine audits also concentrated on checking compliance with the protocols 
that existed for most aspects of the cooperative's work. A clinical team took 
samples of call sheets and looked at them to say whether the medical 
advice was good and to suggest remedies for any apparent problems (e.g. 
members not writing sufficiently detailed records of the calls). Mutual 
education was a counterpart to mutual scrutiny. (Other research (347) 
suggests that knowledge is necessary for evidence based practice, but not 
sufficient.) PharmPlus ran a journal club and held a health promotion 
meeting once a month involving GPs, practice and district nurses. (All the 
UK health sites arranged time off for professional training for their medical 
partners and members, for non-medical partners and (more selectively) for 
employees, although salaried doctors always received the education and 
training stipulated by national guidance. 
11.1.3 Standardisation of practice 
Our study sites were also tending to standardise clinical practice during the 
study period. Whilst not sufficient for the evidence-basing of clinical practice 
(poor practice might become standardised), standardisation is a 
precondition for defining the goals and processes of clinical work, and hence 
for monitoring it (for instance with statistical process control) (348). In 
PharmPlus the pharmacist partner assembled case management plans for 
the chronic diseases listed above, and the GPs homogenised their clinical 
practice toward these more evidence-based protocols. Similarly in a 
cooperative setting; where NICE guidelines were absent the clinical director 
at Metro would formulate consensus guidelines, and consult the (GP) 
membership before adopting and implementing them. 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2012. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
 181 
Project 08/1518/105 
11.2 Cost-effectiveness of service provision 
Findings on effectiveness are presented above. Here we present findings as 
to the cost of providing services. 
11.2.1 Breaking even 
Across their activities, all the NHOs had to cover their costs within a short 
time-scale. Trading insolvently was illegal for them as for a corporation. A 
condition upon making the innovations (and other service changes) 
described above was that the consequent income stream at least covered 
the cost of the additional activity. Informants at all the GP partnerships 
regarded the practice as an independent business. To make any 
improvements they have to 'find the money from somewhere'. At PharmPlus 
assessment of the profitability of a new service was a normal step in 
deciding whether to pursue it. When seeking to admit a new partner, 
existing partners considered the candidate's personal characteristics but 
always the affordability too. At PlusPM the goal of providing good quality 
services could, as related above, be pursued up to the point at which its 
costs were covered. 
In Wholefood too the recruitment of working members was always 
constrained by their capacity to make a contribution to covering the cost: 
We are not a charity. We don't employ ourselves or anybody else under the notion that we're, 
that they aren't carrying their weight. 
(Member, Wholefood) 
What the Wholefood members monitored were: 
three key performance indicators which are sales, nett profit, gross profit, they're key to the 
financial control of the business, but they're all general [i.e. each taken across the whole 
cooperative]. 
(Member, Wholefood) 
A break-even constraint might be an incentive to reduce the volume and 
quality of services provided, but NurseLed practice resisted it: 
Because of our social enterprise background and our high quality service, we try to do 
everything to the best of our ability but it seems as though sometimes we are rewarded for 
doing less, and there are ways of coming out with more money for doing less work so we are 
going to have to … try and keep the good atmosphere that we have, and the high patient 
satisfaction without it actually being a cost. 
(Board member, parent SE for NurseLed) 
Similarly at Metro: 
If we have to go into the market of providing the cheapest possible care regardless of quality, 
then we don't want to do that. There is no point in us being there to do that, so we are not 
prepared to cut quality to get the contract at any price. 
(clinical governance lead, Metro) 
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Interestingly a director of the GP-owned company which supplanted a failed 
cooperative said almost exactly the same: 
it [out-of-hours cover] wasn't going to be at any cost, that whatever we came up with would be 
costed fairly but that if we tried to get beaten down too much and end up trying to provide a 
service that we thought was clinically sub-standard, then basically we weren't going to be 
interested. 
(GP, PLC director) 
Such similarity across different organisational settings suggests that 
professional standards and values influenced these views no less than 
organisational structure. At OverThere changes to services were usually 
presented (inter alia) in terms of budgetary effectiveness even when they 
were also congruent with the philosophy of the organisation. Thus 
preventive care: 
is what you really want us to do to the patients. In order for us to be able to do it, we need to 
be affordable. In order for us to be affordable, we have to go through some efficiencies in our 
practice, in our style. 
(Manager, OverThere) 
Being a large organisation did not necessarily improve financial stability. 
Metro had a multi-million pound turnover but not a huge asset base to back 
it up. It could run at a small loss for a year or two but not withstand any big 
losses. When the PCT which contracted City got into financial difficulties, 
they cut the City's development funds down stepwise to zero over three 
years. In this cooperative: 
The aim has been to break even with a small reserve of course because we need it to exist, but 
with the change in the GP contracts, although we didn't want to make too much surplus, we 
couldn't afford to just break even because economies of scale would have been lost if members 
opted out. 
(Finance Director. City) 
Still, however, a determinate income was required: 'Break even' plus 
contingency reserve. HouseLend implicitly included development funds: 
we've passed that value [surplus] through to our members by better product rates and we're 
always trying to have a fine balance passing that value to them through the products this year 
and retaining profits to go into our capital to protect us and to make sure we have 
sustainability for future members. 
(CEO, HouseLend) 
11.2.2 Costs to purchasers 
The out-of-hours co-operatives had two sources of income. For patients of 
the general practices which opted out of providing out-of-hours care, the 
PCT made a contract with the cooperative. If they chose the cooperative to 
provide these services, the opted-in practices paid the co-operative directly. 
Like the practices described above, the opted-out general practices wished 
to contain their costs, in this case within the amount nominated for OOH 
services in their contractual payments from the NHS. At City the CEO 
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presented his estimates of local general practices' average incomes, and the 
percentage of that income which was (notionally) allocated for out-of-hours 
service, which came to £3.24p per patient per year. 
So essentially whatever pricing mechanism we had ' there was a range and you could never 
go beyond £3.24 if you were to stay as a co-operative. 
(CEO, City) 
The income stream from the PCT was more-or-less fixed. Were they limited 
to that income, the cooperatives had little scope for extending the scale of 
services provided, only for reducing costs of the existing services. The 
second income flow meant the cooperatives could increase their income by 
recruiting new (opted-in) members but not by adding cost-bearing features 
to those services. 
City partly passed the savings it made from economies of scale back to its 
members but also tried to benefit the local health economy more widely, so 
as to give its PCT an incentive to continue to commission the cooperative. 
To do so the cooperative instituted an incentive for its members: 
if they [GP members] have all the incentives to send patients to [City], the A&E benefits, the 
PCTs benefit, and we benefit, which is very good. So we said 'what we will do is we will 
create a ceiling [on referrals or self-referrals to the cooperative]. So I looked at the mean of all 
these practices, and I added 25% beyond the mean. And then I said that this is your ceiling, 
and if you go beyond that ceiling 'you need to start paying for activity. 
(CEO, City) 
The other free benefits that City provided to its members were sufficient to 
prevent the members with lower than average referrals from leaving the 
cooperative. The savings from economies of scale helped keep the 
cooperative's price low to members and the PCT, creating a barrier to entry 
for potential competitors (except those who could afford predatory pricing). 
Outside the NHS, HouseLend had a policy of charging and offering 'fair' but 
not 'market-leading' rates of interest for borrowers and savers. Its strategy 
was not to recruit 'rate tarts'as customers but retain customers through the 
quality of customer service. Their usual customer demographic was people 
over 65 years of 'high net worth' looking for a safe place to save their 
pension or life savings. The two retail cooperatives both operated in very 
competitive market niches. Their prices were therefore competitively 
constrained but both cooperatives tended to focus on non-price (quality, 
product-range and for the larger cooperative, brand) competition.  
11.3 Patient outcomes and experiences 
11.3.1 User influence on providers: mandatory feedback 
mechanisms 
General practices' processes and structures for obtaining data about patient 
experience and service outcomes were in part mandated externally by NHS 
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commissioners. Except for consumer surveys, marketing (even social 
marketing) methods were not used, except that Metro employed Metro a 
marketing and PR manager. 
As QOF required, PharmPlus, PCTrun and NurseLed all used a standard NHS 
patient feedback questionnaires (GPAQ). However the nurse-led practice 
found that GPAQ needed adjustment for its circumstances: 
it's very hard when the question is 'How often do you see your doctor?'and the answer is 
“Never, I can't get to see a doctor”. 
(NP partner, NurseLed) 
All three sites fed the data back to the PCT and internally to GPs and staff. 
Data from patients' letters and complaints were collated. At NurseLed a 
partner dealt personally with any complaints, trying to speak to the 
complainant straight away. For PlusPM, GPAQ superseded a survey of the 
practice's own devising. A suggestions box yielded few responses but those 
that came were often useful (e.g. to fit plug covers to electric sockets in the 
play area). 
City patients usually only contacted them by telephone, which was the 
normal but limited mode of collecting any feedback patients wanted to 
make. Otherwise the patient contacted her general practice which passed 
the message on to City. Both City and Metro had a formal complaints 
procedure which (for complaints concerning medical advice or treatments) 
involved the doctor giving the care and, at need, the Medical Protection 
Society. OverThere relied on routine information systems for feeding patient 
responses back to doctors. Tools to gauge patient satisfaction included 60 
randomly-distributed patient questionnaires from each panel each month. 
Each practitioner had a confidential provider dashboard which recorded how 
many patients reported that the doctor listened to them carefully, spent 
enough time with them and so on. Complaints were routinely monitored by 
business directors. OverThere also made it easy for patients to choose their 
doctor on the basis of CV and background: 
I went back to the sign up place and said, “Is there any way that I can change doctors?” and 
they said, “O sure” They handed me a list of three ring binders and said “Here are the ones of 
your geographic area who are currently accepting”. On this was a different page from each 
one talking about not only their speciality background and their general background, but their 
personal interests, things about themselves. 
(Patient, OverThere) 
She chose a middle-aged woman doctor with grown up children like hers 
and hobbies that she could relate to. 
11.3.2 Patient participation groups 
Some study organisations tried patient participation groups as a means of 
user feedback but found it hard to make much headway. In PharmPlus a 
previous group failed because it was 'grown from ground up', so for its 
second attempt the practice selected members to give a geographical 
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spread and include the most vocal people, but not overly vocal dissenters 
who it was felt might misuse the group. In NurseLed too: 
we're in discussion now in the Practice Meeting to set up a Patient Participation Group but it 
doesn't seem to be the right sort of people who want to get involved. 
(NP partner, NurseLed) 
PlusPM had a different problem. Past efforts to run such a group only 
produced one or two attendees and meant a working evening for the 
partners. City's experience was similar: 
There was talk about having patients on the council but it is very difficult to work it. 
(Finance Manager, City) 
Instead City was often invited to send a representative to patients'meetings 
within City members' practices. Patient representatives from the PCT also 
visited City and City reported to them. 
Contrary to our expectations HouseLend was not keen on customer groups 
either, although in that regard they were atypical of building societies: 
We are not known for holding customer groups or anything like that, we might test the odd 
new product or marketing initiative but by and large 'unlike some of the building societies 'we 
don't do that, we rely on a daily basis on getting feedback through the branches in particular. 
(CEO, HouseLend) 
As our fieldwork was finishing Wholefood were on the verge of setting up a 
'customer service team' to work across its shop and its cafe. Until then, this 
small cooperative had relied on members' informal feedback and 
observations and till takings for monitoring what customer thought of its 
products and services. The large retail cooperative used relatively 
conventional consumer research and tracking methods. 
Patient groups served two different functions at OverThere. One was 
exercising governance over the whole organisation, as reported above. For 
feedback on services, OverThere had different groups for its two main 
subscriber segments. For individual patients, focus groups were convened 
around specific issues. The attendees were called 'consumer consultants' 
However, the results of these focus groups were not routinely fed back to 
consumers, still less any practical consequences of their views. As for 
employers, Leadership Advisory Groups (LAGs) were recruited from local 
business leaders (i.e. the sort of people who might buy OverThere coverage 
for their workers) as a market research tool for the purpose of gathering 
information around specific issues, as and when OverThere desired. These 
groups were controlled by management and so, though officially placed 
within the 'cooperative governance structure' were tools for user feedback 
rather than user governance. 
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11.3.3 Patient experience and feedback 
Although partners' and employees' interpersonal behaviour was an 
important element of patient experience, partnerships did not always 
manage it successfully: 
For example, there's a lady on reception who has been rude to not only the doctors, but the 
patients as well, and nothing has been said to her in the past ' because the situation has been 
allowed to go on for so long, it's very hard now to take that person to task for something that 
they have been doing for years. 
(employee, PlusPM) 
However the same could apply to partners: 
The doctor failing to perhaps see that he needs to be a little more empathetic with people that 
come in and needs to listen. I suppose it's down to how many years they've been in the 
practice possibly. 
(supervisor, PlusPM) 
Nevertheless GPs often attached high value to being central to the patient's 
care: 
I hope we don't become a part of [supermarket-chain]-doc because I kind of worry that people 
will get the brand. "This is what you get, this is what you can have” type thing, there will be 
the lack of continuity, you will never have the relationship that you have with patients 
because the patient will come in and see a doctor, not their doctor, and I think people will only 
miss it once it's gone. 
(GP PlusPM) 
This role of the doctor was also important to some patients at NurseLed: 
Some people left because they wanted to see a doctor all the time and I have to say I don't try 
and stop them because we're not going to provide a doctor to sort out minor ailments or 
monitor your blood pressure. Whereas most patients when they've got to know the people 
involved they don't mind what the role is if they feel that the person is looking after them and 
that's now where we're getting to. But they frequently refer to Nurse Practitioners as the 
doctors 'I think the message from that is they are getting the care they think they should be 
getting from a doctor. 
(NP partner, NurseLed) 
Since nurse practitioners and GPs have different repertoires of clinical skills, 
the similarity in patient experience would appear to stem more from the 
character of personal relationship between clinician and patient. However, 
City staff wondered whether it was their place to form a long-term 
relationship with patients (except for patients with long-term or terminal 
illness) because, to them, that implied substituting for the role of a GP or 
that the GP was providing inadequate care. A HouseLend branch manager 
told us that what was of primary importance in recruiting staff was the 
ability to talk to people, show an interest and ask open questions; 
though it is a sales role, we see it as a service role. 
(Branch manager, HouseLend) 
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The customer was not to be pressurised into buying a service (in contrast, a 
former bank employee told us, to corporate banks). At HouseLend only 
financial advisors, not branch counter staff, actually did any selling. It was a 
rule that nothing was to be sold at the customer's first visit so that 
customers had time to think carefully before committing to anything. The 
Society was against waiting time targets because such targets can reduce 
customer service: 'Each customer gets as long as it takes. 
(Branch manager, HouseLend) 
Wholefood took a more robust line on empathy with customers: 
Our basic ethos in terms of customers [is], we try and treat customers fairly and we take great 
stock in being friendly and giving good service but 'we don't have that "have a nice day". If the 
customer's gonna be a stroppy cow, then we can turn around and you know [say] 'Clear off' 
we don't have that dreadful [fast food] sort of service, we try and be one human being to 
another human being. 
(member, Wholefood) 
OverThere found that their members were sensitive to 'and suspiscious of - 
the use of corporate-style language and other symbols of organisational 
culture, and of use of the term 'customers' rather than 'members' to 
describe them. 
English general practice informants repeatedly cited QOF and GPPS scores 
as evidence of the quality of services to patients. Appendix 6 presents 
(except for out-of-hours services: see Table 5) the scores corresponding to 
the issues which arose from the qualitative data for the general practices 
studied and, for context, mean figures for England. Patients rated our study 
sites equal to or slightly better than the English means for 8/24 of the 
questions. The other site scores were distributed either side of the means. 
Thus our study general practices scored slightly higher on patient 
satisfaction than the generality of English practices. NurseLed's profile was 
distinctive: below-average scores for the questions about doctors and 
scores equal to or above average for the questions about nurses. However 
these differences between NurseLed and the other sites should not be over-
interpreted. The GPPS questions were not designed for nurse-led practices 
with their atypical nurse and doctor roles. Strictly speaking GPPS has no 
response categories for a nurse-practitioner acting as clinical principal, 
making it difficult to say confidently how NurseLed patients interpreted the 
GPPS questions. 
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Table 11. Summary QOF indicators for study sites 
QOF indicator PCTrun 
 
NurseLed PlusPM PharmPlus England 
(mean) 
Total QOF points (out 
of 1000) 
948 1000 996 1000 968 
Clinical QOF points 
(out of 655) 
629 655 655 655 630 
Source: QOF indicators for England 2007-2008, rounded to whole numbers. 
Again this table should be interpreted as a supplementary description of 
patient experience in the particular study sites not as evidence about 
different types of partnership generally. Only PCTrun fell slightly (<2%) 
short of mean scores for England. This time comparing GPPS scores for out-
of-hours services, Table 12 uses a similar method to Appendix 6. The 
method by which the scores for cooperatives were calculated is explained 
above (methods). 
Metro achieved slightly higher than UK mean levels of user satisfaction and 
City somewhat lower levels, although the data do not allow us to calculate 
whether these differences are statistically significant. They suggest that 
between them the two cooperatives studied represented a qualitatively 
typical sample in terms of quality of service as users perceived it. Metro 
achieved nearly 98% compliance with the national out of hours quality 
standards (349), compared with the norm of 95%. 
 
Table 12. Out-of-hours services GPPS scores 
GPPS item Metro City PCTrun NurseLed PlusPM PharmPlus England 
(mean) 
Q30 - If you wanted 
to, would you know 
how to contact an 
out-of-hours GP 
service when the 
surgery or health 
centre is closed? [% 
yes] 
62% 55% 63% 57% 66% 77% 67% 
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Q32 - How easy was 
it to contact the out-
of-hours GP service 
by telephone? [% 
Very or fairly easy] 
83% 71% 70% 0%* 42% 86% 79% 
Q33 - Were you 
prescribed or 
recommended any 
medicines by the 
out-of-hours GP 
service you 
contacted? [% yes] 
56% 48% 59% 0%* 42% 50% 53% 
Q34 - How easy was 
it to get these 
medicines? [% very 
or fairly easy]  
87% 71% 0%* 0%* 0%* 0%* 85% 
Q35 - How do you 
feel about how 
quickly you received 
care from the out-of-
hours GP service? [% 
about right]  
68% 55% 76% 0%* 62% 55% 64% 
Q36 - Overall, how 
do you feel about the 
care you received 
from the out-of-
hours GP service?  
69% 57% 0%* 0%* 0%* 67% 65% 
* Data negligibly small, suppressed. Source: GPPS data 2008-2009. 
For OverThere the simplest form of patient feedback was membership. That 
appeared to be declining, in 2006 by 27,000 people according to 
OverThere's figures. OverThere was above the national mean for 27 scores 
and below it for nine of the HEDIS indicators for quality of care (350). Of 
the CHAPS indicators, OverThere was above the national mean for five 
scores and below it for four. It rated 'excellent' on the (US) National 
Committee for Quality Assurance report card scheme. 
For the non-health cooperatives sales and market share were also a basic 
form of customer feedback. So, for the smallest, was the behaviour of 
potential competitors: 
part of the reason that [two well-known supermarket chains]  and these kinds of people are 
getting temporarily interested in organics...is that they're threatened by organic 
products...[and have] sufficient financial clout and resources. 
(Member, Wholefood) 
Setting this speculation about corporate supermarkets aside, the small retail 
cooperative and its consumers anticipated wider food retailing market 
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trends by some years. In sum, mutual scrutiny ('concertive control') 
supplemented with mutual education was the crucial mechanism for 
managing the quality of services to (users. External competition and 
commissioners' requirements were the most important cost control 
mechanisms. User participation was a means for (limited) user influence on 
the governance of the study organisations but routine collection and 
analysis of managerial and clinical data was a much more effective means 
of monitoring, and therefore initiating improvements in, service quality. 
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12 Combined findings and discussion 
Our descriptive findings show that the organisations we studied were in the 
most important respects similar in organisational structure to those 
described in the systematically review, making it legitimate to combine the 
primary and secondary research findings, which is what this chapter does. 
As previously explained (ch.4) we use the theoretical framework (ch.2) for 
collating and combining the findings. In doing so we also indicate the extent 
(as a proxy for strength) of the secondary evidence reviewed. 'Many 
studies' means studies reporting more than one sector or country. 'Rarely 
reported' refers only to the studies we reviewed. In the reviewed studies, 
the absence of evidence of patterns is also noted but this counts as 
evidence of absence only where the original researchers looked for the 
pattern in question and did not find it, a detail which the published papers 
seldom reported. Combining the two sets of findings in this way allows a 
direct, systematic comparison between them and the original theoretical 
framework. In light of the comparison we revise the theoretical framework 
as necessary to fit the combined evidence and consider any wider 
theoretical implications of that follow. 
12.1 Environment of non-hierarchical organisations 
and professional partnerships 
12.1.1 Organisational goals 
Evidence in the case studies, systematic review or both confirmed the 
importance of non-economic goals, especially those of maintaining service 
quality, working conditions and work 'enablement'; and of cooperation as 
valuable in itself. Especially during the 1970s and 1980s many NHOs were 
founded to rescue a firm from market failure. Ideological goals were more 
important for producer than consumer cooperatives or mutuals, where the 
goal of obtaining high-quality goods and services at an advantageous price 
predominated. Corroborated goals of partnership-formation included: 
limiting liability risks; offering mutual practical assistance; allowing the 
partners to pursue interesting, stimulating work; pursuing economies of 
scale (even if these were not always achieved in fact); and developing a 
more sophisticated practice infrastructure (including employed support 
staff) by pooling resources. Partnerships also had the goal of widening the 
range of services they offered and, outside the health sector, increasing 
their market power. NHOs and partnerships both had to satisfy break-even 
constraint. Their income had to cover members' or partners' incomes, a 
contingency fund and product or service development. However our 
combined evidence does not generally support the (assumption that 
partners or cooperators wanted to maximise (rather than satisfice) their 
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income. Both our case study and our review evidence showed the 
importance of local affiliations among the goals of NHOs, and to a lesser 
extent partnerships. 
Other predicted goals were not fully corroborated. Countervailing the 
(healthcare commissioners' market power may be an important goal of US 
medical partnerships but we found little evidence of it elsewhere. If 
'professional mimesis' means more than 'compliance with professional 
norms of practice', we found no case study evidence of professional mimesis 
as a goal in forming or developing partnerships, and no direct evidence in 
the reviewed studies either. Mimesis of corporate management was 
reported both in our case studies and the review, but not as an 
organisational goal in itself. Thus NHOs and partnerships have complex, 
multiple goals with financial goals not necessarily dominating. Besides 
securing an target income (82,83) members' or partner's financial goals in 
setting up an NHO or partnership were generally two: risk reduction, in the 
sense of sharing workload in order to even out fluctuations between 
members or partners, and over time; and strengthening the members' or 
partners' joint bargaining power (for instance by collectively strengthening 
their reputation or 'brand'). This pattern calls into question the empirical 
relevance to NHOs and partnerships of neo-classical micro-economic 
assumptions about the firm. Instead of profit maximisation in the sense of 
maximising income paid to external shareholders, we found stronger 
evidence of the goal of breaking even at a level that covered somewhat 
higher than market rates of pay. That goal is of attaining a given income at 
minimum cost rather than one of maximising profit from a given set of 
inputs. Empirically the partnerships (faced economies of scale at sizes below 
about 10 partners, but thereafter dis-economies. This (picture conforms to 
the U-shaped cost curves which neo-classical micro-economics assumes 
firms to face. NHOs however faced straightforward economies of scale. 
However the composition of NHOs' and partnerships' costs was different to 
that of the corporation because NHOs and partnerships generally did not 
pay much, or any, dividend, interest or similar rents to external recipients. 
Many assumptions of the neo-classical economic theory of the firm were 
therefore generally not true of partnerships and NHOs. We conclude that 
the economic analysis of NHOs and partnerships requires drastically revised 
micro-economic models whose assumptions are consistent with the 
combined evidence above. We found no case study evidence that 
partnerships or NHOs were ever formed with the conscious goal of reducing 
transaction costs. Although the systematic review papers sometimes 
discussed transaction costs, they presented little direct evidence that 
reduction of these costs was what consciously motivated the formation of 
NHOs and partnerships. They presented little direct evidence that lower 
transaction costs then those of other governance structures were an 
observed effect of partnerships (or of NHOs). Our combined evidence 
suggests that so far as NHOs and partnerships are concerned both types of 
economic analysis are unrealistic in the sense (351) (that they do not 
describe empirically observed (economic) mechanisms or processes, 
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although that criticism might have less force against more sophisticated 
variants of neo-classical economics such as the New Institutional Economics 
and behavioural theories of the firm which relax some of these unrealistic 
assumptions. In the face of similar criticisms elsewhere (e.g. (171)), a 
standard defence (352) of such theories is that they nevertheless generate 
valid predictions. We consider that point below. 
12.1.2 External governance, incentives, regulation 
The importance of the policy, legal and regulative environment for (enabling 
or destroying non-hierarchical organisations (depending on national and 
international policy-makers' preferences) was also confirmed. (Indeed our 
theoretical framework underestimated the importance of certain policy 
contexts for founding NHOs. In central and eastern Europe, one such goal 
was 'soft' privatisation, a politically defensible preliminary to complete 
marketisation of the economy or, whilst the USSR still existed, for 
distancing producer organisations from the state (152). Our data about the 
effectiveness of contracts as a medium of external governance concerns 
partnerships rather than NHOs. Many studies including our own case studies 
show that incentives strongly influence medical partner behaviour. 
(However, the effective incentives include collective ones. The effectiveness 
of governance of partnerships through contracts depended on precisely 
what outputs or outcomes attracted payment. The most effective forms of 
contract for public commissioners to use were those containing clear, 
specific targets whose achievement (or not) was unambiguous, whose 
targets and other stipulations appeared legitimate (or at least, practically 
helpful) to the provider, and which were incentivised. (Evidence-based 
guidance and contracts tended to level up service effectiveness ('quality'). 
An important mechanism for this, many studies show, was making 
practitioners' performance against contractual targets transparent to 
scrutiny, both within the partnership and externally. This approach, 
however, works most effectively when the contractual targets are evidence-
based which is feasible for clinical practice but not necessarily for, say, law. 
Within these constraints, 'light touch' external governance allows greater 
flexibility of the contracted organisations (including NHOs). Competition 
between partnerships produces less collegial, more target-oriented, 
managerialised modes of work. Both the case studies and systematic review 
papers described NHOs and partnerships having to operate within legal 
systems which assumed corporations as the normal organisational type, to 
the neglect or exclusion of NHOs' or even partnerships' requirements, for 
example by treating members' and partners' person income as 'profits' 
equivalent to shareholders' dividends, with the side-effect of inhibiting 
NHOs' and partnerships' operation or development. Financial institutions 
similarly were oriented (primarily towards corporations. When law and 
regulations are oriented towards partnerships they are nevertheless liable, 
English law included, to treat dental and medical general practice as the 
default model to the neglect or exclusion of other partnerships of other 
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health professional partnerships. English law also does not limit the 
personal liability of professional partners. 
Perceptions of tension between market imperatives and the goals (and 
ideologies) of professional partnerships were reported both in the reviewed 
studies and our own informants. Yet our combined findings also suggest 
that partnerships are in certain respects more 'at home' in market 
economies than NHOs are (156). Thus a part-answer to the question 'Why 
are worker cooperatives so rare?' (147,196) is: because the policy, legal 
and financial institutions of developed capitalist societies are often 
indifferent or inhospitable to them. For partnerships are generally 
structured and managed more like small owner-managed businesses than 
NHOs are, and have a similar equity-structure. NHOs are more likely to 
have an anti-market or anti-corporate culture. Being managed and 
differently regulated , however, (quasi-markets offer the opportunity to 
create environments more favourable than conventional markets to NHO 
development. 
12.2 Organisational structures 
12.2.1 A taxonomy of non-hierarchical organisations 
A taxonomy of partnerships and NHOs emerges from our combined findings, 
a taxonomy based on organisations' membership and goals. Their members' 
goals will, on the above theory, require a core productive process to realise, 
hence an organisational structure to operate (coordinate) that process. 
Different types of goal and therefore core process are therefore what 
fundamentally differentiate taxa of organisational structures. For the kinds 
of organisation studied here the fundamental distinction in goal and process 
is between producer and consumer organisations. Because production for is 
their core process, organisations (e.g. some former US communes) which 
produce goods or services solely for their own members' consumption must 
therefore be considered a sub-species of producer organisation (96). Among 
producer and among consumer organisations are both non-hybrid and 
hybrid variants, differentiated by whether they restrict the electorate of 
their internal democracy and who (concomitantly) receives (income only 
from their own work or also profit from their employees' work. Partnerships 
are then the special case of hybrid structure within which equity ownership 
is the property-qualification for participating in governance. Professional 
partnerships add the further qualification of (having the right to pursue a 
legally-closed occupation. A non-hybrid partnership would be structurally 
indistinguishable from a 'pure' non-hierarchical organisation (co-operative). 
All this implies the following structural taxonomy of the organisational 
studied above: 
 1. Producer organisations: 
(a) Non-hybrid ('pure') non-hierarchical producer organisations. 
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(b) Hybrid non-hierarchical producer organisations, with subsets: 
 i. Producer organisations without property qualifications for 
voting or office 
 ii. Partnerships 
 A. Equity partnerships 
 B. Professional partnerships 
 2. Self-help non-hierarchical producer organisations, whose members 
produce goods or services for their own use. Consumer organisations: 
(a) Non-hybrid non-hierarchical consumer organisations. 
(b) Hybrid non-hierarchical consumer producer organisations (no 
subsets). 
As previously explained, NHOs and partnerships are a subset of social 
enterprises and a subset of not-for-profit organisations. English policy 
discourse tends to lump all these organisations, and others such as charities 
and religious organisations, together as the 'third sector'. 
12.2.2 Structures, management and 'degeneration' 
The presence and operation of technical persuasion, ideological (normative) 
persuasion, mutual scrutiny and concertive control, pay incentives and 
expulsion as co-ordination mechanisms were all broadly corroborated by 
both the review and the fieldwork. So was the relational, consensual 
character of decision-making in small organisations, partnerships and NHOs 
alike. Evidence-based practice was an important homogeniser of working 
practices in the healthcare partnerships and cooperatives. Interpersonal 
skills and team working proved more important coordination mechanisms 
than we initially assumed, and expulsion less. The fieldwork and the 
systematic review both strongly indicated the centrality of mutual scrutiny 
and concertive control as a coordinating strategy in both kinds of 
organisation. Weak or slow consensus decision making was reported in one 
consumer and one producer NHO but not the other case study sites. 
Secondary sources rarely if ever reported it as a problem. Generational 
attrition of cooperative or egalitarian values was found in two of our case 
study consumer NHOs and non-health partnerships but not in the producer 
NHOs and health partnerships. Many studies in the systematic review 
reported generational attrition of cooperative or egalitarian values, 
especially in the countries central and eastern Europe. The phenomenon 
was not reported in partnerships. 
An important empirical qualification to our initial account of workplace 
democracy is to notice the apparent necessity, for operating many kinds of 
core process, of structures in which staff do not elect or recall their own 
immediate supervisor. Our findings suggest that two polar models of NHO 
structure are compatible with it long-term survival and effectiveness (in 
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terms of meeting its own objectives). One is the direct, relational 
democracy of the self-contained workshop (or clinic, hospital ward, 
department, office, team) with its reliance on everyday peer scrutiny, 
concertive control, and consensus or voluntary allocation of tasks and 
positions of responsibility. The other model is analogous to an elective 
presidency. The members elect the CEO executive and perhaps the board, 
who until the next election exercise a temporary hierarchical control over 
their electors, typically through a chain of middle managers who are 
salaried employees and cannot be voted out by their subordinates alone. 
Either model can be effective over long periods, raising the question of what 
conditions each is best adapted to. Our combined findings suggest it 
depends on: 
 1. The extent to which external discipline is necessary to get the 
members to operate the organisation's core productive process. 
This depends on the character of the core process (whether it is 
disagreeable work, occurs at inconvenient times or places, 
requires reliable attendance at the same time as other workers, 
is hazardous etc.), hence whether the worker is intrinsically or 
extrinsically motivated to do it. 
 2. The homogeneity of the workforce in terms of skills, motivation 
and social status. Direct democracy and concertive control 
apparently function more effectively within occupational groups 
than between them. 
 3. Speed of decision-making required. Under relational (direct) 
democracy decision-making is fast in small groups (e.g. 
partnerships) and can to a certain extent be streamlined in 
larger entities (e.g. decision by vote rather than consensus). 
However in large organisations especially, decision-making by a 
single person is almost bound to be faster. Whether faster is 
necessarily better decision-making is another matter. 
The more external discipline is required, the more heterogeneous the 
workforce, and the more often fast decision-making is necessary in a large 
organisation, the more effective the elected-CEO or board structure rather 
than direct democracy is likely to be. In consumer cooperatives there was 
so to speak a 'ladder' of member participation but the case studies and the 
reviewed studies gave conflicting evidence about whether this situation 
reflected a degeneration of member control. In our case study sites 
degeneration of member of control was more apparent in consumer than 
producer cooperatives but that difference was not so marked in the 
systematically reviewed research. The subjoined hierarchy tended to be 
proportionately larger and of greater practical importance in consumer 
cooperatives, mutuals and partnerships than in producer cooperatives in our 
case studies. The reviewed studies indicated however that a non-
hierarchical producer organisation could under certain conditions survive 
having as much as 40% of its workforce as employees. 
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Other assumptions about organisational structure were more substantially 
qualified or even refuted by our case study and review findings. The 
allocation of rewards, especially outside the health sector, was often more 
complex and subtle than the simplistic assumptions of neo-classical micro-
economic models. Instances of equal distribution were found, especially in 
NHOs and healthcare partnerships. However more complex arrangements 
were described which partly reflected 'contribution' (mainly, income 
generation) but diluted or compounded these incentives with others based 
on seniority, technical skill, family income 'needs' or simply colleagues' good 
opinion. Decision-making was slow in some of our non-hierarchical case 
study organisations, though without the organisationally fatal consequences 
which some theories predict. In other study sites it was not slow at all. 
Tournament career practices were described in the reviewed literature but 
not found in our study sites. In any event, such systems are not restricted 
to partnerships (they exist for instance in medical and academic 
bureaucracies), are absent in a substantial minority of partnerships and 
(e.g. as apprenticeships) exist a minority of producer NHOs, corporations 
and public bureaucracies. So they are an incidental not a defining structure 
of partnerships. The symbolic importance of an inspirational founder who 
personified organisational culture and ideology to following generations was 
an unforeseen finding. 
Of our case study sites, Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy' (57) appeared to 
have some application to one large non-hierarchical consumer organisation 
and to the partnerships, but less to the other NHOs. Stratification of the 
relevant occupations even within partnerships was corroborated in both 
case studies and reviewed literature, especially studies of NHO workforces 
in the countries of central and eastern Europe. Insofar as managerial 
capture of NHOs occurred, it was through: 
 1. Activists being compliant and relatively few, although the 
nominal membership was many times larger; in our building 
society study site, tens of thousands of times larger. 
 2. A large subjoined bureaucracy with specialised staff whose 
functions were not necessarily intelligible or transparent, or even 
legitimate, to the members. 
 3. Managers becoming conscious of having a distinct interest and 
role apart from the members. 
 4. Managers having weaker normative attachment to the NHO's 
mutualist or democratic organisational structures, management 
practices and goals than to corporate ones. 
Degeneration appeared harder to prevent in consumer NHOs with their 
dispersed memberships in whose lives the organisation played a small part, 
than in producer organisations with the opposite characteristics. It appears 
that consumer NHOs must often rely on a minority of 'true believer' 
members to exercise control and prevent the NHO degenerating. 
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But was it of any practical consequence if managers captured control? Our 
findings suggest that it depended upon how far managers' motivations, 
normative beliefs and interests aligned with the members'. Alignment 
appeared to become less likely, the greater the difference in occupation, 
biography and beliefs between members and managers. Our own financial 
services case study and recent historical experience in that sector show the 
importance of managers' commitment to the principles of cooperation and 
mutuality. One can contrast: 
 1. HouseLend, where the consequences of manager control ensured 
survival of the organisation in its mutual form. Managers 
thwarted attempts to convert HouseLend into a commercial 
bank. 
 2. Northern Rock BS, whose managers converted a mutual building 
society into a corporate bank and began operating accordingly, 
indeed going further than older corporate banks did in relying on 
wholesale credit markets for their financing, raising loan-to-
value limits for mortgages and making risky ('sub-prime') loans. 
Other converted mutuals did likewise (328). 
These polar scenarios contrast with the gradual erosion of mutualist beliefs 
in OverThere in favour of managerial beliefs, norms, practices and language 
copied from corporations. The difference between these scenarios appears 
to stem partly from such contingencies as the outcome of members' votes, 
hence the voting members' perception of their own interests,and partly 
from the ideological standpoint of the managers themselves. 
Mutation of partnerships in corporations was not observed in our study sites 
although the reviewed literature discusses it. Nevertheless our findings 
evidence the following trends: 
 1. Stratification and role specialisation within partnerships 
(emergence of managing-partners, partners with special 
interests, multi-professional partnerships, employed non-
partners). 
 2. Growth of partnership size 
 3. Growth of subjoined hierarchies, both absolutely and in 
proportion to the number of partners. Then a growing proportion 
of partnership income derives from the work of employees 
rather than of the partners, and a hierarchical the culture 
prevails more widely in the organisation as a whole. Many 
studies reported a tendency for partnerships to become more 
bureaucratic, the more wage-workers they employed. 
 4. Formalisation and normalisation of work (e.g. EBM, QOF) with 
increasing external scrutiny of it. 
 5. Shift from personal towards external, often corporate, 
capitalisation, including creation of parallel corporate structures. 
Yet the partners remain in control and their original goals for the 
partnership remain more or less stable. That far, 
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Introducing outside experts such as a human resources manager might make the firm more 
“business-like” in its selection or promotion policies but unless they break the control of 
partners over decision-making they do not alter the firm fundamentally away from the P2 
archetype. 
(115); p.97 
Yet the question remains of how far these changes can go until the partners 
(concentrate on managing their employees' work instead of doing their own, 
increasingly marginalised, productive work. Then, in terms of goals and 
structure the partnership converges upon another archetype, not the 
corporation but the hierarchical, non-profit social enterprise. Indeed the 
NurseLed partners were deliberately following that trajectory. 
None of our case studies allowed us to observe whether increased 
(employment of wage-labour led to the organisation's 'degeneration'. Many 
studies report NHOs employing wage-labour, but of these only a minority of 
studies report degeneration, the rest no degeneration.  
12.2.3 Professions in non-hierarchical organisations and 
partnerships 
Our case studies suggested that professional engagement in NHOs was 
promoted by high pay; the importance of the organisation's decisions and 
activity for other aspects of the professional's life; contact with fellow-
professionals; and a well-organised support infrastructure. Secondary 
sources confirmed that pay for most NHO members, apart from managers, 
was usually higher than in corporations and pay differentials were lower. 
Professionals in NHOs tended to have a strong intrinsic motivation to work. 
Well-developed pro-NHO ideological values strengthened professionals' 
engagement, but could also cause splits in the organisation. Professional 
engagement in partnership was promoted above all by ownership and 
control of the practice, but also by having a profile of work matched to the 
professional's personal interests. Both the case studies and systematic 
review found that a well-organised support infrastructure tended to increase 
professional engagement; and that salaried professionals concentrated on 
technical not managerial work. The systematic review added that 
partnerships benefit professionals through risk sharing, increased 
bargaining power with commissioners, reduced managerial work, and equity 
gains. Ideological uniformity among partners also promoted engagement 
with the practice. Disagreements over income distribution were the thing 
most likely to cause professional disengagement from partnerships. 
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12.3 Process 
12.3.1 Workloads, job satisfaction and morale 
In healthcare NHOs and partnerships alike, our case studies found, 
(professionals tended to take on increasingly skilled work and standardise 
clinical practice. These trends tended to increase their workload but also job 
satisfaction. The pursuit of non-economic values was a motivator. Studies in 
the systematic review corroborated that out-of-hours cooperatives tended 
to improve GP job satisfaction, morale and income. In partnerships partners 
did more managerial work, hence more work overall, than salaried doctors. 
Pay was an important influence on professionals' job satisfaction. In English 
general practice, the QOF element of GP contracts increased GPs' 
managerial work but also their rewards, both financial and professional. 
Positive QOF and GPPS feedback and raised pay and enhanced morale. 
Review studies suggested that work satisfaction was reported greater where 
team climate was better and its work accorded with professional values.  
12.3.2 Innovation 
Case study and systematic review data alike suggested that NHOs tended to 
diversify their work in order to spread the risk of losing contracts and to 
improve the quality of working life. They are reluctant to reduce costs by 
reducing quality of service. The review added that NHOs expand less fast 
than corporations, tend to be less capitalised and have a wider range of 
services than corporations do for marginalised groups. NHO tend to face 
(but (under-exploit) economies of scale (economies of scale in production. 
(Economies of scale may peter out in partnerships once they grow beyond 
about ten partners. Partnerships' patterns of innovation were extensive 
replication, vertical integration, diversification and 're-engineering'. The 
systematic reviewed added that partnerships expand less fast than 
corporations. Partly in response to financial pressures, US medical 
partnerships were increasingly participation in primary care networks. They 
probably faced economies of scale up to a size of about 20 partners, but not 
beyond. Theories of innovation suggest that innovations are more likely to 
be adopted when compatible with existing working practices, organisation 
members' 'values' and ways of measuring 'success' (177). Hence 
innovations which conserve an organisation's existing goals, division of 
labour, patterns of control and benefit-distribution are the most likely to be 
adopted. Such general formulations however abstract from an important 
explanatory question: what goals, whose goals, control and benefits, and 
what benefits make patterns of innovation in partnerships and NHOs differ 
from those in other organisational structures? To a small extent our 
empirical findings contribute to filling that gap. They concern both technical 
and organisational innovations. The goals which partnerships and producer 
NHOs pursue when innovating are those of the partners and members 
respectively (not shareholders or the state). Their goals tend to include a 
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satisfactory quality of work and working life as the partners or members 
define them, security of their livelihood, and non-economic social or policy 
'values' (e.g. contributing to local employment or development). Their 
financial goals are to break even (at a satisfactory level of pay) in contrast 
to maximising shareholders' profits (as corporations do) or (like public 
bureaucracies) minimising costs and implementing current policy. Producer 
NHOs and partnerships like corporations consequently spread risks to their 
income by diversifying, but unlike corporations do not readily do so by 
innovations which would replicate their services beyond the organisation's 
home locality. Within that limitation producer NHOs and partnerships, like 
corporations, expand by replicating (which implies innovations that 
standardise) their services in order to realise economies of scale, and by 
vertical integration. Like corporations, they do so partly to spread risks to 
their incomes, but (less like corporations) they also do so in pursuit of what 
the partners or members, perceive as technically good product quality 
rather than pursue marketing innovations. 
12.4 Policy outcomes 
12.4.1 Clinical quality and best practice 
Health care NHOs, according to our case studies and secondary sources 
alike, developed clinical quality through the application of EBM-based 
protocols, mutual scrutiny and education, concertive control, and the use 
feedback from external providers. NHOs generally market services on 
quality not price. Internally NHOs appeared, in our case studies, to have 
more uniform medical practice than partnerships. Many studies, and our 
case studies, indicate that these mechanisms of skill mix adaptation, 
collegial self-education, and the standardisation of clinical practice (EBM) 
also operate in professional partnerships. Mutual scrutiny is an important 
means of quality control. Because partnerships are collaborative, the calibre 
of her colleagues affects each individual partner's performance. Many 
studies suggest that the combination of EBM, guidance and incentives 
appears to raise clinical quality but more for acute than socially-oriented 
care. In these circumstances partnerships appear to provide similar quality 
care at lower cost than corporate provision. 
12.4.2 Adherence to external performance targets 
The factors which the case studies and systematic review both suggest 
promote NHO and partnership adherence to external performance targets 
are outlined above. Adherence to external performance targets is a goal not 
relevant to most partnerships and NHOs, hence not widely studied. The 
English NHS is an exception. Our case studies, the systematic review, and 
published administrative data all indicate that given the institutional 
arrangements described above, NHOs and partnerships alike are capable of 
close adherence to external performance targets, although the two types of 
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organisation face largely incommensurable targets and so one cannot 
empirically state which type of organisation is more adherent. 
This pattern contrasts with most implementation studies, whose staple fare 
is implementation deficit. The implementation surplus would appear to have 
arisen from the combination of five main factors. The policy promoted 
evidence-based technical processes. It was unambiguous and well-defined. 
Its implementation structure was simple, with only a few intermediaries 
between central governance and NHS primary care providers, and the latter 
were a fairly homogeneous group of implementers. Not least, they were 
organisations of a type whose goals included maintaining the quality of 
clinical care for its own sake; professional partnerships and NHOs modelled 
on professional partnerships. 
12.4.3 Cost-effectiveness of service provision 
Many predictions about the structural degeneration of partnerships and, 
especially, non-hierarchical organisations rest upon economic prediction 
that NHOs are likely to unsustainable in the long term because they are in 
specific ways 'inefficient'. These economic analyses predict economic 
inefficiencies from: the absence of equity in the sense of saleable shares; 
members' economic behaviour; and from changes in the scale or 
composition of production. These are the predictions, mentioned above, 
which follow from applying the neo-classical economic theory of the firm to 
NHOs and partnerships. 
Absence of saleable shares was predicted to cause four inefficiencies. First, 
members who contributed more to an NHO than they were paid would be 
locked into the NHO through being unable to sell their equity. Our findings 
falsify both the assumption and the prediction. The phenomenon of people 
wishing to leave an NHO or partnership but being prevented by equity 'lock-
in' was never reported in our case study sites. The systematic review found 
(many studies) that NHOs which require an initial subscription from new 
members frequently make it partly or fully recuperable. Employees of 
corporations firms also typically have no equity in them but that is not 
usually regarded, at least by neo-classical economics, as economically 
deleterious. As for the prediction that the absence of share prices removes 
disciplines for efficiency, we found in our case study sites both the absence 
of share prices (though in partnerships the value of equity substituted for 
share price in this respect) and the presence of alternative disciplines for 
efficiency. (Competition for income or the imposition of standard national 
contracts provided an external discipline on the prices NHOs or professional 
practices could charge. Within these organisations, members' (or partners' 
mutual scrutiny of each other's work was an internal discipline on quality. 
Our systematic review found that the productivity of cooperatives was on 
balance higher than corporations in same sector in many instances. 
However there were also (a smaller number of) counter-examples. For 
partnerships, competition for income, especially competition from other 
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kinds of organisation, provided an external discipline on prices. So although 
the body of relevant evidence is somewhat equivocal, on balance of 
evidence it is against this prediction too, Our combined evidence (tends to 
support, but with qualifications, the prediction that the external sale of 
equity causes a degeneration of (i.e. is incompatible with) the a partnership 
or NHO. Our case study organisations avoided dependence on external 
share capital by raising finance for buildings (and in one case business 
'goodwill') by setting up a dummy parallel PLC. Against this, our systematic 
review found many studies describing how the external sale of equity led to 
the degeneration of an NHO, and many studies reporting that it did not in 
the case of partnerships. We therefore conclude that the above prediction is 
valid for NHOs but not for partnerships. Lastly it has been predicted that 
NHOs will lack access to capital, hence be under-capitalised, due in part to 
the absence of equity release to members. Of our case study sites, two 
partnerships and two NHOs (all in the health sector) set up parallel 
companies to work around difficulty of accessing capital, a difficulty partly 
due to the liabilities which the English legal system places upon partners 
(but not to the same extent on NHO members). Of our case study NHOs, 
five had planned equity disposal should they fail. We found no evidence that 
lack of earlier release inhibited long-term investment. The (ex-cooperative 
that we studied was not demutualised in order to release equity, but to 
resolve a local impasse resulting from a change in health policy. However, 
many studies in our systematic review report how demutualisation was used 
as means to release accumulated equity, supporting the assumptions that 
equity release and NHO status are incompatible. Our systematic review also 
confirmed (many studies) that producer NHOs, especially small and medium 
sized ones, have lower capitalisation than corporations in same sectors). 
However these studies do not generally report that this lower capitalisation 
is due to being unable to release equity, nor that NHOs have a shorter 
investment horizon than corporations. There is also a conceptual difference 
between low capitalisation (which might indicate high not low cost-
effectiveness) and under capitalisation (compared with some other 
normative benchmark). Published studies rarely if ever reported under-
capitalisation of partnerships. The prediction that members or partners 
allocate surpluses to themselves rather than reinvest them was partially 
supported. In the provider organisations where we made case studies, 
members or partners did indeed pay themselves generously by local labour 
market standards. However, there was no evidence that this caused 
damaging under-investment. In consumer NHOs it was managers rather 
than members who took investment decisions, and they did re-invest 
surpluses. The members of these organisations were of course unpaid. The 
systematic review found evidence from Yugoslavia during 1980s, but not 
elsewhere, supporting the prediction of high pay and low investment. The 
review also (found reports that during the 'shoe-string' phase of setting up 
the organisation, members sacrifice their personal income in order to build 
up the NHO. Many studies in the systematic review reported that 
partnerships form mostly in knowledge-intense sectors requiring little 
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investment for efficient operation. Members' or partners' economic 
behaviour was also predicted to cause economic inefficiencies. For instance 
it was assumed that NHOs and partnership would be attractive to, hence 
recruit, workers of low competence or conscientiousness. We found no 
evidence to support this assumption. Our case study organisations usually 
recruited new members or partners competition or after a probationary 
period (standard recruitment methods in commercial and public hierarchies 
too). Once appointed, members or partners were subject to mutual 
scrutiny, peer pressure and ultimately expulsion if they proved lazy, 
incompetent or undisciplined. Similarly, our systematic review found (many 
studies) that NHOs and professional partnerships had 'concertive control' 
mechanisms for detecting and expelling 'free riders'. Cooperatives and 
partnerships with a 'representative' structure also applied the usual 
hierarchical controls to prevent it. Our findings suggest that due to these 
mechanisms the 'free-rider' predictions which neo-classical micro-economics 
dwells upon have little empirical applicability. Lastly we note the dearth of 
empirical, or even theoretical, studies comparing free-riding in cooperatives, 
partnerships and corporations. For consumer NHOs, the equivalent 
prediction might be that consumer 'irrationality' causes 'mission drift' so 
that the organisation produces inefficiencies. No such tendency was 
observed in our case study sites. Indeed small retail co-operative's 
consumers were ahead of market trends for 'green' and vegetarian 
consumption. Against this, many studies in the systematic review reported 
how in pursuit of capital gains members voted for demutualising financial 
NHOs. Different economic analyses have predicted that the expansion, the 
reduction and a change in product mix will each cause an NHO to revert to a 
corporation. We observed growth of production and of the study 
organisation in all but two of our case study sites, without consequent 
'degeneration'. Systematic review evidence, (mostly from central and 
eastern Europe, suggests that when NHOs merge or undertake joint 
enterprises with corporations, or involve external financiers, 'degeneration' 
tends to follow. The corresponding evidence about professional partnerships 
comes mainly from Canada, UK, USA and is fairly evenly balanced on this 
question. As for the opposite prediction (the 'self-extinction theorem'), only 
two of our case study NHOs had a declining market share. There were signs 
of 'degeneration' in only one (OverThere), occurring because it responded a 
declining market share by mimicking corporate managerial practice. We 
therefore conclude that a shrinking market share can lead to 'self-extinction' 
but this consequence is not automatic. Papers in the systematic review 
described a number of declining organisations but attributed the NHOs' 
decline low capitalisation, dis-economies of scale and high wages, and the 
partnerships' decline to competition (e.g. from corporations). In neither 
case was their decline as described by the (self-extinction theorem. We had 
no declining partnerships among our case studies. Product (or service 
diversification was reported in four of our NHO study sites, but degeneration 
in only one (OverThere; see above). Substantial diversification occurred in 
one partnership, without consequent degeneration. Our systematic review 
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included studies of NHOs in which diversification had caused a hybrid 
structure to develop when diversification occurred though the absorption of 
corporations (a few studies) but seldom otherwise (many studies). Any of 
the aforementioned micro-economic predictions would imply that markets 
select against NHOs because the latter are 'inefficient'. Our findings 
conclusively show that the prediction that markets select against NHOs is 
not universally true. One of our case study organisations had competed in 
markets for over 50 years, two for over 100 years. Our systematic review 
(many studies) found that NHO failure rates are higher than for 
corporations in first five years but thereafter comparable. Waves of NHO 
failures in eastern Europe and Africa occurred when governments 
implemented World Bank and IMF marketisation policies against supporting 
NHOs. 
12.4.4 Patient experience 
According to our case studies, members of consumer NHOs mostly tend to 
occupy the lower rungs of Arnstein's 'ladder' of participation (343). 
Consumer NHOs found that routinised collection of administrative data 
created more usable and persuasive feedback than did patient groups, 
annual conferences or open Board meetings. The systematic review 
confirmed that only small minorities of consumers participate actively in the 
governance even of consumer, let alone producer, NHOs. In professional 
partnerships in the health sector, the quality of doctor-patient relationship 
important to both parties. English primary care general medical practice 
partnerships generally attained high GPPS and QOF scores although it is 
difficult to interpret what these scores mean for non-medical partnerships. 
Many published studies confirm that continuity of care, in particular 
relational continuity, is valued by patients and professionals. The review 
and our case studies corroborate that patient groups appear to be of limited 
value for obtaining patient feedback and patients' experiences of health 
care. 
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13 Conclusions 
13.1 Answering the research questions 
In summary we answer our original research questions as follows. On 
organisational environment: 
1(a) What are the goals (explicit and implicit) of such organisations and 
why/how are they established? Their goals are to secure for members 
and partners and income no worse than prevailing market rates; 
produce a quality of work befitting their members' occupational status: 
to provide services for a particular locality: to break even (not 
maximise external shareholder profits); and to realise other values, 
including cooperation or professional values for their own sake. 
1(b) What is the nature of the governance and incentive arrangements 
that are placed on these organisations from external bodies? Is there 
an effective form of regulation, and if so what is the nature of this? 
The main external governance mechanisms are contract and 
regulation. Contracts (work most effectively when their terms are 
specific, unambiguous, legitimate (in the providers' eyes) and strongly 
incentivised. To preserve NHOs' organisational structures against the 
weakening ('degeneration') of members' or partners' democratic 
control, alternatives to financing by external shareholders are required, 
and regulations limiting the proportion of (non-voting) salaried 
employees. As to organisational structures: 
2(a) What are the structures and internal organisational arrangements of 
non-hierarchical organisations and partnerships? How are professional 
partnerships and non-hierarchical organisations co-ordinated, and 
what makes for a successful co-ordination strategy? (Partnerships' and 
NHOs' organisational structures essentially take either of two forms: a 
direct democracy of small workplace teams (which can articulated in 
multiple layers for controlling a large organisation); or a representative 
democracy in which the workforce elects the top, but not middle, 
managers. Optionally there may be a supporting infrastructure of 
employed staff. Successful coordination relies primarily on concertive 
control. Members or partners monitor each others' work and through 
peer pressure prevent shirking. 
2(b) What are the key elements to the internal management of such 
organisations? In partnerships and provider NHOs they are concertive 
control as described above; legitimation of collective decisions by 
appeal either to an organisational culture or to technical knowledge; 
and as a last resort expulsion of non-compliant members. The internal 
management of consumer NHOs is undertaken largely by employed 
managers. 
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2(c) How do professionals within such organisations interact with each 
other and how do they regulate themselves? Through direct 
democracy, peer pressure and the use of technical knowledge as 
described above, but in larger partnerships a distinct stratum of 
manager-professionals may emerge. 2(d) How do such forms of 
organisation impact on securing professional engagement? Professional 
engagement in these organisations is promoted by high pay; by the 
organisation's decisions and activity being important for the 
professional's work taken as a whole; by enabling contact with fellow-
professionals; and by providing a well-organised support 
infrastructure. Turning to production processes: 
3(a) How do such forms of organisation impact on clinical workloads, job 
satisfaction and morale? They tend to produce an upward shift in the 
expertise and skills of their members and partners, which tends to 
satisfy members' and partners' intrinsic (i.e. non-instrumental, non-
financial) motivations to work. In that respect they tend to increase 
workload, and add a managerial dimension. 
3(b) How do such forms of organisation impact on the development of 
innovative practice? The forms of innovation which they favour are 
innovation through extensive replication, vertical integration, 
diversification and 're-engineering', provided that these innovations 
sustain the quality of work which the members or partners undertake, 
and maintain the members' or partners' centrality to the productive 
process. As outcomes, how do such forms of organisation impact on: 
4(a) Clinical quality and development of best practice? NHOs and 
partnerships generally prefer to develop and market services and 
products on the basis of quality rather than price. The combination of 
evidence-based knowledge, incentives and concertive control appears 
to raise clinical quality. 
4(b) Adherence to external performance targets? In the NHS both 
partnerships and NHOs are demonstrably capable of close adherence 
to external performance targets when these targets are clear, specific, 
legitimate (to the providers), incentivised and compliance (or not) is 
transparent. 
4(c) The cost-effectiveness of service provision? There is sometimes 
tension between requirement to break even and the goal of raising 
quality of work. External competition provided a discipline to control 
costs, EBM a discipline for clinical effectiveness. On balance, micro-
economic predictions that NHOs and partnerships are economically 
inefficient and unsustainable were not supported by the evidence. 
4(d) Patient outcomes/experiences? (User participation mechanisms may 
have merit as a means of representing users in NHO and partnership 
(governance but the character of user experience was more effectively 
monitored and managed by developing systems for routine data 
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collection on that point. Because of their founding goals and 
membership, NHOs and partnerships were active implementers of 
evidence-based medicine.  
13.2 Qualifications and limitations of the findings 
An obvious empirical limitation to the case study findings is that we have 
had to make qualitative generalisations from relatively few cases, although 
we do have evidence for thinking that, in terms of user experiences, our 
health sector partnerships were fairly typical of the English NHS. Our case 
studies of partnerships omit some sectors (e.g. advertising, consultancy, 
vetinary practice) where the partnership model is widespread. Our case 
studies of NHOs omit agricultural, housing, industrial and transport 
producers. Because we could not attend such meetings our knowledge of 
partnership meetings was limited to participants' accounts after the event. 
Our systematic review was largely (though not entirely) limited to material 
(in English, by-passing much material on NHOs which appears to exist in 
the French, German, Dutch, Spanish, Italian and Hebrew literatures 
especially. Although we placed no limits of date or journals in our search of 
the literature, the dispersed, fragmentary nature of this literature leaves 
open the possibility that we have missed isolated peer-reviewed studies. We 
also note the possibility (we are aware of no studies on this point) that 
publication bias affects organisational as it does clinical literatures: 
successful organisational innovations are more likely to be published than 
failures. Our use of economics papers was limited to the minority with 
empirical content, although it might be argued that this is a merit not a 
weakness of the review. Our evidence about the economic characteristics of 
medical partnerships rests heavily on US research which, whilst generally of 
high quality, presupposes very different health system contexts to that of 
the NHS. Methodological limitations of the study are noted above. 
13.3 Research recommendations 
Our evidence also exposed questions in which further empirical research is 
warranted. (Here we list them in what appear to us to be descending order 
of practical, empirical and theoretical significance, noting which of the above 
evidence these recommendations arose from. Although implications for 
organisational research more widely also arise, here we limit ourselves to 
health sector research. 
Our evidence (see ch.11s3, ch.12s1, ch.12s4,ch13.s4) shows up the lack of 
direct head-to-head empirical comparisons between partnerships, NHOs, 
corporations and PCTMS provision of services in terms of patterns of 
innovation, outcomes (in terms of QOF, GPPS and similar national data 
sets), price of services to commissioners, composition of costs, transaction 
costs and incentives for productivity (or, negatively, susceptibility to 'free-
riding'). Because of the APMS contracting policy and the necessity to 
provide out-of-hours services, NHS primary care appears to offer a suitable 
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field for such comparisons. However to facilitate such studies and obtain 
greater organisational research value from the QOF and GPPS datasets 
generally (see ch.4s4), it would be necessary to supplement these datasets 
by recording (the contractual and organisational status of each NHS primary 
care provider. Assuming most NHS primary medical care will pro tem 
continue to be provided by GP partnerships, and assuming that the mean 
size of these partnerships will continue its slow growth, it is necessary to 
resolve the ambivalent evidence (ch.5s3, ch10.s2, ch12.1) about whether, 
at what size, and under what conditions economies of scale can be realised 
in primary medical care, for instance in the emerging GP-led health centres 
(of which London SHA have commissioned an evaluation). Such a study 
might also shed further light on whether, and under what conditions, the 
organisational structure of a professional partnerships does indeed converge 
upon that of a non-profit hierarchical social enterprise. As GP partnership 
size continues to grow, governments extend the NHS quasi-market into 
primary care and GP partnerships undertake health care commissioning, it 
would appear necessary to research the implications of these trends for the 
roles of managers in GP partnerships, and the nature and extent of the 
tensions between professional and market cultures. This is another point on 
which existing evidence is sparse and ambivalent (ch.5s2, ch.9, ch12s2). 
Since some PCTs seem likely to become social enterprises, it would be 
worthwhile researching the (specific size, and other conditions, at which an 
elected CEO and board becomes a more effective way of organising a non-
hierarchical organisation than direct (relational) democracy (and vice-versa) 
(see ch.6.2, ch.9s1). Although this is not a recommendation for an applied 
research project, our combined evidence (ch.12) also suggests that neo-
classical micro-economic analyses of the firm often lack empirical realism 
when applied to NHOs and partnerships. That necessitates the development 
of more realistic micro-economic models of these organisations. 
13.4 Policy and managerial recommendations 
Because they bear upon vested interests and competing normative 
standpoints, policy and managerial recommendations about the merits and 
demerits of partnerships and NHOs compared to other organisational 
structures, and about whether or how to conserve or develop NHOs and 
partnerships, are liable to be controversial. All that can be done is to make 
explicit - so that the reader be forewarned – the additional normative 
assumptions which transform 'implications' of research into 
'recommendations'. 
13.4.1 Professional partnerships, non-hierarchical social 
enterprises and the NHS 
From the above evidence and conclusions it appears to us that compared to 
corporate provision, partnerships and non-hierarchical organisations offer as 
providers the following potential advantages to the NHS: 
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 1. They pursue goals (quality of care as defined by professionals; 
professional engagement; collaboration rather than competition 
with similar providers; commitment to a particular local 
population or care groups; professional ethics; and in the case 
of consumer organisations, user control) which are closer to 
current NHS policy goals than those of corporations. 
Consequently when commissioning NHOs and partnerships there 
is less need for commissioners to rely on incentive schemes and 
the adroit formulation of contracts to produce this goal 
alignment artificially (and not necessarily reliably) than when 
commissioning corporate providers. Because of closer goal 
alignment one would also expect the public accountability of 
partnerships and non-hierarchical organisations to be easier to 
maintain, although that will depend on how far each 
organisation's specific goals happen to align with current health 
policies. Because of their structure, even 'degenerate' consumer 
NHOs are almost certain to be more accountable to the users of 
their services than corporations are to theirs. If general 
practices and cooperatives of NHS or ex-NHS staff count as 'NHS 
organisations' there is to that extent a foundation for the policy 
of regarding NHS organisations as 'preferred bidders' (see 
Health Services Journal 24th September 2009). 
 2. Their tendency to have goals that focus on localised 
constituencies creates a presumption that NHOs (and to a lesser 
extent partnerships) are likely to have strong local networks for 
inter-organisational collaboration and good local knowledge. 
 3. Their focus on localised constituencies and (especially in 
partnerships) their members' technical interests implies that a 
quasi-market with a predominance of professional partnerships 
and NHO providers is likely to generate diverse models of care 
and hence a 'requisite variety' of innovations, provided that 
commissioners can identify and select for development those 
which best match NHS objectives. To that extent, partnership 
and NHO structures would appear to facilitate innovation, but a 
more incisive question is what kinds of innovation. Our evidence 
suggests it is likely to be innovations which raise the 
professionally-defined technical quality of services and raise the 
skill level of professionals' work, rather than innovations for 
marketing or redistributive purposes. 
 4. Partnerships and NHOs tend to give priority to maintenance of 
income, security of work, and 'enablement' of working life for 
their members and partners, making them (in particular, 
cooperatives) the presumable organisational structures of choice 
for NHS staff should the policy of separating PCT-managed 
services from PCT commissioners be taken further. 
On the other hand we found evidence that: 
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 5. In cooperatives organised on the basis of direct democracy, 
decision making may be slower than in hierarchically organised 
providers, including corporations. 
 6. Corporations are capable of fast implementation of already-
elaborated (but not necessarily newly-emerging) models of care, 
and of the management information systems required (208). 
The empirical evidence was (ambivalent about the costs of care. 
Partnerships and NHOs tend to prefer to produce (what their members 
regard as) high quality services with relatively generous terms and 
conditions for members and partners. To that extent their services would 
tend to be costlier than those of corporations. Against this stands our 
evidence that professional partnerships and NHOs (except the large 
retailers) generally spend little on marketing, use less capital and of course 
avoid payments to external shareholders. Taken together, empirical studies 
in other sectors and countries give a no conclusive picture as to how these 
opposite tendencies balance out. 
Here, however, 
we are dealing with distinct institutional forms that differ in both their social structure and 
their patterns of authority. The issue is not merely whether one form of productive enterprise is 
more efficient than another, but whether one set of social relations and pattern of authority is 
superior to another. 
(96); p.775 
Non-hierarchical structures necessarily involve egalitarian, democratic 
control by their members but member control and member ownership are 
not the same thing. Member-controlled NHOs can be (and have been) state-
owned (97). This raises the question of when of whether NHS hierarchies 
might be wholly or partly converted into NHOs. 
13.4.2 Commissioning, competition and governance 
Our evidence about innovation suggests two respects in which NHS 
contracts with partnerships and NHOs should remain incomplete. First, 
sensitivity to local constituencies and variations in partners' and members 
interests appear characteristic of partnerships and NHOs. To allow the 
development of 'requisite variety' in innovations and service models would 
require NHS commissioning practice not to standardise too narrowly in its 
specifications of how health care is provided, provided that QOF, GPPS or 
equivalent standards are satisfied to an acceptable degree. Second, 
relational contracting is for similar reasons necessary, but necessary in 
order to accommodate, develop and harness different organisations' 
(partners' and members') particular interests and constituencies, not only 
as a way of making contracts more complete by informal means (353). 
Without doubting the desirability of further refinement, we (and our 
informants) found that the present-day commissioning framework for 
general practices compared favourably with pre-2004 methods. Contract 
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monitoring and the supporting information systems 'QOF, GPPS, and PACT 
'gave providers clear, concrete, practically useful feedback about what had 
been achieved, what deficiencies remained and what the provider had been 
financially rewarded for. Many informants thought (and the researchers 
agree) that the above indicators between them cover many of the most 
important aspects of general medical practice: clinical process (including 
prescribing) and outcomes, patient experience and satisfaction. The 
contracts monitored and rewarded matters legitimately of concern to 
patients, providers and government. These principles appear applicable to 
NHS services more widely. 
The same applies to another principle implicit in the 2004 GMS contract. 
That is the division of payments to providers into two elements: 
 1. Partly or wholly performance-linked payments. This element 
provides, the evidence of the new GMS contract suggests, an 
incentive to raise service quality and comply with the 
corresponding targets. 
 2. Payments covering other inputs. 
Because the first element has a ceiling and the second is fixed, such units of 
payment also give the commissioners a predictable overall ceiling for 
service costs (even if they previously under-estimated how close to that 
ceiling medical 'and previously dental - partnerships would come). Separate 
arrangements would then be needed to finance capital developments. 
Our finding that partnerships and NHOs tend to safeguard members' and 
partners' incomes, working conditions and job security, and to prefer 
providing what they define as high quality services implies that these 
organisations may be at a price disadvantage in competition with 
corporations. Given the foreseeable pressures on NHS budgets, this finding 
suggests distinguishing two ways of reducing the labour costs of health 
services. One is by using less labour or a 'leaner' skill mix to provide a given 
service. In our opinion this is desirable. The other is by reducing pay, and 
conditions (reducing pensions was a powerful de-motivator, we found) for a 
given workforce with no other change in service provision. In our opinion, 
this is of dubious benefit even when the savings accrue to the NHS rather 
than an external recipient. On this reasoning, a rule stipulating maintenance 
of the equivalent to current NHS pay and conditions for workers in all 
bidders would focus competition between them on technical improvements 
in cost-effectiveness (i.e. the first kind of cost-saving) and away from the 
second, purely re-distributional kind of 'cost-saving'. 
We found ways in which existing NHS regulations stymie service 
development. In our opinion an obvious implication is to revise these 
regulations placing all professional partnerships (medical, nursing, 
pharmaceutical, dental) on the equal footing of being allowed (technical 
competence and skill mix permitting) to provide services across these 
occupational divisions, including such activities as prescribing, certification 
of illness and death, and referrals to secondary services. This does not 
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imply relaxing the law or regulations governing the clinical competence of 
each profession. Similarly cooperatives might be allowed to become primary 
healthcare providers in their own right, not only as subordinates to general 
medical partnerships. One way to reduce the risks which capital investment 
posed for GPs who were equity partners in a conventional (unincorporated 
association) partnership, hence to make such investment easier, would be 
to encourage adoption of the Limited Liability Partnership model (cp. (354)). 
A 'proof-of-concept' policy lesson can be drawn for the case of the US 
consumer cooperative. It is the feasibility of placing large commissioning 
budgets under the governance of an organisation of users. These members 
were governing their own subscriptions rather than a public budget but at 
US$2.6bn per year a larger budget than that of a PCT. It also shows the 
necessity, in that case, of the organisation employing the necessary 
epidemiological and other experts; that only a minority of patients are ever 
likely to participate actively in its governance; and that the threat of 
'degeneration' through 'managerialisation' is ever present. Nonetheless, this 
case suggests that such a form of governance appears feasible for NHS 
commissioning bodies on the scale of a Primary Care Trust. 
13.4.3 Organisational sustainability 
Supposing that NHOs are worth retaining and developing (e.g. for the 
reasons stated above) our evidence suggests that the following policies and 
management practices would help sustain (prevent 'degeneration' of) their 
organisational structures. 
 1. Limiting the proportion of employees (as opposed to partners or 
members) to the number required for short-term marginal 
fluctuations of work. Even in the small cooperative described 
above a margin of 10% was sufficient. 
 2. Where existing or new members cannot provide the necessary 
investment, restricting the types, sources and conditions of 
fund-raising for investment, excluding sale of equity in favour of 
issuing bonds or taking loans. If equity must nevertheless be 
sold externally, one cause of degeneration can be avoided by 
selling only non-voting shares. The contrasting experiences of 
the Mondragon and Estonian enterprises together suggest the 
prudence of giving external lenders no representation on NHO 
decision-making bodies; hence, of taking over other enterprises 
100%, excluding external financiers from the merged 
organisation. In sum, therefore, 
cooperatives need start-up capital without giving control to the supplier of the capital. The 
government is probably the most likely source for such capital. 
(117); pp.1451-52 
 3. Minimising salary differentials, in particular salary differentials 
for employed managers. The Mondragon evidence suggests that 
a differential of five times is sufficient to ensure the provision of 
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expertise and competent management in a leading European 
industrial complex. 
 4. Create, on the model of our large retailer case study, legally-
binding instruments which define the roles any employed 
managers are to play, the limitations on that role and on pay 
differentials; and, in the interests of internal democracy and 
being a 'learning organisation' (214), guarantee freedom of 
speech. 
 5. Recruit and select managers who are normatively committed to 
the principles of cooperation and understand the potentially 
'degenerative' effects of copying corporate management 
practices unthinkingly into non-hierarchical organisations. 
Whilst partnerships do not, as explained, face the same problem of 
degeneration, the question nevertheless arise as to whether to tolerate or 
resist the tendencies described above of evolution towards the 
organisational structure of a hierarchical, non-profit social enterprise. In our 
opinion this is a more open question. 
Our evidence suggests two implications relevant to current policy. We found 
weak evidence (from US settings) of economies of scale in the range 10 to 
20 partners and few economies of scale above that size. Whatever other 
benefits they may bring, mergers to create partnerships above 20 partners 
or the creation of federated GP-led health centres or even 'polysystems' of 
over 20 doctors appear unlikely to produce cost savings in primary medical 
care from economies of scale. But the evidence is not strong, somewhat 
dated and comes from quite a different health system. The 'office managing 
partner' model (103) suggests as one possible organisational structure for 
such centres an enlarged, multi-site general practice in which each partner-
GP manages one (of several) sites (clinics), in each of which a number of 
doctors work as salaried employees of the practice. 
Recent policy announced the end of patient catchment areas and more 
open, competitive recruitment of patients to general practice lists. Our 
evidence suggests that partnerships and NHOs are reluctant competitors. 
Many studies (355-363) indicate the value of continuity of care to patients 
and primary care providers. It therefore remains to be seen what effect this 
change to practice lists will have, especially in under-doctored areas. 
13.4.4 Managerial ideologies and practice: learning or 
copying? 
We found that the normative ideological persuasion of their managers was a 
factor in the survival and development of NHOs. Managerial ideology 
comprises not only generic management knowledge but also specific 
normative attitudes for or against specific forms of organisational structure 
and the corresponding organisational objectives, managerial practices, 
incentives and reward systems. Our evidence (ch.6s4,ch9.s4) suggests that 
whilst the some of more technical aspects of managerial knowledge may be 
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transferable between public, private and third sector, uncritically 
transferring corporate managerial practices and attitudes from corporations 
into partnerships and NHOs without considering what adaptation or restraint 
may be required in their new setting can produce - and in some 
organisations has produced - adverse results. In large professional 
partnerships outside the health sector: 
Sometimes managing partners and other members of the executive will be impatient with this 
[egalitarian, loosely-structured] approach, e.g. they may favour more autocratic methods and 
argue that they are more efficient. They may be efficient where the majority of equity is in the 
hands of the few, but they are likely to be counter productive where the equity and power is 
more widely distributed amongst partners. 
(86); p.848 
In NHOs and partnerships there is therefore a far-reaching practical 
difference between learning (intelligently adapting) and copying corporate 
managerial assumptions, attitudes and practices. On that basis, our opinion 
is that the criteria for managerial recruitment into the NHS should include 
not only possession of knowledge of management in other sectors, but also 
an intelligent understanding of its limitations for NHS use. In the absence of 
hierarchical methods of control, managerial development methods of team-
building, facilitation and assertiveness training appeared particularly 
valuable in non-hierarchical organisations. 
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Appendix 1 Case studies 
General Practice with Pharmacist Partner 
('PharmPlus') 
PharmPlus is located in a relatively affluent rural area. It is contracted under 
a PMS contract with additional monies for meeting QOF targets and 
providing additional services and dispensing medication. This income is used 
to finance its main practice and two sub-practices, premises, salaries and 
GP drawings. In November 2008, the practice was successful in bidding for 
an APMS tender for a practice in a nearby town and two new partners were 
admitted. Total patient numbers remain stable at around 6,300, fluctuating 
+/- 5 per cent each year. 
PharmPlus is one of the few medical general practices with a pharmacist 
partner. Its partnership board currently consists of six partners: - three full-
time, one three-quarter time and two on half-time (one of which is the 
pharmacist partner). There are currently 19 partnership shares shared in 
line with working-time status (3x4; 1x3 and 2x2=19). The pharmacist 
partner is viewed as equal to the GP partners on all levels except title. It is 
usual for new partners to be placed on a fixed share partnership contract 
until their contribution to the overall practice accounts can be established. 
This also permits a detailed examination of the capital accounts of the 
business and from this the cost of a new partner share can be established. 
The Board is managed internally by a 'Chair of the Day' This is rotating 
position on an annual basis. All partners (except the pharmacist) take the 
role in turn. The Chair works closely with the Practice Manager and co-
ordinates issues and changes. It is suggested that one of the problems with 
a professional partnership as opposed to a limited company is that all 
partners have different ideas and this sometimes means a 'multi-headed 
boss' Interviews indicated there was sometimes a problem with open 
communication between the partners especially with levels of workload. 
Some partners ensured they undertook only what was required and were 
not prepared to do any additional work, whilst others were. When seeking 
to admit a new partner, existing partners examine the pros and cons of 
increasing the partnership size. Affordability is the main issue. 
Although strategic decisions are made by the partners in closed meetings, 
the Practice Manager co-ordinates the day-to-day running and financial 
affairs of the practice. At present, this post is filled by a former bank 
manager. Whilst the practice is committed to delivering the best possible 
patient care, it is careful to manage budgets. The Practice Manager sees the 
practice as a business. Until recently, the NHS was viewed as having 'a 
bottomless pit of money' and as this is not now the case the practice has 
re-thought its internal structure as an independent business contracted to 
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the NHS. All practice activities are tightly linked to QOF oriented outcomes. 
It is suggested that at times the practice is more money than patient 
oriented. For example, a minor cut used to be stitched at the health centre, 
but as the practice receives no QOF income for doing so patients requiring 
minor stitching are now referred to the local minor injuries unit. 
Operating alongside the Practice Manager is an Operational Manager. At 
present this post is filled by a member of staff who has worked in various 
non-medical positions in the practice over a number of years. The 
Operational Manager deals mostly with staffing issues. This includes 
ensuring all GP surgeries are covered during periods of leave. Both roles 
have been expanded during 2009 following the acquisition of a new surgery 
and the amalgamation of those staff into the PharmPlus practice. There are 
now approximately 30 non-medical staff working in the practice over four 
sites. It is suggested that the increased size makes it more difficult to co-
ordinate activities without a defined management structure and the 
introduction of teams with line-management reporting. 
There is a non-partner bonus scheme available to all practice staff. This is 
viewed as an incentive and is tied to QOF outcomes. This differs 
fundamentally from the existing Christmas bonus scheme that simply 
rewarded length of service to the practice. Individual scores are now 
collated and sanctioned by the partners with reference to Practice 
Managerial input. 
In 2006, a patient user group was established. This now meets quarterly 
and is chaired by the Practice Manager. 
General Practice with Manager Partner ('PlusPM') 
PlusPM practice serves a quite densely suburbanised part of the home 
counties. Its patient list is just under 11000. Neighbouring practices wish to 
increase their own list size but are not seen as a competitor in practical 
terms. PlusPM employs a practice manager, practice nurses and 
administrative staff. It provides its own computer and patient records 
system, and operates from medical centre with a building and equipment 
typical of general practices. All these resources are owned by partners 
(though not in equal proportions). Clinical care is provided by GPs, nurses 
and one receptionist (dual-)trained as a phlebotomist. Its main change 
during past three years has been implementing extended working hours for 
GPs. The practice introduced a nurse practitioner, who saw few 'normal 
nurse patients'. The nurse practitioner wrote around 20 prescriptions a day, 
thereby reducing the prescribing workload of GPs who otherwise would had 
done that prescribing. The practice opted out of responsibility for its out-of-
hours services but against this central targets have increased its workload. 
This practice is unusual in having made its former practice manager a 
partner or a similar footing to the GPs, though with different remuneration. 
The manager partner represents ('leads' for) the GPs in managing the 
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practice manager, who in turn line-manages the nursing and general 
administrative staff. This was described as a 'soft hierarchy', one reason 
being the mechanisms in place for staff to feed feelings or opinions up to 
partners. Another was the general consensus of support among the staff for 
the practice's stated objectives, set by the partners and PCT, of providing 
high quality general practitioner services. Practice meetings were used to 
discuss and implement all substantial changes in services, and for problem-
solving. Practice meetings are used to enable proposals to be made, and 
there is a suggestion box for patients. 
The partners regarded performance against QOF and other contractual 
targets as critical because it increased income, but saw no contradiction 
between that and the practice's own objective of increasing quality of care. 
Although key difference between this practice's structure and most others' 
was in having a manager as a partner, and there was little to suggest made 
any material difference in securing professional engagement. The point was 
strongly made by a GP that he and his colleagues were exhausted by 
successive reorganisations in general practice due to government policy, 
seeing no point them, especially practice-based commissioning. The GPs felt 
uninterested in what the PCT wanted to offer. They clearly felt that clinical 
workloads had become too heavy in general practice now, and hence their 
job satisfaction and morale appeared low. Yet senior partner also firmly 
stressed that the practice is motivated by providing a good service even if 
NHS policies are doing little to bring that about. 
PlusPM practice was now working more closely with nearby practices due in 
part to practice-based commissioning, although they were sceptical this 
activity had made much difference. The practice was concerned about 
meeting its performance targets. Partly this can be explained by financial 
considerations, such as with QOF money, but the practice manager 
remarked how the relationship with the PCT has gone downhill recently, 
describing them as more difficult'than what they were. 
The cost-effectiveness of service provision did not seem a salient problem 
for the practice although extra paperwork has come with the new systems 
for showing that QOF targets are being met, and that may not necessarily 
be compatible with cost-effectiveness. The practice gave much priority to 
staying within its prescribing budgets. Patients had shown little interest in a 
patient participation group that was set up, although the practice did run 
annual surveys in which patients are invited to submit comments. This 
feedback was reasonably positive and complaints by patients were at a low 
level, although the methods for discovering patients' opinions about the 
performance of the practice were not particularly systematic. 
Nurse-led General Practice ('NurseLed') 
NurseLed was a nurse-led partnership which very explicitly identified itself 
as a social enterprise. NurseLed wanted in some respects to model itself on 
the bigger, longer-established Bromley by Bow social enterprise. 
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In its present form the practice originated when, shortly before the start of 
the present project, the three GPs running the health centre retired. They 
had been operated the practice as a family-oriented GP surgery for 20 years 
previously. On their retirement the PCT put the practice services out to 
tender. The contract was won by three nurse practitioners who had 
previously worked the practice and bid in collaboration with a local social 
enterprise, a community transport company. Initially the partnership 
worked as a subsidiary of the parent social enterprise, under an APMS 
contract. Initially the PCT made the contract was with, and transmitted 
payment via, the parent social enterprise. 
The latter therefore undertook payroll duties and oversaw the practice 
company finances. They were also consulted for employment and health 
and safety issues. They gave financial support and bought the practice 
premises. NurseLed was the only health service within the group of 
enterprises which made up the parent social enterprise. The practice's 
stated main goal is to remain a caring practice and put patients, rather than 
money-making, first. The practice was also committed to a policy of team 
working and reduction of traditional hierarchies. Nonetheless the two nurse 
partners appoint and expel staff, including in the past two GPs (one for 
being too cautious in approach and the other not a 'team player'). The 
practice policy is that staff must be team players and able to work 
autonomously in small unit. As far as possible decisions were made by 
consensus of all staff. No practice manager was employed to oversee day to 
day operations. Weekly staff meetings voted on proposals suggested during 
the previous week, but in these discussions more weight was given to staff 
who would be undertaking the tasks being discussed or changed. 
The NurseLed building was owned by a parallel limited liability company 
whose directors were the practice partners and a representative of the 
parent social enterprise. No other GP practices in the PCT were run as social 
enterprises. 
The practice had 20 staff on contract, but most were only used temporarily 
or part-time to cover when more regular staff were absent. Two sessional 
GPs worked five days a week and three regular nurse practitioners between 
them worked two sessions every morning and one every afternoon. All 
these staff were salaried. The PCT made up any shortfall between the 
practice's expenditure and its contract income. Despite employing sessional 
GPs, the practice partners were nurses with the philosophy that 60%-70% 
of patients coming to the surgery were best dealt with by a nurse 
practitioner. The GPs were encouraged to restrict themselves to seeing 
more complex cases freeing NPs to undertake general consultations. All 
staff were involved in keeping and updating patient records. 
Some patients left the practice list when the previous long-established GPs 
retired but the practice list soon stabilised at around 4300. The internal 
regulation of the quality of practice services was via patient satisfaction 
surveys and peer evaluation of clinical work. Its PCT set guidelines for GP 
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surgeries under QOF framework, and applied them to NurseLed practice too. 
Service users provided feedback on services, in part through a patient 
participation group. 
The practice foresaw a growth of its patient list and changes to funding and 
control regulations. The directors planned to take over the lists of local 
practices falling vacant and put out to tender, and so run more surgeries. 
They anticipated the practice would need to move to bigger premises to 
accommodate this growth. 
Private Architectural Partnership ('Architects') 
Architects is an architectural partnership based in London which employs 
circa 80 people. It has been in business since 1938, and followed the 
standard model of architectural activity for a large, city-based firm until the 
1950s. It then made a deliberate policy of becoming involved in all 
architectural matters to do with healthcare, developing the 1950s 
equivalent of a mission statement' that it would produce the highest quality 
architecture and run a successful business. 
Over the past twenty years, the practice has changed significantly. It still 
occupies its original office premises, but has acknowledged that to run the 
business successfully, it is no longer sufficient to train as an architect, nor 
even to employ adjunct quantity surveyors and structural engineers. 
Increasingly, this professional profile has had to be supplemented by more 
professionally trained business staff. 
As a result of the group's close relationship with healthcare projects, it has 
also been affected by wider changes in the public sector, and in particular 
by the advent of the Thatcherite policies towards the professions, and three 
decades of the New Public Management. Thus, the group found itself in a 
much more competitive situation, with a distinct change in the market place 
as a result of the insurgence of North American architectural practices into 
the UK market. These North American practices tended to be larger and 
more integrated in respect of marketing, financial, business planning and 
support services. Added to which, the past reliability of repeat business 
from the public sector had evaporated. Also, within this market there is 
further competition in the form of the need to now develop bids against 
scale fees rather than using a 'cost plus'system. 
Against this background, the group felt that it may be getting out of its 
depth in respect of its non-architectural skills and capacity. It was also 
becoming increasingly necessary to change its management processes as 
the system was 'Creaking'in such a complex and demanding market. The 
group's solution was to merge with another European architectural practice 
to form a pan-European strategic and operational partnership and alliance. 
The merger has brought immediate benefits to the group with a 
dramatically improved profile, greater global exposure and a sense of being 
taken more seriously. The group also feel that they have chosen the right 
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partners to merge with as the new group is a very stable organisation and 
one which shares the same ethos, namely that it does not become over-
commercial, is still committed to the public sector, and is still 吐ascinated'by 
the healthcare sector, providing, as it does, many and varied professional 
challenges to professional architects. The new partnership offers particular 
benefits in terms of HRM and a differentiated scale of training opportunities 
for new staff who join the group. The group plans to stay with bidding and 
designing for middle size projects of £5-20 million. 
Structurally, from 1938-2001, the group was a full professional partnership 
with equity partners. From 2001-2007 (up until the merger) it became a 
limited company. There were originally four equity partners, each of whom 
had the same financial share but not the same levels of responsibility. When 
the group changed to an LLP, it had seven shareholding directors which 
then went down to five shareholders before the group merged with the 
European partnership. The main professional body which the group is 
influenced by is RIBA (Royal Institute of British Architects) and the 
governance of the Architects Registration Board. Members are also part of 
other bodies, especially sustainability and green organisations related to 
architecture as well as the Urban Design Group. 
The current arrangements give the original group a minority shareholding in 
the new partnership. The group members do not feel that they have lost 
control as a result of the merger; in fact they felt that they were losing 
more control when trading as a single partnership because the sector had 
become so complex with many new projects in the health sector (e.g. 
pharmaceutical practices) becoming more engineering than building design 
led. The group's original size also made them vulnerable to an uncontrolled 
takeover. 
In terms of the division of labour in the firm, it strives to have as flat a 
structure as possible, but in reality, it is semi-hierarchical, built around a 
team structure per project with a director per project. There are also sector 
based teams, e.g. for health or education. This can lead to some issues and 
some difficulties when marketing to other sectors, and some directors are 
better at client -facing business than others. 
The organisation of activity very much matches the actual architectural 
process in terms of the inter-connecting stages, which are : Inception; 
conception; design; production and delivery. However, changes in the 
external environment, particularly in respect of professional regulation, 
have meant that some of the traditional division of labour has had to alter. 
There is now a much heavier monitoring and quality control process that 
has meant that monitoring as a whole new skill area has had to be overlaid 
onto the traditional mix of design, technical and contract activity. Unless all 
these activities are presented in a fully integrated format to the clients, 
there is the danger that the client may in turn become dissatisfied, 
interpreting a lack of integration as a lack of true interface with themselves. 
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This could also be seen as a bifurcation of the professional client architect 
relationship. 
There were some telling comments from the MD of the group 'namely in 
respect of the incursion into the UK market by large American healthcare 
integrated practices who were seen as being on the same side as the 
contractors' so indicating an alteration (under this model, at least) to the 
professional relationship and trust dynamic between the architect and client. 
The changing nature of this fundamental relationship is further represented 
in other co-ordination and decision-making processes within the group, 
particularly what was described as the 'Huge shift'in how the company 
relates to other organisations. The original model of partnership-client 
relationship (Figure 1) has not been possible to recreate under the more 
complex conditions that are seen in Private Finance Initiative (PFI) projects 
where, from the architect's perspective, there are multiple clients and 
agents to the extent that the architects are often left asking "Who is the 
client?'(Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Traditional architect-client relationship 
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Figure 2. Architect-client relationship in PFI 
These changes to the group's previous core activities are further 
exacerbated by the requirement for the group to work in an ever increasing 
number of consortia and groupings of other architects and to put together 
sets of multi-disciplinary teams in order to bid for projects. Thus, the 
professional standing of the architects has been pushed down the hierarchy 
in this multi-client, multi-agency model. This not only adds to the 
complexity of the project in terms of communication and diffuse decision-
making, but also in respect of commerce as the attenuated hierarchy has 
reduced the overall amount of fee income which is available. 
 Whilst not a term used in any interviews, this description is akin to that of 
a supply chain. One of the corollaries of which has become the increasing 
Client 1 (e.g. NHS) 
Client 2 (e.g. Special 
Purposes Vehicle led  
construction consortium) 
Client 3 (e.g. Project 
Management Company) 
Architect 
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need to indemnify the professional practices of the contributions in the 
consortium. The key dynamic which has changed is that of trust, and the 
MD of the company expressed this as trust in all its different versions' The 
old trust relationship which bound the simple tripartite relationship together 
has been replaced by one based upon performance 'and, indeed, a concept 
of performance that is not always fully articulated, nor jointly decided. 
One of the consequences of this, is that some of the architects believe that 
they are spending time on activities other than what they are trained for, 
particularly in respect of marketing. Some of the architects' practices are 
being forced out of business by increasing competition and the financial 
consequences of the increasing corporatisation of architecture. It is felt that 
good and innovative design still sells, but practices have to work in a 
different way now with many practices focussing on particular sectors. 
Architects' work is 60% public sector, which they believe demands yet a 
further set of skills. But, repeating earlier points about the environment, the 
biggest competition comes from the USA where practices are highly trained 
in marketing and have a much more focussed sales techniques, whilst also 
being process and business driven. 
In summary, although the practice has been in business for many years, 
they now exist in an extremely volatile environment with the need to look at 
changes in their organisation. This is seen as being difficult and means 
addressing the attitudes of senior staff who mostly have quite disparate 
attitudes towards work. The overarching key outcome is to run a successful 
business at a profit and to have new and repeat clients and a professional 
peer group that is satisfied with the company's design and approach to 
projects. 
Private Accounting Partnership ('Accountants') 
Accountants International is a network of legally independent firms, all of 
which carry the Accountants brand. In the UK, it is structured as an LLP 
'limited liability partnership - the liability of the members being limited to 
their capital in the firm. This structural solution is influenced by the 
demands of modern corporate governance and the need to be fully 
corporately transparent. The firm has taken this approach to be an 
independent, strong and viable firm, deliberately positioning itself below the 
four major accountancy and consulting firms. The structure was also 
influenced by the opportunity to limit the exposure of members of the LLP 
and to facilitate recruitment by creating rewarding professional careers in 
order to ensure that clients receive the best service. Externally, the firm is 
heavily influenced by the regulatory needs and requirements of the 
accountancy profession. There are two types of partner: salaried partners 
who have no investment; and equity partners, who are members of the LLP. 
The current structure came about in 2005 and involves a constitution 
incorporated in a Member's Agreement. The LLP structure has meant that 
the firm has a much more commercial focus and corporate outlook although 
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the pre-existing partnership ethos, prior to the LLP structure, has allowed 
further cohesion and shared decision-making in the firm. The sense is that 
now the firm is even more integrated financially. Prior to the integration in 
2005, there was local retention of profits by the associated firms but now 
there is one central profit centre. 
The principal activity of Accountants (UK) LLP is the provision of assurance 
and advisory, taxation, financial planning, management consulting, 
corporate recovery, corporate finance and forensic services. The key 
environmental determinants are the regulatory requirements of professional 
accountancy. There are competitors who form part of this external 
environment, who operate with a similar range of services, but with a 
different balance and mix of work. 
The regulatory elements to the firm's activity come from the FSA, 
professional financial institutions (e.g. ICAEW, CIMA, ACCA) and the 
government. Compliance and quality assurance is expected by the 
regulatory bodies, but given the position and seniority of the firm, a 
dialogue is maintained with the regulators. 
Competitors form part of the external environment, but at the same time 
they are also a group of people with whom a dialogue is maintained 
'particularly the Group A firms of leading accountants. The nature of 
competition is manifested in terms of clients, resources, staff, prestige and 
market position. However, Accountants has differentiated itself within this 
competition such that there are some clients it would leave to other 
companies on the basis of risk exposure, but also in terms of the relevant 
experience base. The market comprises a large range of clients from the 
very largest companies (say, top 100 listed companies) to smaller unlisted 
companies 'but the real competition is in the middle, especially for 
Accountants in terms of the owner-managed business sector. Thus, by 
taking a highly selective approach based on value and quality, but above all 
the appropriate technical resource base, the firm has focused its attentions 
on those sections of the marketplace which it is best equipped to service. 
The firm is organised on a regional basis, each with a managing partner 
who all report to the national managing partner. Added to this, there are 
also some national heads of departments for services such as corporate 
recovery and forensic financial services. The decision-making approach is 
narrowly focussed - not diffuse, and has led to an efficient management of 
the firm, with a high level of consistency. This is important, as the LLP 
structure has meant that the operational decision-making and governance 
of the firm has changed. Previously there was a council which acted as the 
custodian of the firm's values. This has now been superseded by a new 
board with four elected and three non-elected members. Some of the LLP 
members have a management role and some have technical roles, but like 
many senior executive structures, their roles involve the exercise of 
judgement and expertise. 
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Critically, from an external view, the firm is seen as a solid, large 
organisation, with a reputation for quality service delivery, which 
demonstrates its core values. These values mean that it is seen as a 
different, friendly, more approachable firm than some of its competitors, 
close to its clients internally and externally, and with a team atmosphere. 
The aim is to grow the business organically but not necessarily to discount 
the option of growth through merger. 
The size and diversity of the client group and the good cultural and 
competitive employment package contribute towards Accountants being 
seen as a good place to work in the competitive market place of 
professional financial firms. There is a graduate recruitment scheme and 
Accountants seeks to differentiate its offering from the top four accountancy 
firms by offering staff a broader business experience, early initiative and 
independence in their careers, and a very structured technical and 
professional training programme. 
The performance which is expected of staff is made explicit, and 
consequently it is understood that staff know what is expected of them. 
Performance is articulated around five key drivers: 
 1. producing good quality work 
 2. serving clients 
 3. growing fees 
 4. being commercial 
 5. leading and enabling people 
These criteria are employed throughout the firm. There is an employee 
survey and enablement survey in operation which helps to assess the 
direction of the firm and how staff can contribute and be recognised. There 
are also a series of staff conferences used to gauge the effect and impact of 
change in the company, and levels of motivation. The model of partnership 
which the company operates is also designed to operate as a retention tool 
for staff with the ultimate possibility of becoming an equity partner. 
In respect of authority and how it is exercised, there is a high level of 
responsibility concentrated in the roles of managing partner, regional 
partners, and heads of department. 
Legal Partnership [Legal] 
Legal is a private legal partnership based in an rural region of England. It 
has office representation in the four largest regional towns. Although each 
office is treated equally, there is a consensus amongst staff that one site 
acts as a quasi-head office. The watershed in the partnership history 
appears to have been the merger of two earlier partnerships in 2000. 
During the merger, the newly formed partnership decided to adopt a more 
corporate (co-ordinated) organisational form. A formal partnership deed 
was set up that structured the business in such a way that it now had an 
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elected management board, rather like a company board. The Board 
currently comprises six partners including a Chair. Only full equity partners 
(currently 17) can both stand for nomination to the Board and vote on 
partnership matters. Since 2000, Legal has merged with a number of 
smaller legal partnerships in order to have full regional overage. Their 
stated partnership aim is to become the biggest and best private legal 
partnership in the region. Legal has a streamlined, cross-office corporate 
management structure. An elected management board chaired by an 
elected partner board member oversees the strategic direction of the firm. 
The Board also includes a designated senior partner (who deals with 
external liaison) and a managing director who is responsible for the day-to-
day management of the firm and for successfully implementing the firm's 
business plan. The managing director is supported by non-lawyer 
professionals who have responsibility for the operation of support 
departments. These include: Business Excellence, Business Development, 
Facilities, Finance and IT. The main professional bodies which the legal 
partnership is influenced by are: The Solicitors Regulatory Authority and 
The Law Society. 
In terms of the division of labour within the group there appear to be two 
distinct populations. From the bottom-up the hierarchy is structured thus: 
paralegals, legal executives, assistant solicitors (comprising anyone who has 
just qualified right through to someone who is 4/5/10 years qualified), 
above them are associates (usually 5 or 6 years qualified). Above them are 
limited equity partners. Limited equity partners share profits in the business 
but haven't invested capital. Above them are equity partners. These 
partners have invested capital in the business (currently £200,000 each) 
and they share profit between themselves. 
As a consequence of post-merger growth in both staff and client numbers, 
Legal has moved into new office space in all 4 locations. The office space is 
ultra-modern 'a deliberate act in order to attract and retain clients as well 
as highly motivated and trained professional staff. The main changes 
expected during the next five years are the outcomes of the recent Legal 
Services Act. At present, partner capital is fixed. This means that the 
amount of capital a partner invests is the amount that is withdrawn when 
the partner leaves. Partnerships thus struggle between allowing maximum 
drawings or ongoing capital investment. From 2011, the Legal Services Act 
will enable partnerships to operate to a corporate model. They will be 
allowed to become a company and have limited liability with holding 
companies. Within these companies capital value can be built. 
Primary Medical Care Cooperative ('Metro') 
Metro Out-Of-Hours Services is a not-for-profit cooperative limited by 
guarantee. It was established in January 2004, by the amalgamation of 
three earlier, similarly-structured cooperatives: Since December 2004 its 
services have been commissioned by three contiguous urban PCTs to 
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provide out-of-hours services to over 900,000 patients. In addition its sister 
organisation, a PLC, has been working alongside Metro in providing services 
such as cover for out-of-hours training. 
However during the course of the research Metro lost their largest out-of-
hours contract to a corporation from another region. Thus Metro is having to 
explore different avenues of work. It is currently undertaking a pilot 
exercise with the practice base commissioning consortia, a PCT and hospital 
trust to develop supported discharge. Even if this were successful, it would 
not recover the out-of-hours work lost and redundancies are on the horizon. 
Even though Metro is a not-for-profit social enterprise is does have 
operating reserves and any redundancy payments would have to be met 
through this source. 
GPs working in the three PCTs that Metro serves are able to become 
members of Metro OOH Services. The only criteria are that they must have 
an 'active commitment' to the organisation. However, 'active commitment' 
was not defined. Although it is expected that members work out of hours, if 
they later cease to work out of hours but remained committed to the 
organisation in 'Some way' they can remain members. Other staff members 
such as nurses, drivers and telephone operators are employed directly by 
Metro. 
As its structure the organisation has a Board of Directors, which comprises 
GPs elected to the Board. Any GP working for Metro can be nominated to 
the board. The PCTs also have an input to the board. 
One of the biggest issues facing Metro prior to loss of their OOH contract 
was cost. All respondents suggested a concern with costs appeared to 
permeate through all operations. There was a call to use more nurses in 
order to reduce the cost of medical staff whilst at the same time retaining 
the same levels of service. Hourly paid nurses were cheaper than doctors, 
said to be better at telephone triage and had also been undertaking less 
complicated home visits. It was not uncommon for staff to multi-task on the 
same shift. For example, if Primary Care Centres were full and telephone 
triage staff quiet, it was expected for them to help out and see patients on a 
face to face basis. On the flipside, if doctors were quiet, but telephones 
busy then doctors were expected to the help given by triage staff. Monetary 
objectives (in the form of performance targets) were set by the PCTs. 
Communications between members were made via regular (usually weekly) 
e-mails to members. Any significant information was also sent by post to 
member's home addresses. There is an AGM and regular members 
meetings. The AGM is seen as adherence to statutory requirements and 
formal business is discussed. Members meetings are less formal. These deal 
with issues such as clinical governance and premises issues. 
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Medical Cooperative ('City') 
City has for its members approximately 500 GPs in a non-for-profit limited 
company set up in 1996. It is owned, managed and financed by the GPs and 
now represents GPs in three contiguous city boroughs. It is a 
members'cooperative. Initially an on-call cooperative, it now offered a wider 
range of medical services including: primary care locum services, 24-hour 
answering services and forensic medical examiners. Legally, however, City 
was only legally obliged to offer out-of-hours services so its name was 
changed to reflect its new core activity. 
City is owned and managed by GPs who have opted into the out-of-hours 
care provided by City. If their surgery uses City, they automatically become 
members (owners). However, to work as a GP for City, individuals need to 
be either a partner GP, or a salaried GP working at least six sessions per 
week in their own surgeries. Initially, GPs were expected to commit to 
working a certain number of hours for City per month, but as the number of 
members has increased, there is a waiting list to work. Each GP is paid 
£120 an hour for out-of-hours work. 
The division of labour within the organisation is semi-hierarchical. It 
comprises: Company Secretary, Council Members (including Board of 
Directors), Chief Executive, Finance Manager, Operations Manager, 
Supervisors, GPs, Non-medical staff. 
City is democratically controlled. The GPs for each of the three boroughs 
has five council members per borough, one member of whom is each 
elected to serve on the board. Each is re-elected after two years. The 
council has bi-monthly meetings where policy and staffing issues are 
discussed. The CEO views the strength of City as its members. The GPs 
provide the out-of-hours service and how they do that is up to them via 
voting rights at members meetings. By being members of City they can 
dictate how the service is delivered and for what cost. There appears to be 
ambivalence from older GPs about attending membership meetings. At the 
last AGM, only 30 GPs (approximately 5% of the membership) attended. 
Competitors form part of the external environment, and there is a 
competing corporation working in a nearby borough. There is also 
increasing pressure from newly created drop-in 24/7 clinics. 
The membership of City are regulated by the General Medical Council. 
City does not own its premises. It currently has four consulting rooms at a 
community hospital, for which it pays rent although the hospital is now 
being rebuilt under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and on completion, 
City's rent will increase to £250,000 per annum. City is therefore seeking 
cheaper premises in a central location for patients within a 2-3 mile radius. 
It's long term vision is to work in a multi-team building (one-stop-shop) 
that may incorporate other services such as social services. This would 
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allow for fuller utilisation of all assets and allow greater flexibility of 
decision-making. 
Consumer-led Cooperative ('OverThere') 
OverThere is a non-profit health-care system based in the USA that 
integrates care and coverage. It serves more than 600,000 members in two 
states, it one of which it is one of the largest employers with over 9,000 
employees (including nearly 900 doctors). It offers both individual and 
group insurance plans. 
The organisation is managed by a Board of Trustees who are officially 
charged with establishing organisational goals and setting policies. The 
Board works closely with management and medical staff to ensure that the 
policies and strategic direction puts patients first. However, in practice the 
Executive Leadership Team (ELT) (management) often seem to initiate 
goals which are then legitimated by the board. 
There appears to be three loci of control within the organisation: 
1. The cooperative (culminating in the Board of Trustees); 
2. The management (culminating in the ELT); 
3. The medical professionals. 
Members do not automatically become voting members. They must register 
their need in becoming so. However, this is a simple process which involves 
no fee or special health requirement. At present there are approximately 
30,000 voting members out of 175,000 potential members. Often there is a 
delay between a new member joining and registering to become a voting 
member. Voting members later vote for individuals to join the Board of 
Trustees. 
The Board currently comprises 11 members including a chair. The official 
aim of the Board is to oversee and monitor the well-being and 
accountability of the organisation by a variety of tasks including: 
establishing organisational goals, setting policies and monitoring fiscal 
affairs. 
Below the Board are various consumer, leadership advisory and focus 
groups. These groups feed upwards and are thus officially placed within the 
'cooperative governance structure' but may be more accurately described as 
tools for user feedback, rather than user governance. 
The Management Executive Leadership Team (ELT) has various executive 
divisions including a health plan division, strategic services and quality, 
public affairs and finance. The medical professionals have executive teams 
that feed into the ELT. 
As for Medical Professionals, every clinician has to serve a 3 year 
probationary period before they are elected into the organisation. A key 
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element to 'passing' probation is the receipt of a large number of high 
scores for patient satisfaction. This is an attempt to make the organisation 
more primary care-led. Physicians may describe a democratic way of 
working but in reality there are tight hierarchical organisations operating in 
local medical centres. The biggest change over the last three years has 
been the pilot and subsequent introduction of its 'Medical Home' model. This 
endeavours to provide out of hospital care with an emphasis on prevention 
and self-care of chronic conditions. It also utilises an interactive web tool 
which is described as being 'beyond the medical record' This has been 
through a process of continuing development and now allows the patient to 
order prescription items, view lab results, make appointments and review 
consultations with their doctor. This information is further supplemented by 
DVDs. Despite this, membership appears to be declining. During 2006, 
membership reduced by 27,000. OverThere is viewed as being too slow to 
respond to changes desired in the healthcare system. 
The medical home model has led to dramatic changes in the way doctors 
work. As a consequence, they clearly have a reduced patient list size and 
this in turn offers greater positive changes for their home life. The key 
clinician mentality appears to be that of 'Serving others'rather than 'Get 
rich' and emphasises preventative medicine. 
Cost-effectiveness appears to be behind many of the introduced 
innovations. However, here, 'lean management' appears to be about 
expanding the organisation whilst cutting out wasteful practices. 
Organic Food Cooperative ('Wholefood') 
Wholefood and a like-minded bakery ('Likebakery') with which it 
collaborates both sign up to the Statement on the Cooperative Identity 
(adopted by the International Co-operative Alliance in 1995) (itself founded 
in 1895) which defines a co-op and sets out its underpinning principles and 
values. Cooperatives themselves are constituted under the Industrial and 
Provident Societies Act. 
Likebakery Grocery is a worker cooperative owned and run by its workforce, 
currently in excess of 40 members within the 10,000 sq.ft. premises. It is a 
flat-rate pay organisation making all decisions by consensus. From a 
turnover of £3,500 to £3.5 million, from 4 members to 50, Likebakery 
donates 5 per cent of wage costs to local and international projects. It 
opened in a large northern city in 1996 and it now owns 21 acres of prime 
growing land 14 miles from its shop. It is able to stock over 70 lines of 
organic fruit and vegetables grown in the area. It also sells a selection of 
environmentally friendly baby products, cosmetics and household goods. 
The shop is full of information about the source of the products so 
consumers can make informed choices in their purchasing. 
Likebakery follows on from a model devised in 1980s and used first at the 
Daily Bread Co-operative, Northampton. This model involved direct, often 
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bulk purchasing, on site processing and competitive margins and prices. 
This was run by owner- members following a clear social agenda. 
Wholefood Cooperative is a democratically run, worker-controlled business. 
Its constitution demands the promotion of the physical, mental and spiritual 
well-being of the community, especially of those individuals participating in 
the cooperative. It consists of a cafe and shop where all the products are 
vegetarian or vegan and fairly traded wherever possible. 
The above also cooperate with the UK's largest independent wholesaler-
distributor. It specialises in vegetarian, fairly traded, organic, ethical and 
natural products. It is a radical workers' cooperative, having dedicated 30 
years to providing quality products with unparalleled customer service. 
Competition is now increasing as large supermarkets are campaigning to 
show their green credentials. All three cooperatives have a division between 
full members, probationary members and staff. The movement from latter 
to the former is encouraged, but for Wholefood this is partly about 
responding to increased demands during student term times when they 
employ part-time 'Staff' for short periods of time in order to cope with 
increased demand. Only full members can vote in all three organisations. 
The large wholesaling cooperative has an elected management committee 
but no Chief Executive and motions can be raised by any member. 
Likebakery and Wholefood operate via a consensus so they need all 
members to agree on major decisions. They are also divided into teams. 
Likebakery's teams send elected representatives to a fortnightly meeting 
called: 'The forum' The purpose of 'The forum' is to undertake shorter term 
strategic decisions. The whole membership meets every quarter. Decisions 
require 100 per cent approval, although members may also abstain or voice 
reservations whilst withholding objections. For a proposal to fail it needs to 
be blocked by at least two out of the forty members. Strategy and policy is 
set by all three organisations in general membership meetings. 
Individual members join all three cooperatives due to a mix of ideals 
'political, philosophical, spiritual etc. They are also attracted to the ideals of 
democratic working and the absence of hierarchy. In the wholesaler in 
particular, people enjoy a multi-skilling environment. Often this is because 
they have worked for other organisations and have loathed the hierarchical 
or corporate ethos. 
All three cooperatives pride themselves on multi-tasking, so there is a mix 
of manual labour, office labour and driving by members. However, all 
employ committees or teams to tackle more specialist work. These teams 
are not permanent, but in Wholefood, the treasurer has been in post for 
over 6 years (as the smallest cooperative they may have problems with 
replacement). 
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Mutual Building Society ('HouseLend') 
HouseLend was founded in 1853. In 1942 it merged with a nearby building 
society and acquired its present name. Since 1962 and 1987 several other 
building societies have merged into it, most recently in 2009. HouseLend is 
a mutual building society with its head office still in its provincial town of 
origin. It has a nationwide branch network across the UK. 
The society is owned by its members. Individuals can become members by 
having savings or borrowing in excess of £100. In the case of joint savings / 
borrowing the first named on the account becomes the member. Each 
member has voting rights at the AGM. In a sense, the society is owned by 
its members and this accountability appears to drive much of what the 
society does. There were approximately 900,000 voting members in 
January 2009, but only 40-50 actually attend the AGM in person. The AGM 
is used as an opportunity not only to meet statutory requirements but as a 
key channel to communicate what the society is doing in terms of priorities 
and key issues. 
However, despite the society being owned by the members the best 
members can do is to get the board to consider a request. The Board is 
bound by statute to act in the best interests of both current and future 
members. If they feel that members are suggesting a motion they consider 
to be not in the current or future interest of the society it can be dismissed 
at board level after consideration. A recent example was a motion that the 
society de-mutualised. This was rejected by the board. 
The Society is bound by the rules of the Financial Services Authority and 
also regulated by the Building Societies Organisation (BSA). In accordance 
with Building Society Association control of balance sheet regulations at 
least 75 per cent of its assets must be invested in retail mortgages and at 
least 50 per cent of funding must come from retail customers. Against the 
current financial turbulence, the FSA asks for twice daily balance sheet 
checks. Internally, it is governed by its directors who work under its own 
rules and regulations. It has 19 sub companies which include an estate 
agency and credit reference agency. 
The society appears to have adopted a deliberately flat hierarchy 
comprising: Executives, Non-Executives, Regional Mangers, Branch 
Operation Managers and Customer Service Staff. The setting of objectives is 
led by the management team in consultation with members. The building 
society undertakes two common activities: 1.) It completes financial 
transactions on behalf of branch customers and 2) by staff employed by a 
financial services subsidiary it sells various financial products. 
The motto of HouseLend is 'Mutual Matters' Staff are continually reminded 
about its four objectives: Enthusiasm, Fairness, Ownership and Trust. A 
2008 marketing campaign sought to differentiate HouseLend from corporate 
banks and de-mutualised building societies by highlighting the fact that 
HouseLend tries to do the best for members and not shareholders. 
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Marketing campaigns cite the removal of all security barriers in branches 
and staff-customer interaction is determined to be a 'conversation with a 
purpose'. A key mantra is: 'attract on price and retain on service.' 
The society undertakes its own in-house training. Every new member of 
staff completes two four-day training sessions at the head office within the 
first three months of joining. There is no graduate training scheme but the 
society has its own 'academy' an internal training scheme for customer 
service staff who have the ambition to become branch managers. There is 
also the 'Famous Academy' for existing branch managers who have the 
drive to become regional managers. As well as this in-house training, staff 
are assisted with their professional qualifications (such as mortgage 
accreditation) by the Learning and Development Department. All staff are 
expected to qualify at advanced professional levels. 
Large Retailer ('Bigshop') 
This cooperative is a unique retail organisation designed around a set of 
principles and values. Its uniqueness lies in its founding purpose to provide 
'Happiness for its members through worthwhile and satisfying employment 
in a successful business' Since 1929 it has been owned by a trust for the 
benefit of all who work in it. It is a profit-making retailer but there are no 
outside shareholders. Net profits can be used as the partnership so deem, 
including to fund an annual partnership bonus as well as for re-investment 
in the cooperative. These decisions are taken by a Partnership Council which 
represents all Partners. The details presented in this case, and the 
interviews which were conducted during fieldwork are from one city centre 
store, but the business principles which are described apply to the whole 
cooperative in the UK. The local environmental issues are specific to the 
case study which is presented here. 
In order to understand the culture and operating principles of the 
Partnership, it is necessary to understand the power of the principles and 
how these are reinforced in every aspect of the cooperative's and employee 
activity. They are: 
 1. Be honest. Partners will be open, decent and fair. The 
Partnership will maintain a climate of transparency and trust. 
 2. Give respect. Partners will treat others in the way they expect to 
be treated. The Partnership will guarantee a fulfilling working 
environment. 
 3. Recognise others. Partners will value others'contributions. The 
Partnership will ensure a fair reward for all. 
 4. Show enterprise. Partners will seize the initiative whenever 
possible. The Partnership will give Partners the freedom to use 
their talents. 
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 5. Work together. Partners will work together for the benefit of the 
Partnership. The Partnership will provide a sense of common 
purpose. 
 6. Achieve more. Partners will strive to achieve greater success 
whenever possible. The Partnership will recognise and celebrate 
exceptional achievement. 
Partners share the responsibilities of ownership as well as its rewards which 
are 'profit, knowledge and power'. A good sense of the nature of the 
cooperative comes from the Chairman's welcome to new staff printed in the 
Partnership handbook. This explains that the recruits have entered 'a 
special business and a different kind of place to work'. Thus the cooperative 
can be seen as the embodiment of an employee owned cooperative. The 
Principles are regarded as the DNA of the cooperative and it is they which 
serve to influence the cooperative's structure. In an interview with the 
store's managing director the Principles were described as a 'line coiling' in 
and around the structure. 
Commercially, the cooperative is extraordinarily successful in respect of 
profitability, reputation and presence in the high street. However, it is also 
very clear about what it does and what its employees do, and to quote 'we 
work in a shop; our job is to interact with people and to sell to customers'. 
Staff join the cooperative for a variety of reasons - because they know its 
values, it can match and can improve upon the market rate for 
remuneration; has outstanding terms and conditions of employment and 
offers structured career opportunities. 
Two levels of environment influence were identified 'the broader UK 
company environment and the immediate local, and in this case, urban civic 
environment. The cooperative environment also includes its supply chain. 
All products are nationally sourced via the Head Office operations, and there 
is some, but very little, regional or local variation in the range of products 
for sale. Hence the national distribution centre is regarded as a key 
environmental determinant, as are suppliers, buyers, and other non-
competitive retailers. In this sense, the cooperative is remarkably resilient 
to broader environmental forces because of its sense of corporate unity that 
serves to create its own environment. None of the respondents spoke of the 
national retail environment, only their own cooperative environment and 
local civic issues. 
Locally, the environmental interaction is with the local city council, 
particularly in respect of issues such as the quality of the local urban 
environment, traffic management; local transport initiatives; discussions 
about the effect of congestion charges on local retailers and the level of 
rents and commercial rates that are charged. The cooperative seeks to work 
in a collaborative way with the public services and to encourage a pro-city 
centre retail set of values and support from local policy-makers. One 
example of this collaboration is working with the police. The store is a 
member of 'retailers against crime' and is active and vigilant in respect of 
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anti-terrorism. Staff also work with special constables and community 
workers in schools and colleges. In turn, the cooperative seeks to influence 
the environment and have a strong voice in the city because they wish to 
attract a particular socio-economic category of customer and it is important 
that this type of customer finds an attractive local retailing environment. 
Community involvement also assists in staff recruitment. Other local 
environmental influences are the neighbouring retail forums and 
competitors with whom the cooperative benchmark themselves, but with 
whom they also co-operate particularly on local urban matters of joint 
interest. 
Retailing is not an occupation subject to any specific regulation more than 
that which applies to the rest of commerce. However senior members of the 
cooperative belong to local retail forums, chambers of commerce and the 
city's business assembly. Thus, networks are more civic in their scale and 
tend to be used for lobbying and advice. 
It is the cooperative's structure which has attracted the label 'unique'. It is 
held in Trust, with a Board of Trustees, and for the benefit of the 
membership. The cooperative operates via explicit democratic principles, 
has a written constitution, and operationalises this democracy using a series 
of councils and formally elected bodies to assist with the sharing of 'profit, 
knowledge and power'. The cooperative is proud of this democracy and its 
first 'staff council' was set up in 1919. There is a Partnership Council which 
represents all partners and it elects five directors to the Partnership Board 
which decides policy issues. Any partner can stand as a candidate for 
election to the Board, and elections take place every two years. Four-fifths 
of the members are elected, and one-fifth appointed by the chairman. 
Freedom of speech is guaranteed, and council members have a role that is 
clearly representational rather than to act as constituents or delegates for 
sectional interest. 
Other aspects of the unique approach of the cooperative are the degree of 
explicitness with which they deal with working issues. In the staff 
handbook, one of the sentences is 'knowledge and power are linked'. Much 
of the responsibility for this knowledge-sharing is placed with managers who 
are told that they are constantly accountable to Partners, particularly via 
councils and their sub committees where managers have to account for 
their business performance. Even matters of business reorganisation and 
redundancy are discussed, such that the Partnership Board has to approve 
any reorganisations or closure involving the loss of 12 or more positions. 
Much of the success of this democratic approach is as a result of the 
cooperative's structure, but also because of the design and effort put into 
communication. Every branch of the retailer and its support services has a 
Committee for Communication (C4C) elected by and comprising non-
management Partners, and they have existed since 1915. Informal 
communication is also encouraged and reinforced to take place 'Constantly' 
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and further supported by regular meetings, written material, notices and 
bulletins. 
In all the interviews, this 'uniqueness' of the resultant philosophy of an 
early nineteenth century social experiment was revealed. Furthermore, the 
uniqueness has been exploited to give the cooperative a commercially 
differentiated position in its niche area as a department store. This fosters 
the success of the cooperative and helps it to perpetuate itself by 
generating its own return, and protect it from 'carpetbaggers'. This culture 
of philosophical and business differentiation is actively and positively 
encouraged by including 'in every conversation discussions of how to do 
things differently'. The founding principles have not changed, only the 
language of these principles has been contemporarised. 
The philosophy behind the organisational processes of the cooperative 
relates to the statement 'that we are a shop', the operating model is one of 
first principles 'they are not too complex 'we have sales staff and we 
organise them by function and the staff's job is to serve the customer and 
meet their needs if at all possible'. Twenty to twenty-five years ago the 
cooperative had a move to develop rules and regulations and standard 
operating procedures, but it became apparent that too much emphasis was 
being put upon these procedural ways of working. Today, the focus has 
shifted away from these procedural approaches, so 'releasing the potential 
of our people', allowing, once trained, staff to make their own judgements 
within the principles. The values and principles of the cooperative are 
instilled into every point of the staff recruitment with potential new staff 
being tutored about the ethics of the cooperative. 
The outcomes for the cooperative revolve around sustaining it within the 
principles of its philosophy. Standard, commercial retailing outcomes are 
also fostered such as, cost control, costs as a percentage of sales, service 
levels and their achievement. There are Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), 
one of which is how quickly a product reaches the shelf in a cooperative that 
has over 300,000 product lines. These KPIs are expected to be met via the 
partners even where they do not have a direct responsibility for a particular 
process 'such as the central distribution system. Using this as an example, 
store partners would be expected to work with a distribution centre if there 
was a problem getting a product to the shelf and to partake in joint problem 
solving to develop a communication conduit in order to deal with 
operational issues. 
This level of performance is appraised via the personal development plans 
of all staff, the plans are designed around achieving the Principles. The 
principles are set as the performance indicators, and the measures are set 
at three levels of 'don't want to see'; 'want to see' and 'outstanding', built 
around a set of behaviours about what partners are expected to do. 
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A Nationalised Medical 'Partnership' ('PCTrun') 
PCTrun was a three-partner practice in a medium-sized but not wealthy 
provincial town where recruiting GPs was difficult. A few years before this 
study one GP, the senior (managing) partner reached retirement and plans 
for the succession had to be made. For family reasons the two remaining 
partners were uninterested in taking on the daily tasks of managing the 
practice and wanted to leave open their options for part-time work. 
They therefore arranged to become salaried GPs employed by the PCT. The 
two GPs retained ownership of the building, renting it back to the PCT. 
The PCT appointed an experienced practice manager to work full time on-
site managing [PCTrun] practice. The medical staff complement was the 
three salaried GPs (part-time), a full-time salaried GP registrar and locums. 
Towards the end of the fieldwork another GP was recruited to work full-
time. The PCT provided the locums, relieving the GPs of what had been a 
stressful responsibility since it was as hard to recruit locums as doctors. The 
practice manager was line-managed by a PCT manager. She did most of the 
work involved in re-negotiating the PMS contract for the practice, was 
clinical governance lead for the practice and managed the QOF side of its 
work. Nevertheless she did not regard herself as the GPs' line manager. She 
would raise task and problems in general terms at practice meetings, but 
did not direct the individual GPs. Indeed it was not very clear whether for 
practical purposes the GPs really had a line manager, although in the same 
way as partner-GPs they had an annual appraisal with an external 
appraiser. Certainly they felt that the PCT was in no way interfering with 
their clinical practice. 
The main external influence of clinical work was through PACT data and the 
concomitant meetings at which each GP's prescribing practice was 
compared with that of other local GPs, but this arrangement was just the 
same as for a conventional partnership. The GPs met managers from the 
PCT infrequently but relationships between GPs and PCT were described as 
friendly. PCT decision-making seemed slow to the GPs. The GPs received a 
flat-rate salary with (to the GPs' regret) no performance-related element. 
They therefore wondered whether, after 2004, their pay was therefore 
falling behind that of partner-GPs in other local practices. As partners the 
GPs had equal incomes, but salary rates now varied between them. 
Negotiating the practice's PMS contract with the PCT had been something of 
a revelation to the GPs, making them feel that the future of practice was 
less secure than once it had been. This raised a number of questions in the 
GPs' minds. One was whether their working hours might unilaterally be 
changed. Another was whether PCTrun practice might be merged with 
another (as had been proposed some years before but had not 
materialised). The biggest question was whether the practice might be put 
out to competitive tender. The GPs were aware of the controversy and 
outcome of the proposal (early in the fieldwork period) about putting a 
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vacant general practice in North Derbyshire out to tender, which an 
American corporation (UHE) had been awarded. Negotiating the contract 
proved difficult because it was a new contract being drafted from scratch, 
which took over a year until the BMA produced a prototype draft of its own, 
which PCTrun and the PCT adapted. 
The PMS contract did not change the profile of services provided at PCTrun 
very much from those provided by or at local GMS practices (which were 
still professional partnerships). Neither did the new profile of services 
depart very far from what PCTrun had already provided. The practice had a 
nurse practitioner, practice nurse and four long-standing medical records / 
reception staff. A midwife and a CHD nurse visit the practice for one session 
a week (antenatal care and CHD care respectively) and there was a regular 
drug addiction clinic. The practice manager handled day-to-day staffing 
issues, staff recruitment, finance. She had also recruited a health care 
assistant to visit older patients at home. The PCT often helped with staff 
recruitment and selection, but at times the GPs did it themselves. (The 
practice was involved in a practice-based commissioning consortium, at 
which the practice manager would normally represent the practice. 
Former Medical Cooperative ('WasCoop') 
WasCoop is a PLC originating from the failure of a cooperative providing 
primary medical care outside ordinary working hours. It operates in a rural 
area with several small (but no large) towns and a correspondingly 
dispersed but often fairly well-to-do rural population in commuting reach of 
several cities. The large distances necessitated relatively high numbers of 
doctors and cars for out-of-hours work. 
The cooperative from which the present owners and workers for WasCoop 
was recruited served one town and the surrounding countryside, with GPs 
contributing sessions in proportion to their practice list size. This in put was 
given in kind without any direct payment because at that time the GP 
contract required 25 hours a week per GP. The local GPs were initially 
reluctant to join in because of concerns about safety. Not all were interested 
or qualified in obstetrics. They joined the cooperative gradually, with the 
cooperative starting by providing night cover first. Initially the PCT provided 
call-handling infrastructure and nurses from the local minor injuries unit 
(MIU) to triage calls but as the MIU workload the nurses were withdrawn 
and triage work subcontracted to a corporation. This proved expensive and 
the firm had no local knowledge, resulting in what the GPs regarded as a 
poor service. The PCT had never identified or paid the costs of the 
cooperative's infra-structure, which meant the cooperative was continually 
short of money. 
The 2004 GMS contract allowed GPs to opt out of out of hours care. To deal 
with the implications the PCT called a steering group including the chair of 
the co-operative and 14 other out-of-hours services providers who were 
also operating for different groups of GPs across the PCT's territory. The 
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group was 'messy to coordinate' and with so many conflicting vested 
interests made little progress towards agreement. After two or three 
meetings the chair of the cooperative suggested (outside the group) to the 
PCT link that the co-op chair and few colleagues organise a commercial 
service at a fair cost and good clinical standard. The PCT welcomed the idea 
but then had to undertake the due process of inviting tenders. The 'few 
colleagues ' were two other GPs from the cooperative and its administrator. 
As managing director for the new firm they recruited a manager which 
experience in a number of out-of-hours cooperatives who was now looking 
for a 'less bureaucratic' organisation to work in. Two GPs and this person 
own the business equally, employing the former administrator of the 
cooperative. Initially they employed salaried GPs to cover nights, but these 
were gradually replaced by partners in local practices, whose goodwill the 
organisation had largely retained, working sessions. Increasingly they have 
been supplemented with nurse practitioners (NPs). Formally the GPs are 
self-employed contractors paid a flat rate per session (increased for nights 
and the busy, less popular weekend slots). No NHS pension but the session 
payment is enough to cover it should the GP wish to pay out of that. There 
developed a flourishing 'internal market' in 'Selling shifts' The firm now 
employs call handlers, drivers, nurses and support staff. Although 
[WasCoop] was commercial they were proud of being good employers, with 
training and an ethos of support and open feedback.. But the sessional GPs 
were not employees and so the firm had no need to use formal disciplinary 
interviews and warnings to dispense with an under-performing or non-
compliant GP. There was a largely medical forum with five elected GPs and 
the managers who meet every two months, to which the PCT sent its 
patient representative. The directors saw WasCoop as part of the NHS. They 
were sceptical about the idea of its becoming a social enterprise because it 
would then have to diverse interests, and so become slower, in its decision-
making. 
WasCoop had failed as a cooperative in large part due to the disorganisation 
of its PCT, which had under-funded it and allowed out-of-hours primary care 
services to remain fragmented and uncoordinated. The PCT's decision to 
encourage WasCoop to replace the cooperative was an ad hoc response to 
an unforeseen, unplanned event. The replacement company had the 
structure of a former professional partnership which had just crossed the 
threshold of transforming itself into a corporation. It now had a hierarchy of 
support staff (with the sessional GPs effectively causalised) managed for 
profit by three partners whose work had become much more that of an 
owner-manager than professional 'shop floor' production work. 
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Appendix 2 Electronic search strategy (Medline) 
1. non hierarch$ organi$.mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of 
substance word, subject heading word] 
2. hierarch$ organi$.mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of 
substance word, subject heading word] 
3. nho.mp. 
4. cooperative$.mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of substance 
word, subject heading word] 
5. exp Societies/ 
6. exp Social Welfare/ 
7. exp Cooperative Behavior/ 
8. exp Voluntary Health Agencies/ 
9. exp Professional Practice/ 
10. exp Partnership Practice/ 
11. hierarch$.mp. [mp=title, original title, abstract, name of substance 
word, subject heading word] 
12. organization$.mp. 
13. 11 and 12 
14. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 13 
15. exp models, organizational/ 
16. exp organizational culture/ 
17. exp Entrepreneurship/ 
18. exp Organizational Innovation/ 
19. 15 or 16 or 17 or 18 
20. 14 and 19 
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Appendix 3 Electronic search strategy (Medline) 
1. Reference ID: 
Author 
Type of organisation (by provisional taxa)  
 1. Professional partnership       Y/N 
(a) atomised            Y/N 
(b) collaborative          Y/N 
(c) other           Y/N 
 For 'other', please describe what activities the individual partners 
undertake  jointly............................................................................. 
2. Non-hierarchical organisation: 
(a) consumer co-operative        Y/N 
(b) producer co-operative        Y/N 
(c) voluntary organisation promoting policy      Y/N 
(d) voluntary direct service provider       Y/N 
(e) fundraiser           Y/N 
(f) Other           Y/N 
Please describe its main activities: 
Coverage of hypothesised relationships 
 3. Factors covered (tick any that apply):  
(a) environment of organisation       Y/N 
(b) organisational structure ('form')       Y/N 
(c) organisational processes        Y/N 
(d) organisational outcomes ('function')      Y/N 
 4. Relationships covered (tick any that apply):  
(a) Environment - organisational structure ('form')     Y/N  
(b) Environment - organisational processes       Y/N  
(c) Environment - organisational outcomes ('function')   Y/N 
(d) Organisational structure - organisational processes    Y/N 
(e) Organisational structure - outcomes ('function')    Y/N 
(f) Organisational processes -outcomes ('function')     Y/N 
 5. Evidence base (tick any that apply)  
(a) Census of organisations       Y/N 
(b) Survey of organisations       Y/N 
(c) Survey of individuals         Y/N 
(d) Multiple case study        Y/N 
(e) Single case study         Y/N 
(f) Observer, participant or managerial rapportage    Y/N 
(g) Internal 'grey' document(s)       Y/N 
(h) Other, please state.............................................. 
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6. Representativeness (tick any that apply)  
(a) Census           Y/N 
(b) Randomised sample        Y/N 
(c) Purposive sample        Y/N 
(d) Convenience sample        Y/N 
(e) Single report or case        Y/N 
(f) Other, please state.............................................. 
 7. (Method (Tick any which apply)  
(a) Randomised control trial        Y/N 
(b) Quasi-experiment (i.e. non-randomised control)     Y/N 
(c) Other comparative design        Y/N 
(d) Longitudinal (historical, before-and-after, time series)   Y/N 
(e) Multiple case study        Y/N 
(f) Single case study         Y/N 
(g) Laboratory game / simulation / experiment    Y/N 
(h) Other (please state)......................................................... 
(a) Is this a multi-method study (e.g. survey + case studies)?  Y/N 
 8. Publication Peer reviewed?        Y/N 
Include/Exclude decision 
PP and or NHO?          Y/N 
At least one ESPO relationship covered?      Y/N 
Has at least one of the above types of evidence base?   Y/N 
Has at least one of the above types of method?     Y/N 
Peer reviewed publication?         Y/N 
Substantive Findings  
Relationships found (summarise or enter 'N/A'):  
1. How environment influences organisational structure ('form')     
2. How environment influences organisational processes ('organisational 
behaviour') 
3. How environment influences organisational outcomes ('function') 
4. How organisational form influences organisational processes 
('organisational behaviour') 
5. How organisational form influences organisational outcome ('function') 
6. How organisational processes influence organisational outcomes 
('function')  
Relationships to policy outcomes;  
Which cell(s) in Table 1 does this study cover (tick any that apply)? 
 
Environmental 
factor 
Organisational 
Structure 
Organisational 
processes 
1  Securing professional 
engagement  
   
2  Impact on clinical / 
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professional workloads, job 
satisfaction and morale 
3  Impact on: 
3.1  clinical quality and 
development of best 
practice 
   
3.2  impact on 
evidence-basing on 
practice 
   
3.3  development of 
innovative practice 
   
3.4  Adherence to 
external performance 
targets 
   
3.5  cost-effectiveness 
of service provision 
   
3.6  Patient 
outcomes/experiences 
   
3.7  Service access  
   
3.8  Range of services 
   
3.9  User opportunity 
to influence services 
   
 
Country and sector (tick any that apply; write in where necessary):  
Does the study cover the health sector?       Y/N 
Does the study cover non-health sectors?     Y/N 
Which non-health sector(s)?  
Main service(s) provided? (please list)  
Main client group(s) served? (please list) 
Which country / countries are covered?  
UK           Y/N 
Other European (including former USSR)     Y/N 
Australia          Y/N 
Canada           Y/N 
Israel           Y/N 
New Zealand          Y/N 
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USA           Y/N 
Other(s), please state 
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Appendix 4 Study site characteristics in GPPS 
data-set 
 Metro City PCTrun NurseLed PlusPM PharmPlus England 
(mean) 
Q37 - Are you 
male or 
female? [% 
female] 
57 53 60 63 61 58 58 
Q38 - How old 
are you? [% 
over 65] 
29 21 35 21 26 36 31 
Q39 - What is 
your ethnic 
group? [% 
other than 
British] 
22 52 10 35 4 5 18 
Q40 - Which 
of these best 
describes 
what you are 
doing at 
present? [% 
not in full or 
part time 
work]  
50 44 59 62 52 45 50 
Q43 - In 
general, would 
you say your 
health is? [% 
excellent or 
very good]  
41 44 32 45 50 43 41 
Q44 - Do you 
have any of 
the following 
long-standing 
conditions? 
Please include 
50 56 43 52 59 48 51 
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problems 
which are due 
to old age.[% 
with no long-
standing 
condition]  
Q46 - Are you 
a parent or a 
legal guardian 
for any 
children aged 
under 16 
currently 
living in your 
home? [% 
yes] 
23 25 22 30 27 11 22 
Q47 – Do you 
have carer 
responsibilities 
for anyone in 
your 
household 
with a long-
standing 
health 
problem of 
disability? [% 
yes]  
10 9 13 8 7 12 9 
Source: GPPS 2008 dataset 
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Appendix 5 Case study data grid 
One column per organisation, row headings shown below: 
Environment of the organisation 
Policy context 'external policy imperatives which apply to this organisation  
 1. Legal and regulatory framework:  
 2. Professional bodies 'nature and extent of regulation of organisation members 
 3. External resource dependences and their institutional structure: 
(a) users (patients, clients or equivalent)  
 (b) staff (including volunteers) ( 
 (c) money (all sources)  
 (d) knowledge / information  
 (e) legitimation i.e. legal/regulatory/professional recognition/permission  
 (f) physical resources (equipment, consumables, accommodation)  
 (g) others? 
4. Stability of environment 
(a) main changes during past 3 years  
 (b) main changes foreseen in next 3 years  
 (c) in/stability of workload 
5. Any similar organisations: 
(a) earlier, that anticipated (or became) the present organisation?  
 (b) elsewhere 'non-competing  
 (c) competing / substitute 
6. Formation of organisation: 
(a) recruitment mechanisms and criteria 'open or closed organisation? 
 (b) individual members' reasons for supporting the organisation  
 (c) How members are lost / expelled (criteria, mechanisms)  
 (d) Who provides (the above) resources and how 
7. Objective setting 'what is the stated purpose of the organisation, its core 
activity and intended outcomes? 
(a) what objectives does the organisation have 
 (b) who sets organisation objectives  
 (c) by what processes  
 (d) degree of consensus, support or opposition among organisation 
members for these objectives 
Structure of the organisation  
1. Membership ('stakeholders') 
(a) owners  
 (b) electors  
 (c) producers 
 (d) users 
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2. Division of labour 
(a) Managerial tiers ('vertical' division of labour 
 (b) skill mix ('horizontal' division of labour) organisational members 
 (c) roles of service clients or users (including proxy users such as 
carers) 
3. Property rights 
(a) who owns what resources  
 (b) incentives or sanctions 
4. Coordination processes and who participates in each 
(a) deployment of materials, staff?  
 (b) information (data) exchange? 
 (c) referrals?  
 (d) delegation of budgets / staff / decisions from higher-level 
decision-makers?  
 (e) joint learning / training / self-development /knowledge 
management  
 (f) information and monitoring systems 
5. Trust, affiliation and conflict 
(a) shared assumptions, beliefs, value 'organisation 'culture' and 
'ideology' 
 (b) any conflicts or disputes, dissident members, active or passive 
resistance from any organisation members or groups thereof 
 (c) any soft coercion?  
 (d) How uniformly do organisation members participate in its 
activities? 
 (e ) Incentives to collaborate and their effects 
[Process] 
1. 'Technology' by which the organisation undertakes its core activity i.e. 
(a) nature of the common activities which the organisation 
undertakes ( 
 (b) who directly interacts with whom, in undertaking this activity  
 (c) its resource requirements i.e. external resource dependencies 
above plus internal resources supplied by the organisation 
members. Same categories as above i.e.: 
(i. users (patients, clients or equivalent) and their inputs*  
 (ii. staff (including volunteers) ( 
 (iii. money (all sources)  
 (iv. knowledge / information  
 (v. legitimation / authority / permission  
 (vi. physical resources (equipment, consumables, 
accommodation) 'their asset specificity, nature and quantity ( 
 (vii. others? 
2. How changes occur in organisation's core activity 'openness to innovation 
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Outcomes of organisation activity 
1. How organisation activities compare with: 
(a) mandator's requirements (where applicable)  
 (b) organisation's own stated objectives 
 (c) member organisations and individuals' reasons for supporting 
the organisation  
 (d) SDO's original list of policy outcomes: How do such forms of 
organisation impact on outcomes in terms of: 
i. Securing professional engagement; 
ii. Impact on clinical workloads, job satisfaction and morale; 
iii. Impact on clinical quality and development of best 
practice, 
iv. The development of innovative practice; 
v. Adherence to external performance targets 
vi. The cost-effectiveness of service provision; and 
vii. Patient outcomes/experiences. 
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Appendix 6 Selected GPPS scores for study 
general practices 
GPPS item PCTrun NurseLed PlusPM PharmPlus England 
(mean) 
Q4 - How helpful do you 
find the receptionists at 
your GP surgery or health 
centre? [% fairly or very 
helpful] 
95 92 98 94 84 
Q15 - Is there a particular 
doctor you prefer to see at 
your GP surgery or health 
centre? % yes] 
56 24 64 65 62 
Q16 - How often do you 
see the doctor you prefer 
to see? [%Always, almost 
always or a lot of the 
time]  
63 0* 86 70 77 
Q17 - How satisfied are 
you with the hours that 
your GP surgery or health 
centre is open? [% very or 
fairly satisfied]  
78 79 92 76 81 
Q18 - Would you like your 
GP surgery or health 
centre to open at 
additional times? [% Yes]  
55 58 47 58 55 
Q20a - Last time you saw 
a doctor at your GP 
surgery or health centre, 
how good was the doctor 
at - Giving you enough 
time? [% very good or 
94 82 92 98 90 
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good]  
Q20b - Last time you saw 
a doctor at your GP 
surgery or health centre, 
how good was the doctor 
at - Asking about your 
symptoms? [% very good 
or good]  
93 83 92 94 
 
88 
20c - Last time you saw a 
doctor at your GP surgery 
or health centre, how good 
was the doctor at - 
Listening to you? [% very 
good or good]  
94 82 93 92 89 
Q20d - Last time you saw 
a doctor at your GP 
surgery or health centre, 
how good was the doctor 
at - Explaining tests and 
treatments? [% very good 
or good]  
88 70 82 87 78 
Q20e - Last time you saw 
a doctor at your GP 
surgery or health centre, 
how good was the doctor 
at - Involving you in 
decisions about your care? 
[% very good or good]  
80 66 70 92 73 
Q20f - Last time you saw a 
doctor at your GP surgery 
or health centre, how good 
was the doctor at - 
Treating you with care and 
concern? [% very good or 
good]  
92 79 89 88 85 
Q20g - Last time you saw 
a doctor at your GP 
surgery or health centre, 
how good was the doctor 
at - Taking your problems 
seriously? [% very good or 
90 75 87 92 84 
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good]  
Q24a - Last time you saw 
a practice nurse at your 
GP surgery or health 
centre, how good was the 
practice nurse at - Giving 
you enough time? [% very 
good or good]  
97% 94% 98% 94% 94% 
Q24b - Last time you saw 
a practice nurse at your 
GP surgery or health 
centre, how good was the 
practice nurse at - Asking 
about your symptoms? [% 
very good or good]  
92% 90% 83% 88% 83% 
Q24c - Last time you saw 
a practice nurse at your 
GP surgery or health 
centre, how good was the 
practice nurse at - 
Listening to you? [% very 
good or good]  
97% 91% 89% 92% 89% 
Q24d - Last time you saw 
a practice nurse at your 
GP surgery or health 
centre, how good was the 
practice nurse at - 
Explaining tests and 
treatments? [% very good 
or good]  
99% 88% 83% 86% 84% 
Q24e - Last time you saw 
a practice nurse at your 
GP surgery or health 
centre, how good was the 
practice nurse at - 
Involving you in decisions 
about your care? [% very 
good or good]  
86% 83% 69% 81% 75% 
Q24f - Last time you saw a 
practice nurse at your GP 
surgery or health centre, 
93% 91% 92% 91% 90% 
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how good was the practice 
nurse at - Treating you 
with care and concern? [% 
very good or good]  
Q24g - Last time you saw 
a practice nurse at your 
GP surgery or health 
centre, how good was the 
practice nurse at - Taking 
your problems seriously? 
[% very good or good]  
92% 88% 83% 92% 83% 
Q25 – In general, how 
satisfied are you with the 
care you get at your GP 
surgery of health centre? 
[% very or fairly satisfied] 
97% 81% 95% 92% 92% 
Q27 - In the past 6 
months, have you had a 
discussion with a doctor or 
nurse about managing 
your long-standing health 
problem? [% yes or not 
wanted]  
95% 94% 91% 95% 91% 
Q28 - Following this 
discussion, did a doctor or 
nurse agree a plan about 
how you wanted to 
manage your long-
standing health problem? 
[% yes]  
91% 100% 84% 87% 85% 
Q29 - Do you think that 
having a discussion or plan 
has helped improve the 
care you receive? [% 
definitely or to some 
extent]  
94% 76% 87% 87% 87% 
* Data negligibly small, suppressed. 
Source: GPPS data 2008-2009. 
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Addendum 
This document is an output from a research project that was commissioned by 
the Service Delivery and Organisation (SDO) programme whilst it was managed 
by the National Coordinating Centre for the Service Delivery and Organisation 
(NCCSDO) at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. The NIHR SDO 
programme is now managed by the National Institute for Health Research 
Evaluations, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre (NETSCC) based at the 
University of Southampton. 
Although NETSCC, SDO has managed the project and conducted the editorial 
review of this document, we had no involvement in the commissioning, and 
therefore may not be able to comment on the background of this document. 
Should you have any queries please contact sdo@southampton.ac.uk. 
 
 
